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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
"All progress is based upon a universal innate desire on the part 
of every organism to live beyond its income*"
Samuel Butlers ^Notebooks, "Life",l6*
1This th e s is  i s  concerned m ih  progress* I t  re p re se n ts  an attem pt to
examine the læaning of p ro g re ss , i t s  c o n s titu e n t elem ents, and th e  cond itions
req u ired  for i t*  I t  is  by  no means iiie f i r s t  such enquiry* The p:hrase from th e
1t i t l e  "The Idea o f Progress" has i t s e l f  been the t i t l e  of sev e ra l in v e s tig a tio n s*
l/'Jliat d is tin g u ish e s  th is  work from o th e r, r e la te d  essays is  ih a t no a t ta n p t  is
made h e re in  to d f e l l  on s p e c if ic  developments in  human h is to ry  which may, or may
not c o n s t i tu te  progress* No a t ta n p t  is  made to  sppeal to co lle  cto. ve stand ai’ds in
order to  ev a lu a te  p a r t ic u la r  h i s to r ic a l  s tra n d s ; noir is  th e re  d iscu ss io n  of themes
in  the s to ry  of man and h is s o c ie t ie s ,  or of the content of a p o ss ib le  fu lu re  s ta te ,
The ro le  of th is  th e s is  is  a n a ly tic a l  and in te rp r e ta t iv e ,  r a th e r  than ev a lu a tiv e ;
i t  examines why th in g s  happen as they do, ra th e r  than whether th e se  th in g s can be
ca lle d  good or bad*
JcH* Plumb tallcs ( in  'The H ijs to rian 's  Dilemma, 19610 of "one c e r t a in
judgement of value th a t  can be made about h i s to iy ,  and th a t i s  the idea  o f p ro g ress
I f  th i s  g re a t human tru th  were once more to  be fran k ly  accep ted ,"  he t e l l s  u s ,
"the reason for i t ,  and Hie consequences of i t ,  c o n s is te n tly  and im ag ina tive ly
explored and ta u g h t, h is to ry  vjould no t only  be an in f in i t e ly  r ic h e r  education  but
%also  p lay  a much more e f fe c t iv e  p a r t  i n  the cu.lture o f  western society"*  lin fo rtun -
a te l  y he. n e ith e r  t e l l s  us what i t  i s ,  h e ; we can recognise  i t ,  or hew we can be
sure th a t  i t  is  what i t  seems to be* We a re  given to understand , thougji, t h a t  i t
3is  sonething good* Arnold Beichm n describes the d a r iv a tiv e s  o f  th e  word 'p ro g re ss  
as "halo  words", whose only  fu n c tio n  i s  to  transform  the words n e x t to  them by 
im parting a warm gloîf of approval* Thus, w hile 'v io le n c e ' mi^ht be bad, "p rog ressif 
violence" can be taken as  good*
I t  i s  an in s t ru c t iv e  s ta r t in g  p o in t i n  ana lysis to consider what th e  
word a c tu a l ly  meanso D ic tio n a r ie s  d e f ire  i t  in  the term  of "forward or onward 
movement", "advance", "Improvement", " s a t is f a c to ry  development", and so on* I t
■3 ‘
s trü c e s  the a t te n t io n  im m ediately th a t  th e se  are  a l l  tÆ>rds or p h rases  which imply 
a standard  of measurement* Movemmt i n  a fon^ard or onward d ir e c t io n  re q u ire s  
th a t  we know which d ire c tio n  is  forward* "Advame" i s  m eaningless u n le ss  one is  
advancing towards something* Improvement, meaning 'b e t te r  than  before ' must 
n e c e s s a r ily  involve th e  q u estio n  'b e t te r  in  wliat re sp e c ts? ' Tlie no tion  of 
s a t is f a c to ry  development c a r r ie s  m th  i t  th e  im p lica tio n  th a t tliere i s  something to 
be s a t is f ie d *  A ll of them, we might say , are aim-roLatedo A ll of them convey 
im p l ic i t ly  the  n o tio n  of an ajnii which i s  req u ired  to  be  adiieved* Movement or 
development can be regarded as p rog ress i f  i t  i s  in  t ie  d ir e c t io n  of the 
achievement of th a t aim* The n o tio n  of p rog ress only  becomes i n t e l l i g ib lo  i n  terms 
of th e  aim or aims wîiose fu lf i l lm e n t  io required* There i s  no such th ing  as 
p rog ress in  the a b s tra c t;  only p rog ress tow ards w hatever aim or aims are under 
consideration*
tJhen Pluiiib (and o th e rs )  t a lk  of p rogress i n  h is to ry ,  œ r : f i r s t  s tep  
in  understanding th e  term is  to  in sp e c t th e  im p lic it aims fh ich  must n e c e s s a r ily  
be involved* On]y a f te r  the  aims have been id e n t i f ie d  m i l  we be  in  any p o s it io n  
to  see whether o r no t t i e r e  has been any movement i n  the d ire c tio n  of th e i r  
fu lfillm en t*  The person who ta lk s  of "human progress" must always be u sing  the 
terms to mean, t ie  ad vane enent towards particulcU* and Id e n tif ia b le  aims. I f  we do 
no t knm  vhat th ey  a re , then th e re  can be no way of e i th e r  assen tin g  to ,  or 
denying, the v a l id i ty  of h is claim*
I f  everyone shared th e  same aims, and accorded them the  same re la tiv e - 
p r io r  i t i e s ,  then we could a l l  agree q u ite  h ap p ily  on wliat would be c o n s titu te d  by 
p ro g re ss , even though we might d isa g re e  on whether i n  f a c t  any p a r t ic u la r  develop men 
had led  c lo se r  to  die achievement of those ends* U nfortuna tely  for s im p lic ity  
th e re  is  no such agreement to be fouixl* Not only do we d isa g re e  on th e  fa c ts  of 
in d iv id u a l developments, we a lso  d isag ree  over the aims wliich we are measuringo
•4 -^
TVo people might agree th a t  a p a r t ic u la r  s t a t e  a c tu a l ly  b r o u ^ t  about an inc reased  
a b i l i ty  to  f u l f i l  an aim, bu t they  might n o t agree on the d e s ira b i l i ty  o f 1iie aim; 
they might not share i t*  I f  people hold co n trad ic to ry  alms, th e n  one m an's 
p rogress w i l l  be another m an's re tro g re s s io n )  fo r  th e  same development w i l l  take 
one man nearer to  h is  aim, w hile talcing h is  r iv a l  fu r th e r  from an aim which l i e s  
in  the opposite d ir  ection*
Use of the term 'p ro g re s s ' thus im plies move mm t  i n  the  d ir e c t io n  of an 
aim Wiich i s  shared and approved o f by th e  user of the  te rm , Mien people ta lk  
g en e ra lly  of p ro g re ss , tiiey are  speaking of movement tw a rd s  aims which they too 
partalce o f , A speaker who im d te s  the  agreement of h is  audience to th e  a s s e r t io n  
th a t  th e re  has been p rog ress i s  in v i t in g  them to assen t to two Uiings ; f i r s t l y ,  
th a t  th e re  has indeed been movement towai'ds an c b je c t i \^ ,  and secondly, th a t  t l i is  
o b je c tiv e  i s  regarded by the audience as d e s ira b le . They could w ithhold th e i r  
agreement on e i th e r  of the two co u n ts . In  the q u o ta tio n  of Pluirb given above.
Plumb i s  asking us to  " fran k ly  accept" the "g rea t human tru th "  of p ro g ress  in  
h is to ry . He i s  thus asking us to assen t f irs t3 .y  to h is  aim s, and secondly to  
h is  co n ten tio n  th a t  h is to ry  has brought us nearer to Uie achievement of them*
Tlie sad f a c t  for those ;-ho would have us g ird  up air lo in s  for a g re a t 
crusade of p rogress i s  th a t  th is  agreement over human aims i s  nowhere to  be found. 
Not only do people fi,nd them selves possessed of d if fe r in g  m o tivations, but they  
i l l u s t r a t e  th is  f a c t  by passing co n trad ic to ry  judgements on various a c tu a l human 
developments. By no means everyone w i l l  concur with th e  suggestion  th a t  th e  
In d u s tr ia l  R evolution brought p ro g re ss . They m i^ it, i t  i s  t r u e ,  concede th a t  i t  
brought some people nearer to  the  fu lf i l lm e n t of th e ir  aims, but th e y  w i l l  d isp u te  
the p ro g re ss  by d isp u tin g  the v a l id i ty  of the aims. To those  who nominate an 
increased  m a te r ia l p ro sp e r ity  as a high order aim, tlie I n d u s tr ia l  R evolution i s  
seen as d e f in i te  progress* To those who value in s tead  such th in g s  as the "measured
rhythm o f ru ra l  l i f e "  or man's contentm ent w ith h is  l o t ,  th a t same In d u s tr ia l  
R evolution i s  seen as rep resen tin g  a re tro g ra d e  step* In  any co n s id e ra tio n  of 
p ro g re ss , th e re fo re , we must no t f a i l  to  take  account of th e  a im -re la ted  n a tu re  
o f judgements which concern i t*
D espite th is  s u b je c t iv i ty ,  th o i^ a , th e re  are some f i e ld s  i n  wiiich th e re  
i s  u n iv e rs a l  agreement th a t  p ro g ress  has been made* The n a tu ra l s c ie n c e s , fo r  
example, seen to  have enjoyed a s t r ik in g  and u n p a ra lle led  success s in ce  the tim e 
of Newton* During a period  in  which i t  has seemed to many o b se rv e rs  th a t  i n  f ie ld s  
such as m o ra lity , philosophy and p o l i t i c s ,  man has œ v e red and re-covered  th e  old 
ground many tim es over, the n a tu ra l sc ien ces  ha ve appeared to  mardi forward i n  
constan t and l in e a r  p rogress w ith confiden t s t r id e s .  Whereas in  o ther su b je c ts  
people a re  s t i l l  debating and d is p u ti i^  th e  e s se n tia ls  of th e ir  d is c ip l in e s ,  
in  sc ience a t  l e a s t  i t  seems th a t  th e re  is  n e a r-u n iv e rsa l acceptance of what i t  i s  
th a t  c o n s t i tu te s  th e  fundamentals of the a c t iv i ty .  Thus i t  is  th a t .s c ie n c e  has 
appeared to  move on from one problem to  th e  n ex t, mdcing every s tep  which i t  tak es  
look l i k e  a forward one* Few would d isp u te , e i th e r , hi a t  th e re  has been p ro g re ss  
in  the f ie ld  of human a th le t ic  a tta in m en t. There i s  l i t t l e  d a ib t th a t  men today 
(though not a l l  of them) can run fu rth e r and f a s te r ,  jump higher and lo n g e r, svtLm 
more ra p id ly  and tb rav  d iscu s , ja v e l in  and sho t fo r  g rea te r d is ta n c e s  than could 
th e ir  p redecesso rs. S ince th ese  th in g s  s ta r te d  to be accu ra te ly  m easured, the  
graph of human performance can be drawn as an upwar d al oping cur ve *
'Die f i r s t  question  to  be considered in  t i l s  th e s is ,  th en , is  why th e re  
should be  adm itted p ro g ress  i n  some f ie ld s ,  but not i n  others* bhy i s  i t  t h a t  
we can a l l  ag ree  to  describe  the  a tta in m en ts  in  science and a th le t ic  a c t iv i ty  as 
'p ro g re s s '?  Thomas Kuhn poses th e  q u es tio n  in  h is "S tru c tu re  of S c ie n tif ic  
R evolu tions"; "Miy should the  e n te rp r is e  sketched above j^ c ie n c  ^  move s te a d ily  
ahead i n  ways t h a t , say, a r t ,  p o l i t ic a l  th e o ry , or philosophy does no t? Why i s
^ &
p rog ress a p e rq u is i te  rese rved  a].most ex c lu s iv e ly  for th e  a c t i v i t i e s  ive c a l l  
4science?" Kuhn parti.y  answers h is  am question* He asks us to "Notice immedi.ately
th.at p a r t  of the qu.estion is  e n t i r e ly  sem antic," and goes on to advance the th e s is
th a t  "To a very g rea t ex ten t th e  term  'science* is reserved  fo r  f ie ld s  th a t  do
S'p ro g ress  in  obvious ways"* I f  Kuhn is  r ig h t  to bdiave in  th is  way, then the  
problem of p rogress becomes the  problem of science* To say th a t  we c a l l  whatever 
make's p rogress by the name of ' sc ien c e ' is  to say nothing about progress*
Tlie con ten tion  i n  tliis  vork is  th a t  Kuhn's supplied  answer is  inadequate) 
th a t  th e re  is  something sp e c ia l about the fi.eld of s c ie n t i f ic  a c t iv i ty  which 
enables us to  agree upon what c o n s t i tu te s  p rogress w ith in  i t  « The search  for • 
the fundamentals of p ro g ress s t a r t s  out w ith a c lo se  exan ination  of what i t  is  'that 
c o n s t i tu te s  s c ie n t i f ic  a c t iv i ty ,  and th e  ta s k  i s  to  i s o la te  the c o n s titu e n t 
elem ents of p rogress in  science*
The "T ria l and E rror" p a r t  o f th e  t i t l e  becomes r e a d i ly  ap p aren t. I t
i s  by way of a t r ib u te  to S ir K arl Popper, whose method of "conjecture and
6 7re fu ta tio n "  has su c c e ss fu lly  solved the  prcblem o f induction*  Although the view
of sc ience advanced by th i s  th e s is  is  a consid er able m o d ific a tio n  of P opper's  
systeii in  many key hmdamentals, the Popper method is  tdcen a s  the s ta r t in g -p o in t  
for c r i t ic is m  and a l t e r a t i o n  both i n  method and conception* R etained throughout 
the t h e s i s ,  havever, is  th e  b as ic  " t r i a l  and erro r"  elem ent vhich Popper 
form ulated. D espite th e  f a c t  th a t  my conclusions lead  me to  propose th a t  we 
are not proposing what Popper thinl<s we are p roposing , nor te s t in g  fo r what he 
thinlcs we are  te s tin g  fo r , nor even attem pting to  achieve by the a c t i v i t y  Meat 
Popper Üiinîcs we should be ach iev ing , tlie re remains a t tlie end of the an a ly s is  
the no tio n  of t i e  e lim in a tio n  of various].y proposed a l te rn a t iv e s ,  r a th e r  than the 
com putation of necessary  steps*
r . .LT
The c e n tra l  problem is  seen  as th e  ^minimisation of the  use of non- 
conclusive arguments, and to e s ta b lis h  the im portance of te s tin g *  The p ro p o sitio n  
"A3.1 A i s  B" n e c e ssa r ily  im plies "This A Is B", meaning th a t  i t  would be im possible 
for the f i i ’ s t  to  be t r u e , bu t not th e  second* TtB argument i s  conclusive*  But 
the p ro p o s itio n  "This A is  B" does n o t, of course, imply t i a t  "A ll A is  B"* I t  
may be talc en as s l ig h t  evidence towards i t ,  in  the absence of kna-jledge about 
any'A th a t  i s  n o t B, aid the more As Wiich are found to  be  a lso  Bs, then the  more 
do we regard  them a s  evidence supporting  Üie p ro p o s itio n  "A ll A is B"« N onetheless 
the argument is  inco n clu siv e , and hovever many As we f in d  th a t a re  Bs, i t  is  
q u ite  possib le  t h a t  th e re  are  undiscovered As Wiich a re  not Bs. I t  i s  the  
in d u c tiv e  s ty le  of argument ih ic h  proceeds in  th is  way from the p a r tic u la r  to  the  
g en era l. Popper has provided us w ith  an a l te rn a tiv e  whereby th e  g e n e ra lis a tio n  
i s  proposed by an im aginative le a p , and then te s ted  by i t s  deducible consequences* 
In  th is  th e s is  i t  i s  argued th a t th e se  im aginative leaps must be seen as r e la tin g  
to  some purpose, and th a t  v h ile  th e ir  proposals can never be f in a l l y  e s tab lish e d  
in  any way, they can be re ta in e d  so long as they  serve t i a t  purpose b e t te r  than  
th e ir  r iv a l s ,  and re je c te d  whenever a x iva l p roposal i s  found to  serve th a t  puxpose 
even b e t t e r .  The fu n c tio n  of te s t in g  is  seen  as one of determining which of 
various competing proposals b e s t se rves th e  p a r t ic u la r  purpose in  question*
"T ria l end Error aid the Idea of Progress" repx'esents ai a ttem pt to 
a b s tra c t  from a co n s id e ra tio n  of s c ie n t i f i c  a c tiv i ty  a formula liio se  a p p lic a tio n
is  what enables p ro g ress to  be made, and an a t tm p t  to apply th i s  formula to
;other f i e ld s  of human endeavour in  order to  in v e s tig a te  the p o s s ib i l i ty  of 
meaningful d iscu ss io n  of p rogress m th  in  them * F in a lly , i t  i s  an attem pt to  
p o s tu la te  those  cond itions which are  w ith in  'the co n tro l of s o c ie ty , which can be 
m anipulated in  such a way as to  c re a te  a c lim ate  favourable to  th e  making of 
progress*
On th e  q u estio n  of ev a lu a tio n  cf p re fe ren ces , no attem pt i s  made
h e re in  to suggest th a t  some human aims are more worthy than o th e rs , or why they
should be considered so* Miere th e  term 'p ro g re s s ' i s  used, i t  i s  used in  a
way which does n o t ca rry  with i t  th e  value judgm ents necessary  fo r  the  everyday
use of th e  term . P rog ress , in  th is  work, is  ta te n  to r e f e r  to  the  c lo se r
achievement of ends, whatever those ends m i ^ t  be* I t  is  talcen æ  an avoivedlv
a im -re la ted  term , and i s  only used m th  re fe re n ce  to  an end* P rogress is  used
to  mean 'p ro g ress  towards som ething' ,  aid th e  value of th a t  something i s  not
re le v an t to  the ana l^^ is  and d iscu ss io n  %d_th vMoh th is  th e s is  i s  concerned* I t
could be explained by saying th a t  p rogress is  only considered  h e re  as devoid of
co n ten t: th i s  d iscu ss io n  i s  only m th  th e  achievement of aims (or w ith  the c lo se r
approach to  such achievem ent). A d iscu ss io n  of i-hich ends ought ‘bo be achieved
rep re se n ts  a com pletely d i f f e r e n t  approach, and the use o f arguments of a to t a l ly
d if fe re n t  order to those encountered h e re in . This dea ls  m th  the s tru c tu re  of
p ro g ress , not vrith i t s  content*
One of the  major conclusions of th is  work i s  th a t  th e  p r in c ip le s  of
p ro g ress (ab s trac ted  from s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty )  form a un ify ing  iiieme which u n d erlie s
the attem pt to  achieve human aims in  any a c t iv i ty .  The concepts Wiich in  sc ience
8emerge as 'm odels' and 'm o d e l-te s tin g ' become broadened to th e  concepts of 
'a tte m p ts ' and ' a t te m p t- te s t in g ' ,  and are su sc ep tib le  of a p p lic a tio n  in  any f ie ld  
in  which we engage in  a c t iv i ty  d ire c te d  towards b ring ing  us nearer to  our 
o b je c tiv e s . The formula which shows what i s  necessary b efo re  p ro g ress  can taice 
p lace  i s  no t p o s ited  as a recommendation, but as a d e sc r ip tio n  of how progress 
i s  a c tu a l ly  made*
9The an a ly sis  of p rog ress in  s c ie n t i f ic  a c t i \d ty  is  follow ed here by 
a co n s id e ra tio n  of un te  s ta b le  im ag ina tive  le a p s .  I t  i s  px'oposed th a t the  most 
va], id dem arcation be We en p ro p o sitio n s  c o n s is ts  i n  t ie  sep a ra tio n  o f then in to
those which can a s s i s t  us in  p rogressing  towards o b je c tiv e s , and those which lo
cannot. I f  te s t in g  and consequent choice a re  v i t a l  in g re d ie n ts  of p ro g re ss , th e n , 
i t  i s  claim ed, there  can be no choice made between u n te s tab le  p ro p o sitio n s , and 
consequently  no p rogress towards an ob jec tive*
An in sp e c tio n  of the study of h is to ry  and th e  s o c ia l  sc iences i sn
undertaken in  order to  e s ta b lish  whether the pecu lia r l im ita t io n s  imposed by the
su b je c t m atter of th ese  d is c ip l in e s  i n  any way l im it  the ap p lic a tio n  of th e
method of p rog ress ab s tra c ted  from sc ien ce . Hie f ie ld  of human s k i l l s  and th e i r
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a c q u is it io n  i s  examined to  in sp e c t whether cr not the a p p lic a tio n  of 'knowledge 
. hav ' ra th e r t ia n  'laicwledge trh a t' invo lves any necessary r e s t r i c t io n  on the
v a lid ity  of the e le iien ts o f  p rogress i n  tiem and th e ir  r e la te d  a c t i v i t i e s .  Only 
a f te r  an an a ly s is  of th e  d if fe re n t ty p es of a c t i v i t i e s  th ic h  humans engage in ,  
and of th e  types of m otivations to  wliich they are su b je c t, is  th e re  co n s id e ra tio n  
of p rogress in  so c ia l and p o l i t i c a l  f ie ld s*
I t  i s  not q u ite  a tau to logy  to ssy t h a t  i f  p rogress means th e  c lo ser 
approach to  our aims, then we must desire  p rogress i f  m  desire  our aims, i t o t  
saves us from the  tauto logy i s  the f a c t  th a t we have an h ie ra rch y  of aim s, w ith 
lower o b je c tiv e s  serv ing  h igher ones. Cases can a r is e  i n  which we fin d  ou rse lves 
's a t is f ie d *  by what appears to be only th e  p a r t i a l  fu lf i l lm e n t of an ob jective*  
These a re  cases in  which we have achieved the higher end which we thought the 
lower o b jec tiv e  was servl.ng, not r e a l is in g  th a t  complete achie vement of the lowcs' 
o b je c tiv e  would no t serve the higher end* I t  is  not ta u to lo g ic a l  to  say th a t  
the  d e s ire  to  achieve our ends can always be assumed, because th a -e  are some 
ends vhich we hold m th o u t r e a l is in g  th a t  they do no t serve the higher ends which 
we th in k  they do. There are undoubtedly, to o , some aims which we hold 
unconsciously , being unaware ivith the th ink ing  p a r t  of our minds as to  i*hat our
l ô
d e s ire s  r e a l ly  a re .  The p ro g ress  we make towards our h igher and our unconscious
ISends i s  a lso  d iscussed  before th e re  i s  any co n s id e ra tio n  of the  p rogress of man in  
h is  so c ie tie s*
The judgement th a t  c e r ta in  types of so c ia l o rg an isa tio n  are more 
conducive than o th e rs  to  e f f ic ie n t  p ro g ress  towards our o b je c tiv es  deriv es from 
an in v e s tig a tio n  in to  p rog ress Miich man has a c tu a lly  made, and an a ly s is  o f how i t  
i s  made* D espite th e  absence of recommendations, the re  are c le a r  overtones to  
th e  th e s is  which might prov ide le sso n s fo r man and society* From an a ly sis  and 
in te rp r e ta t io n  th e re  emerge co n d itio n a l' proposals which suggest th a t  i l  we wish 
to  achieve c e r ta in  s ta te s ,  then we can take sp e c if ied  steps to  bring  about those  
s ta te s*  To those who might m sh  to  achieve these  aforem entioned s ta te s ,  the  
argument might propose a programme of p o s i t iv e  a c tio n  (or a t  l e a s t  prov ide the  
ou'blines of one).
The idea of p rogress on any geieraL s c a le  i s ,  ap a rt from sporadic 
in s ta n c e s , a r e la t iv e ly  modern one. Ind iv idual p rogress i s , of c a irse , a very 
old idea indeed. Even in  p rim itiv e  s o c ie t ie s  there  e x is te d  th e  n o tio n  of b e t te r in g  
o n e 's  l o t  in  l i f e ,  of improving o n e 's  s k i l l s ,  and of moving towards ‘the 
achievement of lim ite d  objectives*  But on ly  r a r e ly  b e fo re  the  Renaissance was 
th e re  faind  the  general view th a t Die world m ight be becoming a b e t te r  p lace  
fo r everyone* Some Romans viewed the  ex tension  of th e i r  donmn as progress 
towards the  c iv i l i s in g  of mankind; some C h ris tian s  viewed the march of th e  
C h ris tian  re l ig io n  as p rogress towards peace and ju s t i c e  on ear'‘Di* Only fo r a 
few hundred years has th e re  been the w idespread view th a t man could, w ith reasonable 
management, hope to  look forward to  a fu tu re  of ev e r-in c re as in g  s a t i s f a c t io n  of 
h is  d e s ire s , and ev e r-in c reas in g  conquests of th e  sources of unhappiness*
I f  Kuhn i s  wrong to  suggest th a t th e  term 's c ie n c e ' i s  rese rved  for 
f ie ld s  in  which ob\àous progress i s  made, he i s  r ig h t  to  draw, as o th e rs  have
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draim, a c lo se  connection between the tivo* I t  i s  only with th e  r i s e  o f sc ience  
in  modern Europe th a t  th e  idea of continuous p rogress in  human h is to ry  has come 
in to  i t s  own. I t  i s  n o t so much th e  d ire c t  p rogress of sc ience  which has shorn
progress to  be p o ss ib le , bu t r a th e r  the tecluiology a r is in g  from s c ie n t i f i c
p rogress which has given fo rce  to  man's d e s ire s . Technology i s  not an end, but
a means which can be applied to  a v a rie ty  of ends. The r i s e  of sc ien ce  i n
Europe has brought w ith  i t  an a tten d a n t technology capable of th l f iH in g  
o b je c tiv e s  in  many spheres* That technology has been used to  in c re ase  m ateria], 
p ro s p e r ity , to  b rin g  a range of consumer goods w ith in  reach  of th e  average 
c i t iz e n ;  i t  has been used to  make t r a v e l  s a fe r  and f a s te r ,  to  extend communication; 
i t  has been used to  reduce drudgery and d isease , and to  b rin g  both o p p o rtu n itie s  
and th e  le is u r e  to  indulge them to  the common man. Everyifhere technology has been 
seen as the s tren g th  to  man's elbow, as the  fo rce  which tu rn s  d e s ire  in to  
r e a l i t y .
Technology has brought f r ig h te n in g  dimensions to  war and ac c id e n ts , to o .
I t  i s  m orally  n e u tra l ,  merely a fo rce  to  be harnessed behind whatever motives
man a p p lie s . Uhatever man has wanted to  do, both good and e v i l ,  technology has
enabled him to  do more e f f e c t iv e ly .  Moreover, technology has been thought of
as l im i t le s s ;  whatever fo rce  i s  needed to  solve whatever problem, technology has
been seen as capable o f applying i n i f i n i t e  support. One d e f in i t io n  of a
16so p h is tic a te d  modern economy invo lves the no tion  th a t  resources can be d irec ted  
towards the  achievement of alm ost any d e s ire  -  even a f l ig h t  to  th e  moon. The 
growth of a s c ie n ti f ic a l ly -b a s e d  technology?' can be seen as the  c h ie f  spur to  the  
modern idea o f p ro g re ss . I f  p ro g ress  means th a t  one i s  able to  approach neare r 
to  th e  achievement of o b je c tiv e s , and technology i s  the  method used to  b ring  
th is  about, then the connection i s  s e lf - e v id e n t .  But we cannot assume th a t  i t  
i s  onlv m a te r ia l d e s ire s  which technology has enabled us to  f u l f i l  more adequately .
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The tech n o lo g ica l p ro g ress which s ta r te d  in  Western Europe has been harnessed to  
non-m ateria l desires*  By perform ing necessary  work, i t  in c re a se s  le i s u r e  time ; by 
promoting economic growth i t  enables more resources to  be committed to  such 
th ings as education . The optimlsm ih ic h  has p rev a iled  over such a la rg e  p a r t  of 
the time s in ce  the r i s e  of s c ie n t i f i c  technology has been substan tieû .ly  due to  the 
view th a t  man would be able to  apply th a t  technology towards ev e r-in c reas in g  
s a t i s f a c t io n  of h is  d e s ire s . For the  g rea te r  p o rtio n  of th a t  time i t  i s  an optimism 
which has been ju s t i f i e d .
The modern view, which c e r ta in ly  p rev a iled  u n t i l  w ell in to  the  p resen t 
cen tu ry , and which i s  s t i l l  probably the most lideqp read  view, i s  th a t  each 
g enera tion  of man v ji l l  in h a b it  a world in  li i ic h  the general cond itions of l i f e  m i l  
be b e t te r  than  they were fo r the  prevd.ous g enera tion . This is  th e  c e n tr a l  f a c t
about the  idea of p rogress which has m le d  for se v e ra l hundred y ea rs . P rogress
has been seen as in e v ita b le ;  and l i i i l e  tem porary setbacks may have shaken th i s  
view, none has d isp e lle d  i t*
Tixe theme of th is  work i s  th a t  p rogress i s  n o t something necessary
and in e v i ta b le ,  l ik e  the ' s e lf - s u s ta in in g  economic groivth' of W.W. R o sta^ 's  
19model. I t  i s ,  r a th e r ,  th e  r e s u l t  of d e lib e ra te  a p p lic a tio n  by man, the f r u i t s  of 
a determ ination  backed by a va lid  tech n iq u e . Tlie c le a r  im p lica tio n s a re  th a t  
th e re  a re  cond itions ap p ro p ria te  to e f f ic ie n t  and su ccessfu l p ro g re ss , and th a t
th e re  are cond itions under win.ch p rog ress w il l  be slow and d i f f i c u l t .  I t  i s
perhaps ap p ro p ria te  th a t  a f te r  the idea of p rogress has enjoyed so long a tu n , an 
an a ly s is  should be undertaken of i t s  component elem ents and of th e  circum stances 
under which i t  proceeds smoothly.
In  view of the c lo se  connection  between the modern id ea  of p ro g ress  and 
the r i s e  of science and of s c ie n ti f ic a l ly -b a s e d  technology, i t  i s  perhaps 
in e v ita b le  th a t  an enqu iry  in to  p ro g ress  should beging w ith an exam ination of the
12 13
methods o f sc ience .
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Chapter 2
ABvîS AND H'lETHODS IN SCIENCE
"Logic is a feeble reed, friend* 'Logic* proved that airplanes 
can't fly and that H-bombs won't work and that stones don't fall out of the 
slcy. Logic is a Way of saying that anything which didn't happen yesterday 
won't happen tomorrow."
“ Robert Heinlein; 'Glory Road.'
....................  ü ,
1
XThe Popper account of s c ie n t i f i c  method i s  n o t w ithout i t s  w edcnesses,
the c e n tr a l  one being th e  very notion of ' f a l s l f i o a t i o n '© Popper in c lu d e s
amongst h is  aims th a t  of saving re a l i ty o  " I  propose to  accept reallsm.'% he t e l l s
uSÿ "as the only sen s ib le  hypothesis as a conjecture to  which no se n s ib le
£a l te r n a t iv e  has ever been o ffe re d " . He s p e l l s  i t  o u t In  a la te r  passages "Our
main concern in  ph ilo sphy  and in  sc ien ce  should be th e  se a rd i for t r u th " ,  and goes
on to  say , " I  accept the commonsense theory (defended and re f in a d  by  A lfred  Tarslci)
th a t  truth i s  correspondence w ith the  f a c ts  (or w ith  r e a lity )s  ae , more p re c is e ly ,
3th a t  a th eo ry  i s  tru e  I f  and only i f  i t  co rre^ o i^ s to  the  f a c t s " .
I t  is  because Popper th in k s th a t  " in  scrlence we search  for t r u th " , t h a t  
h is  terms a re  those  which d esc rib e  an o b jec tiv e  r e a l i t y .  The se w ch , he say s , i s  
for v e r is lm lli t i id e , or g re a te s t  truth conten t w ith  lo w est f a l s i t y  cx>ntent« and our 
com petitive search  for v er is im ilitu d e  turns, " esp ecia lly  from the m ipirical. point 
of view, in to  a com petitive comparison of f a l s i t y  c o n ta i t s " . He p o in ts  o u t th a t  
"we can never make a b so lu te ly  c e r ta in  th a t  our th eo ry  i s  not l o s t .  A ll we can do 
i s  to  search for the  f a l s i t y  conten t of our b e s t  theory. We do so by try in g  to  
refu te our th e o iy ; th a t  i s ,  by trying to  t e s t  i t  sev ere ly  i n  the l ig h t  o f  a l l  our 
o b je c tiv e  knowledge and a l l  our In g e n u ity . I t  I s ,  of cou rse , always p o ss ib le  th a t  
the theory  may be f a l s e  even i f  i t  p asses  a l l  th e s e  t e s t s ;  th is  is  al'^uwed fo r by 
our sea rch  fo r v er is im ilitu d e . But i f  i t  p asses  a l l  th e s e  t e s t s  then we may have 
good reason to  co n jec tu re  that our theory, which a s  we kncvj has a g re a te r  t iu th  
con ten t than  i t s  p red ecesso r, may have no g rea te r f a l s i t y  c o n te n t, And i f  we f a l l  
to  re fu te  th e  new th eo ry , e sp e c ia lly  in  fj,e lds in  which i t s  p redecessor has been 
re fu te d , then we can claim  th is  as one o f  the o b je c tiv e  reasons fo r  Die con jpctu re
<oth a t  the new theo ry  i s  a b etter  aoproxim atlon to t r u t h  than  th e  old theory."
«Rxs.'rvM.tf tkxciM.ne.vi 'CiUtsasijtsntx.cxaziXjf.i omrb mr; w w  cauSKvïa R sw w s« » m * .s» -^  csjuo.-r'it'ss-yobon
I t  Is worth quoting Popper a t soiris len gth  on th is  point to  esta b lish
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c p l te  c l e a r ly  th a t  he regards s c ie n t i f ic  th e o r ie s  as co n jec tu res  concerning th e
s ta te  o f r e a l i t y .  They a re ,  he t e l l s  u s ,  either true  or f a l s e .  E ither th e  f a c ts
are l ik e  th a t ;  or they  a re  n o t.  And w hile we have no way of knacing which th eories
are t r u e ,  we can hope to  show which a re  f a l s e .  Popper says th a t  w hereas we have
7no c r i t e r io n  of t r u t h , we do have a p a r t ia l c r i te r io n  o f  f a l s i t y . No experim ent, 
or s e r ie s  of experiments, w i l l  ever show us that a theory is  t m e ,  b u t i f  we could 
find a sin g le  counter-exam ple, th en  we ifould be e n t i t l e d  to  say t h a t  the theory  
was f a l s e .
The weakness i n  the f a l s i f i c a t i o n  approach i s  contained w ith in  the  *ifs 
of the c lause " i f  we could find  a counter-exam ple"* In  order for us to  be able 
to  declare a theory f a l s e ,  we would need 'bo be c e r ta in  th a t  mb had indeed found 
a counter-exam ple. I t  i s  a l l  very w all to  t a lk  in  taemis of te s t in g  "se v e re ly  in  
Die l i g h t  of a l l  our o b jec tiv e  knowledge", but whence comes th is  o b jec tiv e  
kncwledge? As Lakatos has shown, we cannot have i t  both ways. I f  no knowledge is  
ever c e r ta in ,  then  th e re  can be no c e r t a in  o b je c tiv e  knc/wledge against which a new 
th eo ry  may be te s te d .  Whenever we make any s c ie n t i f 'ic  t e s t ,  we do so  by assuming 
some o f  our background knowledge to  be unpx'oblematic@ I t  may be an assum ption 
of th e  t r i v i a l  form "th a t our senses a re  not deceiving u s " , or i t  may be of a 
more com plicated n a tu re  such a s  " th a t  tbo law s of electrom agnetic r a d ia t io n  
continue to  hold fo r  a previously  unexplored a rea  of p h y s ic s" . N either assum ption 
can be co n c lu siv e ly  j u s t i f i e d@
Since a l l  o f  our experinmhts depend upon the r e su lts  o f  o th e r  experiments
to  provide the s ta b le  background fo r t e s t in g ,  we a re  l e f t  m th  a c ircu lar  process
i n  which our s c ie n t i f ic  'laiowledge* may be seen a s  a s e l f ‘^ contained system . I t
may be convenient to  accept the coimiionsaise hypothesis th a t  th is  se lf-con ta in ed
system describes r e a l i t y ,  b u t i t  seems u n fo rtu n a te  th a t  a r a t i o n a l i s t  methodology 
designed at le a s t  in  part to  save r e a lity  should only do so by amounts to  an
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I n i t i a l  a c t o f f a i t h .  81m e a i r  I n te r p re ta t io n  of what we co n jec tu re  a re  accurate ly  
observed r e s u l t s  depends upon p rev ious in te r p r e ta t io n  of what we previously  
conjeotured were accurately observed r e s u lts , th e re  i s  no b reak -o u t from the  
system in to  any kind o f o b je c t iv i ty ,  no p o in t a t  which th e  chain i s  anchored to  an 
ob jective r e a l i t y .
I t  may w ell be th a t  " se n s ib le  a l te rn a tiv e s "  are d i f f i c u l t  to  conjecture. 
S ince our experiments are  judged fo r r e s u l t s  ag a in s t the  background o f  assumed 
knowledge, we do b u ild  up a body of s c i m t l f i c  co n jec tu re  in  which in tern a l 
co n sis ten cy  i s  a t  a premium. I t  i s  n o t, says Lalcatos, t h a t  we perform  our t e s t  and 
the u n iv erse  sliouts "no)'; rather i s  i t  a case o f  us performing our t e s t  and th e—  g
u n iv e rse  shouting  " in c o n s is te n t" * We might thus b© le d  to propose that e i th e rÜV fvasw r  ^ 1. 4. «S.-r*dsi7Ltwif«rJ«T»
OOT body of s c ie n t i f ic  hypotheses does indeed "correspond w ith  th e  f a c ts " ,  or th a t  
the u n iv e rse  i s  deceiving us in  a system atic way. But th e re  remains a th ird  
p o s s ib i l i ty ;  which i s  th a t  th e re  might be other system s, d ifferen t fxx>m the body 
of in terp reta tion  which we have b u i l t  up , but possessing in te rn a l  consistency  to  
the same degree as th a t o f  our p re s e n t system.
The re a lisa tio n  th a t , when we t e s t ,  we cannot assume "the l ig h t  o f a l l  
our o b je c tiv e  knowledge", means th a t  we cannot say in  Die event of a d iscrepancy 
th a t  we have su c c e ss fu lly  shovjn the p ro p o s itio n  under t e s t  1x> be false.* And out 
o f the  same window as goes f a l s i f i c a t i o n ,  Die re  must a lso  d e p a rt th e  id e a  of 
g re a te r  v er is im ilitu d e , I f  we cannot, fo r  c e r ta in ,  r e je c t  what i s  f a l s e , then
n e ith e r  can we accumulate hypotheses of greater t r u th  c o n te n t, and n e i th e r  can we
ta lk  any longer- of g re a te r  correspondence viitli the f a c t s .  When we t e s t ,  we are 
te s t in g  a con junction  of the new hypothesis w ith what we th in k  we a lread y  know, 
"what we th in k  we a lread y  know" i s  no more than th o se  propositio i'B  which te stin g  
has no t le d  us to abandon.
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I f  the search  i s  fo r  'In c o n s is tm c y  c o n t e n t r a t h e r  than for ' f a l s i t y  
co n ten t* , we may see how i t  oou].d come about th a t ,  s ta r t in g  m ’th d ifferen t  
in te rp re ta t io n s  and assum ptions, we could , i n  th eo ry , build up a body o f  
c o n s is te n t Dmarlodge* d iffer en t from the  body o f  knowledge we have a c tu a lly  
b u i l t  up, given the in te rp r e ta t io n s  and assumptions we did s t a r t  with® In  
p la in e r  te rm s, i f  the s e lf - c o n s is te n t  and c i rc u la r  system i s  t i e d  a t  no p o in t to  
an o b je c tiv e  r e a lity ,  we can envisage many eq u iv a le n t, b u t d i f f e r e n t ,  systems 
which we m ight have a rriv ed  a t  in s tead  o f our p re se n t system. In  -vsiat sense, then,
does our s c ie n t i f ic  knowledge correspond w ith  the f a c ts ?
Science as a human d is c ip lin e  appears to  have made m d e ly -accep ted  
p ro g re ss , d e sp ite  the absence o f  any f3.rm l i n k  tying i t s  p ro p o sitio n s  to  an 
o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y .  Perhaps s c ie n t i f ic  co n jec tu re s , w hile not p u rp o rtin g  to  
describe  r e a l i t y ,  do something which we can regard  as equal3.y accep tab le . I f  i t  
i s  sen sib le  to  ta lk  o f an o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y ,  i t  i s  equally se n s ib le  to  ap p rec ia te  
th a t  because we are  dependent upon our senses and our minds for an in te ip rsta tio n  
of i t ,  th en  th e re  w il l  be a 'form o f  r e a l i ty *  ap p ro p ria te  to us as ob se rv e rs .
That i s ,  th e re  w il l  be a form i n  which r e a l i t y  cannot but seem to  be p resen ted  to
us because o f the n a tu re  o f  our sensory  and mental equipment. We may imagine th a t
o th er be ings ivlth ddf fe ro n t senses and d ifferen t types of minds id . l l  have th e i r  
own 'form of re a l ity *  in  the way in  which o b je c tiv e  r e a l i ty  cannot b u t be in te rp re ts  
by them. We are  spealcing here not on ly  o f those asp ec ts  o f the  u n iv e rse  a lready  
contem plated by man, but those which are  capable of such contem plation. The form 
of r e a l i t y  i s  thus seen as a p o te n t ia l ,  not n e c e s s a r ily  an a c tu a l ,  a p p re c ia tio n .
I t  may be thought o f as Die t o t a l  d e s c r ip tio n  of the u n iv erse  from the p o in t of 
view of th e  mind and senses of any p a r t ic u la r  sp e c ie s . I t  i s ,  moreover, the only 
r e a3.ity which i s  (by d e f in i t io n )  apprec iab le  by th a t  sp e c ie s .
5I f  the  human race were to  disappear suddenly, then  th e i r  form of r e a l i ty  
would not d isappear w ith  them. I t  would remain as a p o te n t ia l  way of understanding  
the  u n iv e rse , to  be re a l is e d  a t  such a time as a new species emerged with the 
same type of sense organs and minds as humans p o ssess . But when we ta lk  o f 'rea lity  
and our a ttem pts to  understand i t ,  we are ta lk in g  of the form in  which any o b jec tive  
Ideality  i s  a c c e ss ib le  to  our contemplation. I t  I s  a r e a l i t y  liiich  a lready  has the 
p a t te rn  o f man atanped on i t .  There i s  no p o in t a t  a l l  i n  our attem pting to  
concern ou rse lves if ith  th e  o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y  which p re se n ts  th a t  p a r t ic u la r  form 
to  u s , s in c e  (by d e f in it io n )  i t  i s  a r e a l i t y  fo rever beyond our d e tec tio n  or 
comprehensiono
But even th is  'form o f r e a l i ty * ,  th is  aspect of ex is ten ce  as i t  can only  
be observed and Interpreted by man, i s  not t i e d  lo g ic a l ly  to th e  world o f  our 
s c ie n t i f ic  p ro p o s itio n s . ¥e have no way of ascribing c e r ta in  f a l s i t y  to  con jec tu res 
which are concerned with the u n iv e rse  o f our o b se rv a tio n ,; for either our senses 
may be deceiving u s, or the ' sta b le  knar ledge * a g a in s t which th e  co n jec tu re s  are  
te s te d  may i t s e l f  be in  error. One s o lu t io n  to  t h i s  dilemma is  to opt for a 
correspondence between s c ie n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  and th e  observed un iverse  because "the  
overwhelming weight o f  common sense" suppw t s  such an id  ent i f  ic  a t io n . I f  the  
a l te rn a t iv e  i s  to  b e liev e  th a t  the  u n iv e rse  i s  deceiving us i n  a system atic way, 
then th e  tem p ta tio n  :ls g re a t  to  b e lie v e  in s te a d  th a t  'inoonsistm cy* can be
iPequated w ith  ' f a l s i t y ' . The n o tio n  o f  'b e l ie f '  i s ,  however, a dangerous one* In  
answer to  Hume's problem of in d u c tio n , many peop le , e s p e c ia lly  s c i e n t i s t s ,  were 
prepared  to  say t h a t  the e n t i r e  s c i e n t i f i c  system  re s te d  on the i r r a t io n a l  b e l ie f  
D iat th e re  was a lo g ic a l  connection between repea ted  In s ta n c es  of an ev e n t, the 
b e l ie f  th a t  what happened yesterday  provided a reason  fo r u s  to  b e lie v e  i t  x-^ ould 
happen again  tomorrow.
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I t  was a d e s ire  to  p rese rv e  in d u c tio n  >jhich le d  to  the djiclusion of 
b e l ie f  to  supply th e  m issing l in k ;  j u s t  as i t  i s  the d e s ire  to  save r e a l i t y  which 
b rin g s  b e l ie f  in to  th is  équation» J u s t  a s  i t  proved p o ss ib le  to  abandon induction  
and rep la ce  i t  w ith  an acceptable a ltern a tiv e  ; thereby  d isposing of th e  problem  
of in d u c tio n ; so i t  m ight be p o ss ib le  to g e t rid o f the n o tio n  th a t  s c i e n t i f i c  
co n jec tu res  are  purported  d esc rip tio n s  of th e  observed m ilversB; and y e t  replace  
i t  by an accep tab le  substitu te®
Ttie human race  has access to  devices o th e r than  d e sc r ip tio n  in  i t s  
a ttem pts to  understand <'md to  in te rp re t»  One such device i s  the modol» or analogue » 
In  circum stances where th e  r e a l  th ing  i s  fo r  some reason denied to  uS; we can 
proceed to  extend our knowledge by th e  co n s tru c tio n  of a model» We can perform  
operations on th e  model which perhaps we could never perform  on the re a l th in g ; 
and thereby  gain  g re a te r  understanding  of whatever i t  i s  th a t  our model i s  in tended  
to  represent®  I f  the  purpose of our s c ie n t i f ic  conjectures i s  to  enable us to  
understand and to  in terp ret in  some way the  observed u n iv e rse ; we c a i  see that i t  
i s  not necessary to  regard  them as p u ta t iv e  descriptions of r e a lity :  we could 
propose in s te a d  th a t  th ey  bear more of the c h a ra c te r i s t ic s  o f a system of analogues< 
What i s  being  suggested here  is  th a t  s c i e n t i s t s ;  d e sp ite  th e  appearances 
of term inology’; are no t p u ttin g  forward p ro p o sitio n s  which purport to  d escrib e  th e  
observed r e a lity ;  b u t th a t  they  are In stead  proposing models whose fh n c tio n  I t  i s  
to  help  us in  some way to  in te r p r e t  the observed reaD-ity» In  o ther words ; in s te a d  
of saying ”I  con jec tu re  th a t  in  our observed r e a l i t y ;  a l l  bodies a t t r a c t  each o th e r  
w ith  a force th a t  v a rie s  in versely  w ith  the square o f the  d is tan c e  between them"; 
th e  s c i e n t i s t  i s  saying " I  propose th a t  i n  o rder to  understand our observed rea lity j  
we should contem plate a mental model o f  i t  in  which bodies a t t r a c t  each o th e r id.th 
a fo rce  th a t  v a r ie s  in v e rse ly  w ith th e  square of tlie d istan ce  between them" *
M iHe the  two ways o f p u tt in g  i t  seem very s im ila r ;  th e re  a r e ,  n onethe less ; 
fundamental d iffe re n ce s  Im plicit®
The d iffe re n c e s  with which we are  h ere  concerned are  ti^ofold® In  th e  
f i r s t  p lace , the second approach makes i t  q u ite  c le a r  th a t  th e  world o f sc ien ce  
is  maiMiiade® tJliile th e  f i r s t  way o f p u ttin g  th in g s  might le ad  to  the im pression  
th a t  s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty  c o n s is ts  in  d isco v erin g , l i t t l e  by l i t t l e ,  what already  
e x is ts  o b je c tiv e ly , the  second way c le a r ly  im p lies th a t sc ience is  c rea ted  by man 
to  serve h is  purposes» S c ie n tif ic  th eo ries a re  not discovered, they are  created , 
and s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv ity  c o n s is ts  nob in  gaining access to an ever la rg e r  share  of 
in fo rm ation  w aiting to  be d iscovered , b u t in  a c tiv e ly  in v en tin g  ever more wi.de- 
ranging and so p h is tic a te d  models in  order to  b ring  th e  observed u n iv erse  w ith in  the 
ambit o f our c ompr ehens ion »
The second key d ifferen ce from our p o in t o f vien  i s  th a t 'th ile  th© 
f i r s t  approach Invo lves us in  the  form ulations of p ro p o sitio n s  which a re  e i th e r  
tru e  or fa ls e ;  the  second way of looking  a t  s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty  in v o lv es us in  
the p roposal o f  models which a re  e i th e r  good or bad. I f  we are dealing w ith  
p ro p o s itio n s  which p u rp o rt to  concern them salves w ith  re r0 .ity , vrltii 'the f a c t s ' ,  
then  we encounter a l l  o f the o b jec tio n s  d e riv in g  from our in a b i l i ty  to  break  out 
o f  the c losed  chain o f  in te rn a l  co n s is ten cy , Because a l l  o f  our kncrwledge i s  
dependent upon our o ther knowledge, wq have no way o f e s ta b lish in g  any s c ie n t i f i c  
p ro p o s itio n  as d e f in ite ly  f a ls e ,  any more th an  we have of e s ta b lish in g  i t  to  be 
d e f in i te ly  true*
Once we r e a l i s e ,  however, th a t  we a re  ta lk in g  about a system of analogues
ra th e r  th a n  about a c o lle c tio n  of p ro p o sitio n s  describ ing  r e a l i t y ,  the problem
does not arise* We can now admit le g itim a te ly  in to  our s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv ity  the
11very conventional ism that Popper i s  so anxious to avoid * - We can say not ttia t we
8f a l s i f y  c o n je c tu re s , bu t th a t  we r e je c t  proposed models which we fin d  inadequate®
We a re  not now asking i f  our s c i e n t i f i c  p roposals have g re a te r  verisIm ilitu d o , or
t r u th  con ten t with low er f a l s i t y  co n ten t, than t h e i r  p red ecesso rs; we are  asking
whether or no t they serve our purposes b e t t e r  than did t h e i r  predecessors* Before
we en te r  the d iscu ss io n  as to  what th o se  purposes a r e ,  i t  i s  perhaps as w ell to
note  a t  th i s  p o in t t h a t  even the Lakatos m o d ifica tio n  of Popper Involved the
in troduction  of an e x p l ic i t  conventionaLlsm in to  the system* 'When Lakatos p o in ts
out th a t  every t e s t  i s  in  f a c t  th e  te s t in g  of a con junction  of a new hypo thesis and
'unproblematic ' background knowledge, he explains th a t  th e  d ec is io n  as to  which
iaknowledge i s  'unproblematic ' i s  a conven tional one » I f  a discrepancy occurs in  
t e s t in g ,  the d e c is io n  to  c a s t  doubt on th e  new theory i s  a conventional one® We 
decide which of our Imowledge s h a l l  be deemed as above susp icion»
This m o d ifica tio n  by Lakatos is  a major one, and a l l  o f h is  c a re fu l 
a t te n t io n  to  th e  a c tu a l procedures adopted by s c ie n t i s t s  i n  th e ix  research programme 
cannot a l t e r  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  m odification disposes of Popper's hope for  an o b je c t­
iv e  standard  to  which h is  system might be anchored* Lakatos a ttem pts to  devise  
ru le s  whereby s c ie n t i s t s  can loiow au to m atica lly  which in fo rm ation  i s  su sp ec t i n  
th e  event o f  te s t in g  d isc re p a n c ie s , b u t s in c e  the  ru le s  amount to  no more th an  a 
convenience the way i s  wide open for  any s c i e n t i s t  to r e j e c t  them» One of 
Lakatos* major concerns i s  to  p reven t s itu a tio n s  arisin g i n  which new th e o r ie s
may be d iscarded  because of undetected  flatus in  the  background knavledge used in
13th e i r  testin g#  He in stan ces the atomic theory o f P rout ( th a t  the  atomic w eights 
o f  choiiical elements a re  whole numbers), and p o in ts  ou t th a t  when even the most 
accu ra te  p ractica l measure showed Gif Lori ne to  have an atomic if e igh t of th e
theory  was discarded# We know now, o f co u rse , s in c e  the  id ea  o f iso to p e s  was 
in troduced , th a t  Clilorine c o n s is ts  o f  two types (atomic w eights 3!? end ?A) which
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give an average atomic weight o f 3 5 #5 , and we can ap p rec ia te  t h a t  the th eo ry  would 
not have been d iscarded  had th i s  been known a t  th e  time of te s t in g *
The tro u b le  w ith the Lakatos ru le s  i s  th a t  in  saving the  odd theo ry  l ik e  
th a t  of P ro u t; he compels us a lso  to  re ta in  many th e o rie s  worthy of re je c tio n *  Hie 
whole p rocess of s o im t i f io  discovery  would be slaved down considerably i f  s c ie n t i s i  
were to  adopt in  p ra c t ic e  th e  maxims which Lakatos proposes in  theory# F o rtu n a te ly  
fo r sc ien ce , they  do not adopt such maxims# What s c ie n t i s t s  do in  p ra ctice  i s  to  
proceed as b e fo re , d isca rd in g  th e o r ie s  which f a i l  to  su rv iv e  c r i t i c a l  t e s t s ,  even 
in c lu d in g  such th e o rie s  as Front's# I f ,  with the  ta r e s ,  a few ea rs  o f  wheat are 
a lso  thrown away, science can always backtrack  b r ie f ly  a t  such a time as the  pile-U |: 
o f anomalies compels them to  doubt th e  background knowledge used to  r e je c t  some of 
th ese  th eo rie so  This Is  p rec ise ly  what happened in  th e  case of Prout*s theory* I t  
was d iscard ed ; and i t  was subsequently r e h a b i l i ta te d  as anom alies revealed  a flaw  
in  the narrow conception of a chemical element*
Perhaps fo r tu n a te ly  for sc ien c e , s c ie n t i s t s  a re  o f te n  committed to  th e i r
3-4*th e o rie s  i n  a h ig h ly  p erso n a l way* As Kuhn and o th e rs  have observed, s c ie n t i f i c  
p rogress i s  made more by new s c i e n t i s t s  concentrating on new is s u e s  th an  by old 
ones adm itting  th a t  t h e i r  id eas  were ifrong* Even though s c ie n t i f ic  a c t iv i ty  
proceeds a t  f u l l  speed, r u th le s s ly  r e je c tin g  th e o rie s  ( l ik e  Front's) which do not 
surv ive severe te s t in g ,  th e re  a re  always some s c ie n t i s t s  s u f f i c ie n t ly  committed to  
.the d iscarded  th e o rie s  to  explore th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  the d ec is io n  might have been 
an unwise one*
Lakatos h as  overlooked th a t  one of the aims of scien ce tak es in to  account 
the r a te  o f progress® We want laiowXedge, and we want i t  now# Under th e  Lakatos 
r u le s ,  p ro g ress  would undoubtedly be made, sa fe ly  and s te a d ily . Under the system 
a c tu a l ly  used by sc ien ce  (w ith a much more ca v a lie r  approach), p ro g ress  i s  made
......................  25
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quleldy* Science can proceed, make m is tak es, b ack track , p ick  up n eed le ss ly  
d iscarded  th e o r ie s ,  and s t i l l  be  years  ahead of the p o in t they  would have reached 
m th  the p a in stak in g  approach o f Lakatos * Lakatos, d e s p ite  h is  In tro d u c tio n  at' 
conventional d ec is io n s, f a i l s  to  talce s u f f ic ie n t  account of the  alms o f th e  a c tlv itg  
I f  we reg ard  s c ie n t i f ic  th e o rie s  not as p u ta t iv e  d e sc r ip tio n s  of r e a l i t y , 
bu t as proposed models, then  the problem i s  solved easily*  S c ie n t is t s  are  being 
asked not to  a sc rib e  t r u th  or f a l s i t y  to  con jectu res, but to  accep t or to  r e j e c t  
them as good or bad models# The convent!onallsm here is  e x p l ic i t  and necessary# 
Unliice the  conventionalism  in troduced  by Lakatos in to  th e  simple Popper system, 
which was proposed as an u n fo rtu n a te , but unavoidable d ep a rtu re  from o b jec tiv ism , 
the  conventionalism  in  the  analogue system d e riv e s  from a recogn ition  th a t  s c i e n t i f ‘J 
a c t iv i ty  i s  d ire c te d  to  th e  fu lfi/ilm en t o f a human purpose» I t  ceases to  be a 
q u es tio n  of "b u t i s  th e  universe l ik e  that" , and becomes im tead  a question  of 
"but do we want that" @
The q u estio n  of what i s ,  or is  n o t, a good model devolves around th e  whole 
purpose of th e  a ctiv ity #  Men do not engage in  s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty  a im le ss ly ; nor 
do they  chose i t  as a p le a sa n t way of occupying them selves in  order to  pass the
timeo They engage in  s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty  in  order to  gain  knowledge and under™
15standing  of the  observed universe* That knowledge and understanding i s  measured 
in  term s o f  th e i r  a b i l i t y  to  p re d ic t  fu tu re  even ts and to  ex p la in  p a s t ones* One 
can be said to  have an e f fe c t iv e  grasp of th e  fundamental workings of a system 
i f  one i s  able to  p re d ic t  su c c e ss fu lly  the  ih tu re  outcomes of t h a t  system, and 
to  ‘re tro d ic t*  the p a s t  outcomes, Tlis q u es tio n  of why men should wish to  be 
ab le  to. p re d ic t  the  behaviour ox th e  observed u n iv e rse  i s  not s t r i c t ly  re levan t, 
provided th a t  one accep ts th a t  th e y  do; b u t i t  may a s s i s t  th a t  acceptance i f  one 
r e a l i s e s  th a t  to  p red ict i s  b u t one step  sh o r t of to  control® I t  may im ll be th a t  
man, th e  c rea tu re  which sur v ives no t by adapting to  the environment, bu t by
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adapting the emd.ronfftent, has been se le c te d  w ith  an in b u i l t  d r iv e  to  c o n tro l h is  
cam circum stances'; and th a t  he a s p ir e s ,  d e s p ite  h im se lf, to  be not-m erely  the
I/omeasure o f a l l  th in g s, but the m aster of a l l  things* What counts as an " e ffe c tiv e "  
grasp o f th e  fundamental workings of a system, is  an understanding th a t  w i l l  
enable on© to  compute forthcom ing e v e n ts , and be ab le  to  act on the b a s is  of th a t  
assumption®
The prime o b je c t o f s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv ity  i s  th a t  man w i l l  acqu ire  an 
increasing a b i l i t y  to  p re d ic t  th e  behaviour of e x te rn a l o b je c ts  and forces* Scleiiee 
makes p rog ress whenever our a b i l i t y  to  p re d ic t  the observed universe i s  g rea te r  
or more accu ra te  than I t  was b efore, A 'good ' s c ie n t i f ic  model I s  th u s one which
in c rease s  our a b l l 'l ty  to  do t h i s , and a 'b a d ' model i s  one which does not# Wiat
we seek in  our models i s  the a b il ity  on our p a r t  to  use them to  achieve b e t te r  the
purpose of s c ie n t i f ic  a c t iv ity .  In a rc h i te c tu re  ov in  engineering , we o ften
co n s tru c t p h y s ic a l, sm a ll-sca le  models to  a s s i s t  us to  so lve our problems# The 
fu m tlo n  of th e  model i s  to  stand in  for th e  r e a l  th in g  which i t  r e p re s e n ts , be i t  
a b u ild in g ; a bridge or an aeroplane® ¥e hope th a t  the r e la t io n  of the  p a r ts  of 
th e  model to  each o th e r wllIl enable us to  say something about the r e la tio n s h ip  
between the eq u iv a len t asp ec ts  of the  real thing® I f  our model o ff ic e -b lo c k  i s  
b u i l t  to  sca le  i n  s iz e ,  weight and s tre n g th , and we see th a t  i t  co llap se s  when 
we add more than  twenty s to r ie s  to  th e  fo u n d atio n s , then , i f  i t  i s  a good model, 
we would consider ou rselves unwise to  b u ild  a re a l  o fflc e -b lo c k  in  fuTil s ia e  w ith  
as many as twenty s to r ie s  u n le ss  we f i r s t  adopt a stronger design  fo r th e  
foundations* The model, w hile not d e sc rib in g  r e a l i t y ,  t e l l s  us something about I t  
by way o f  th e  in te r n a l  r e la t io n s h ip s  between i t s  parts#
We can, o f  co u rse , c o n s tru c t  models which t e l l  us something from 
ex te rn a l re la tio n s h ip s  vrlth o th e r models# When we bu ild  our model aerop lane , we
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do so In  order to  see  I f  a p articu lar design  i s  viable* In  a wind tunnel we 
escpose i t  to  a model o f the a i r  stream  which th e  r e a l  aeroplane w i l l  have to  f ly  
th rough0 I f  our modelling has been good, i t  i s  our hope th a t  the re la tio n s h ip  
between the model aeroplane and the model a i r  stream  wil3, t e l l  u s  something about 
th e  r e la tio n s h ip  between the rea l aeroplane and the r e a l  a ir  stream#
S im ilarly  do we hope th a t  our s c ie n t i f i c  models wll3- te H  u s something 
about th e  behaviour of th e  observed universe® Even thoug^i s c ie n t i f ic  models are 
not generally  p h y s ic a l, but models in  the sense o f id e a s , our hope i s  th a t  study 
and computation performed on the model w il l  tc i l l  us something o f how to  p re d ic t  
th e  observed universe# Consider, fo r  example, th e  'model! fo rm u la tion  of g ra v ita -  
tionsQ. a ttrac tio n ®  I t  was worded thus; "I propose th a t  in  order to  understand our 
observed r e a lity , we should contem plate a mental model o f  i t  i n  vhlch  bodies a t t r a c i  
each other w ith a fo rce  th a t  v a rie s  in v e rse ly  w ith  the  square o f  th e  d is ta n ce  
between them"® I f ,  by m anipulation  w ith  t h i s  madeO., by performing c a lc u la tio n s  on 
i t ,  we are  ab le  to  'p red ict' what we a lready  know to  occur i n  the observed 
u n iv e rse  (i®e® to  'r e tr o d ic t ') ,  then  obviously  our modal has some value# I f  by 
s im ila r  c a lc u la tio n  on the  model, we are able to  p re d ic t  events i n  Hie u n iv e rse  
whose outcome we do not a lread y  know, then we say  th a t  th e  model i s  a good one®
We say I t  i s  good because th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between asp ec ts  of the model 's ta n d  In ' 
fo r  an eq u iv a len t re la tio n s h ip  in  the observed u n iv e rse , and because contemplation  
o f  the model has enabled us to  extend our p re d ic tiv e  power over observed reeO.ity# 
Tï*?o th in g s  a re  req u ired  of our models in  order for them to serve our 
s c ie n t i f ic  purposes# They must 'stand in ' fo r  th e  observed u n iv erse  i n  two 
respects® The re la tio n s h ip s  w ith in  th e  model must enable us to  increase our 
a b i l i t y  to  p re d ic t  the asp ec t of observable r e a l i t y  which the  model represents, 
and the rela tion sh ip s between the now model and o th e r  medals must r e f l e c t  the
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eq u iv a le n t re la tio n s h ip s  in  th e  world o f ca r observation* In  o th e r words we ask 
o f our s c ie n t i f i c  modd  system th a t  i t s  behavioug" wxl,l enable us to  p re d ic t  
observable r e a l i t y ,  and th a t  i t  be in tern a lly  consistent®  A new modeü-, aioh as, 
fo r example, an equation  fo r  f a l l in g  b o d ie s , might be valuab le  to  us i f  i t  
enables us to  p re d ic t  what w i l l  happen to  objects which f a l l*  I t  w il l  be o f 
considerab ly  more value i f  i t  can. f i t  co n sis ten tly  in to  a general mod e l  o f motion 
and 'so  extend enormously our p re d ic tiv e  range®
Mien we t e s t  proposed models in  sc ien c e , th en , what we are te s t in g  them 
fo r  i s  th e i r  c a p a c ity  fo r  helping us to achieve the ends of the activ ity*  ¥© 
t e s t  the model to  sea i f  i t  enab les us to  p re d ic t  new th in g s  abou t tho  world of 
our o b se rv a tio n , and whether i t  i s  c o n s is te n t  w ith our a lread y  e s ta b lish e d  model 
system -  th e  one wo c a l l  cur s c ie n t i f i c  knowledge* We are  constantly  attempt:lng 
to  Improve our scheme o f analogues, in  order th a t  our a b il ity  to  p re d ic t  the  
observed, u n iv e rse  m aybe extended» th e n  we r e j e c t  a p rev io u sly  used model in
favour of a newly proposed one, we do so because te s t in g  shows us th a t  th e  new one
i s  more adequate to  our purposes than  was th e  old* E in s te in 's  modal was p re fe rre d  
over Newton's because i t  enabled us to  p re d ic t  everything about th e  observed 
u n iv e rse  which Newton's d id , and a l i t t l e  extra* I t  was not t h a t  Newton's theory  
was 'f a l s i f i e d '  -  as we saw, th e re  are  lo g ic a l  reasons for supposing such a p rocess 
to  be impossible® Rather i t  was th a t  E in s te in 's  th eo ry  served our purposes b e tte r»  
Of co u rse , th e re  remains s t i l l  the problem of whether to  adm it a new
mode], in  th e  event of in co n sis ten cy  w ith  cur e s tab lish ed  systern of analogues, or
whether to  propose In stead  th a t  th e  e s ta b lish e d  system i s  inadequate* Now th a t we 
are  using  concepts which make c le a r  th e  element o f human s io tiv a tio n  in  tîie 
a c t iv i ty ,  th e  problem seems le s s  acute. I t  i s  not a question  o f r e je c t in g  p o ss ib le  
t r u th  ; or even admitting falsehoods* I t  comes down to a q u es tio n  of the  re la t iv e
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adequacy o f th e  a l te rn a tiv e s  for th e  ta s k  we have s e t  them® Where th e  new 
p roposal has su c cessfa l p re d ic tiv e  a b i l i t y ,  but cannot be rendered c o n s is te n t w ith  
ex is tin g  raodels• (i<,e® i t  f a i l s  to  'predict* estab lished  knowledge), then  th e re  
i s  c le a r ly  in d ic a ted  the need fo r  research  to  decide whether the new model o r the  
e s ta b lish e d  model can be modified i n  order to  achieve consistency® Sometimes 
i t  may be both® The obvious example from th e  h is to ry  of sc ience  sp rings to  mind 
w ith  th e o r ie s  concerning th e  n a tu re  o f  l ig h t*  C orpuscular th e o rie s  were u se fu l 
models in  th a t  they could explain some observed phenomena and be used to  p re d ic t  
new events® Wave th e o r ie s  could be used to  explain  other observed phenomena, and 
could a lso  predict* Consistency was only achieved a f t e r  two c e n tu r ie s , when a 
model system (th e  Quantum Theory) was proposed vîhich was v i r tu a l ly  a compromise, 
combining as i t  d id  elements of both r i v a l  s 553terns*
We can , i f  necessary , r e j e c t  such proposals as Prout* s atomic w eight 
th eo ry , w ithout th e  fe e lin g  th a t we might be ra sh ly  consigning to  o b liv io n  an 
im portant truth®  A ll we are  r e je c t in g  i s  what might subsequently  tu rn  out to  be 
a useful, model a f te r  all® I f  we do proceed in  th i s  fa sh io n , and i f  we have 
inadvertently  re je c te d  a u se fu l model, th e re  v d ll  be p le n ty  of opportun ity  to  
reco n s id er i t s  m erits  a t  such a time in  the fu tu re  as we find th a t  o th e r d isc rep an ­
c ie s  have le d  to  the  need fo r  a major overhaul o f our e s ta b lish e d  system of 
analogues® The p o in t i s  w orth  malcing th a t  the P rou ts  o f sc ience  a re  q u ite  rare*  
U sually  when we d isca rd  proposed models a f te r  te s t in g ,  we never re g re t  doing so*
I t  i s  b e t te r  to  d iscard  the occasional good model along w ith  th e  many, many bad 
ones, knowing th a t  we can p ick  i t  up l a t e r ,  than i t  i s  to  proceed over c a u tio u s ly , 
spending ovenmch tim e on th e  co n s id e ra tio n  of w o rth less  models*
I t  i s  im portan t to  ap p rec ia te  th a t  we are not concerned w ith  th e  no tio n  oj 
'adequacy* in  any ab so lu te  sense® Only a scheme o f  models whose contem plation
•  ^ 30;
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enabled us to  p r e d ic t  and ex p la in  everything w ith in  the world of our o b serv a tio n  
could be deemed 'ad eq u a te ' i n  th a t  sense* What coneerns u s in  our choice I s  th a t  
we should s e le c t  a t  each s tag e  a model which i s  more adequate th a n  i t s  r iv a ls  i n  
helping us to  p re d ic t  or to  retrocUct® Our te s t in g ,  th e re fo re , i s  n e c e ssa r ily  
com petitive* We choose th e  com paratively  more adequate, and we seek increased  
p re d ic tiv e  power -  a r e la t iv e  fac to r#  Mien we t e s t ,  W ierefore, we are te s t in g  
re la tiv e ly *  We are  te s t in g  to  discover which of the a l te rn a t iv e  models proposed 
b e s t  serves our purposes* At f i r s t  g.ance, th is  s t r e s s  on the com petitive a sp ec t 
o f te s t in g  might appear to  run  counter to experience: su re ly  there are cases 
in  which a mw model i s  proposed to  help  us to understand a newly observed phenomertc 
In  fa c t ,  though, we always have a t  the  very le a s t  a sim ple background theory which 
p rev io u sly  s a t is f ie d  us* In  the case of a "newly observed phenomenon", we can
r e f l e c t  on Popper's dictum th a t  we only  make 'o b se rv a tio n s ' In  the l i g h t  o f our
ITprev ious th eo rie s*  An even t only  s t r ik e s  our n o tice  as an observation when there  
i s  a preconceived theory ; we s in g le  i t  o u t for a t te n t io n  because I t  assumes some 
s ig n if ic a n c e  to  us ag a in s t the  background of t h a t  preconceived theory*
Even Newton's th eo ry  had i t s  predecessors in  the form of models which 
p o s tu la te d  th a t  for th in g s  to  fa ].l downwards was a n a tu ra l s t a t e  of affaS/rs* I t  
was Nevrton's model, on which o b je c ts  continued a t  r e s t  or in  a s ta te  of co n stan t 
v e lo c ity , which made the  downward a c c e le ra tio n  of o b je c ts  req u ire  a d d itio n a l 
causes® The theory  which proposes as i t s  model th a t  a given s t a t e  o f a f f a i r s  i s  
'na tm ’a l '  i s  as much a th eo ry  as a successor which proposes th a t  a d d itio n a l 
causes must be sought* Mien we t e s t ,  we r e je c t  whichever of the  a].te i'na tives 
i s  th e  le s s  adequate to  our ta sk  of predicting th e  observed un iverse*
We can now th in k  of s c i e n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty  as a human d is c ip l in e  i n  which 
th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  are  a ttem p ting  to  approach ever neare r to  a nominated objective*
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The f a c t  th a t  th e  o b jec tiv e  (p e r fe c t  knafledge) is  n o t obtainab lo  in  the  absolute 
sense in  no way p reven ts  us from approaching ever nearer to  i t  than we were befoi'e* 
The method of sc ien ce  c o n s is ts  in  the nom ination of propered m odels, whose fu n c tio n  
i s  to  enable u s ,  by studying th e i r  r e la tio n sh ip s , to  mal® p re d ic tio n s  su ccessfu lly  
concerning th e  u n iv e rse  which we can observe* We co n s ta n tly  in c re a se  our a b i l i t y  
to  p r e d ic t ,  by  se le c tin g  models co m p etitiv e ly  on th e i r  a b i l i ty  to  a s s i s t  us i n  
th a t  task® More a c c u ra te ly , we r e j e c t  th o se  which a re  shoxm on te s t in g  to  be 
l e s s  adequate than the a ltern a tiv es  o ffered . S c ie n t i f ic  a c t iv i t y ,  th e n , has several 
imp or ta n t  In g r ed i a i t  s ®
A ll of those who engage in  sc ien ce  are  expected to  embrace the nominated 
o b je c tiv e  o f  increased p re d ic tiv e  power; and they know th a t  th e ir  perform ance 
w ith in  the  a c t iv i ty  w i l l  be adjudged as su ccessfu l in s o fa r  as they  are  able to  
achieve such an increase* They might be k in d ly , humane men: .they might be a 
source of In s p ir a t io n  to  th e i r  s tu d e n ts : they might stand out as worthy o f 
adm iration  fo r taking moral stands on the p o l i t i c a l  uses o f s c ie n t i f i c  Irnowledge* 
But tViey w i l l  be judged as su c ce ss fu l s c ie n t is t s  only by the standard which 
recju ires them to  in c re a se  m an's a b i l i ty  to %)redict ti© observed universe®
Secondly, i t  may be said  o f sc ience t h a t  i t s  a c t iv i .ty  c o n s is ts  i n  the 
c o n s tru c tio n  and p ro p o s itio n  of m ental models, and i n  the te s t in g  o f  th ese  models# 
S c ie n t i f ic  a c t iv i ty  re q u ire s  th a t  men imagine analogue systems wrhose study w i l l  
.enable su c cessfu l p red ic tio n s  to  be made concerning the observed universe® I t  
re q u ire s  the  exerc ise  o f  the  im agination  in  o rder th a t  t e s t in g  programmes raig^it be 
produced which a re  designed to  b rin g  compe'bing modal systems to  a c r i s i s  p o in t a t  
which on© can be se lec ted  as superior to i t s  rivals®  And i t  req u ire s  th is  p rocess 
to  be continuous* Science makes p ro g re ss  towards i t s  nominated end whenever a 
d ecision  is  taken* At every " c r is is  poinb", a le s s  adequate mod el i s  r e je c te d  in
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favour of a more adequate model; and s in ce  the  adequacy i s  measured by th e  a b i l i ty  
to  achieve the  nominated end, i t  fo llow s au to m atica lly  th a t  every d e c is io n  t  alee a 
us n ea re r  to  the  nominated end* Even when the  d ec is io n  a t  the c r i s i s  p o in t i s  to 
r e je c t  the  newly proposed model on th e  grounds th a t  i t  i s  l e s s  adequate than th e  
e s ta b lish e d  modal., we knaf a t  l e a s t  th a t  th e  rejected  model can be e lim in a ted  in  
our search  fo r superior ones*
Sometimes in  such d r  cams ta n ces  we gain  even more a s s is ta n c e  in  our 
efforts® I f  th e  devisor o f  the t e s t  has bem  p a r t ic u la r ly  s k i l f u l ,  or p a r t ic u la r ly  
lu ck y , we might g e t d ir e c t  feedback and learn not only th a t  a p a r t ic u la r  proposed 
model was le s s  adequate, bu t also th e  re sp e c ts  in  which i t  was inadequate® We 
might lea rn , i n  o ther words, how to  improve th e  model i n  such a wa^ r th a t  i t  becomes 
sup erio r to  i t s  rivals® Even xcibhcait such circum stances, hoxfever, we do proceed 
by n eg a tiv e  feedback, co n tin u a lly  e lim in a tin g  the worse i n  favour o f th e  better*
The normal course of s c i e n t i f i c  a c t iv ity  i s  thus one in  x-jhich every 
a l te r a t io n  to  our system of analogues is  an improvement? i t  was only adm itted a f te r  
te s t in g  had shown i t  to  be b e t te r  than i t s  predecessors® P rogress i s ,  in  sc ien c e , 
the  norm* The a c t iv i ty  proceeds in  such a way th a t  every d e c is io n  must mean an 
advancement, e i th e r  i n  introducing a nexf model which b e t te r  f u l f i l s  our goal of 
in c reased  p re d ic tiv e  power, or in  making u s  aware t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one type of mode],
is  no t what we are looking for i f  we are  to  augment th a t  power# I t  might* be
argued th a t  'm is tak es ' are p o ss ib le  on th i s  scheme o f  s c im t i f io  a c t iv i ty ;  th a t  i t  
i s  p o s s ib le  fo r us to  d isc a rd  a good model in  favour o f one which seems b e t te r  a t  
the tim e, bu t subsequently  turns out to  be in fe r io r»  I t  i s  certa in ly  tru e  th a t  
circum stances l ik e  th e se  can a r i s e ,  but i t  w uld  be wrong to  th in k  o f  th e  period  
in  which the  old (good) model was s e t  as ide  as a b lin d  ^ le y  or a re tro g re ss io n #
I f  a new model i s  p re fe rre d  a t  a l l ,  i t  must be because a c r i t i c a l  t e s t  or s e r ie s
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o f t e s t s  has shown i t  to  have improved p red ictive  power over the old modal (our 
" c r i s i s  p o in t" )#  I f  the old one i s  subsequently  r e h a b i l i ta te d  in  m odified form, i t  
w i l l  be fo r a s im ila r reason* Both s ta g e s ,  th e  r e je c t io n  and subsequent readoption , 
a re  marked by an ex ten sio n  o f our p re d ic t iv e  power, and b o th , th e re fo re , re p re se n t 
p ro g ress  toxvards our goal* I t  i s  the  period  spent with th e  new modal which shows 
us the inadequacies xdiich only  a m odified form of th e  old modd. can surmounb* Had 
thea^e been no 'blind a l le y ' phase, we have no reason to  suppose th a t  our old  model, 
would have been so improved* Provided th a t  wre a c t in  science in  f u l l  consciousness 
o f what x-je are doing and what we a re  trying to achieve, p ro g ress  i s  guaranteed with 
every d ec is io n  we make*
We cannot, of course, guaran tee that xdien we perform  our t e s t s  we are 
not in  a s t a t e  in  which our senses a re  deceiving us* One of th e  weaknesses of 
' f a l s i f i c a t i o n '  i s  th a t  we can never be sure th a t  our observations a re  made 
a c c u ra te ly , and th a t  we are  r i # i t  to  r e j e c t  the theory  in s te a d  o f  cur sensory  
evidence* Gan i t  no t a lso  be sa id  o f our model systems th a t  we m i ^ t  r e j e c t  a 
good one because we b!: serve t e s t  r e s u l t s  in c o rre c tly ?  The imp or ta n t  p o in t of  
d iffe re n ce  between th e  two approaches i s  to  a t  to e  ' f a l s i f i e  a t io n  ' approach concerns 
i t s e l f  Tvith tru e  or f a ls e  p ro p o sitio n s  concerning "the  f a c t s " ,  xtoereas the model 
systaii concerns i t s e l f  xdth analogues designed to  help us to  p r e d ic t  the  observable 
universe*
I t  be t r u e  th a t  our senses might deceive us i n  one t e s t ,  bu t s in ce  
t e s t s  have to  be re p e a ta b le , one such freak oocurraice would e a s ily  be  corrected* 
The more se rio u s  case vre are  considering  i s  one in  which our senses repeatedly and 
co n sis ten tly  deceive u s , so that o ther experimenters perform ing rep e titio n s  of the 
t e s t  w i l l  achieve equa lly  erroneous resu lts*  I f ,  hov^rever, such a s i.tu a tio n  occurs, 
i t  may r e a d i ly  be seen th a t  the achieved r e s u l t  to  the d)served u n iv e rse , ‘whether 
o r not i t  d iverges from some unknown and unlmavable re a l ity *  I f  our senses
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c o n s is te n tly  deceive us a t  some p o in t ,  then  our modal, systems w il l  be so construe tec
as to  p re d ic t  th a t  deception® They xd .ll not. enable us to  ap p rec ia te  th a t  i t  i s  a
deception, but our concern i s  v?ith x-jhat we obserxm, w ith p red ictin g  the  observed
universe® We can le av e  those xtoose concern i s  xdith " tru th "  and "the  fa c ts "  to
worry about whether th e i r  obserx 'ations accord xàth  xiiat r e a l ly  i s  th e  case* With
our more lim ite d  o b je c tiv e  of being ab le  to  p re d ic t  what xm x-dll observe, the
problem does not a r is e  a t  all® We r e je c t  xmichever o f our proposed models i s  l e s s
adequate than  i t s  r iv a l  a t  enabling us to  p re d ic t  the  observed u n iv e rse , l e s s
adequate, th a t  i s ,  a t  enabling us to  -pred ict th e  observed r e s u l t s  of our t e s t s ,  as
opposed to  any " re a l"  r e s u l t s  of our tests®
In  view o f the remarks made e a r l i e r  concerning r e a l i ty  and the  form in
xfhich i t  cannot bu t p resen t i t s e l f  to  u s, i t  i s  very doubt A ll th a t  th e re  i s
anything to  be gained a t  al.l from drax-jing a d is t in c t io n  between 'r e a lity ' andm d ep en d eîat
're a lity -as-w c '^ can -o b se rv e^ lt ' ® Since any r e a lity  mymwkwm# o f the  minds and 
sense organs of the  sp ec ies which contemplate i t  ca?i on].y be interpreted  by any
ind iv idual species through i t s  mind and sense organs, the contem plation of i t  caxi
a v a il  us naught® Our lim ite d  concern in  scien ce i s  to  produce analogue systems 
vj’hose contem plation xvill enable u s to  p re d ic t  su c c e ss fn lly  what vre s h a l l  observe 
in  any t e s t s  xve perform®
We are nox-f in  a p o s it io n  where xve are able to  supply a conceptual 
m o d ifica tio n  to  P opper's shorthand of s c i a i t i f i c  method® Popper describes
the system by the  terms :
FI -> TT — >EE F2
meaning th a t  P ro p o sitio n  One proceeds by xvay of theoxy- t e s tin g  and error«e].lmj.nation 
to  P ro p o sitio n  Txm, which i t s a l f  becomes the PI of a new cycle  o f  th e  equation®
Each P2, says Popper, i s  n e c e s s a r ily  more accurate to  an PI by v ir tu e  of th e  error
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elim ina ted  as a consequence of th eo ry - t e s ting* Thus i s  p ro g ress  made in  science*
With co n s id e ra tio n  to  the c r i t ic is m  given above, we can keep th e  e s s e n tia l  a sp ec t
o f th e  th e  "co n jec tu re  and re fu ta tio n "  s id e  of i t ,  b u t modify th e
,  ^  .  forfn iila .concepts to  gxv© us a nexv
m  or M2  > T — > CP —^  IE — > M2
This i s  a shorthand way of saying th a t  we proceed from the com petitive p roposal o f 
model systems by xfay of te s t in g  (T) to  a c r i s i s  p o in t (OP) a t  xAich we can 
e lim in a te  the l e s s  adequate o f  the com petito rs (IE -  in a d eq u acy -e liïïd m tio n ), f in a l l  
le av in g  us with a preferred M2® Tlie su c cessfu l M2 w lH  then, have competing M3 
proposed a g a in s t i t ,  and w il l  undertake a new cycle of th e  equation®
The ML represents th e  model which corresponds to  our l a t e s t  s ta g e  of 
knowledge® I t  -was itsc3 .f  preferred a t  some p o in t because te s t in g  showed i t  to  be 
more adequate than i t s  r iv a l s  a t  enab ling  us to p re d ic t  toe observed universe© The 
M2 i s  th e  new sc len t!L ie  co n jec tu re  proposed as a b e t te r  model© Tests are  designed 
which w i l l  bring th e  competing system s to a c r is i s  point a t  to ich  we w il l  have 
grounds for p re fe r r in g  the one ra th e r  than  toe other* Those grounds are  th e  
su periority  of one system a t h e lp in g  us to p re d ic t  xhat we s h a ll  cbserve; the le s s  
adeuate of th e  tw> is  e lim ina ted , and ve  are l e f t  w ith  a new' "cu rren t s t a te  o f  
knowledge". M2, which X'je know w i l l  one day be superseded by a sup erio r competitor® 
The conventional aspects o f th i s  equation  are ex p lic it*  We are  choosing between 
.a l te rn a tiv e s  on the b a s is  o f xtolch one b e s t serves our in tentions©  We d e l ib e ra te ly  
undertake tes'b ing to  bxlng us to a c r i s i s  p o in t a t  xtoich xto can. s a t is fy  ourselves 
as to  xd'iich i t  i s  'that does b e s t  serve those in te n tio n s  © We are not elim inating  
o b je c tiv e  e rro r  from p rep osition s , we are deciding which one xfe prefer©  The testin g  
i s  eq u iv a len t to a p r a c t ic a l  run under f ie ld  c o n d itio n s | th e  one which performs 
b e t te r  under te s t in g  i s  chosen because i t  has proved i t s e l f  in  px^actice©
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The 'inadequacy-el:lii[d.natiori* i s  the stag e  a t which we e lim in a te  xAichever 
model shoifs i t s e l f  i n  p ra c t ic e  to  he o f l e s s  asgd.stance to  us i n  our chosen ta sk  o f  
su c c e s s fu lly  predicting t i e  world of our observation® P m g ress  i s  guaranteed® Bad 
M2 i s  n e c e s s a r ily  superior fo r  our purposes than each Ml; i t  was only  chosen fo r  
tlia t reason® Furtherm ore, th is  revised  equation  p u rp o rts  to  describe n o t only 
xdiat s c i e n t i s t s  should do, bu t xdiat 'they do do® We are noxsr in  a p o s i t io n  to 
ap p rec ia te  why i t  i s  th a t  sc ien ce  has made the "constan t and lin e a r"  p ro g ress  
re fe r re d  to  i n  the introduction* Science has made p ro g re ss  because i t s  participants  
have accepted th e  nominated end of the  a c t iv i ty ,  and because a method has been used 
xdiich guar an'bees that every step  is  a step forvfard®
The method by whidi one mod e l i s  rep laced  by another i s  one vjhlch 
guarantees that xfe X’e ta in  our b e s t  devices fo r  p re d ic tin g  the observed u n iv e rse  
u n t i l  'we have s a t i s f ie d  ourselves 'bhat th e re  are b e t te r  ones© At no point do we 
d e t a t  oh our se lves from any rung o f th e  ladder u n t i l  we ^ r c a c ÿ  have one foot on 
another rung we Imow to  be higher© Given a common acceptance o f the d irection  of 
our d e s t in a t io n , i t  i s  in e v ita b le  th a t  each move should be a move towards it*
We may reduce the c o n s titu e n t elem ents o f progress in  sc ience  to  two :
( l )  Universal, acceptance by th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  o f th e  nominated 
end ( a b i l i ty  to  p re d ic t  t i e  observed u n iv e rse  a s  much as 
p o ss ib le )
and (2) The adoption  by the p a r t ic ip a n ts  of th e  meihod o u tlin ed  
by t ie  m  or M2 —^ T —> CP — > IE — M2
We might n o te  that th e re  i s  a th ird  im plied co n d itio n , 'that sc ien ti 'b s  w i l l  exercise  
th e i r  im aginations to  c re a te  nexf con jec tu red  model systems (M2s), and th a t  th ey , or 
o th e rs , w i l l  use th e i r  Im aginative s lc ills  to  devise t e s t s  xtoich can b rin g  the  
com petition of a ltern atives to a c r i t ic a l  p o in t a t  xAich choice can be made® But
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th is  co n d itio n  amounts on ly  to  saying th a t th e re  must be s c ie n t i s t s  engaging in  
sc ien tif3 .c  activ ity©
Given th o se  c o n d itio n s , s c ie n t i f i c  progress w i l l  be made, even i f  i t  i s  
only th e  p rogress which covers an in c re as in g  knowledge of xhat proposed model 
systems are  n o t more adequate than e s ta b lish e d  ones# As we might expect from 
slnp le observation of the h is tb ry  of sc ience , the presm oe x\dth:Ln. th e  d is c ip l in e  o f 
h ig i ly  ta le n te d  and im aginative ind iv iduals can make a considerab le  d if fe re n c e  to  
the r a te  o f progress achieved© P rogress o f a much more d i r e c t  and ap p rec iab le  kind 
i s  made xiien an M2 &*uccess:Mly su p p lan ts  an îCL| so i t  i s  a good th in g  fo r  
s c ie n t i f i c  p rog ress i f  g rea t minds are xforking on the problem of c re a tin g  new 
models© Again, s c ie n t i f i c  progress i s  obvicusly accelerated i f  ta le n te d  people a re  
working on the problems concerned with the dev ising  o f c r i t i c a l  tests©  I t  would be 
a remarkable th ing  Indeed i f  toe progress of sc ience were smooto and regular, 
d e sp ite  th e  d iffe ren t, mental, q u a litie s  o f those who, at various tim es, have engaged 
in  th e  activ ity©  I t  has not been© I t s  ra te  has v aried  xdLth the m a l i t  y and numbers 
o f i t s  p a r t ic ip a n ts ;  but i t  has bean Itoear and unid irectional * Every d ec is io n  has 
rep resen ted  a step  nearer to  toe perhaps unattainable goal o f a b i l i ty  to  p re d ic t  
everything*
¥e should note that to e  s c i e n t i f i c  co n jec tu res  of model systems re p re se n t 
a t  temp t £  to  achieve the  chosen goal© I f  we xfere being l e s s  s p e c i f ic ,  we cou ld , 
w ithou t in accu racy , rep lace Ml and M2 by A1 and A2, where A1 represents th e  b e s t  
a ttem pt so f a r  to  reach towards the desired  end, and A2 i s  th e  proposed improvement * 
¥e  embark upon the- course of a c tio n  in  order to  f u l f i l  a huroan purpose ( in  th i s  
case, the a b i l i ty  to  ]predict the observed universe® ) Each proposed model i s  an 
attem pt to  achieve th a t  purpose more than did previous attempts® Wetan thus 
r e s ta te  our confiltuerit elem ents o f progress i n  sc ience  as :
38'23
( l )  U niversal acceptance by the p a r t ic ip a n ts  of th e  nominated 
end ,
and (2) The adoption by th e  p articip an ts c£ the method o u tlin ed
by tlie AAÿàa&k» ÆL or A2 T —> CP —  ^ IE — ^ A2
Once the c o n s titu e n t d.em ents a re  p u t in to  th i s  fo m , we can see  th a t
th e re  a re  no lo n g e r any terms w ith in  th e se  cond itions which re fe r  s p e c i f ic a l ly
and ex c lu s iv e ly  to  s c ie n t i f i c  ac tiv ity©  We have replaced P opper's  propositions *
P I and P2, by attem pts to  achieve th e  aim of the  activ ity *  (We n o te  to a t  in  
sc ience th e se  take the form of proposing models ÏCI and M2)* We have s u b s t itu te d  
te s t in g  fo r P opper's  th e o ry - te s t in g , and we have replaced the id e a  of error™ 
elim ination  by inadequacy «élimina tion* By tak in g  out the terms xAich referred to  
p ro p o s itio n s , th e w ie s  and errors, we have taken  the  equation  a i t  of th e  lim ite d  
realm of sc ien ce , and we can see th a t  s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv ity  rep re se n ts  only a sp e c ia l 
case determ ined by cond ition  ( l ) ,  the aim of th e  a c tiv ity »  These twin c o n s titu e n ts  
of s c ie n t i f i c  p rogress can be seen as  constituents of p rog ress which have a 
sp ec ific  a p p lic a tio n  in  the f i e l d of science©
Ml a t g ives s c ie n t i f i c  p ro g ress  i t s  p ecu liar ly  's c i e n t i f i c '  ch a rac te r a re  
the s p e c if ic  terms which we if r i t e  in  as a s p e c ia l  case in to  th o se  two genet'el 
c o n s titu e n t elem ents of progress# I t  i s  because the nominated end u n iv e rs a lly  
accepted by th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  is  the ev e r-in c reas in g  a b i l i t y  to  p re d ic t  the world 
of our o b se rv a tio n , and because the a ttem pts to  achieve th is  (A1 and A2) taice th e  
form of proposed models (ML and M2), th a t  th e  p rog ress becomes, i n  th i s  in s ta n c e , 
s c ie n t i f i c  progress* I t  x^ould be a nonsense to ask such questions as "Suppose 
sc ience bad d ifferen t atos?" because the aim is  i t s a l f  an imp or ta n t d efin ing  
c h a ra c te r i s t ic  of the a c tiv ity »  I t  becomes an equal ab su rd ity  to  ask questions 
concerning " s c ie n t i f ic  th e o r ie s  which cannot be te s te d " ,  s in ce  such th e o r ie s  would 
f a l l  o u ts id e  th e  ambit o f the  a p p lic a tio n  of conditjon (2 ) ,  and would th e re fo re  no t
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be sc ien tific®  I f  a px'oposal cannot be te s te d ,  then we cannot proceed through 
the  stages represented by th e  and xfe cannot e i th e r  p re fe r  i t  over i t s
r iv a ls , or r e je c t  i t#
In  one sense, even questions of the  form "But should sc ien ce  proceed in  
th i s  manner?" a re  bogus® I t  i s  sen sib le  to suggest th a t  s c i e n t i s t s  should adopt 
a p a r t ic u la r  way o f doing th in g s  i f  they  wish to  achieve th e i r  o b je c tiv e s , b u t i t  
should be apprécia ted th a t  i t  i s  tlie p u rs u it  of those o b je c tiv e s  ty th e  method 
described by co n d itio n  (2) xtoich define  the a c tiv ity #  I f  people nominate a ltern a tiv  
goa ls, or proceed to  then by o th e r methods, then  they a re  not engaging in  
s c i e n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty  a t  all© The an a ly s is  g iven above purports to  be a d escrip tion  
o f th e  elem ents of s c ie n t i f i c  progress® To suggest th a t  people should do th in g s  i n
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another way i s  to suggest th a t  they engage in  a c t iv it ie s  other th a n  th e  p u rs u it
o f s c ie n t i f i c  progress# The analysto  i s  claimed, in  o th e r  words, to  be an 
exam ination of what people must and do do when they  undertake s c i e n t i f i c  researcho 
I t  i s  q u ite  p o ss ib le  th a t  many p ra c t is in g  s c ie n t i s t s  migLit be found idio 
wou].d deny th a t  th e  above analysis accurately describes th e ir  a c t iv i t ie s #  I t  i s  
w ell to remember, in  th is  context, th a t  most sc len t to t s  thought (a id  some s t i l l  do) 
th a t  they  wore u sin g  in d u c tiv e  p ro cesses to  a rr iv e  a t  genera l th e o r ie s ;  and th a t  
idiis b e l i e f  continued long a f t e r  th e  lo g ic a l  im p o ss ib ility  of in d u c tio n  liad bem  
i l lu s tra te d ©  We judge s c i e n t i s t s  as good or bad on the b a s is  o f th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  
perform the a c t iv ity ,  not to  understand i t  or to  explain  i t#  The co n ten tio n  
h e re in  i s  that the two c o n s titu e n t elem ents, cond itions ( l )  and (2 ) ,  s u ff ic e  to  
give an account o f  th e  activ3.ty and th e  reasons for i t s  p ro g re ss , to o th e r  or 
no t th o se  actu a lly  engaged in  the ex e rc ise  f u l ly  a p p rec ia te  th is*
I t  cannot be doubted th a t  many s c ie n t i s t s  pursue i iie ir  a c t iv i t ie s  xcibh 
m otives o ther than th a t  of seeking to  extend our p re d ic tiv e  power ® Deal re  for
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f in a n c ia l g a in , for Nobel p r iz e s ,  for th e  esteem o f o n e 's  p eers, a l l  play a part 
in  m otivation» Haey might a l l  be determ ining fa c to rs  to ic h  decide people to  
propose new models or to devise so p h is tic a te d  tests®  The p o in t i s  th a t  because toe 
conventional ta rg e t  i s  the  ex tension  o f p re d ic tiv e  power, then success or f a i lu re  
o f  s c ie n t i s t s  as s c i e n t i s t s  i s  judged by th a t  standard* A s c i e n t i s t  such as 
Lysenko, who gained wealth and power i n  S t a l i n i s t  R ussia , i s  no t regarded  as a 
good or su ccessfu l s c ie n t i s t ,  because he i s  not judged by h is  own m otives, but by 
the conventional o b je c t o f science#
For Kxihn to  say , as he does, "There remains the  problem of under stand i
why p ro g ress  should be so note>K?rthy a c h a ra c te r is t ic  of an e n te rp r is e  conducted
19essay has d esc rib ed " , i s  fo r  him towith the techniques and g>als th i s  h is
t e l l  us th a t  he has fallied  to  understand c o rre c tly  the techn iques and goals o f 
science# As we have seen from the above a n a ly s is , p ro g ress i s  in e v ita b le  once 
cond itions ( l )  and (2) a re  sa tis fied ®  Kuhn's treatm ent of s c ie n t i f ic  rév o lu tio n s  
seems as much a psychological s tudy  as a p h ilo sophical one * No doubt th e re  are  
fa c to rs  which induce s c i e n t i s t s  to  Xiork from an assumed 'parad igm ', and d o u b tle ss , 
to o , the  young g enera tion  of s c i e n t i s t s  r e a c t  ag a in st th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e ir  
e ld e rs  and are  more in c lin ed  to  accept rev o lu tio n ary  paradigms# But none of th is  
r e a lly  deals with the  standards by which s c ie n t i s t s  are  judged, whatever to e l r  
p sycho log ica l m otivating facto rs#  No s c ie n t is t  would urge accept me e o f a new 
paradigm on the grounds th a t  i t  enabled a new genera tion  to  a s s e r t  i t s  independence 
from i t s  teachers#  And i f  one d id , cer ta in ly  no-one x^ould pay any a t te n t io n  to  i t#  
This might be h is  b as ic  m otivation, but in  order fo r  him to  g a in  acceptance (o r 
a t  l e a s t  favourable c o n s id e ra tio n ) , be xfould have to toow h w  th e  nexv paradigm was 
a b e t te r  model th an  toe old i n  re s p e c t  of i t s  u ses  for prediction*
In  dxfolling on the im portance o f  paradigms, Kulm is  s in g lin g  out for  
s p e c ia l a t te n t io n  xtoat i s  only one a sp e c t o f  s c ie n t i f i c  development# There are
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tim es , i t  i s  tru e , when our scheme o f  analogues stands in  need o f  majo r  stru ctural
a l te ra tio n #  There a re  p e rio d s  when anom alies and d isc rep an c ies  p i l e  up from
te s t in g , and th e  s c ie n t i f i c  community rea ] .ise s  th a t  i t s  p a r t ic u la r  model must
undergo a major overhaul i f  i t s  p re d ic tiv e  power i s  to  be enlarged  vo-thout lo s s  to
consistency# Such a s i tu a t io n  p rev a iled  i n  nuclear physics and electrom agnetic
r a d ia tio n  towards idie end of the M ineteaith  and toe beginning of toe Tw entieth
Century * A xtoole new range o f observed phenomena could nob be p re d ic te d
su c c e s s fu lly  by e x is t in g  models, and a majo r search was unde r taken on se v e ra l
f ro n ts  for proposed rep lacanents#  But th e  s c ie n t i f ic  'r e v o lu tio n ' is  only a
m agnified v e rs io n  of what goes on all. the  time in  s c ie n t i f ic  a c t i x l t y » Row much
change must th e re  be to  a model before i t  can be ca lle d  a new 'parad igm '? How
new must new ways of th in k in g  be b efo re  we can ta]Jc of 'r e v o lu t io n '?  Questions
such as th ese  lead  us to ap p rec ia te  th a t  i n  talk ing of s c ie n t i f i c  revo lu tion s,
we are  d iscu ss in g  questions o f s c a le ,  and not of kind » Every improvement of a
paradigm i s  a change o f model, whether th i s  be 'w ithin' th e  par-adigm, or beyond it*
Kuhn's paradigms assume for him a considerab le im portance in  toe
consideration of s c ie n t i f ic  progress# "P a r t o f the  answer to  th e  problem of
p ro g re ss" , he sa,ys, " l i e s  sim ply in  th e  eye of the  beholdecc©" " I t  i s  only during
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p erio d s  of normal science t h a t  p rog ress piems bo th  obvious and assured#" The 
phrase 'norm al sc ien c e ' he td-ces to  describe.' toe s itu  a tio n  in  which to e re  a re  not 
competing paradigms s tru g g lin g  for supremacy, and 'the term  'p ro g re s s ' he u se s  to 
denote "the resu lt of su c ce ss fu l c re a tiv e  work"# th a t  he i s  t e l l in g  us th a t  I t  
i s  only t o  en th e re  i s  a u n iv e rs a l paradigm , t i ia t  " su ccessfu l c re a tiv e  work" (xiithin  
t h a t  paradigm) w il l  be recognised fo r the  p rogress th a t  i t  is*  I t  is  n o t recognised  
during times of in te n se  paradigm com petition because the "very  fundamentals" are 
being q uestionned# I f  Kuhn is  t e l l in g  us in  a ra th e r  e la b o ra te  way th a t  th e  
improvement, o f  models i s  recognised a s  p rog ress except a t  such tim es as people
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thlnK the wWoW (ivoodel in j-\ecd o f h^^or Sulfccrsiicxn ia sttTActure. , tH ^vi
he i s  saying nothing co n tro v e rs ia l*  But we must nob lo s e  s ig h t o f th e  f a c t  t h a t ,
given the nominated aim of sc ience  to  extend oux" p re d ic t iv e  a b i l i t y ,  progress
re p re se n ts  a c tu a l in c re ase  in  our cap ac ity  fo r  successfh l p re d ic t io n , q u ite
re g a rd le ss  of whether i t  i s  recognised  a t  th e  tim e, or overlooked because i t
21deriv es from a 'wrong' paradigm* Given a c le a r  aim, p ro g ress  can be measured 
o b je c tiv e ly  by the r e la t iv e  degree to x^hich that aim is  a tta in ed *
Even though th is  an alysis i s  presented as a descx-iption o f  what . 
s c ie n t i s t s  must and do do vjhen they engage i n  s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty ,  i t  may be seen 
that in sp e c tio n  of toe  cond itions can le a d  to  the p ostu la tion  th a t  certa in  
p re v a ilin g  cond itions are  more conducive to  s c ie n t i f i c  p ro g ress  than  a re  others®
I t  may be taken  for granted th a t  acceptance of the nominated aim i s  a necessary  
co n d itio n  for progress; otherw ise there xfould he no ta rg e t  to make p rog ress 
twrardso Miat can by no means b© taken for granted i s  t h ^ s c i e n t i f i c  p rogress 
m i l  proceed a t  the  same r a te  regardless o f  conditions p revailin g  in  so c ie ty  
and i n  toe s c ie n t i f ic  community# Some of th e  fa c to rs  re p re sa ite d  b y  terms in  
toe
m. or M2 —>  T —> GP — > IE — ^M2 
can be in fluenced  by s o c ie ty 's  ix is tito tio rx a l arrangem ents and trad itions*  We are  
more l ik e ly  to  encounter th e  p ro p o s itio n  of u sefu l models i f  many, x'atoer than  
few, are  engaged in  toe a c t iv ity ,  and i f  no arbitrary b a rs  a re  p laced  on the 
type o f models to ic h  may be proposed# I f  a so c ie ty , for id e o lo g ic a l or re lig io u s  
or o th e r reasons, d elib era te ly  p ro h ib its  the form ulation  o f models w ith in  a certa in  
range, i t  i s  denying sc ience access to a group of p œ s ib ly  u sefu l p rop osals, and 
might xfell find  i t s  sc ie n to f ic  p ro g ress  re tarded»  S im ilarly  "with toe 'T* stage 
o f th e  methodo We e ^ e c t  progress to be f a s te r  where the?;e are  few est l im i t s  to 
testin g*  I f  there i s  freedom to  t e s t ,  and resources are  availab le for te s t in g ,  
then we would expect th e se  cond itions to  b e  more conducive to p ro g ress  than th e i r
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op p o sites  o And, o f course , i t  folloc^s that i f  a conmiunity i n s i s t s  on th e  r e tm t io n  
o f  c e r ta in  models, w ithout allowing them to  bo rep laced , then h e re , to o , progress 
i s  denied*
These conditions a re  aîjnost th e  opposite  of those which Kulm a lleg e s
to  p re v a i l  during p erio d s o f most progress® Kuhn a lle g e s  ( c o r re c t ly ,  I  th in k )  th a t
22s c ie n t i f i c  communities behave in  a r e s t r i c t i v e  manner » To o b ta in  p ro fe s s io n a l 
re co g n itio n  a t  the tim e, a p ra c tis in g  s c i e n t i s t  is  expected to  conform® The 
s c ie n t i f i c  community tends to  co ld -sh o u ld er th o se  xtoo do not 'accep t the 
paradigm '» As o f te n  as n ot, they are  dism issed a s  " c ra ik s" , and eoccluded from 
the re s p e c t o f t h e i r  peers# D espite apparent freedom to  c o n je c tu re , to  t e s t ,  
and to  re p la c e  models, the p re ssu re  of the  community often makes the  ex e rc ise  
of th i s  freedom very d i f f i c u l t  for the individual s c i e n t i s t  who w id ies to  
remain in  good standing  X'ith the  s c i e n t i f i c  profession , Tliese a re  the characterise* 
t i c s  of th o se  p e rio d s  in  which Kuhn says th e  paradigm to unchallenged : they are 
the periods of "normal" science© And y e t ,  says Kulm, these a re 'th e  v ery  p e rio d s  
in  which th e re  i s  unchallenged progress*
On the  b as is  o f  our examination of the  conditions req u ired  for progress, 
and of how the  in d iv id u a l fa c to rs  m ight be op tim ised , wo can on ly  look  upon the 
r e s t r i c t i v e  ten d en cies  of s c ie n t i f i c  communities as unfortunate lim ita tio n s  on 
p o ssib le  progress* The p ra c t ic e s  o f  the p rofessional body of sc ien tJ .s 'ts  during 
p erio d s of 'norm al' sc ience  can only r e s tr ic t  toe range and scope of proposed 
models and t e s t s ,  and in h ib it ,  ra th e r  than a c c e le ra te  the r a t e  o f  progress* I f  
s c ie n t i f i c  workers did n o t have to  f e a r  th e  d isapp rova l o f ,  and re jec tio n  by, th e i r  
p ee r group, they might be much more f r e e  w ith  t h e i r  c re a tiv e  thought and work, 
and might a c c e le ra te  progress i n  conséquence* The o f t-d e c la re d  id e a ls  of the  
s c ie n t i f i c  community, viz* o b je c t iv ity , fair-m indedness, w illin g n e ss  to consider
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any p o in t,  a re  much more ap p ro p ria te  to  the cond itions required fo r  p ro g re ss , 
than  are  theix ' moi'e narraf-m inded p rac tic e s#
Looked a t  more o b je c tiv e ly , x fitho it th e  confusion of talcing in to  
consideration what people thinlc a t th e  tlriB , we can see th a t  th e  s c ie n t i f i c  
'r e v o lu t io n s ' are regarded as much more toe p erio d s of g re a te s t  progress, than  
are the q u ieter , 'normal' times* Xtoan to e re  is  a major r e s tru c tu r in g  o f our 
model system , such th a t  a new gx’oup of phenomena i s  su cc essfu lly  bx’ought w ithin  
range o f our p re d ic tiv e  p afer, then we speak of d ran a tic  p rog ress being made*
This i s  what we would expect from our a n a ly s is , fox'* i t  i s  a t  such tim es th a t th e  
exposed weaknesses of tlie e s ta b lish e d  model system le sse n  tba p ressu re  for 
conform ity which the s c ie n t i f ic  community is  able to  bring to bear* I t  i s  a t  
such tim es that the  a t te n t io n  of many minds is  d ire c te d  to the problem , and th a t 
people a re  izorking on a wide v a r ie ty  of a te rn a tiv e s  ax'd t e s t  situations*
Popper has in troduced  a "Third World" (or "World I I I )  i n  to ic h  our
23p rop osition s, once u t te re d , gain o b je c tiv ity *  Unlike World I ,  toe world of 
e x te rn a l fa c t , or World I I ,  the world of our se lv e s , our thoughts and our emotions, 
World I I I  i s  concerned w ith  those ideas which we put forward as  conjectures#  One 
of the  im portan t p o in ts  he makes about World I I I  is  th a t  the  p ro p o sitio n s  we 
put in to  i t  become detatched  from ou rse lv es aid from our liv e s *  Tney become 
" o b je c t i f ie d " ,  :Ui th a t  they  stand to  be c r i t i c i s e d  only on th e ir  m e r its ,  and 
independently o f the 1i£b  and motive o f th e  per sons who form ulated them# Without 
n ecessa r ily  accepting  P opper's ' t i i . p a r t i t e '  d iv is io n , or even h is  ca tegor ies , i t  
i s  usefu l, to  think in  terms of h is  World I I I  when we a re  th ink ing  about 
s c ie n t i f i c  progress*  Kuhn th inks of progress as something t o t a l ly  su b je c tiv e , 
and so i t  i s  i n  a t  l e a s t  one sense# Obviously, any in d iv id u a l 's  id ea  of what 
s teps co n stitu te  prog ress w i l l  be determ ined by the aims lie envisages* As we 
sa id  i n  th e  in tro d u c tio n , one m an's progress i s  another m an's retrogression*
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There i s ,  hcwever, ano ther sense in  which p ro g ress can be though t of
more o b jec tiv â t,/*  The public d e lin e a tio n  of an a c t iv i ty  by a nominated aim does
d b je c tif^ r .to a t a c t iv i ty ,  and prova.de a s tan d ard  by which peX'fomance in  th a t
a c t iv i ty  can be judged, w ithout regard  to  to e  in d iv id u a l aims of th o se  who
p a r t i  G ip  ate» I t  i s  as i f  sc ien ce  as a d is c ip lin e  has had i t s  o b je c tiv e s  p laced
in to  a kind of World I I I*  Tiie aim of sc ien c e , to  in c re a se  a b i l i ty  to p re d ic t  the
observed u n iv e rse , has been o b je c tif ie d  beyond the reach  of th e  p ro fe s s io n a l
24body of sc ien tis ts®  M ille they  might bestow p ra is e  on conform ist behaviouîr, and 
blame on the  independent mavericks o f  the  d isc ip lin e , toey  are no lo n g e r in  an 
p o s it io n  to  control the  judgement over M iat behaviour i s  's c l a i t i f i c  ' ,  or what 
proposed models c o n s t i tu te  'p rogress '®  These are new judged ag a in s t the  
measuring-rod ' which l i e s  beyond th e i r  reach i n  World I I I*
In  ta lk in g  of th e  p ro g ress  w hich, to  Kulm, seems so conspicuously  absent 
in  n o n -s c ie n tif ic  f i e ld s ,  Kuhn says, " I f  we doubt, as many do, t h a t  n o n -sc ien tifio  
.f ie ld s  make p ro g re ss , th a t  cannot be because individu a l schools make none o R ather 
i t  must be because th e re  a re  always competing sch o o ls , each of ih ic h  co n s ta n tly  
q uestions the  v ery  foundations o f the o thers*" His claim  is  to a t  w hile th e re  i s  
progress i n  each schoo l, by " su ccessfu l c re a tiv e  work", th e re  i s  no p rog ress in  
the f ie ld  as a whole because, th e re  a re  o th e r  schooto a ttac k in g  toe le g itim acy  of 
every o ther school* I f  we consider the sixigle school m th  in  the f i e ld ,  fox' th e  
moment, we can ask p e r t in e n t ly  how "su ccessfh l"  c re a t iv e  work i s  to be d is tin g u ish ec  
from u n su ccessfu l c re a tiv e  work* By what standard i s  mice ess Bieasux'ed? I f  th e re  
i s  progress w ith in  an In d iv id u a l school, i t  can only be i n  to e  form of a neare r 
approach to  whatever th a t  school regards as the end of the a c tiv ity *  And i f  o ther 
schools do no t admit th a t  th i s  change can be described as progress, eingn though 
i t  be a nearer approach to  the aim of the school which produced i t ,  i t  mupfit be
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because they are  not in  agreement m th  th a t  school concerning *ihe ob jectives o f the  
a c tiv i ty o  These " very fundam entals” *üiat are  ca lled  in to  q u es tio n  are, in  f a c t ,  
\dews about the end sought by the exercise#
I f  th ese  n o n -sc ien tif ic  f i e ld s  were agreed w ith in  each d isc ip lin e  upon 
idle o b je c tiv e  sought, then  they  could hope to  e s ta b lish  by t e s t l i g  v iie ther any 
new proposal from one p a r t ic u la r  schoo l rep resen ted  a nearer approach to  t h a t  endo 
Acceptance by the  various (schools composing a d is c ip l in e  of an agreed paradigm, is  
la rg e ly  irre levan t®  Even w ithout a paradigm , they can t e s t  to see which of the  
proposed paradigms b e s t  enables the o b je c tiv e  to  be achieved® Whereas i f  they  
have paradigm b u t no c le a r  s i^ i t  o f t h e i r  o b je c tiv e , then te s t in g  i s  rendered 
m eaningless s ince  t i e y  have nothing to  t e s t  for® What i s  m issing from th e se  
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  which no p rog ress i s  made Is  no t the agreement on a paradigm , b u t 
agreement on an objective®
We saw t h a t  the two co n d itio lE: for p ro g re ss  ( l )  and (2 ) ,  (given a t  the 
top of page 58)9  contained no terms re la t in g  ex c lu s iv e ly  to  s c i e n t i f i c  a c t iv ity @ 
What they d escrib e  j o in t ly  i s  a p ro cess  by which attem pts to  achieve a chosen end 
converge on th e  ever-increasing fu lfillm en t of that end® Both cond itions must 
be met before progress can be made® Wlien Kuhn ta lk s  about the qaestionnirig  of 
’’very fundam entals” by opposing schools beiujg the reason for la c k  of o v e ra ll 
p ro g ress  w ith  any p a r t ic u la r  f i e l d , we can point, out, more a c c u ra te ly , th a t  
co n d itio n  ( l )  i s  not being fhlfiH ed®  They who d isag ree  about what is  to  be 
done can never a g r e e ‘about ihe  value o f what has been  done® But those who ^  
agree about what i s  to  be done can fjuid i n  the equation  of our co n d itio n  (2 ) 
a method which w il l  enable them to  converge on i t s  achievem ent<> Science i s  or.io 
a c t iv i ty  i n  which p rog ress has been made throu^  th e  use o f a convergent method 
to  achieve an agreed objective® As we s h a ll  see l a t e r  i n  th i s  work, th e re  a re  
otherSo
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Chapter 3
A NEW »iA R C A T IO N
"Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a 
considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science| but arise 
either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into 
subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular 
superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise 
these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chaced from the 
open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon 
every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and 
prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is 
oppressed® And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, 
and willingly receive them with reverence and submission, as their le^l sovereigns,
“ B&vid Hume I ’An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’.
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A p ro p o s itio n  which p u rp o rts  t o  concern i t s e l f  x-jith r e a l i t y ,  and y e t 
which has no im plied consequences d e te c ta b le  in  the observed u n iv e rse , i s  a t  once 
a source of puzzlement and I r r i t a t i o n  to  iiiin k ers  of more empirical bento 
E m p iric is ts  (and o th e rs) have r ig h t ly  f e l t  th a t  th e re  i s  an im portant d if fe re n c e  in 
kind:.between co n jec tu res  of the  s c ie n t i f i c  kind, ^hich have added so much to  
our in te s ip re ta tio n  o f , and a b i l i t y  to  p r e d ic t ,  the observed u n iv e rse , and th o se  
more sp e c u la tiv e  fan c ie s  which do no t appear to  concern them selves with any r e a l i t y  
th a t  man can hope to  g e t to  g r ip s  with® C onjectures which have no im p lica tio n s  for 
the world of our observation cannot be sub jec ted  to' the equation  described in  our 
co n d itio n  (2)® They cannot be te s te d ,  nor can com petitors be brought to a c r i s i s  
p o in t a t  which th e re  can be d e c is io n  to  eliminate the le s s  adequate® Because they  
represent bewildering anomalies in  an o therw ise smoothly-running system , ph ilosopher 
of some schools have sought to e lim in a te  them from co n s id e ra tio n ; and i t  i s  th is  
d e s ire  to  d ism iss th e se  ’m etaphysica l’ p ro p o sitio n s  which l i e s  a t  the  hea);t of tlie 
’ Dema rc a tio  n Deba te  * «
1The a t ta n p t  o f the Vienna C irc le  of lo g ic a l  p o s i t iv i s t s  was to  e s ta b lis h  
standards o f meaning fu lness which m etaphysical propositions would f a i l»  Whereas 
the  e s ta b lish e d  common sense view  of nam ing  >7ould have i t  th a t  th e re  a re  t^ro 
co nd itions which must be s a t i s f i e d  before a proposition can be considered 'm eaningful., 
namely;
( l )  The language in  the propos I t i c m l  s tat orient must be used 
c o r re c t ly ,
end (2) The words contained  in  the p ro p o s itio n  must them selves be 
m eaningful,
the Vienna C irc le  m aintainsd th a t  a th ird  co n d itio n  must a lso  be s a t i s f i e d ,  t h a t :
(3) Tlie words must exp ress e ith e r  a tautology, or a p ro p o s itio n  
wii'jch i s  capable, a t  l e a s t  in  p r in c ip le , of being v e rif ied o
I t  may be seen th a t  w hile iTietaphyslcal propositions might hope to pass ( l )  and. (2), 
the y would undoubtedly f a l l  ( 3 ) ,  and could th e re fo re  be dismiss ed as ’l i t e r a l  
nonsense’ ®
This approach has the  advantage for e m p ir ic is ts  th a t they need tales no 
n o tic e  a t  a l l  of m etaphysical p ro p o sitio n so  I f  they l i e  beyond th e  demarcation 
l i n e , then they are  m eaningless and can be ignored® The disadvantage i s  th a t the 
procedure i s  unsound « Mot only does the notion of ’v e r i f i c a t io n ’ démand 
im possib le  p roo f th a t  our senses do n o t deceive us >jhen we attem pt to  v e r ify  
anything, bu t i t  also ru le s  out most of - th e  most im portant co n jec tu res  of th e  
n a tu ra l sciences, A general law of na tu re  can never be verified, s in c e  i t  p u rp o rts  
to  account for every specific in s ta n c e  of a genera], rule. We can never observe 
every p o ss ib le  c a se , and cannot, th e re fo re ,  verify the law . Thus i f  v e r i f ic a t io n  
i s  a s tandard  of meaning fu ln e s s , then  a l l  of our physical ’laws of nature’ are  
nonsense.
Some phi].osophers (but notably not Popper) have t r i e d  to remedy th e
d e fec t by substituting the  n o tio n  of ’falsification’ for v e r i f ic a t io n  in the
3ex tra  requirem ent for irean ingfu lness. Again, not only is th e re  the same problem 
of a re lia n c e  on sensory  evidence, but a whole c la s s  of innocent-sounding 
p ro p o sitio n s  of th e  form ’’P e rp e tu a l m otion raachires e x is t"  would be reduced to 
the realms of g ib b e rish , Obvi.ously, such propositions could never be f a l s i f i e d ,  
since  once would need to  in sp e c t sim ultaneously  a l l  p a r ts  of th e  universe in  
o rder to  e s ta b lish  th a t  tliere were none (even i f  one could , m y sterio u sly , assume 
th a t  one was obser\ang r e l ia b ly )  ®
The f a i lu r e  o f any of th e se  proposed a d d itio n a l requirements fo r meaning- 
fu ln ess  to  gain  wide acceptance d e r iv e s , in p a r t ,  from the f a c t  th a t  they  a l l  invo l\ 
us i n  throwing away too  many im portant bab ies with the metaphysical, ba thw ater, The
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failure derives, too, from any lack of objectivity in the establishment of
such requirements. Even if all of the parties opposed to metaphysics were to
agree on a third requirement, and even if it were one that enabled the conjectures
of the natural sciences to be retained,' the way would still be open for those who
4*indulge in metaphysical speculation to simply record their disagreement. They
mi^t claim, with justice, that no objective standard required them to accept any
requirement for meaningfulness beyond the established coiranonsense requirements (l)
and. (2), that the extra condition was only included to cut out metaphysics, and
that since they saw no reason to exclude it, they would continue to talk what
others regarded as nonsense.
The failure of the logical positivists and others to exclude metaphysics
as meaningless does not mean, however, that we have to admit that there is no
difference in kind between propositions which have observable implications and
those which are completely speculative. Popper has looked for differences in
fields other than meaningfulness. His contention is the more limited one that
metaphysical propositions do not belong in the world of science. Conceding that
they may be meaningful, he relegates them to the category of non-science, rather 
5*than nonsense. Popper's account of science may be summarised simply but not 
unfairly by saying that he regards science as an attempt to gain increasing 
verisimilitude ("correspondence with the facts") by trial and error-elimination 
on our propositions. His shorthand to express this is
P1 — >  TT — ^  ES — > P2 
What Popper sayd of metaphysical propositions is that, since they are untestable, 
they cannot be subjected to the methods of science, and must therefore be regarded 
as lying outside the scope of that activity. He does not deal with the question 
of whether or not metaphysics can represent an attempt to obtain increasing 
correspondence with the facts by any method other than that of trial and error- 
elimination.
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What Popper has done I s  to  s u b s ta n tia te  h is  c laim  by d e f in i t io n .  A fter
a rigorous an a ly sis  of what i s  c o n s titu te d  by s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty ^  Popper has
produced a t ig h t  d e f in i t io n  of i t  which w i l l  not admit m etaphysical ac tiv ity®  One
cannot b u t admit th a t  i f  Popper’s account of sc ien ce  is correct®  then  he i s
c e r ta in ly  r ig h t  to  p o in t out th a t  m etaphysics has no p lace  in  tills® I f  sc ien ce  i s
a search  fo r  in c reas in g  tru th  con ten t and lav e r falsity content  ^ and i f  te s t in g
can, enable us to e lim in a te  e rro r from p ro p o sitio n s^  then obviously  an unte stable
p ro p o s itio n  can never compete i n  the erro x '-e lim in a tio n  s tak es  and can have no
6p lace in  the activ ity®
Although 'th is thesis o f fe r s  a view of sc ience which d i f f e r s  i n  key 
fundamentals from Popper’s account^ i t  is  certainly s im ila r  i n  th is  respect. The 
p ic tu re  of science presented herein; namely t h a t  of a q u e s t-fo r  ever ^increasing 
a b i l i t y  to  p re d ic t  th e  observed u n iv e rse  by  the systematic com petitive  te s t in g  
of a l te rn a t iv e  mod els j, and a l im in a tio n  a f te r  c r i t i c a l  te s t in g  of those found le s s  
adequate to  oar purposes than their rivals^ enables us to  t r e a t  m etaphysics in  
the same way. M etaphysical conjectures can be excluded from s c ie n t i f i c  activity 
on two gi"ound8o Firstly^ they are  not designed to  a s s i s t  us i n  the ta sk  o f 
p re d ic tin g  the world of o b se rv a tio n i and secondly, s ince  they  are  u n te s ta b le ,  we 
can never make a choice between c o n f lic t in g  ones on the b as is  of tjh ich b e s t se rv es 
our purpose.
D espite the agreement w ith  Popper th a t  m e t^ h y s ic s  has no p a r t  to  p lay  
in  s c ie n t i f i c  activity, the  implication of this th e s ia  is tlia t Popper ’ s exclusion  
of m etaphysics i s  an unnecessarily narrow one, and th a t  m etaphysics can be 
excluded from o t ie r  a c t iv l . t i s s  as w e ll a s  from science® The d e s ire  to  dism iss 
m etaphysical p ro p o s itio n s  was s ta te d  ( in  the f i r s t  paragraph of th is  se c tio n ) to 
l i e  a t  the  heart of th e  dem arcation debate® To my mind, this provides the key to 
the  debates i t  i s  a d e s ire  to  dj-smiss them® The attempts of various schools to•V n«»uda:T^EV-.iscan»u. —
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set up objective standards which will exclude metaphysics were prompted by that
desire. Whether one talks of sense versus nonsense, of science versus non-science,
7or of "progressive problemshift" versus "degenerating problemshift", the 
attempt is the same. It is to prevent us from being bothered by metaphysical 
theories on which we can never have any reasons for making conventional decisions. 
All of the proposed demarcation lines are drawn in such a way that metaphysics 
will lie beyond them: they are drawn so because people do not want to have to 
deal with metaphysical theories.
All of these proposed standards have the weakness that they are attempt­
ing to achieve one purpose by the imposition of another standard. It ig a human 
foible which we often encounter in daily life: we have all seen or read about 
foreign countries where racial minorities are debarred from voting not because 
they are of the 'wrong* ethnic origins, but because they fail the 'literacy test* 
or the 'property test*. It seems to be a human weakness that where we think our 
desires are somewhat disreputable, We cloak them in the garb of another standard. 
In the demarcation debate, it would seem that the desire to exclude metaphysics 
has inspired the variously proposed standards of admission. "Nonsense",
"non-science", "degenerating problemshift", and the like are all devices designed 
to serve a purpose substantially different from the apparent purpose. The weakness 
of metaphysical propositions lies in the fact that we have no way of comparing 
their value either with each other, or with our testable propositions. I see 
nothing to be ^ined by sheltering behind the cover of an alleged objective 
standard, instead of admitting that this is the reason why we are determined to 
exclude metaphysics from our consideration. I therefore propose that we should 
clarify the demarcation issue by stating it in the terms which best malce clear our 
intentions; that we should express our determination to take into consideration 
only such propositions as will allow us to take conventional decisions.
%The ’conventional d e c is io n s ’ which we take  are  whether to  r e ta in  a 
p roposal as more adequate , or to r e j e c t  i t  as l e s s  adequate , than i t s  rivals®
And by ’adequate’ , we re fe r  to our a b i l i t y  to  use i t  to  achieve th e  aim of th e  
ac tiv ity®  Folloi^ing the c r i t i c is m  and m o d ifica tio n  of Popper’s account of 
s c ie n t i f i c  method, we found ou rse lves l e f t  m t h  a com bination of conditions th a t  
contained  no terms exc lusive  to  science* The condi-tions were
(1) Universal, acceptance by the p a r tic ip a n b s  of the nominated
end,
and (2) The adoption by th e  participants o f  th e  method outlined by 
the Al or A2 T CP — > IE — > A2
In  order to  d ispose of tae  in superab le  o b jec tions to  Popper’s account, we had to 
produce a description of s c ie n t i f i c  p ro g ress  in  which liie conventional aspects  
are  much more exp lic it®  In  doing so , we have a rriv ed  a t  cond itions which id  11, 
when m et, g ive r i s e  to  p rogress in aotivities other than  sc ience . If we agree
about what is  to  be done, then  we can compare our attem pts to achieve it, and
s e le c t  those a ttem pts which te s t in g  rev ea ls  to  be more adequate than th e i r  r iv a ls  
in  hi a t respect®
l# a t  we can' say about m etaphysical p ropositions is  not only that they  
have no p lace  i n  the woïfld o f  sc ien ce  (though we agree w ith Poppe:r i i ia t  th i s  i s  
s o ) ,  bu t a lso  th a t  we can never hope to  make any p rogress %d_th regard  to  the 
a lleg ed  in fo rm ation  con ten t o f  such propositions * I t  m aybe th a t  thqy are te s ta b le  
for f a c to rs  o ther than  th e ir  ’in fo rm ation  content’ : this w ill  be considered belowo 
For the moment, however, we can say th a t  s in c e  th e se  p ro p o s itio n s  a re , by 'th e ir  
n a tu re , un tes table for t h e i r  co n ten t, we cannot use the method o u tlin ed  by th e
of co n d itio n  (2 ) ,  and cannot the refere hope to  p ro g ress  towards any end 
th a t  might be nominated as our co n d itio n  (l)® P ropositions wliich are  u n te  s ta b le  
are  to  be re je c te d  by an avoifedly conventional d ec is io n  not because they are
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4>m eaningless (lA ich  t h e y  may, or may not, b e ) ,  or even because they a re  n o n « sc ien tl 
(which th ey  c e r ta in ly  a r e ) ,  bu t because tliey a re  val.uelesse We can never 
use theuu i f  they a re  u n te s ta b le , to nnaJce p ro g ress  towards any end, and therefore 
we dism iss them® This the reason ; i t  needs no s u r re p ti t io u s  suppo rt by refer en 
to  d i f f e r e n t  e x te rn a l standards®
The nom ination of an o b je c tiv e  to  gain  in c reas in g  a b i l i ty  to  p r e d ic t  and 
to  r e tro  die t  the u n iv e rse  as we observe i t ,  m th  1iie  s u b s t i tu t io n  of the more 
s p e c if ic  ’proposed models’ , FO, and M2, in  p lace of the  more gaieraL ’a t ta ï ip ts ’ , Al 
and A2, i s  what makes our tw o -p art an a ly s is  apply s p e c i f ic a l ly  to  s c ia n t i f i c  
activity. But unte stable p ro p o s itio n s , by ly in g  o u ts id e  th e  ambit of the 
equation  of co n d itio n  (2 ) even in  i t s  genera l form, can never a s s i s t  us i n  progress:
t(7wards the  achievement of any aim whatsoever# This is  why they c o n s ti tu te  "a
source of puzzlem ent and ir r i ta t io n " ®  We do not know "what to  do w ith them because 
nothing can be done m ü i them® I f  metaphysical p ro p o sitio n s  were u n te s ta b le  in  a l l  
f i e ld s ,  th en  we would be unable to  make conventional decisions about them in  a l l  
fields®
I t  ïïdght seem outrageous to  some th a t  one should be advocating the 
d ism issa l from co n s id e ra tio n  of p ro p o sitio n s  wliich "mi.ght be true" * The p o in t i s  
th a t  th e  question  of whether or no t they m i^ t  be true* has nothing whatsoever to  
do Tjith our co n s id e ra tio n  of them® In  principle, any proposition e x c ^ t  a s e l f -  
co n tra d ic tin g  one "might be t ru e " .  We can never have any reason fo r an a s s e r t io n  
th a t  any p ro p o s itio n  (except a tau to lo g ica l, or s e lf -c o n tra d ic tin g  one) i s  e i th e r  
t r u e ,  or false® The tenor of th is  th e s is  i s  that we a re  no t even concerned 
d ir e c t ly  w ith t r u th  or false-hood. But even i f  we were, we T-joxild s t i l l  have no 
grounds for such an assertion. Our co n s id e ra tio n  of than i s  l im ite d  to  th e i r
ca p ac ity  to  serve our ends. We do n o t accqxt a p i'o p o sitlo n  as t ru e ;  we r e ta in  i t
fo r the time being as more adequate than  i t s  r iv a ls  a t  assisting us to  achieve
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our objectives®  S im ila r ly , we do not d ec la re  a p ro p o s itio n  to  be f a l s e ;  we r e je c t
i t  as l e s s  adequate th an  i t s  rivals®  Any p ro p o sitio n  "might be t r u e " .  The ones
we are  in te re s te d  i n  a re  t i e  ones which can , by te s t in g ,  give us reason to p re fe r
them over th e i r  r i v a l s ,  or to  r e j e c t  them in  favour of th o se  r iv a la  ® To say t h a t
m etaphysical p ro p o sitio n s  should be considered because they a re  meaningful and
because they  might be t r u e ,  i s  to  say no more than th a t  a l l  meaiingfTxl p ro p o s itio n s
Bshould be considered which do not a c tu a lly  c o n tra d ic t  'fchemselveso
I f  we were to  adiidt in to  our co n s id e ra tio n  the range of u n te s tab le
p ro p o s itio n s , in  xAat form would th is  ’c o n s id e ra tio n ’ m an ifest i t s e l f ?  Miat
would we do w ith them? Hav would we ev a lu a te  them? Quite c le a r ly ,  s in ce  they are
u n te s ta b le , we cannot be expected to  compare them in  r e f l e c t  of iheix^ a b i l i t y  to
out«*perform their r iv a ls  in  te s t in g ,  and to thus enable us to  approach nearer
to  any objectives®  We are left with them f lo a tin g  in  the air, unanchored to  the
iforld o f  observa tion  and experience , and w ithout j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of any kind for
ranking them above or below th e i r  r iv a l s .  I f  the proponents of u n te s ta b le
p ro p o s itio n s  wish to  have th e i r  theories adm itted to  c o n s id e ra tio n , they should
in d ic a te  what i t  i s  th a t we a re  supposed to  do liien we ’c o n s id e r’ them® Perhaps
. . .  9we are  expected to  be].ieve in  them, to  award iliem for some r e a ^ n  an a c t of faith®
Perhaps, by b e lie v in g , we a re  enabled to  achieve aims i n  l i f e  which are thought 
w o rth iA ile . I f  t h i s  i s  so , then presumably th e  achievement can be te s te d ,  even i f  
the co n ten t of the b e l i e f  cm inot be®
Our new dem arcation line, th en , i s  drawn q u ite  openly a t th e  p o in t  of 
u se fu ln e ss . Only te s ta b le  theories can serve our aims, since  on ly  by te s t in g  can 
we be le d  to  p re fe r  some of th e se  th e o r ie s  over o th e rs  i n  re s p e c t  of th e ir  ability 
to  enable us to approach c lo s e r  to  t ie  rCulfilZment of those aims® We can say th a t  
a proposition i s  u se fu l in so fa r  as i t  is  te s ta b le .  There i s  a c la s s  o f  p ro p o s itio n  
to  be considered which f a l l s  i n  n e ith e r of the tw  camps @ That is a p ro p o s itio n  whi
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although no t te s ta b le  lAen proposed, might become te s ta b le  a t  some subsequent date. 
P la in ly , to  those who encounter it, i t  corns neither in  the c la s s  o f te s ta b le  
p ro p o s itio n s , nor in the c la s s  o f  px^opositions which can never be te s te d .  And since  
one cannot Imow in  advance what advances w il l  be made i n  science and technology 
(or o th e r ap p ro p ria te  fields), th e re  w i l l  always be some th e o r ie s  which, althoujÿi 
u n te s ta b le , do nonetheless admit o f  the  p o s s ib i l i ty  of te s t in g  a t  some u n sp ec if ied  
time in  the iiiture® On which s id e  o f our new l in e  of donarcation  are  we to  p la c e  
such p ro p o s itio n s?  I f  we consider, by way of example, the atomic iiieory o f 
Dem ocritus, we can ap p rec ia te  th a t  when i t  was form ulated , i t  was no t only  untestab'J
iOb u t no-one could see any p o ss ib le  way i n  which i t  might ev en tu a lly  be tested®
On such an issu e  one f in d s  i t  very difficult to  avoid being in fluenced  
by the knowledge th a t the proposal of Democritus did subsequently  turn out to  be 
a model which had u se  i n  increasing our p re d ic tiv e  power® One wishes, naturally, 
to  adopt a procedure wliich would not have dism issed it. D espite  t h i s  w ish , th e re  
are  some th in g s  which must be said about the theory* F i r s t l y ,  l ik e  so many of th e  
th e o r ie s  o f th e  Greeks, i t  was com pletely  speculative: i t  did purport to g ive  
an account of the observable w orld , but only i n  terms which, so fa r as Democritus 
and h is  tim e were concerned, not only could not be te s te d  ag a in s t competing 
th e o r ie s ,  bu t fo r i-jhich no-one could even conceive of any p o ss ib le  test. Secondly, 
the  theo ry  in  question  was a t  par .wdth o th e r , equa lly  sp e c u la tiv e  (and contradictory 
theories; and t h a t ,  in  the absence o f  t e s t in g ,  no-one could have any reason  for 
p re fe r r in g  some and re je c t in g  others*
I t  i s  tru e  th a t  tlie atomic theory  of D aaocritus (or a rev ised  v e rs io n  of 
i t )  subsequently became useful; but i t  only became u se fu l vhen i t  became te s ta b le .  
Many hundreds o f  years a fb e r the  f i r s t  fo rm u la tion  of the th eo ry , when s u f f i c ie n t  
p ro g ress  had been made w ithou t th e  u se  of the  theory fo r  i t  to  be compared w ith  
others fo r  a b i l i ty  to  p re d ic t  the  observed u n iv e rse , only then  could people have
10 4 0
any reason  to  r e ta in  i t  or to  r e je c t  i t ,  and to  c o n s tm c t fa r th e r  models on i t s  
foun d atio n s. But at the tim e of i t s  fo rm u la tion , i t s  onl.y value lay  i n  i t s  
p o te n tia l  fo r  testability -  a p o te n t ia l  possessed in  p r in c ip le  by some of tlie  
counte r -ü ie o r ie s  of the time @
We can see from the foregoixig d iscu ss io n  ih a t propositions of th is  th i r d  
type in  no w ise p resen t o b jec tio n s to a dem arcation based on v a lu e . I f  te s ta b i l i ty ^  
i s  th e  key to  v a lu e , th en  p ro p o sitio n s  become o f value to  us as  they become
testable®  Theories l ik e  Demonritus ’ a re  only u s e fu l In so fa r  a s  they m ight become
te s ta b le ,  in th a t  contem plation of the theo ry  m i^ it in sp ire  sk il& il minds to  work 
on the advances which w i l l  be req u ired  befo re  they  do become testable. I f ,  as 
was a c tu a lly  the case with the theory of Democritus, th e re  i s  n o t even any 
conceivable way in lA ich  they m i^it become testatO-e, they must be s e t  a s id e  as 
non-USefu.1 until such time as circum stances may change to admit them® Bat l e t  it 
be remembered th a t  p ro p o sitio n s  which are  not susceptible to  t e s t ,  and which, by
th e i r  very n a tu re , wD.l always be u n te s ta b le , w ill a].ways be non-useful*
None o f this argument is  ca lcu la te d  to e s ta b lish  that a p ro p o s itio n  
which i s  o f  no value i n  one f ie ld  o f endeavour might n o t have i t s  uses i n  another. 
I t  might be claimed by th o se  m th  a l ik in g  for metaphysical p ro p o sitio n s  th a t ,  
even though th ese  do not belong i n  the  i^ r ld  of sc ience, they might have th e i r  
u ses in  other f i e ld s .  I t  i s  not a claim e a s i ly  established®  As we saw from 
co n s id e ra tio n  of the genera l case , i f  a t ta n p ts  cannot be ra te d  ag a in st each o ther 
by te s t in g ,  then  we cannot hope to diminate those l e s s  adequate a t achieving the 
desired  end. In  o ther w^rds, whenever we have an aim in  view, then an a tta n p t to  
achieve th a t  aim cannot a s s i s t  p rog ress unless i t  can be rated ag a in st o ther 
attem pts by t e s t in g .  Thus any u n te s ta b le  p ro p o s itio n  cannot be of use to  us for 
any huitian ainu
u .
There a r e ,  however, p ro p o sitio n s  which a re  u n te s ta b le  in  some f i e ld s  but
not i n  o th e rs . The ’f i e l d ’ i s  d e lin ea ted  by th e  aim® M etaphysical p ro p o s itio n s
a re  th o se  which cannot be te s te d  fox' t h e i r  in to  xmi at ion  content. We c a l l  a
p ro p o s itio n  of the form "The A bsolute is  o u ts id e  tiim " metsphysicaL because t i e r e
i s  no conceivable te s t in g  pr ogx-aime th a t  would ©lable us to  say xAether th a t
p ro p o s itio n  were preferable to, say, "The Absolute Is  in s id e  time", But i t  i s
q u ite  conceivable th a t  we might wi_sh to  use  th a t p ro p o s itio n  fo r an aim n o t
concerned ir ith  i t s  in fo rm ation  content, Thus, xA ile we cannot t e s t  to  determ ine
whether* the p ro p o s itio n  "The A bsolute i s  outside tim e" i s  p re fe ra b le  to i t s  r iv a ls
in  in c reas in g  our a b i l i t y  to  p re d ic t  th e  obsex'ved uni.verse, we can most c e r ta in ly
t e s t  i t  for a v a r ie ty  of othexr aims not d i r e c t ly  concerned w ith  i t s  i n t e l l i g i b l e
conten te We can t e s t ,  for example, t o  see whether or nab the u tte ra n c e  of i t
th re e  tim es a t  th e  top of a h igh  mountain w i l l  b ring  r a in  more re a d i ly  than w il l
rival, utterances such as "Abracadabra"; or we can t e s t  to  see i f  the holding of
particular unbeatable b e l ie f s  b r in g s  about desieable rewards measured in terms of
the q u a l i ty  of life. The b e l ie f  remains u n te s ta b le ; but the  e f f e c ts  consequent
upon i t s  b e l i e f  ajre te s ta b le ,  e i th e r  by the in d iv id u a l concerned, or by others®
Thus even m etaphysical p ro p o s itio n s , although u n te s tab le  in  th e  .Held of sciexice or
epistem ology, might well be te s ta b le  for theix' a b i l i t y  to  a s s i s t  us "bo achieve othe?
aimse T)iey might be u se f .il  e i th e r  xAiere we seek an ’in s p i r a t io n a l ’ e f f e c t ,  or
vhere we are  sedcing an e f f e c t  which is " in can ta to ry  and an ti« ra tio n a l®  A magical
i lra th e r  than  a philosophical u se  of language"®
L est this seem f a n c i fu l ,  we shculd r e f l e c t  th a t  a s u b s ta n tia l  body of 
m etaphysical propositions is claiïïisd by its adhsreJ.its to have something approaching 
th is  kind of effect®  Wliile m etaphysical propositions might no t be u s e fu l  i n  th e  
ta sk  o f  p re d ic tin g  the observed u n iv e rse , i t  i s  claimed th a t  they are  u s e fu l in  
other ways® P ropositions of a r e l ig io u s  nature, i t  i s  claim ed, enable people to
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le a d  b e t te r ,  more moral lives, to  experience a warm ^ow  of in te r n a l  s e c u r i ty .
Wlrile th e se  a re  no t concerned with the p u rs u it  of la iarledge, we cou].d hardly deny 
til a t  such p ro p o s itio n s  undoubtedly have th e  l ig h t to  be ca lle d  ’usefu l*  i f  they  
can achieve such effects® The p o in t i s ,  though, th a t  they a re  te s ta b le  fo r  these ^ »nilTr«.'«a\es3iiA,t.'U!'JèS4â£iA>
e f f e c t s .  We only cal,l propositions non-usefu l for fields in  v^ich  ihey are 
untestable®  I t  may w e ll be th a t th e  u t te ra n c e  o f a propmition no t te s ta b le  w ith 
re sp e c t to  i t s  i n t e l l i g ib le  conbm t nonetheless a ia b le s  o ther ends to  be achieved® 
hlxare th i s  i s  iiie case  i t  i s  because i t  i s  te s ta b le  fo r those ends® An in d iv id u a l 
is in a p o s it io n  to t e s t  if th e  u tte ra n c e  or contemplation of a metaphysical 
p ro p o s itio n  achieves the  purpose of c re a tin g  "a warm glow of in te rn a l  se c u r ity "  
b e t t e r  than do o th e r propositions®  He can even t e s t ,  by h is  a^n s ta n d a rd s , id ie t te r  
m etaphysical p ro p o sitio n s  do enable o th e rs  to lead  what he regards a s  b e t t e r ,  
more m oral, lives®  I t  i s  because he can t e s t  these  th in g s  th a t  th e  m etaphysical 
proposition becomes u se fu l to  him® He has standards by which i t  can be compared 
vrlth i t s  rivals * He can, in other w ords, proceed by th e  method o f te s t in g  
com petito rs and rejecting a f te r  critical t r i a l  those which he f in d s  le s s  adequate 
to  h is  purposes. What those purposes a re , be they in te rn a l  security or a b e t t e r ,  
more m oral, life, i s  -idiat d e fin es  toe activity in  idiich tto  p ro p o s itio n  must be 
te s ta b le  in ordei' to be useful*
I t  Is  n o t c o r re c t ,  th e re fo re , to  say th a t an u n te s ta b le  p ro p o s itio n  
might have o th e r uses* I t  is  correct, however, to  m aintain  tlia t a -p ro p o s itio n  
which i s  u n te s ta b le  in  one H e ld  of a c t iv i ty  m i^ it have i t s  uses by being te s ta b le  
in  an o th er. Metaphj^rical propositions, we naf see , can be u s e fu l ,  even i f  t h i s  
usefulness i s  confined to  objectives which can take no a c c a in t of th e ir  intelligib].( 
co n te n t, (s in ce  th is  i s ,  by d e f in i t io n ,  u n te s ta b le ) .  D a ib tle s s , th en , m etaphysical 
p ro p o sitio n s  will continue to be popular « ‘.Hie adoption of hie form al method 
described  by the equation  o f co n d itio n  (2 ) i s  undertaken in  order to  approach
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the objective®  But people a re  su b je c t to  a l l  k inds of emotions and i r r a t io n a l  
d e s ire s ,  and m ay.often be, id-thaxt r e a l is in g  i t ,  serv ing -those d e s ire s  r a th e r  
than  th e i r  declared  ones® People accep t what they  wish to  be t r u e ,  and whatever 
serves to  re in fo rc e  th e i r  confirmed p re ju d ic e s , even though they convince themselves 
that th ey  a re  engaging d ispassionatoLy in  the ta sk  of extending th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  
p re d ic t  th e  observed u n iv e rse . We should not be too su rp rised  when people s e le c t  
an obviously  in f e r io r  a l te r n a t iv e ,  a f te r  t e s t in g ,  in  one a sp ec t o f  progress® Tiiey 
a re ,  sometimes m th  exit knm ing i t ,  s e le c tin g  what i s  a su p e rio r a l te rn a t iv e  fo r  
an aim which they  esteem h igher than the declared  aim® Nowhere is  th is  t r a i t  
more evident th a n  in  the work of many ’s o c ia l s c i e n t i s t s T h e y  might d ec la re  theix 
aim to  be an in c reas in g  ability to  p re d ic t  th e  behaviour of man aid h is  s o c ie t i e s ,  
and might even th in k  th a t  th is  i s  what they  are doing* But when i t  comes to  
the s e le c t io n  between competing alternatives, we often see a oh d ice  made on grounds 
which cl early have more to  do with p o l i t i c a l  and moral mo'livBS than  w ith  d es ire  to  
predict* If the t e s t s  go against a p a r t ic u la r  theory idiose support len d s  tiiem 
morcO. and p o li t ic a l ,  comfort, then o ften  do we see them a tta c k  th e  v a l id i ty  o f the 
t e s t ,  ra th e r  than make a co n v en tio n a lly  required d e c is io n  which would run counter 
to  tlie fulfillment of th a t  comCort®
The re te n tio n  of a c le a r  a p p re c ia tio n  of what c o n s t i tu te s  the o b je c tiv e  
i s  a fundamental recjuirement for p ro g ress  towards t l ia t  o b je c tiv e . The lo g ic  of -(he 
arguiænt h e re in  has been th a t  metaphynicgl propositions are not u se fu l to us i n  
th a t  c la s s  of a c t i id ty  to  which (hey purport to ba long , b u t are  o ften  of use i n  
the achieven%nt of t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  (and often concealed) objectives®  And i t  i s  
i n  the p u rs u it  o f those other o b je c tiv e s  t h a t  m etaphysical p ro p o s itio n s  are  
testable®
One f in a l  poirxb ghould be made b efo re  we move on from the  dem arcation
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issue® That i s  th a t  te s ta b le  attem pts a t achieving our aims can c o n trib u te  more 
to  the s a t i s f a c t io n  of those aims than is  gained fmm the sim ple acceptance or 
r e je c t io n  follow ing com petitive tr ia l®  They can often a s s i s t  us i n  the fo rm u la tion  
of new attem pts or new tests. This is  what Popper c a lls  the ’f e r t i l i t y ’ o f a 
proposition®  I t  can be ca lle d  f e r t i l e ,  he say s, i f  i t  has im p lica tio n s  which 
y ie ld  a v a r ie ty  of w ide-ranging t e s t s  and co n jec tu res . To a g rea t ex ten t t h i s  
’f e r t i l i t y ’ of Popper’s re p re se n ts  tiie  e f f e c t  th a t  a theory has on us® I f  i t  
suggests to  us new avenues of approach, or so p h is tic a te d  t e s t s  involving novel 
phenomena, then, i t  h e lp s  us to  achieve our ends by-more than i t  was o r ig in a l ly  
proposed to  do. The cu rre n t ja rgon  would probably  have this as the ’f a l l o u t ’ o f 
the theory  I th a t  is, the unanticipated bonus of its fo rm u la tio n  and test. We do 
n o t know very much about th e  msmtal c re a tiv e  p r œ e s s ,  but we can observe th a t  
in sp ire d  f la sh e s  o f te n  come abort i n  circumstances in  which proposais a re  being 
sub jected  to  c r itic ism *  Tlie con b m p la tio n  of the inadequacies of a p ro p o sa l seems 
to  a s s i s t  the process of in s p i r a t io n  of fu rli ie r  su g g estio n s . We can se e , id ierefore, 
s in ce  our awareness of inadequacies comes about from t e s t in g ,  th a t te s t in g  can 
p lay  a ro le  i n  p o s i t iv e  feedback even to  the  c re a tiv e  p rocess i t s e l f  *
This rep re se n ts  another p o in t o f d iffe ren ce  between toe  te s ta b le  and 
the u n te s tab le  theory. Whereas the te s ta b le  one iiri^ it, under te s t in g ,  make us
Iaware of a v a r ie ty  of phenomena h ith e r to  unobserved and unsuspected , and might 
even, by i t s  contem plation, in s p ire  people to  dev ise  new proposals which la c k  i t s  
inadequac ies, the u n te s tab le  proposition must by contrast remain complete.y sterile®  
Since i t  cannot be te s te d ,  i t  cannot open up new phenomena. I t  c a in o t enable us 
to  a s c e r ta in  i t s  inadequacies and perhaps propose b e t te r  A lternatives®  Unlike th e  
te s ta b le  p ro p o sitio n s  whidi can open up new avenues, tlie metaphysical. p ro p o s itio n  
remains closed® Indeed, such propositions sha-j a d is tu rb in g  tendency to  reduce
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new d isc o v e rie s  in to  sp e c ia l cases o f  toe o ld , ra th e r  than  using new d isc o v e rie s
to  form ulate w ider co n jec tu res  in  which the old can be seen as a s p e c ia l  and
lim ite d  case* There a re  many famous m etaphysical p ro p o sitio n s  whose adheren ts
eag erly  snatch  up new in fo rm ation  revealed  by te s ta b le  p ro p o s it io n s , and adduce i t
13as y e t more evidence of the u n iv e rs a l i ty  o f toe theory®
Having already  c a s tig a te d  u n te s ta b le  p ro p o sitio n s fo r th e i r  la c k  of
b a s is  fo r  the  tak ing  of conventional p re fe ra ic e  d e c is io n s , we na^ must add
s t e r i l i t y  to  the charges ag a in s t them. Not on ly  can we not use then to  p ro g ress
towards our chosen ends, b u t they  do not even in s p ire  us towards g re a te r  p rog ress
in  p u rsu it  of those ends® We can do nothing w ith  them; and th ey , in  turn, can
do nothing fo r  us.
There seem to  be two re la te d  reason^ fo r valuing t e s ta b l e ,  ra th e r  than
u n te s ta b le  p ro p o sitio n s  ® F i r s t l y ,  the te s ta b le  v a r ie ty  p ro v id e , throu^ tests,
the b as is  o f  a conventional d e c is io n  to  p re fe r  them ova' th e i r  r i v a l s ,  or to
r e je c t  them in  favour of to.ose r iv a l s j  and secondly , because they can lead  on to
new id e a s  and conjectures® N either of th e se  reasons is  concerned w ith the t ru th
o f a p ro p o s itio n , or even with whether i t  i s  re ta in e d  or rejected. A proposition
which has to  be re je c te d  is  u s e fu l both from th e  standpo in t th a t  i t  t e l l s  us
y e t another avenue in which we need not lo o k  for p ro g re ss , and i n  re sp e c t of any
new questions wiiich i t  opens up, any new phenomena i t s  te s t in g  re v e a ls , and any
new co n jec tu re s  which are  inspired by i t s  cont cm p i a t io n . Looking back over the
h is to ry  of s c ie n t i f i c  p rog ress ( to  name only one f i e l d ) ,  we can see th a t many
ofof our abandoned proposals have been considerab ly  more use tJiaii some of our 
re ta in ed  ones, by v ir tu e  of the p ro g re ss  th ey  have in s t ig a te d  even w hile being 
re j ectedo
Thus tlie d ec is io n  to e s ta b lis h  tbs dem arcation l in e  openly a t  the  p o in t
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of u se fu ln e ss  i s  to  take no account of the subsequent p o ss ib le  f a te  o f a prop­
osition®  I t s  u se fu ln e ss  i s  no t connected w ith  i t s  acceptance or r e je c t io n ,  but 
ra th e r  xHth the f a c t  th a t  one ov the other w i l l  take place® And i t  have 
a d d itio n a l u ses during the time in  which we are d e tem in in g  xiiich of those two 
a l te rn a t iv e s  i t  s h a ll  be® For any human a c t iv i ty  d e lin ea ted  by an aim, we can 
draw a l in e  se p a ra tin g  those proposals which can be te s te d  fo r  th e i r  a b i l i ty  to  
a s s i s t  us i n  achieving th a t  a c t iv i ty ,  and th o se  which cannot® In  every case 
can say th a t  on ly  th e  former group w i l l  be  o f  se rv ic e  to  us i n  making progress 
towards the aim to which the a c t iv i ty  is  directed* The dem arcation l in e  which 
m atte rs  to us i s  the  p rogress l in e :  those which f a l l  xd.thin i t  can, help us to  
p ro g ress ; those which l i e  beyond i t  cannot* I t  i s  tantamount to a tau to lo g y  to  
say th a t  people d e s ire  t o  make progress towards the achievensnt of th e ir  o b je c tiv e s ; 
th is  i s  included in th e  id ea  of an objective* I t  i s  this d e s ire ,  though, which 
has m otivated the  dem arcation debate , a debate xtoich has been concluded idien one 
has In je c te d  in to  i t  an o v ert conventionalism  * We do not want u n te s ta b le  
p ro p o sitio n s  because they  cannot help us to  achieve any of our aiirs®
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5
1o e.g, RUDOLF CARNAP, "Aufbau". Popper points out in a footnote in his"Conjectures and Refutations" (p258) that althou^ Carnap and the Vienna Circle attributed to Wittgenstein the assertion that metaphysics was meaningless and consisted of nonsensical pseudo-propositions, the theory goes back to Hobbes (in one form, at least) and was used by Berkeley and Hume *
2p BEDE RUNDLS, in "Reforming our Philosophical Positions" (Encounter, Nov*, 
1975  ^advances the view that the word 'verification' has been used too rigorously® He says, "®.with respect to our generalisations: these are constantly being verified by the finding of particular satisfying instances." His line of argument seems to be tliat since we do verify, and since rigorous verification can never be possible (as Popper showed), then We must 'verify' in some looser sense. I shall continue to use the word in the rigorous sense in which it is defined.
3* Because Popper has been so often misquoted and misunderstood on this point, it is pertinent to point out that he has only used 'falsiflability* to demarcate between 'science and non-science', never between 'sense and nonsense'*
4. If the meaningless of metaphysical propositions is a purely conventional one, then there can always be a simple refusal to subscribe to the convention.
"The criterion of meaning", says Popper, "leads to the wrong demarcation of Science and Metaphysics". ("Conjectures and Refutations", essay 11, "The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics").
6* Unless increased truth content and lowered falsity content could beestablished by some other way than testing. I am assuming that they cannot be established except by testing in some form.
7„ The term used by BffiB LAKATOS in his "Criticism and the Growth of Knovfledge" (edited with Alan Musgrave, 1970)a Lakatos essays "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes".
8, To explain any one event, an infinite number of meaningful explanations could be proposed, any of which 'might be true'. Only the testable ones provide a basis for selection between some of these competing proposals.
9, But see Chapter 2, footnote 10, on the weaknesses of 'belief.
10, The Greeks placed no great premium on testing. Some of their scientific theories were susceptible to retrodiotion - that is, they were required to account for the current state of observation. But the notion of testing by predicted consequences was never established,
11, The quotation is from ALASDAIR Mao INTYRE's "Ivlarcuse" (1970), He is describing Marcuse * s prose.
12, In "Conjectures and Refutations" (196$)
15. Also in "Conjectures and Refutations", Popper quotes (in Chapter 1) anilluminating personal experience. At a time when Adler's views on 'individual
psychology* were very much in vogue, Popper tells us,"Once, in 1919? I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no (difficulty in analysing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the child, Sli^tly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. 'Because of my thousandfold experience,' he replied; whereupon I could not help sayings 'And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one-fold.* "All Adler had sho^m was that a case-,, could be interpreted in the light of the theory. One is reminded irresistably of how each new historical circumstance is adduced as further evidence of the soundness of Karl îvlarx's theories on the inevitable course of historical development.
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Chapter 4
THE ACQUISITION AND DvIPROYBÎYÏENT OF SKILLS
"If a man write a better book, preach a better sermon, or make a 
better mouse-trap than his neighbour, though he build his house in the woods, 
the world will malce a beaten path to his door."
" Halph Waldo Emerson: 'Lecture noted down byMr3.Sarah Yule'
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The no tion  th a t  th e re  might be o th e r uses fo r m etaphysical p ropositions^
o th er than  those xdiich d eriv e  from th e ir  in fo rm atio n  conbarb^ le ad s  on to  the
co n s id e ra tio n  of attcanpts to  achieve aims i n  which the  attem pts talce th e  form of
a c tio n s . This c la s s  of a c t iv i ty  i s  c le a r ly  distinct from th a t  which xfe have
already  in spected  in  the sense th a t R y le’s "knowledge how” to d i s t i n c t  from h is
"knoxvledge tshat” c. D espite the f a c t  th a t  the  foregoing ana lysis  has suggested th a t
all^human a c t i v i t i e s  can be delineated by a d es ired  ob jec tive^  th e re  i s  s t i l l  a
d if fe re n c e  which can be to e n t i f ie d  betxmen th o se  attem pts to ad iia v e  aims xdilch
proceed by x-rsy o f  proposition^ and those xdiich involve an actual performance*
1In  h is  essay "R ationalism  in  P o l i t i c s ”  ^ Michael O akeshott s e t s  out the
txfo s o r ts  of knowledge ap p ro p ria te  to the d i f f e r e n t  types of attempts® He says :
"Every science^ every art, every practical a c t iv i ty  requiring s k i l l  of any s o r t ,
indeed every human ac tiv j.ty  x iia tsoever, invo lves knoxfLedge® And, u n iv e rs a lly , th is
knowledge i s  o f txm sorts, both  of xtolch are atoays involved in  any a c tu a l  activity®
I t  i s  not, I  th inlc, making to o  much of i t  to  c a l l  toem two sorts of knowledge,
because (th a ig h  in  f a c t  they  do not e x i s t  s e p a ra te ly )  th e re  a re  c e r ta in  im portant
d iffe re n c e s  between them®" He c a l l s  them te ch n ic a l and pr ac tio  al knox-rledge* The
f i r s t  of th e se  i s  i n  mmy activities formu].ated in to  ru le s , but he t e l l s  us :
"Whether or n o t i t  i s ,  or has been, p re c is e ly  form ulated, i t s  c h ie f  c h a ra c te r i s t ic
i s  th a t  i t  i s  su scep tib le  of p re c is e  fo rm ula tion , a l th a i^ i  sp e c ia l  skjX l and Insigh t
may be required to  give i t  th a t  form ulation*" Tlie second s o r t  he c a l l s  p r a c t ic a l ,
"because i t  e x is ts  only i n  u se , i s  nob r e f le c t iv e  md (unlike te d in iq u e ) cannot be
2form ulated in to  ru les*" The method by which i t  to shared , he claiins, i s  "not the  
method of form ulated d o c trin e* ” I t  can "n e ito e r  be taught nor le a rn e d , b u t only 
im parted and acquired® I t  e x is ts  only i n  p r a c t ic e ,  and the  only  way to  acquire i t  
i s  by ap p ren ticesh ip  to  a m aster -  no t because tha m aster can teach  i t  (he can n o t), 
b u t because i t  can be acquired  only by continuous œ n liac t xclth one xAo i s
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Oakeshott^s con ten tion  is  th a t  i n  aich a c t iv i t i e s  as cookery^ the
in s tm c tio n s  w r i t te n  in  a cookery book consti'lx ite  only the te d in ic d . kno^/ledgee Eo
one supposes th a t  a person w il l  become a good cook simply by reading  i t ^  because
th e re  i s   ^ in  addition^ t i e  p ra c t ic a l  kn œ led g e  which can onl.y bo im parted or 
4*acquired in  usOo His c r it ic is m  of *the r a t i o n a l i s t ’ stems from wliat Oalceshott 
reg ard s as the  l a t t e r ’s a s s e r t io n  th a t  th is  "practi.cal. knw ledge" is  no t Imowledge 
a t  a l l 5, th a t  ’’p ro p e rly  spealcing^ th e re  is  no knovdedge which i s  no t technical, 
knocfledge” . Oakeshott does not say vîhether the p ra c t ic a l  knowledge can never be 
form ulated because i t  i s  n e c e s s a r ily  of to o  complex an order^ or because i t  i s  
n o n -ra tio n a lf  bu t he does^ by h is  u se  o f th e  terms ’’im parted and acquired" make i t  
c le a r  th a t  i t  i s  knowledge whidi can be passed from a person  who knows i t  to  one 
Tiio does not^ a lb e i t  by a kind of d if fu s io n  p rocess ü iic h  soirehow surmounts the 
f a c t  th a t  th e  knowledge cannot be formulated^ Oskeshott p la in ly  takes the view 
th a t  i t  i s  n o t m erely our la c k  o f competence a t  an a ly s is  or d e sc r ip tio n  which 
renders us unable to  tran sm it t h i s  knowledge i n  a form ulated schane^ b u t ra th e r 
th a t  th e  kncwledge by i t s  very nature^  d e f ie s  the trea tm en t of an a ly sis  and 
descjrf-ptiono I t  e x is ts  "only  in  p rac tice "o
I t  i s  c e r ta in ly  tru e  th a t  when people engage in  s).cilled a c t iv i t ie s ^  
th e re  i s  a c e r ta in  amount which they  can 1  earn from in s tru c tio n s  su pp lied  by 
o thers^  whether th e se  be supp lied  by the v m tte n  or spoken word. I t  i s  a lso  tru e  
th a t  th e re  is^  beyond this, a certa j.n  amount which can only be gd.ned by actual 
experience of the activityo This is the p a r t  we speak of when we ta lk  about 
" lea rn in g  from p rac tic e "o  One of the c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  o f a s k i l l  I s  th a t  th e re  i s  
a c le a r ly -d e f in e d  aim which d e lin e a te s  i t  from other activaities<» There i s  a 
conven tional t a r g e t  which p a r t ic ip a n ts  are  expected to  aim for i f  they  a re  engaging
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i n  the  actdAdtyp and which m i l  be used as a standard agaiist which th e ir  
perform ance w i l l  be judged. The two ty p e s  o f knafledge^ technical and practical^ 
are  designed to  a s s i s t  in  th e  achievement (o r nearer approach) of th e  conventional 
t a r g e t .  In  go lf g fo r example g the  conventional t a r g e t  i s  to  com plete the 18 h o les  
o f the course u sin g  as few s tro k e s  as p o ss ib le !  and th is  aim is  a s s is te d  by both 
the te c h n ic a l knowledge (of which c lubs to  use,, how to stand g e t c . )  and th e
p r a c t ic a l  knowledge (of hcrw much fo rce  to  apply g  when and how to  swing the  hips^
and so on ).
P a r t ic ip a t io n  in  a skilled activity consists in an attem pt to  perform  
ac tio n s which will modify the observed u n iv e rse  to  a predeterm ined p a t te rn .  The 
conven tional t a r g e t  t e l l s  us how th e  observed u n iv e rse  should appear a f te r  we have
performed the  ac tion^  and thus gives us an id ea l s t a t e  a g a in s t which we can
measure the  a c tu a l m o d ifica tio n  achieved, Wîien we embark on a 2 0 -fo o t p u t t  on 
the green of a g o lf  cou rse , we know th a t  the conventional ta r g e t  would have th e  
observed u n iv e rse  d i f f e r in g ,  a f t e r  our s tro k e , to the  e f fe c t  t h a t  the ball would
(abe in  the hole. I f ,  after our attempt, the b a l l  does proceed to  e n te r  th e  h o le , 
then  we can, by the standards of the  conventional t a r g e t ,  c a l l  our attem pt 
su c c e ss fu l, Tlie conventional t a r g e t  may be an abso lu te  one, or i t  may be 
com parative, b u t i t s  ex is ten ce  i s  e s s e n t ia l  to sep a ra te  o f f  from o th er ac tiv d .tie s  
the  l im ite d  f ie ld  of a p a r t ic u la r  s k i l l .  In  golf we have, a th e o re tic  a i  ab so lu te  
ta r g e t ,  in  th a t  the a b i l i ty  to  complete 1 8  h o les of go lf i n  1 8  strokes would be 
regarded as p e r fe c t  by anyone trho contem plated üie a c t iv i ty  * But in  t e r n i s ,  üie 
t a r g e t  i s  com parative, fo r we are  only  requ ired  to  p la c e  the b a l l  with such 
directions and v e lo c it ie s  th a t  our opponent cannot re tu rn  it*
Of cou rse , in  many s k i l l s ,  the  adiievement of the nominated o b je c tiv e  
i s  hedged about w ith  a r t i f i c i a l l y  imposed l im ita t io n s  ( ru le s  of th e  gams) in
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order to  make I t s  a tta inm ent more d i f f i c u l t ,  or in  order to  make com parative 
e s tim a tio n  of p a r t ic ip a n ts  ea s ie r and f a i r e r .  These l im ita t io n s  become q u a l i f ic a ­
tio n s  to th e  -fcarget, making i t  a more l im ite d  one. The objective in  g o lf  is thus 
to  complete an 18  hole course i n  as few s tro k e s  a s  p o s s ib le , while carry ing  no 
more th an  ]ii clubs of an approved design , i h i l e  counting two penalty  s tro k es  
for every sho t out of bounds, and so f o r th . Ttiese imposed l im ita t io n s  are more 
ev id en t in  the s k i l l s  we cal.l ’s p o r t s ’ , but can o ften  be p re se n t in  o th e r s k i l l s .  
I f  a c l a r i n e t i s t ,  fo r example, were to  in tro d u ce  a mnd m achiæ  which could be 
co n tro lled  e le c t ro n ic a l ly  by means o f sm tc h e s , he would n o t, however s a t is f a c to ry  
the  perform ance, be described  as a good p lay e r. The no tio n  of a s k i l le d  
c l a r i n e t i s t  i s  one which assumes th e  l im ita t io n  th a t  the instrum ent must be played 
w ith the mouth.
I t  might be argued t h a t  i n  some a c t i v i t i e s  such a s ,  for example, the p lay in g  
of m usical instrum ents or the p a in tin g  of p ic tu r e s ,  th e re  i s  no cl ear ly-define d 
target. The m usician whmaim i s  to  be  ’b e t t e r ’ than  anyone else does not 
necessarily know what standard w il l  be used, and what performance he must 
achieve to  be ’b e t t e r ’ . This is  t r u e ,  and serves to  dem onstrate th a t  th e re  are 
fa c e ts  of th e se  a c t i \d .t ie s  which cannot be c a lle d  ’s k i l l ’ at a l l .  One of the 
c r i t e r i a  which d is t in g u ish  a dcill or a c r a f t  from an a r t  i s  th a t  the s k i l l  or 
c r a f t  has nominated stan d ard s by which i t  can be ra te d , and th a t  th e s e  standards 
have become ’o b jec tifie d *  by tlie ir  p u b lic  formtxlationo Tixe sco re  i n  a game of 
go lf i s  n o t a m atter of su b je c tiv e  o p in io n , whereas the excellence of a musical 
r e c i t a l  most c e r ta in ly  i s .  This i s  n o t to say th a t  m usical a p p re c ia tio n  must be 
e n t i r e ly  su b je c tiv e . On the c o n tra ry , i t  is  because th e re  are  c le a r ly -d e f in e d  
standards of measurement and assessm ent th a t  m usical ap p rec ia tio n  something 
which can be taught: people can be to ld  what to  look  for*, and how to  ap p rec ia te
i t c  N onetheless, th e re  remains i n  iiie judgement of a m usical perform ance an
74
element which depends upon the reac tio n s  o f the o b server.
I f  t  lie re  i s  i n  the minds of th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  or s p e c ta to rs  of a 
p u rs u it  a c le a r ly -d e f in e d  o b je c tiv e  which is  independent of their in d iv id u a l 
op in ions, th e n  the a c t iv i ty  may be described as a d c i l l  or a c r a f t .  I f  
the  achievement of success depends for i t s  a tta inm en t on tlie ré p o n s e  of the  
sp e c ta to r , then  we a re  dealing  w ith  an a c t iv i ty  which lias elem ents of ’a r t ’ i n  i t ,  
as >>'glL1 as  (p o ssib ly ) those of skilfL. Many a c t iv i . t ie s  do invo lve ole nient s of both@ 
A photograph can be a work of d c i l l  i f  i t  i s  to  be on ly  a l ik e n e s s ;  people who 
in sp e c t i t  can compare i t  with the su b je c t and evaluate the accuracy of i t s  
re p re se n ta tio n . I t  can a ls o , though, be a work of a r t  i f  th e  contem plation of i t  
evokes in  the  minds of the spectators some awareness of th e  relationships betweai 
the s u b je c t , the photographer and the  photograph*
In  co n s id e ra tio n  of s k i l l ,  however, we are  l im ite d  to  those a c t iv i t i e s  
in  which th e re  i s  a nominated and c le a r ly -a p p re c ia te d  o b je c tiv e . We deal wd.th 
cases i n  which the p a r t ic ip a n t  Icncws what i t  i s  he i s  tlying to  do, in  xAich we 
might say th a t  he has a mental p ic tu r e  of haw Hie u n iv e rse  diould look  a f te r  
a successfu l-.a ttem pt has been made. The degree to  tNiliich h is  performance produces 
a s ta te  corresponding to  th a t mental, p ic tu re  r e p r e s a i t s  hie degree to  lA ich 
h is  performance can be c a lle d  successfu lo  The tech n ica l ard p r a c t ic a l  knoiwledge 
are  n ecessary  components of the achievement o f such a correspondence.
I f  we su b je c t th e se  components to  a more d e ta iM  exam ination, we can 
see t h a t  the d iffe re n ce  between them c a i t r e s  around the n o tio n  of t h e i r  capacity  
to  be u n iv e rs a l i s ede Including in  th e  ca tegory  of knowledge which can be 
form ulated a l l  of th a t  whidi i s  capable i n  principle of being fo rm ulated , we a re  
l e f t  w ith  th a t  which never can be fo rm ulated , which concerns i t s e l f  w ith  in d iv id u a l
yc a p a b i l i t ie s  i n  p a r t ic u la r  circum stances. This knowledge can never be form ulated
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in to  genera l rules because th e re  a re  no general m le s  about i t .  People vary so 
much in  th e i r  c a p a b i l i t ie s  and in  the ways i n  xAich they r e a c t  to  partiou3.ar 
circum stances, th a t  th ey  can be guided by th e  experience of o th e rs  to  only  a 
l im ite d  e x te n t . Science is  independent of the individual in  one sen se , because 
i t s  t e s t s  can, in  p r in c ip le ,  be repeated  a t  any time by anyone, and w ith  the 
ex p ec ta tio n  of the  same r e s u l t .  In  th e  case  of a sp e c if ic  human performance we 
do not expect the same r e s u l t  simply because we know people a re  d i f f e r e n t .  The 
p h y sica l limitations of one man might mal.ce him incapable of reproducing ex a c tly  
the technique devised  by  ano ther to  ach ieve a s p e c if ic  purpose. This i s  the 
major v a r ia b le  in human perform ance which cannot be resolved  to  a s e t  o f general 
ru le s ; i t  invo lves a necessary dependence on the in d iv id u a l.
In  addition to le a rn in g  th e  Icnowledge which is  g en e ra l, which ap p lie s  to  
everyone who engages in  the a c t iv i ty ,  th e re  i s  the e x tra  kncwledge to be le a rn e d  
%'Aiich ap p lie s  only t o  the in d iv id u a l c a se . The te ch n ic a l knowledge i s  t h a t  wbidi 
i s  p itch ed  a t  a le v e l  s u f f ic ie n t ly  low th a t  the  individual d iffe re n ce s  between 
people a re  not an intruding factor* The p ra c t ic a l  laiowledge is  knowledge gained 
above th a t  l e v e l ,  where In form ation  r e la te s  to the in d iv id u a l case only . There 
are  genera l ru le s  in- every a c t iv i ty ,  rules which w i l l  help th e  le a rn e r  by 
supplying him q u ick ly  w ith  knafledge Hi a t  a p p lie s  to  everyone who undertalc as 
the a c t i v i t y . In  the absence of such ru le s ,  a p a r t ic ip a n t might educate h im self 
by a long p rocess of te s t in g  d if fe re n t  a ttem p ts and re je c tin g  those which produce 
le s s  adequate r e s u l t s  than  o th e r a ttem pts. But th is  i s  an u n n ecessa rily  long 
p rocess when th e  knafledge may be gained from the many experiences of o ü ie r 
p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  and comaunicated th ro u ^ i a book or -üirough th e  mouth of an in s tru c to r  
' For p r a c t ic a l  laiowledge, however, the p a r t ic ip a n t  has no a l te rn a t iv e  
except th a t  of d iscovering  i t  for himself* He cannot le a rn  i t  from o th e rs  because
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i t  does not apply to  others. I t  i s  knowledge which concerns i t s e l f  with such 
fa c to rs  as the  in d iv id u a l’s sen so ry  equipiiBiit, h is  muscular resp o n ses, th e  
s e n s i t iv i ty  of h is  nerve-end ings. These are  f a c to r s  about lir ich  we can say  th a t  
the knowledge of one in d iv id u a l about h im self not only c a in o t be communicated to  
o th e rs , b u t that i t  would be of no velue  to  o th e rs  s in ce  i t  would be knowledge 
which did no t apply to  them. They must le a r n  for 'liiemselves th e  equivalent 
kncxfledge com em ing  th e i r  am  sensory  equipment, muscular responses, and 
s e n s i t iv i ty  of nerve-end ings.
Oalceshott says th a t t h i s  p ra c t ic a l  knowledge can "n e ith e r be tau g h t not 
le a rn e d , b u t only Im parted and acqu ired . And the wa^ r to  acq u ire  i t  i s  by
ap p ren tice sh ip  to  a m aster -  no t because the master can teach i t  (he can n o t), but 
because i t  can be acquired o n ^  by continuous con tac t w ith  one who is  p e rp e tu a lly  
p ra c t is in g  it"©^ By h is  use o f th e se  terms, Oakeshott i s  g iv ing  the  im pression 
th a t  th e  p ra c t ic a l  knowledge is  possessed  by  one person (the m aste r) , and "im parted’ 
by him to  another ( th e  a p p re n tic e ) .
From th e  previous argument I  would regard t h i s  as  a fundamentaOfLy 
erroneous and deceptive way of looking  at th e  problem* My contention i s  th a t  th e  
ap p ren tice  i s  not attem pting  to  le a rn  something which tîie m aster already knows, but 
i s  a ttem p ting  to  le a r n  for himself the eq u iv a len t l-cnowledge which w i l l  apply to  
him p e rso n a lly . This i s  knowledge which the master does not a lready  have, and 
cannot, th e re fo re , " im p art" . The m aster knows h is  own a b i l i t i e s  and l im ita tio n s  
i n  ad d itio n  to  the  general ru le s  of the o p e ra tio n  which apply to everyone 
undertaîring  it© Tlie ^ p r e n t ic e  kiows only  the general m le s  and i s  seeking ‘to 
acq u ire  not the  e x tra  knowledge about ttie m aste r’s a b i l i t i e s  and l im i ta t io n s ,  but 
new knowledge concerning h is  am  ©
Tlie p o in t i s  an im portant one because i t  enables us to see how the
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knowledge i s  ga ined , and how p rog ress is  thus made towards c lo se r achievement 
of whatever end i t  i s  th a t  delineates th e  a c t iv i ty .  AH o f  the Im m ledge 
r e q u is i te  to  a good perform ance cmi be gained by te s t in g  proposed attem pts and 
elim ina ting  those  le s s  adequate than  o th e rs . But s im e  a ^ o d  p a r t  of th e  
in fo rm ation  i s  general in  n a tu re  (the te c h n ic a l kna-fLedge), i t  i s  e a s ie r  and 
quicker to  o b ta in  i t  from secondary sou rces, even though we a p p re c ia te  th a t  
somewhere along th e  l in e  i t  had to  be acquired  b y  someone by te s t in g  ag a in st 
alternatives* The non-general knowledge, that t-daich r e la te s  on ly  to  one person 
( th e  p ra c 'tic a l Imowledge), must be gained by him self because no-one else knows it* 
I f  we now consider a novice i n  the p rocess of acquiring a p a r t ic u la r  s k i l l ,  we can 
in sp e c t the v ario u s stages of h is  p ro g re ss . Havi.ng learned  what a re  the  nominated 
o b je c tiv e s  and the  l im ita tio n s  in^ posed on his perform ance, hja X'rill read  in s t ru c t io n  
books on th e  subject, or take le sso n s  from a coach. Having m astered th e  te c h n ic a l  
knowledge, no-one supposes th a t  he xvill be a competent p e rfo rim r, fcr he s t i l l  has 
the p r a c t ic a l  knowledge to a c q u ire . The time comes when he m ist make h is  f i r s t  
attempt, and compare i t s  result xvith what should have happened had he been 
su c c e ss fu l. The feedback in  s k i l l s  is u su a lly  of üie d i r e c t  kind which not only  
t e l l s  us t h a t  an attem pt was inadequate , but in d ic a te s  to us the  re sp e c ts  and th e  
degree to  which i t  was so * The le a rn e r  makes a new attempt on "(he b a s is  of 'liiat 
f i r s t  r e s u l t ,  and xvdJl, if he approaches nearer to  tlie  conventional o b je c tiv e , 
r e je c t  the  way he t r i e d  the f i r s t  tim e . Learning through p ra c t ic e  might be a long 
p ro cess , especially where hig^ily complex and su b tle  d cH ls  a re  sought, b u t i t  is  
u n iv e rs a lly  agreed to  be necessary  i f  one is  to  achieve improved proficiency.
P rogress in  the a c q u is it io n  of s k i l l s  is  governed by th e  tw o -p art
10an a ly sis  given in  th e  f i r s t  se c tio n  o f th is  th e s i s . I f  the o b je c tiv e  i s  agreed, 
then p ro g ress  comas about as the  l e s s  adequate of competing a tto n p ts  a re  elim inated
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in  c r i t i c a l  t r i a l s .  Unlike s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty ,  though, tlie attem pts a re  in  tlie 
form o f behavioural perform ances ra th e r  iiian  proposed mod e l s , and only p a r t  o f th e  
Imowledge gained i s  ap p lica b le  to  o th e rs . There a re  thus f a c e ts  of s k i l l  
a c q u is it io n  in  which p ro g re ss  w i l l  be specdfic  to  the in d iv id u a l, aid in  which 
an advance w i l l  not n e c e s s a r ily  b e n e f i t  o th e r  p a r t ic ip a n ts .  An advance in  sc ien ce , 
when i t  i s  p u b lic is e d , in c re ase s  the  a b i l i t y  of everyone to  p re d ic t  th e  observed 
u n iv e rse . An advance in  go lf by an indixddual might not be su sc e p tib le  to  
p u b lic a tio n , and might b e n e f i t  no-one bu t the person who made i t ,  i f  i t  f a l l s  in to  
the c la s s  of knowledge which ap p lie s  only to  h im se lf.
A curious e f f e c t  of such advances in  s k i l l  i s ' t h a t  even though th e
achievement is  In d iv id u a l, and even though the  p a r t ic u la r  advance i s  in a c c e ss ib le
and in a p p lic ab le  to  anyone e l s e ,  y e t  such advances can b rin g  about improvement in
the performance of o th e rs . Tlie d isc u ss io n  so fa r has used term  such as "adequate
performance" and " su c ce ssfu l a ttem p ts" , xfithout going in to  the d e ta i l  of how far
towards a th e o re t ic a l  p o ss ib le  achievement people attempt to  re a c h . Research on
s k i l l  performed under lab o ra to ry  cond itions has shown two in te re s t in g  r e s u l t s :
the le v e l  of adequacy i s  apparen tly  determ ined by  b o th  the p a r t i c ip a n t ’s es tim ate
of h is  oxvn c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  and by the knowledge of xfhat i s  req u ired  o f him. H. Halsor
advances th e  hypothesis i n  h is  "A daptaH on-level Theory" th a t  in d iv id u a ls  s e t  fo r
them selves a standard  of performance which they are  con ten t to  reach , and which
i s  h a b i tu a l ly  s e t  below the le v e l  of performance th ey  a c tu a lly  are capable ofiZachievingo F i t t s  and Posner in  th e i r  "Human Performance" claim  th a t  th e  "most
xvldeily. accepted g e n e ra lis a tio n  from experimek&S concerning th i s  is su e  (Gofer and 
IS
Appley, I 9 6 U) is  th a t  su ccessfu l perform ance le a d s  to an Increase  in  the  standard  
of ex ce llen ce , xAile fad.lure le ad s  to  a decrease , hie re  can be exceptions ~ fo r 
example, viien long-continued success lead s  to boredom xd.th a ta sk  and unw illingness
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to  expend ad d itio n a l e f f o r t " .  But,.;they go on to  show th a t  le v e l  of performance can 
be varied  according to  x-ftether or not th e  ta sk  is  arranged to  suggest th a t  a high 
le v e l  of perform ance Is  expected. They quote Mace (195>3) ## improving perform ance 
in  an aiming ta sk  sim ply by adding more concen tric  rin g s  x&thin the  e s tab lish e d  
p e rip h e ry , thus making what p rev io u s ly  appeared to  be good performance look 
mediocre.
k h ile  i t  i s  ev ident th a t  attem pts to  a tta i.n  an id e a l o b je c tiv e  might be 
su b jec t to  p ra c t ic a l  l im ita t io n s ,  such as lack  of s tre n g th  or d e x te r i ty ,  th a t  xv ill 
s e t  the i t ie o re tic a H y  p o ss ib le  atta inm ent w e ll  b e lm  the. ideal, i t  appears th a t  
tlie s u b je c t 's  es tim a te  of h is  oxm c a p a b i l i t ie s  i s  u su a lly  s e t  b e laf th a t  
the or e t ic  a l  l im it  « When i t  i s  c le a r  th a t more is  expected, more i s  su p p lied . I t  
comas ab o u t, th e re fo re , th a t an advance by  one p a r t ic ip a n t ,  even thou^i th e  
knowledge requ ired  to  achieve i t  miglib be p ecu lia r  to  h im se lf , can none tlie le s s  
promote Improved perform ance in  o th e rs  by l e t t i n g  them knowr th a t  more i s  p o s s ib le . 
I t  is  claim ed th a t men can nm  nin four-m inute mile races because o f b e t te r  d ie t 
and b e t te r  health*  A ll th is  may be t r u e ,  b u t i t  ignores the in g re d ie n t of 
m o tivation . When Roger B ann ister ran the f i r s t  four-m inute m ile , o ther runner s 
ra ise d  t h e i r  s ig h t to  what they saw was now a p o ss ib le  a tta in m en t, and x=nthin a 
very sh o rt time many of them proved capable of achiexâi^  the new t a r g e t .  J u s t  as 
we value the  innovator in  sc ien ce  xfho sees new problems or xho propos es new m odels,
so do we value the innovator in  s k i l le d  a c t iv i ty  who shows us new s tan d ard s  to
be sought a f t e r .  S o c ie tie s  may continue fo r many g m era tio n s  to  perform  p a r t ic u la r  
a c t iv i t i e s  i n  t r a d i t io n a l  ways, not because they are  incapable of achieving 
b e t te r ,  but o f te n  because they do not ap p rec ia te  th a t t i i s  i s  p o s s ib le .
An importcint fu n c tio n  of the 'm a s te r ' in  th e  a c q u is it io n  of s k i l l  by an
ap p ren tice  i s  th a t  h is  achievements enable th a t  ap p ren tice  to s e t h is  s ig h t  to  th e
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le v e l  o f achievement req u îred . By c o n tin u a lly  sharing  vhat i s  p o s s ib le , th e
m aster i s  a source o f  encouraganent in  the improvement of the ap p ren tice . Oakeshott
i s  to o  r e s t r i c t i v e  when he says ü ia t  p r a c t ic a l  kncwledge is  on ly  acquired by
ap p ren tice sh ip , and only; by continuous co n tac t w ith  th o se  in  constan t p ra c t ic e .  As
has been in d ic a te d , tlie le a rn e r  might hope 'to acq u ire  th is  knowledge as a r e s u l t  of
h is  oxfn t r i a l s .  On O alceshott's model th e re  is  no accounting for the s e lf - ta u g h t ,
no exp lanation  of the popular sen tinB iita l theme of the gypsy who has managed w ithout
tra in in g  to  become a b r i l l i a n t  g u ita r is t*  The m aster in c re a se s  th e  ease and th e
r a p id i ty  o f the s tu d e n t’s p ro g re ss . Not only do h is achievements supply cone option
of an ap p ro p ria te  ta r g e t ,  bu t h is  work su p p lie s  feedback to  t ie  s tu d en t xho can
compare i t  xfith h is  own. The s tu d m t can r e s t r i c t  much more ’idle range of h is
f i r s t  co n jec tu res  by watching tlie m aster, and has a constant comparison between h is
own work and th a t  of a su ccessfu l perform er* By working a longside him, the
studen t i s  a tto u p tin g  to gain  su ffilc ien t in fo rm ation  about him self to  be able to
IS'd u p lic a te  the e f f e c ts  of th e  m aste r’s ac tions*
But more knowledge is  gained in  the doing than i n  th e  wratching. Anyone 
xvho p ro fe sse s  a f a i r  p ro fic ien c y  a t  any p a r t ic u la r  s k i l l  xa .ll confirm  th a t  th e re  is  
such a th ing  as the r ig h t ’f e e l ’ to  a perform ance. The baker making h is  dough has 
done i t  so o ften  th a t he has acquired enaigh feedback from previ.ous t r i a l s  to 
es tim ate  when h is  dough ’f e e l s ’ r i ^ i t .  He has observed so m i^ny tim es the r e s u l t  of 
balcing dough o f various co n s is te n c ie s  th a t  he has corns to  know what to  expect from 
a dough of a p a r t ic u la r  te x tu re  or e l a s t i c i t y .  This i s  the  type of laicywledge which 
comes only from experience , for w hile ( in  t h i s  case) a c e r ta in  amount of knowledge 
could be acquired  by xvatching an e x p e rt over a long p e r io d , so much more d ir e c t  
feedback i s  gained xhen one’s a-m bands a re  in  the nmrbure, feaJring i t s  tem perature 
and co n sis ten cy , as xfell as meroLy seeing what i t  looks l i k e .  A g o lfe r  p lay ing  a
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te e  shot comes to  loioxv ’hie fe e lin g  he re c e iv e s  througji the club s h a f t  # ien  h is  
d riv e  i s  a good, clean^ one. In  a3.most any s k il le d  a c t iv i ty  the expert is  ab].e to  
make d ec is io n s  and to  assess  h is  perform ance b efo re  the r e s u l t  of h is  a c t iv i ty  i s  
iQiox-m, xvLth an accuracy which seems alm ost m j^tic  to  a beg inner. But the beginner, 
to o , given s u f f ic ie n t  t r i a l s ,  can hope to  accum ulate the in fo rm ation  ap p ro p ria te  
to  t h i s  leveO. of p rofic iencyo
In  g en era l, the more augmented th e  feedback, the g re a te r  is  th e  p rogress 
in  perform ance. Since th e  method re q u ire s  the co n stan t s e le c tio n  of the more 
adequate over th e  le s s  adequate, then  more Inform ation  xvill u su a lly  improve the 
e f f ic ie n c y  of the decision-m aking p ro cess and m i l  in c rease  a b i l i ty  to  b ring  
proposed a l te rn a t iv e s  to a c r i s i s  p o in t a t  which we can make a p re fe ren ce  
judgement based on th e i r  performance* The dram atic in c rease  in  perform ance xiiieh 
can r e s u l t  from augmented feedback has been demonstrated under t r i a l *  From the  
chance d iscovery  th a t  su b je c ts  Improved th e ir  performance in  la b o ra to ry  t e s t s  when 
a n o isy  c lock  was p re se n t (provid ing aud ib le  in fo rm ation  about the  pap-sage of 
tim e), A lfred  Smode (1938) in v e s tig a te d  t ie  e f f e c t  i n  d e t a i l .  In  s k i l l  experim ents 
where the nominated o b je c tiv e  was to  keep cen tred  a randomly varying need le  by 
ro'bating a d i a l ,  Smode allowed some groups to .b e  to ld  afber th e  end of a t r i a l  what 
th e i r  perform ance had been, and allowed o ther groups to see  th is  continuously  
recorded on a coun ter. The d if fe re n c e s  i n  performance were s tr ik in g *  The 
four groups w ith ’normal ’ feedback improved over a dozen t r i a l s  from being on 
ta r g e t  fo r of the tim e, to  achieving $0% of the  time on t a r g e t .  The four 
groups w ith  'augmented' feedback s ta r te d  vTi'th m a r ly  $0% success, and improved i t  
over the same period  of time to  6 l|.  ^ success.
In  commenting on Smode's r e s u l t s ,  F i t t s  and Posner suggest t h a t  because 
the performance of the 'augmented feedback ' groups was b e t t e r  even fo r th e  f i r s t
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t r i a l ,  th a t  increased  m otivation  occur red . They advance the id ea  th a t  the su b jec ts  
were "m otivated to  work harder" by th e  p resence o f a su cce s s -co u n te r , and th a t 
improvement from the very f i r s t  t r i a l  reveals this@ %#ile i i i i s  i s  by  no means 
c le a r ,  s in ce  the su b je c ts  x^ere ap p aren tly  rece iv ing  feedback during the very  f i r s t  
t r i a l ,  and were in  a p o s it io n  to  gain  ilmmediate b e n e fit  from i t ,  i t  remains a 
p o ss ib le  exp lanation  for the improvement in  perform ance, and (as F i t t s  and Posner 
p o in t ou t) s t i l l  leaves the q u es tio n  of wrhether the grcup m th  augmented feedback 
had a c tu a l ly  lea rn ed  more. F o rtu n a te ly  the same p o in t occurred to  Smode, for he 
repea ted  h is  eiicperiments m th  th e  same groups, th is  tiim  w it M r awing th e  augmented 
feedback from h a l f  of tlie group which had been g iven  i t  in  the f i r s t  s e r ie s  of 
t r i a l s , and re ta in in g  i t  for the o ther h a l f ,  while s im ila r ly  d iv id in g  the group 
xhich had not enjoyed the  augmented feedback in to  two se c tio n s , ha3.f o f them now 
rece iv in g  the augmented feedback. The groups which had rece iv ed  augmented feedback 
on the  f i r s t  day sliowed b e t te r  performance than th e  other groups whether or not 
they  continued to  rece iv e  the  a d d itio n a l feedback* The im p lic a tio n  i s  c le a r  th a t  
th ese  groups gained knowledge ap p ro p ria te  to  improved performance when they  receivec 
the augmented feedback, knowledge T'ihich th ey  subsequently  re ta in e d  even when 
cond itions rev e rte d  to  'nox'mal’ o
M otivation  i s  a f a c to r  which occurs in  üie conditions for p ro g ress  inITboth p a i 't  ( l )  and p a r t  (2 ) . Not only must th e re  be agreement about the conventional 
o b je c tiv e , but people must a c tu a l ly  engage in  the a c t i v i t i e s  of te s t in g  and 
inadequacy-elim ination  b efo re  th e re  can  be p ro g re ss . As x\ras seen  in  tlie d iscu ssio n  
of s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty ,  the m o tivation  need not be d i r e c t ly  r e la te d  to  the 
nominated end. People might w ell engage i n  s c ie n t i f i c  re sea rch  and become 
su ccessfu l s c i e n t i s t s  w ithout every being m otivated to  in c rease  man's a b i l i ty  to  
p re d ic t  the observed universe* The im portant th ing  is  th a t  p ro g ress  re q u ire s  the
111.
r e a l  m otivations to  be served by achievement of th e  nominated o b jec tiv e  * Whether 
the d riv in g  fo rce  be d e s ire  for g a in , for adm ira tion , or sim ply for the 
s a t i s f a c t io n  gained by acliiexdng a high standard  in  a chosen a c t iv i ty ,  i t  w i l l  be 
conducive to  p ro g ress  in  any f ie ld  i f  i t  can be d ire c te d  tabard  the d ec lared  
o b je c tiv e  of th a t  f ie ld  *
Many of the a c t i v i t i e s  which we d escrib e  as s k i l l s  a re  so a r b i t r a r y  in  
th e i r  nominated ends th a t  no-one could p o ss ib ly  xd.sh 'to ach ieve the o b je c tiv e  for 
i t s  own sake. They are  conven tional ta rg e ts  in  th a t  so c ie ty  decides by convention 
to  reward by substance or by esteem a good performance. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  imagine 
üihy anyone should wlsh to  use s p e c ia l ly  shaped c lu b s  to h i t  a sm all w hite  b a l l  
in to  a hole several hundred* yards awsy* D if f ic u l t ,  th a t i s ,  to  imagine anyone 
Tvishing 'bo do th is  for i t s  own sake. But because so c ie ty  has made t h i s ,  by 
convention, a ' t e s t  of s k i l l ' ,  people are  enabled to  f u l f i l  other d e s ire s  by i t s  
accomplishmento S e l f - g r a t i f i c a t io n ,  fame and for'bune can a].l be f h l f i l l e d  by 
excellence a t  golf because so c ie ty  has s e t  i t  a s  a standard  te s t*  At a more 
se rio u s  le v e l  so c ie ty  can, by conventiona]. d e c is io n , d ir e c t  'the motives o f i t s  
members in to  the se rv ic e  of a nominated ta r g e t  xAieh might liave, in  i t s e l f ,  a very 
low po 'bential fo r m o tiv a tio n . C haritab le  organisa 'b ions, d e s p ite  th e ir  s t r e s s  on 
the m o ra lity  of c h a rita b le  dona'bion, none'theless take ca re  to ensure 'that other 
m otives can be fu lf 'H le d  by the achievem ent of th e 'ir  ends* Often th e i r  a d v e rtis in g  
i s  d irec ted  in  such a way th a t  people can absolve g u il ty  consciences, can fe e l  the  
warm glow of s e l f - s a t i s f a c t io n  by co n trib u tin g  to  an end which the o rg an isa tio n  
s e t s ,  bu't which has lotf poi-jer to  m otivate  in d iv id u a ls  o u ts id e  th e  organ isa tion*
Some r e l ig io n s ,  xvhile s tre s s in g  th e  value of moral goodness as ser^nlce to  th e  
d iv in i ty ,  a lso  take good care *to hedge ib  about w ith  rewards of e te rn a l l i f e  and 
dixd'ne favour so 'that i t  becomes a ta r g e t  fo r more se lf-seek in g  m otivations*
1!^
l^ a te v e r  the a c tu a l m o tiv a tio n , i t  Is enough for improvement in  a 
s k i l le d  a c t iv i ty  t i a t  tlie su b je c t accept th e  nominated aim of th a t  'a c t iv i ty  as a 
way of achievi.ng h is  o\m o b je c tiv e s . Given t h i s ,  Üien the su b je c t can apply th.e 
technique of te s t in g  com paratively and elim inating  in fe r io r  a l te rn a t iv e  a ttan p ts#  
The f a c t  ü ia t  a la rg e  body of what he would discover by th i s  method is  of such a 
general n a tu re  ü ia t  i t  i s  su sc ep tib le  of wide app lica tijon  means th a t  he i s  able 
to  ialce the sh o rt cu t of ob tain ing  some of h is  in fo rm ation  from secondary sources! 
The r e s t  of th e  laiavLedge he needs i n  order to improve h is  a b i l i t i e s  must be 
learned  by h im self because i t  ap p lie s  only to h im self * We can see th a t ,  in  
d iscovering  and extending th e i r  a b i l i t i e s ,  each g en e ra tio n  must s t a r t  from a 
common pool o f  communie able knowledge which ap p lie s  to  a l l .  Through p ra c t ic e  they 
acqu ire  In d iv id u a lly  an ex tension  of knavledge in  the ac tiv ity^w h ich  a p p lie s  only 
to  them selves, and which endures on ly  fo r th e i r  l i f e t im e s ;  each g m e ra tio n  must 
s t a r t  a fresh  from th e  common pool* A concern fo r  an in c rease  i n  th.e knowledge and 
a b i l i t i e s  o f  the human race  must th e re fo re  take  th e  form of a co m ern  for the 
enlargement and ex tension  of th a t  common pool* M ille  the man x^ ho achieves i n  any 
s k i l l  a p re v io u s ly  u n r iv a lle d  perform ance i s  esteemed and valued in  h is  awn tim e, 
i t  i s  the  man xfho achieves improvement in  'the te ch n ic a l îoiaHedge of an a c t iv i ty ,  
he xdio gains an advance t h a t  everyone can partake o f ,  xmo is  axvarded the more 
la s t in g  acclaim  of p o s te r i ty .
In  one of the e x q u is ite  fo o tn o tes  xfhich adorn h is  "work, Michael Oalceshott 
t e l l s  of the xdieelwright who c r i t i c i s e s  the  duke fo r read in g , expressing the 
sentim ent (which Oakeshott p la in ly  approves of):
"In  my opinion i t  must have been the same xiith the  men of old. A ll t h a t  xvas worth
handing on, died xvith them; t i e  r e s t  they  put in  th e ir  books. That i s  xvhy I  said
18th a t  xihat you xfere reading xfas the  le e s  and scum of bygone men" ® The valuation
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i s  here  p laced  upon p r a c t ic a l  knowledge; i t  is  what a man achieves of h is  p o t a i t i a l  
in  a l ife t im e e  F oH aring  on from our prexdous argument, though, we rev erse  the 
val-uation* What they  put in  th e i r  books was xfhat they  d iscovered  th a t  was of 
general a p p lic a tio n ; xAat died xfith them was kncwledge xfhich ap p lied  only  to  
them selves and which xfas th e re fo re  o f  no use to  anyone eLse. One can look a t  th e  
former as th e i r  " le e s  and scum", b u t fmm the  p o in t of viea^ of the human race  and - 
i t s 'd e s i r e  to  extend i t s  knowledge and c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  one could regard  xdiat x-jas 
l e f t  as p a r t  of the " d is tH le d  essence of p ro g re ss" .
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Chapter 3
HISTORY AND THE STUDY OP MAN
"A ccidental causes caimot he g en e ra lised ; and, since they are  in  the  
f u l l e s t  sense of the word unique, they  teach  no lessons and lead  to  no conclusions 
But here I  must make ano ther p o in t. I t  i s  p rec ise ly  th i s  no tion  of an end in  
view which provides the key to  our trea tm en t of causation  in  h is to ry * "
-  EoH.Carr; 'What i s  History?*
1 8B
There are  problems encountered in  the attem pt to  apply the t~wo-part
equation  of p rogress to the  d is c ip l in e s  which malce mankind th e  qaecia l o b je c t o f
th e ir  s tu d y . H isto ry  and the S o c ia l Sciences cannot be subsum d under th e
general heading of 's c i e n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty ' because th ey  are  concerned w ith  th e
o rd e rly  and systam atic p re se n ta tio n  of purported f a c ts  re la te d  by su b je c t m a tte r.
1As WoH. Wal.vSh p o in ts  o u t, such a d e sc r ip tio n  xould in c lu d e  a ra ilw ay  timetable.
To sha^r th a t  the equation  does apply to  p ro g ress  in  these  f i e ld s ,  i t  i s  necessary  t(
show t h a t  th e re  is  ( l )  an agreed and accepted aim of th e ’a c t iv i t y ,  aid (2) th a t
steps towards the fu lf i l lm e n t of th a t  aim are  talcen by innovative  p ro p o sa l, te s t in g
com paratively  so th a t  a p re fe ren ce  d ec is io n  can be taken a t  a c r i s i s  p o in t  as to
which proposal most adequate ly  f u l f i l s  the aim, and r e te n tio n  o f th a t  proposal
pending fu r th e r  com petitive te s t in g .
I t  i s  convenient to  take H istory  as an exanple of ttie 's tu d ie s  of
manlclnd ' ,  because i t  i s  a d is c ip lin e  s u f f ic ie n t ly  broad to allow  tie  s o c ia l
sc iences to  be included as su b se ts , governed by ru le s  xdiich are  s im ila r in  th e ir  
Ze s s e n t ia ls .  By th e  use o f the term 'H is to ry ',  we intend to  denote the a c t iv i ty  
of the men and women who have made the doings of the human race  the p a r t ic u la r  objet 
of th e ir  a t te n t io n ,  and not m erely the a c t iv i ty  in  which our species has engaged 
(x'Thich i s  a lso  described as 'h i s t o r y ') .  For more than a c m tu r y the re  has been 
c lo se  debate concerning’what i s ,  or should b e , the o b jec t of th e ir  exerc ise ; about 
the methods used by h is to r ia n s ;  and on vhether or not i t  is  c o r re c t  to  describe  
H isto ry  as a ‘s c ie n t i f i c 'a c t iv i ty *  Tlris is  nob s u rp r is in g . The books of the 
Old Testament bear w itn ess to  the  a n t iq u i ty  o f the d is c ip l in e ,  and i t  Is  n a tu ra l 
th a t  men should have specu la ted  about xdiat i t  i s  they a re  doing when they  are  
engaged in  what is  c a lle d  h is to r ic a l  a c tiv i ty *
An immediate problem which a r is e s  xvhen one a ttem p ts  an an a ly sis  and 
summary d e sc r ip tio n  of xvhat i s  involved in  the study of h is to ry  is  th a t  our concept
of what i t  I s  th a t  c o n s t i tu te s  the a c t iv i ty  has been s u f f ic ie n t ly  vague as to
admit a vîhole range of d i f f e r e n t  p u r a i i t s  under th e  one heading . This d iscu ss io n
i s  lim ite d  to  dealing  xvith those h is to r ia n s  who engage in  explana t io n , r a th e r
than in  simple n a r ra tio n  (a l im ita t io n  xvhich s t i l l  inc ludes the  a c t iv i ty  of
s o c ia l  s c i e n t i s t s ) .  An h is to r ia n ,  for th is  pu rpose, s h a ll  be taken  to  mean
someone who t r i e s  to  b u ild  up a coherent p ic tu re  of the p a s t by t e l l i n g  us what- he
th inks happened and why i t  happened. The ju s t i f i c a t io n  for th is  i s  sim ple enoufh,
thaxgh some h is to r ia n s  might not care  to  a d n it i t*  I t  i s  th a t  those engaged in  the
study and a p p re c ia tio n  of h is to ry  tend to  say t h a t  xvhile the mere n a r ra tio n  of
events is  a le g itim a te  h is to r ic a l  a c t iv i ty ,  the in te l le c tu a l  ex e rc ise  which
c o n s is ts  i n  dea ling  id-th and in te rp re tii* ^  th ese  events i s  o f a h igher o rd e r, and
3c o n s ti tu te s  much more the value o f th e  o p e ra tio n .
J u s t  as we value more h ig h ly  th e  s c ie n t i s t  x-jiio sees the problem and 
who makes an in v en tiv e  pr op os al to  so lv e  i t  th a n  xfs value th o se  xAio pursue 
the more lim ite d  ( a lb e i t  le g i t im a te ly  s c ie n t i f i c )  a c t iv i ty  of compiling 
o b se rv a tio n a l d a ta , so in  h is to ry  do xm value ü io se  xho attem pt to eii3,arge our 
understanding by asking  questions of the 'hcru' and h h y ’ v a r ie ty . I t  remains 
tru e  th a t  the d e lig h t in  gossip xfe can observe i n  oursa).x7es and our fe lla //-c re a tu re
seems basic  to  mankind* th e re  may always be h is to r ia n s  xfho s a t i s f y  th is  ui’ge of
ours w ith  h igh ly -readab le  and in te re s t in g  accounts of xhat has happened in  bygone 
ages. We sh a ll  s t i l l  take p le a su re  i n  1:1staring to  the t a le s  of the Txvelve 
C aesars, or to  the lo v e - l i f e  of Napoleon; and no doubt to  to x â l l  continue to  be 
described  as ’h i s to r y ’ . D oubtless, to o , xfe s h a l l  continue to read and to xvatdi 
accounts of popu larised  sc ien ce , and to  regard  "The Wonders o f the Heavens" as a
s c ie n t i f i c  book. But in  an ex an in a tio n  o f the role and fum  tio n  of the enquiry , we
must give our in t e r e s t  p rim arily  to those xtoo xmuld t e l l  us in  h is to ry  xtoy i t  
happened as they th in k  i t  d id , and to th e se  xiio would te l], us in  sc ien ce  why i t
90
happens as they th in k  i t  must©
The IB i s  an immediate and obvious d iffe ren ce  In  the su b je c t m atter of 
sc ience and h is to ry  xdiich sp rin g s to  mind as a p o ssib le  o b jec tio n  to the  trea tm en t 
of them as branches o f the same a c t iv i ty .  VJhereas sc ience  is  concerned e s s e n t ia l ly  
w ith  th a t  xfhich is  rep e a tab le , h is to ry  occupies i t s e l f  w ith a unique p a s t xfhich 
once departed may r e tu rn  no more. In  sc ien ce  Xfe p o s tu la te  general laxfs xiiich may 
co n s tan tly  be te s te d ;  in  h is to ry  \je exp lain  one se c tio n  of th e  p a s t, con ten ting  
our sa lv es  for the most p a r t  m .th a p a r tic u la r  s e t  o f in d iv id u a l events.
While th is  might seem to  p lace  forever an im possible b a r r ie r  between the 
two d is c ip l in e s ,  i f  we examine more c lo se ly  some of the a c t i v i t i e s  to ic h  xfe 
d escrib e  as sc ien ce , then xfe find  among the numerous s tu d ie s  to ic h  come under 
th a t  heading some which are su b je c t to s im ila r co n d itio n s . Geology, for example, 
i s  recognised  as a le g itim a te  branch of sc ien ce , and yet i t ,  to o , concerns i t s e l f  
vjith th e . exp lanation  and in te rp r e ta t io n  of events in  the dead p a s t. We m ight, i t  
i s  t r u e ,  argue th a t  the p o s tu la te s  of geology are such th a t i f  we could d u p lic a te  
the  cond itions which ex is ted  on e a rth  m illio n s  of years ago, then xfe would expect 
the same to  liappen again . But the same might be said o f  h is  'lory or th e  so c ia l 
sc ien ces. We might expect th e re ,  to o , tlia t i f  we ecu Id re p e a t a l l  of the 
circum stances surrounding a p a r t ic u la r  c i v i l i s a t io n ,  tie n  we would find  i t  
fo llow ing the same p a tte rn s  aga in . In  term s of con ten t m a tte r , then there  seems 
to  be no reason to  assign  to  h is to ry  a s ta tu s  d if fe re n t  from th a t xhich we award 
to  geology; b u t we may be wrong to  consider geology as a sc ience.
I t  might be argued th a t  a g eo lo g is t draws on general laws concealing th e  
behaviour of m a tte r, and a p p lie s  them in  a s c i e n t i f i c  way to  th e  events w ith which 
h is  d is c ip lin e  is  p a r t ic u la r ly  concerned. The q æ s t io n  of whether toe h is to r ia n  
or so c ia l s c i e n t i s t  ap p lie s  ’ s o c io -h is to r ic a l  * laws governing the  behaviour of 
people and so c ie ty  to toe sp e c if ic  even ts urn er study i s  a c o n ta it io u s  one. Soire
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h is to r ia n s  have argued to a t  th e se  so-c a i le d  ^laws* are har'dl.y to  be found i n  toe 
pages o f  h is to ry -w rritin g , aid th a t  h is to r ia n s  do not u se  a s c ie n t i f i c  method of
rexp lana tion .
On toe other s id e , th e  groups le d  by Popper and HempaL have argued, with 
more su ccess , th a t  exp lanation  must n e c e s s a r ily  involve re fe ren c e  to  general law s.
. - Î .
Popper a l le g e s  th a t th e  fu m tio n  of e x p la ia tio n  is  only  f u l f i l l e d  ( in  history as in
t  .  6science) i f  there  i s  a combination of i n i t i a l  cond itions and covering law . The
covering law  i s  a co n jec tu re , a te s te d  but as yet u n re jec ted  p ro p o sitio n  conoeming
what happens i n  the general case: toe i n i t i a l  c o rd itio m  are th e se  which sh a f th a t
the p a r t ic u la r  example under c o n s id e ra tio n  does indeed -fa l.l xwi to in  the am bit of toe
general rule. In  h is example we a re  invited to consider a s tr in g  xtoich breaks
Mien a weiglit is  a ttach ed . The f a c t  th a t ’ toe s tr in g  broke ’ i s  explained by too
sta tem en ts; ( l )  "For th i s  thread  the c'nar a c te r i s t i c  maxi.mum ten sio n  a t  which i t
i s  l ia b le  to  break i s  equal to  a one-pound vreight", and (2) "The w eig h t pu t on
7th is  th read  was a two-pound w eito t " « Statem ent ( l )  s e ts  ou t th e  covering laxf, 
while (2) describ es th e  in i t ia i ,  conditions* Together they c o n s t i tu te  an ex p lan a tio  
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to confute an argument from so firm  a ground in  c la s s ic  a], 
log ic*  Popper’s ’e x p la ia tio n ’ d e riv e s  from toe unarguable sy llogism :
(1) Eveiy A i s  B
(2) X is  an A
(3) Therefore X i s  B
The conclusion  ’Therefore X i s  B’ fo llow s completely and irrefutably from the 
p re n ise s  ( l )  aid (2 ) .
H is to r ia n s , i t  is  argued, go th rou^ i a s im ila r process when p resen tin g  
ex p lan a tio n s; aid  the reason  to y  toe covering law is  often  n o t given is  th a t i t  i s  
freq u en tly  of a t r i v i a l ,  divi.ous n a tu re , aid i s  im plied ra th e r  than stated. Thus, 
while an h is to r ia n  might ssy  th a t  an exp tonation  of the form " D is t a e l i ’s dea th  was
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caused by b ro n ch ia l pneumonia" does n o t in v o lv e  covering law s, one can show to a t  
fo r  th i s  to  be m  accep tab le  e x p la ia tio n , i t  must be separated  in to  two sta tem ents 
of th e  type suggested by Popper* I t  i s  no ex p lan a tio n  a t  a l l  u n le ss  we can take i t  
th a t  b ro n ch ia l pneumonia does cause death a t t in e s ,  and th a t  fo r  D is ra e l i ,  t h i s  was 
one of those  time s . In  th i s  case  we might say ( l )  People who c o n tra c t pneumonia 
when in  a c e r ta in  s tag e  of weakness w i l l  d ie , and (2 ) D is ra e li  con trac ted  pneumonia 
Ml l i e  i n  th a t s ta g e  o f  weakness.
Of course , i t  would be i n f in i t e ly  ted ious and unnecessary to  have th to  
procedure sp e lle d  out every time* Most of the covering laws are so t r i v i a l l y  
obvious th a t  no-one would req u ire  th is  * I t  h e lp s , nom the l e s s ,  i f  m  a p p rec ia te  the 
p rocess when we come to deal, with explanations involving law s Miich a re  n e ith e r 
ob VÎ.OUS nor t r iv i a l*  There a re , i t  sh cu Id be sa id , both  h is  tor ians and philosophers 
Mio a s s e r t  th a t  th e re  are  no complex law s, and th a t w xûters of h is to ry  must be 
fo rev er confined to  the t r i v i a l l y  obvious * I t  is  ar gued th a t far human beings and 
th e ir  s o c ie t ie s ,  the  fa c to rs  involved a re  so numerous and so com plicated th a t no 
one can ever hope to  know en ou to about any one is s u e , must l e s s  p o s tu la te  a general 
law* As th e  adheren ts of th i s  viewpoint are not lo th  to  po in t o u t ,  th e re  are 
p rec io u s few ' laws o f  h is to ry ' beyond the t r i v i a l l y  cbvious which have been 
suggested so f a r .  They fh r th e r  argue t i a t  the very uniqueness of h is to r ic a l  events 
m il i ta te s  a g a in s t  the d iscovery  of g e n e ra lis a tio n s , th a t  each s in g le  h is to r ic a l  
s i tu  a tio n  has to o  many re lev an t and in te rconnec ted  s tran d s  for i t  ever to  be 
t r e a te d  as i f  i t  were of a kiiM with any other, and to a t huimn behaviour w i l l  
always have f a r  more cau sa tiv e  f a c to rs  than can ever be I so la te d  or defined .
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  apparent i n  p red ic tin g  the behaviour of any one 
in d iv id u a l add weight to  these  argum ents, but th ey  cb n o t p rec lude  a s c ie n t i f ic  
approach to h is to ry *  A s c i e n t i s t ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  1b o ften  unable to  p re d ic t  th e  
behaviour of a s ing le  atom; y e t he cm  mMce valid  p red in tio n s concerning th e  fa te
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of la rg e  numbers of atoms. For an unstab le  iso to p e  with a h a l f - l i f e  of 99 y ea rs ,
the p h y s ic is t  cannot t e l l  u s  which atoms w i l l  decay f i . r s t ;  tu t  he can t e l l  us th a t
a f te r  99 years h a lf  of them w il l  have gpæ* F ,A* Hayek, in  h is trea tm en t of 'orders
of com plexity ' has shown th a t one can hope to produce p a t te rn  g e n e ra lis a tio n s  even
where th e  behaviour of human beings is  concerned, even though one can never hope
to  know a l l  of the h igh ly  complex d e ta ils *  The pat te r  n gener at. i s  a t i  on stops sh o rt
a t  the p o in t where the in d iv id u a l and inde term inate  d e ta ils  of each p a r t ic u la r  case
cause them to diverge from a p re d ic ta b le  model* Tlius the s c i e n t i s t  engaged in
the study  of c ry s ta l  form ation may never be a b le  to  know aU  of the f a c t s  about
h is  chem icals and th e ir  circum stances to t e l l  us what s iz e  h i s  c ry s ta ls  wiJJ. be;
he may, n o n e th e less , know enoito  to  be  able to  t e l l  us th a t they  w ill  a l l  be 
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hexagonal* In  tlie same way we mi to t  be ab le to recognise common p a tte rn s  to  
h i s to r ic a l  even ts and be able to  p o s tu la te  p a t te rn  g e n e ra lisa tio n s  based on fa c to rs  
which a re  common to these  events*
Each shipwreck is  a unique event* Wien each ship  has sunlc and drowuied 
i t s  quota of passengers, th e re  i s  an end of i t*  We wl 11 never again  have a sh ip  
of the same s is e ,  the same s tru e tu ra l  s t r e s s  p a tte rn s , carry ing  the same passengers 
in  the same t id a l  conditions* . We might n o tic e , though, from a s e r ie s  of such 
d is a s te r s  th a t  passengers Mio are vrlth in  (say) twenty yards of a sinking  ship when 
i t  goes down tend to be sucked under tnd drowned* Even i f  v/e never have th e  
te ch n ic a l s k i l l  req u ired  to measure a l l  of the t i d a l  c u r r a i ts  and eddies involved 
in  t ie  drowning of any one passenger, we can , d esp ite  t h i s ,  s t i l l  make th e  p e rfec t!; 
reasonab le  gener al, is  ation* Thus, when we are  asked "i.hy was Mr* X drowned?" then  
a tw o -p art answer co n s is tin g  of i n i t i a l  cond itions and covering law  could be 
supplied* We might say in  th is  case ( l )  Passengers wrilhin twenty yards of a 
sinking  ship  a re  u su a lly  sucked under and drowned as i t  does down, and (2) Mr* X 
was w ith in  twenty yards of the  sh ip  a s  i t  went down* We accept t h i s  as a
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satisfactory e>qp3.ana tion  of (3) Mr. X was drowned.
I t  would appear, therefore, th a t i n  s p i t e  of th e  number and com plexity of 
fa c to rs  involved in  s o c io -h ls to r ic a l  ev en ts , we can s t i l l  hope to supply genera l 
laws* In  h is to ry  we might p o s tu la te , a f te r  consider a t io n  of many re v o lu tio n s , 
some such g e n e ra lis a tio n  as "In  predom inantly ag rarian  soc i t  t i e s ,  re v o lu tio n  i s  
u su a lly  proceeded b y  c e r ta in  su ccess iv e  s tag es  o f  peasant d s c o n b a i t" ,  and we 
might compose an index on which those 'c e r t a in  successive  s ta g e s ' could be 
measured* Even thou gh such a Uilng as 'p easan t dLs c o n ta i t ' might never be 
q u a n tif ia b le  in  any detail, th is  fact does not render th e  p o s tu la te d  g e n e ra lisa tio n  
u s e le s s . P ro fess io n a l h is to r ia n s  are  h ig h ly  s k il le d  a t  d e tec tin g  signs of such to i  
as peasant d isc o n te n t. They might f in d  evidence of i t  that otoer observers would 
e i th e r  miss, or no t th ink  of looking for* By imposing an arbitrary index , they  
mito'b be able to  measure the sc a le  or the  degree to which discontent is  p re se n t 
a t  various stages. Non-payment of tax es  i s  one s tag e , but c le a r ly  th e  r e s o r t  to
em igration  from th e  land, or to  sporad ic a c ts  of v io len ce , i s  another, H is to rian s
m ight, by recogn ising  the presence o f factors which o ften  precede a re v o lu tio n , 
gain g re a te r  understanding  of the period  in  q u estio n . I f  we in sp e c t th e i r  work, 
we can see th a t  many- of them do p o s tu la te  such g e n e ra lisa tio n s  and make use o f  
them in  ex p lan atio n .
There i s ,  however, a major d i i f e r a i c e  apparent betw em  history and 
; ; science in  terms of th e  a b i l i ty  to pred ict*  The method of innovative propos al and
'. com parative te s t in g  has as one o f i t s  c a i t r a l  pivobs th e  us e of experiment to
?|vi.ll.check prediction ag a in st observation, and thus to  e lim in a te  inadequacies system - 
tic all y , ';)hen th e  s c i e n t i s t  makes h is  gener a l i  s a t .  on , he can u su a lly  s e t  up
't.'yv ; t r i a l s  to see i t  in  ac tio n , and can predict what M.lLbe obser ved, given certai);x
f  i  ' ::•yy kna-m c ircu m stan ces. The h is to r ia n ,  however, workir^ w ith  peop le , and cannot
; s e t  up experim ents to  see i f  h is  g e n e ra lis a tio rs  may be in sp ec ted  at work; nor can
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p re d ic t  events abcut a p a s t which i s  a lready  dead and gone, and which is  h is
11p r in c ip a l f ie ld  of s tu d y .
Yet th e re  i s  an h i s to r i c a l  éq u iv a lan t of p re d ic tio n , an eq u iv a len t 
Mnich se rv e s  th e  same ro le  as p re d ic tio n  does in  sc ience , tone, an h is to r ia n  
cannot s e t  up contxB lled experim ents m th  co lon ies o f people in  order to  see i f  
they behave as h is  g e n e ra lisa tio n s  say  they  to ou Id ,  but he can look a t  s o c ie t ie s  
Miich have a lready  ex is ted , and look fo r th in g s  to ic h  no one lias p r e â o u a ly  thought 
of looking f o r . He cannot make 'p red ic tio n s*  about a dead p a s t, but he can 
p o s tu la te  th in g s  which ought to have hcopened and t h ^  look fo r  evidence of them. 
This process o f *re tro d ic tio n *  has as i t s  basis  of v a l id ity  th a t  people must be 
looking fo r something no t a iready  knovni* I f ,  in  tW  l ig h t  o f  a th e o ry , some new 
fac to r  i s  looked fo r  and found, then  people " p ra is e  the theory  i n  ju s t  th e  same 
way th a t  they  p ra is e  a s c ie n t i f ic  theory which enables a su c ce ss fu l p re d ic tio n  
to  be made. The s u b s t i tu t io n  of re tro d iic tlo n  for p re d jx tio n  is allowed because
1^we may be j u s t  as Ignorant concerning a p a s t event as we are about a fu tu re  event. 
The new in fo m a tio n , be i t  about what does hap pm or what did happen, se rves to she 
us :if our theory should be re je c te d  or re ta in e d  fo r th e  time being. In  bo to scienc 
and h is to ry  i t  can cause the m o d ifica tio n  or abandonnent o f  th e  th eo ry , Tliis i s  
what is  meant by saying th a t  r e t r o d ic t io n  serves toe  sane ro le : we mean th a t  i t  . 
p rovides a mechanism whereby tho method of innovative proposal and com parative 
testâmg may be operated .
We may take  th e  secondary aim of h is to r ic a l  a c t iv i ty  to be th e  
understanding and ex p lan a tio n  of man's a c t i v i t i e s ,  even thou^i we m ight ca re  to  
advance a higher end served by th i s  secondary aim. I t  was suggested for 
s c ie n t i f i c  a c t iv i ty  th a t  th e  aim co n v en tio n a lly  s e t  fo r  the ex e rc ise  o f  in creasin g  
our a b i l i ty  to  p re d ic t  the world of cur o b se rv a tio n  might a c tu a l ly  serve a d e s ire  
to  c o n tro l ,  to  so order the  u n iv e rse  th a t  i t  conformed more to our d e s ire s , and
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rendered us le s s  vulnerable to  the  random hazards tliich  might be encountered#
Similarly in  h is to ry ^  i t  is  po ssib le  th a t our attem pts a t understand ing  and
13explaiiation  are  le s s  d isp a ss io n a te  than  th e y  seem^ and th a t  I'hPU Carr i s  c o rre c t 
to say th a t  oar aim is  do something about i t^  to le a rn  enough about th e  natu re  o f  
man and h is  s o c ie t ie s  to  enable u s ‘to order the world of c i v i l  l i f e  much more to  
our satisfaction. Mietber or not th e  name o f  th e  gane here^ too^ i s  pcwer^ we 
c a n ’accept th a t  the  secondary aim of understanding and exp lanation  is  one which 
can be approached system atic a l ly  by choice between competing propos a!.s 5 provided 
th a t  W'0 a re  in  p o ssession  of a te clinique which g ives us grounds fo r  choic e. 
R e tro d ic tio n  su p p lie s  th a t  technique* P ossession  of a s e t  of g e n e ra lis a tio n s  
w ith i n i t i a l  conditio îis f u l f i l s  the fu n c tio n  of explanabion; w hile th e  
fjenera llsa tio ris  proposed can be te s te d  aga inst each other by e s ta b lish in g  
whether the  outcomes expected to follow  from t i e  i n i t i a l  conditions have 
l e f t  h i s to r ic a l  evidence of th e i r  occurrence*
Ifj, in  a i r  previous exaiiple; ore did indeed postulate .that ’in  ag ra ria n  
societies, revolution is  u su a lly  preceded by ce rta j.n  successive s ta g e s  of peasan t 
discontent ', and i f  one then lool<ed a t an example of a re volution in  an ag rarian  
so c ie ty  not previously considered  for this asp ec t, and i f  ore d id  f in d  evidence of 
the successive s tag es of cU scontait p o s tu la te d  by h ie  generalisation, then the 
theory could z ig h tly  be 'considered as a u se fu l one. The obvious cau tio n  to observe 
is  th a t  the  hie to r ian does f iW  >iiat he is looking for i n  a new f i e l d ,  and does not 
merely use ex is tin g  knailedge to  support h is  preconceived ideas. I f  the h is to r ia n  
has already in spected  a l l  ag ra rian  so c ie ty  re io lu l lo n s  before making h is  co n jec tu re , 
then  he can hard ly  t e s t  h is  idea by  exaning a previously unconsidered case; 
ra th e r would ho have to  te s t  i t  by deducing im plica tions from i t  which have no t 
a lready  been examined i n  the s o c ie t ie s  he knows about* Pm vided th a t  the exerc ise ' 
is  pursued h o n es tly , rotrodiotion does fulfil th e  same function in  h is tù ^ y  hi a t
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p re d ic tio n  does in  science* And there are lim ited  f ie ld s  of sc ience, such as 
geology and ev o lu tio n a ry  b io logy , in  which r e tro d ic t io n  in  th is  manner plays a 
la rg e r  ro le  than normal p red ic tio n *  Any f i e l d  o f  study vliich s e ts  out as one of 
i t s  ta sks the  job of accounting for a p resen t s ta te  of a f f a i r s  through an 
understanding and ex p lana tion  of a unique p a s t  must n e c e ssa r ily  find th a t 
r e tro d ic t io n  plays the major ro le  in  a iy  p re fe ren ce  dec isions tdœ n coixarning
CO mp e t i  ng proposed gene r  s i i s  a t io  ns a
Even thaig ji g e n e ra lisa tio n s  can be form ulated i n  the study of his tory, 
and even thou^^i they  can be co m p etitiv e ly  te s te d , t ie y  must s t i l l  be in spected  to 
see i f  they a re  of th e  same form as s c ie n t i f i c  p ropositions b e fo ’e one can 
estatO.ish th a t the study of h is to ry  proceeds by sim ilar methods* Our * s c ie n t i f ic  
co n jec tu re s , we saw, are o f tm  c a s t  i n  the form "Whenever X, th en  Y” , but i f  we 
look again  a t  the  examples of th e  type of co n jec tu re  to be expected i n  history, we 
meet with terms such as ’te n d ’ , ’p o s s ib le ',  ’u s u a lly ’ md the  l i lm * We note th a t  
th ese  terms a l l  imply a considerab ly  le s s e r  degree o f c e r ta in ty  tlian we find in  
s c ie n t i f ic  p o s tu la te s , and we are le d  to ask >hat k ir l  of ’gaieral la w ’ i s  i t  
which does not apply to  a l l  in s ta n c e s . I s  i t  no t a nonsense to speak of a 
g e n e ra lis a tio n  which is  n o t, in  fa c t ,  general? Of what value is  i t  f o r  us to
r e a l i s e  th a t  soræthing might happen? S urely  we should be concerned w ith  >iiat
must happen?
Hie answer to  these  p o in ts  i s  th a t i n  so c io -h is te r ic a ] , laws we en te r  
in to  th e  realms of p ro b a b ility  * Ilumaa beings and t t e i r  s o c ie t ie s  are infinitely 
more complex them w eights and id .res or f a i l in g  bodies* One tw -pound weight 
resembles another tivo-pound weight to a much g re a te r  ex ten t than one human being 
can ever resemble a n o lie r î  the number o f  v a ria b le s  is  le s s *  When wb attempt to  
co n jec tu re  hew human beings i n  groups wdll behave under d if f e r e n t  co n d itio n s , we 
come up against th e  p r a c t ic a l  l im i t  of th e  number o f  v a riab le s  which we can knm
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about and m anipulât e sim ultan ecu s ly  * Our ‘law s’, th e re fo re ,  only account fo r  th e  
behaviour of men and women up to a v e iy  p rim itiv e  le v e l below which the individuai. 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of our su b je c ts  mate no d if fe re n c e . Beyond th a t  le v e l  th e re  i s  
a range in  which our laws apply to  most, then to  many, to  some, and to  few*
14Most human c h a ra c te r is t ic s  foijlow a Gaussian curve of d i s t r ib u t io n .  Not 
only physica l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  such as  b e i^ i t  and w eig h t, bu t f a c to r s  such as 
in te l l ig e n c e ,  to o , are  grouped under th e  be ll^^ iaped  curve* This means th a t  w hile 
we cannot p re d ic t  t i e  c h a ra c te r i s t ic s  o f one in d iv id u a l, we can  p r e d ic t  the 
d is t r ib u t io n  of c h a ra c te r is t ic s  fo r  a group of in d iv id u a ls . We could not p re d ic t  
the h e ig h t, weight or in te U .ig a ic e  q u o tie n t of any ind iv idual dra>m a t  random 
from W estern Europe, but we could draw a graph predic ÿing the d is t r ib u t io n  of 
such c h a ra c te r is t ic s  fo r a thousand in d iv id u a ls  drawn a t  random. I t  Is nob 
unreasonable to  suppose t i a t  we could make sta tu jistica l p re d ic tio n s  coneem ing 
fa c to rs  vhich depend upon human c h a ra c te r i s t ic s ,  even though we might not be able 
to  sp e c ify  whidi in d iv id u a ls  th e se  p re die tio n s  would b e  f u l f i l l  ed by.
To give an example o f t h i s , we might put forward as a gaiera.1 law th a t 
a l l  men die w ith in  a year i f  t o t a l l y  deprived o f food and w a te r . This i s  w ell b e loi 
the p r im itiv e  le v e l where inc îiv idual physio logy, capacity  fo r  endurance, and w il l  
to  surv ive w i l l  be brought to b ear. I f ,  h arev e r, we s e t  the f ig u i’e a t  UO days, 
we would have to  amend the  law to read  ‘most men die i f  t o t a l ly  dm riv ed  of food 
and w ater fo r  Lo d ay s’, because we have reaso n  to suppose th a t th e re  might have 
been is o la te d  cases of su rv iv a l even a f te r  so long a period  of d e p riv a tio n . The 
p o in t about p ro b a b il i ty  is  th a t  w hile we knav th a t  on ly  a very  small number o f 
people have such capacity  fo r  e n d u ra ix e 'th a t they could su rv ive  an o rd ea l of th is  
n a tu re , we do not know in  advance which ores they w il l  be* We can, when dealings 
m th  la rg e  numbers of peop le , maice s t a t i s t i c a l  e s tim a te s  of a high order o f  
accuracy, but we cannot say in  advance te ic h  p a r t ic u la r  in d iv id u a ls  ‘w il l  f a l l  on
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which s id e  of whatever dividing l i n e s  are  s e t  up fo r  c o n s id e ra tio n . I t  i s  not
tru e  th a t  th e re  are  no adequate causal f a c to rs  to account fo r th e  behaviour of the
in d iv id u a l; i t  i s  ju s t th a t  they are beyond th e  range of measurement.
This c o n s id e ra tio n , while i t  l im i t s  tie -  c e r ta in  a p p l ic a b il i ty  of a
g e n e ra lis a tio n  to any p a r tic u la r  case , does n o t, I  th in k , a f f e c t  th e  v a l id i ty  of
the g e n e ra lis a tio n  i t s e l f .  I t  may s t i l l  be te s te d  a id  amended i n  th e  ways vhich
have been described , and people may s t i l l  find reasons for re ta in in g  i t  or fo r
re je c tin g  i t .  Vljere we do come across a case which f a l ls  outsi.de, t-b are not
in c lin e d  to  r e j e c t  the g en er a l i s  ati.o n im m ediately, because we know i t  was one
which re fe r re d  only to  a p ro b a b il i ty . VJliat we attem ot to  do i s  to d iscover why •
th is  sp e c ia l case l i e s  o u ts id e , in  order th a t our o r ig in a l g e n e ra lis a tio n  might be
made more r ig o ro u s . I f  we come acro ss a man who was m th  in  twenty yards of a
sh ip  as i t  went down, and who y e t managed to avoid being drowned, we t ry  to find
out why: we t r y  to  ].ocate the  reasons for such odd exceptions in  order th a t  we
might modify the o r ig in a l  p ro p o s itio n  in  such a way th a t i t  tak es  account of them a
This i s  not to  say th a t  our g e n e ra lisa tio n s  of th e  s o c io -h is to r ia l
v a r ie ty  cannot be shown inadequate by te s tin g *  On the  c o n tra ry , being s t a t i s t i c a l
p re d ic tio n s , they  cafi be a s sa ile d  s t a t i s t i c a l l y .  Ihe g e n e ra lis a tio n  th a t  I .Q ,
d is t r ib u t io n  fo r manlcind fo llow s a Gaussian curve ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f  e th n ic  background
has been se v e rly  a ttacked  by s t a t i s t i c s  which show th a t I.Q . sco res ob tained by
15*n o n -cu ltu ra lly -lo ad ed  t e s t s  group around d if f e r e n t  curves fo r d if f e re n t  ra c e s .
And the g e n e ra lis a tio n  th a t  I,Q . score depends iar la rg e  measure upon so c ia l
background has been jo l te d  by .figures which show th a t  the North American Ind ian
and th e  Mexican American both score on curves which are h igher th m  th a t  for th e
North American Negro, even though the  l a t t e r  are soc ia lly -advan taged  to  a
16considerab le  degree by comparison w ith the o th e rs .
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We see , th en , th a t in  t ie  p a r t  o f h is to ry  which concerns i t s e l f  w ith 
ex p lan a tio n , w ith the ex tension  cf kna'jlec3ge and under standing , we have a l l  of 
the in g red ie n ts  fo r the su ccessfu l a p p lic a tio n  of a method s im ila r  in  i t s  e ssen tia ls  
to  til a t pursued in  sc ience . We make our innovative  p ro p o s a i as we r e a l i s e  th a t 
th e re  are  questions Wiich re q u ire  answers (ex p lan a tio n s), and we deduce xAriat would 
fo lla-r as consequences of th o se  propos e ls .  We then use cur e lab o ra te  techniques 
t'/O examine new f ie ld s  to see i f  the evid ere e corresponds to  what our deduced 
consequences lead  us to  expect* I f  th e  evidence does correspond w ith  our 
‘r e t r o d ic t io n ’, then we have reason  fo r  pro fa rin g  th e  proposal over ones which did 
not achieve t h i s # In  the absm ce of such a method, i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to  
conceive of reasons for choosing between two eq u a lly -p o ssib le  a l te rn a t iv e  
explanations c ^'e r e ta in  th o se  exp lanations xiiich our evidence does not b e lie*
H isto ry  i s ,  l ik e  o ther d is c ip l in e s ,  a developing one* In  h is to ry ,  as in  
sc ience, we a re  today l e s s  than s a t i s f i e d  with th e  msiliods used and the conclusions 
reached by previous genera tions of p ra c t i t io n e rs *  I t  may be tha t we have a concept
of the  id e a l approach, and th a t we recognise th a t  the re have been many who have
not used i t .  I t  is  p e r t in e n t to p o in t out th a t previous works of h is to ry  and 
science may s t i l l  be app rec ia ted  on a d if fe re n t l e v e l ,  as l i t e r a t u r e ,  even thouj^i 
we recogn ise th a t  th e ir  find ings and perhaps liie ir methods have been superseded *
Both the s c ie n t i f ic  w ritin g s  of Aris to t  le  and th e  h is to r ic a l  ivri t in g s  o f  Gibbon may 
remain immortal c la s s ic s  of a r t ,  even thoiph we now adn it th a t  th e i r  value to  the 
d is c ip lin e s  of sc ience and h is to ry  has declined*
Leaving as id e  the question  of th e i r  value as a r t ,  I  would suggest th a t
f since  h is to ry  and s o ia ic e u s e  a s im ila r  rnsthod in  pur su it o f s im ila r aims, they
could both be considered simply as branches of the  search fo r knowledge* Our
knowledge of h is to ry  i s ,  l ik e  our knailedge of th e  u n iv e rse , an accum ulation of 
u n re jec ted  p ro p o s itio n s . To say th a t because h is  te r y deals w ith  what i s  p a s t ,  th e re
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must bo some th in g s wbich we can kna-j fo r  c e r ta in ,  is  to  over value th e  re l ia n c e  
we should p lace  on the  oviclence of our (or other p eo p le ’s) se isss*  L o g ica lly  
speaking, we could be wrong about every th ing , even about something as seemingly 
c e r ta in  a s , for example, "Napoleon commanded the  defea ted  army a t  th e  B a ttle  of 
W aterloo". D espite a l l  of the t e s t s  which th i s  suggestion  p a sse s , (eye-w itness 
accounts, h is  own w r itin g s , e t c , )  i t  is  always lo g ic a l ly  p o ssib le  t h a t  we are 
m istaken. An ingenious mind can re a d ily  th in k  up hundreds of a l te rn a t iv e  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  -  Perhaps a double kidnapped Napoleon and took h is  p lace on 'the night- 
before the b a t t l e .  I f  any of these  a l te ï 'n a tiv e s  were te s ta b le ,  vb might soon 
find them co n tra d ic ted  by other evidence ( i t s e l f  p os sib l y mis leading ) ,  Any vhich wc 
u n te s tab le  could be d iscarded , s in c e  we could never have reason  to  p r e f e r  them 
or to  r e j e c t  them, As with sc ien ce , i t  i s  more h e lp fu l to th in k  i n  terms no t of 
‘c o r r e c t’ , b u t of ’most adequate’* The suggestion  waich passes most t e s t s  and i s  
thus more c o n s is te n t w ith 'the r e s t  o f vhat we in te r p r e t  as the evidence to 
re ta in ed  as the most u se fu l one.
To see th i s  o rocess i n  a c tio n , we mig;ht look  at some of th e  g re a t
17co n tro v e rs ie s  of h is to r ic  cl explanation* The Walco'tt th e s to , p o s tu la tin g  th a t  
personal and fam ily groups dominated the p o l i t i c s  of 'the re ig n  of Queen Anna f a r  
more th an  did any id e o lo g ic a l d iffe ren ces , was challenged by o ther Viistortoms viio 
used m ettpds modelled on the o u tlin e  giv^n here. They devised t e s t s  based on 
the deducible 'im plications of the W alcott th e o ry , in spected  new f ie ld s  for 
evidence, and found th e  o r ig in a l  suggestion  very poor a t  r e t r o d ic t io n ,  Holmes, 
Speck and Dickinson a l l  found th a t the ’p e ræ m l and fam ily g roups’ voted what 
was p r a c t ic a l ly  a s tra ig h t t i c k e t  on the id eo lo g ica l is su e s , lliv is io n  l i s t s  from 
parliam entary  records d isp lay  a rem arkable ideo log ic al co n s is ten cy . The ideo log ic  a] 
c o n f l ic t  can be seen a t  work r ig h t  down to indivj.dixal consti'buencies through 
p r iv a te  l e t t e r s  and e s ta te  or church records* These t e s t s  have .11 po in ted  to th e
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r e je c t io n  (or a t l e a s t  to  the severe m odification) of th e  l i e  c ry . A u se fu l r e s u l t  
of W a lco tt 's  innovatory  proposal, i s  th a t  we naf have a much c le a re r  id ea  of what 
England was l ik e  in  the re ig n  ox Queen Anne, We rea].ise  th a t the id e o lo g ic a l 
co n fl.ic ts  d ivided a l l  c la sse s  o f so c ie ty  much more t ia n  was p rev io u sly  thought 
p o ss ib le ,
18Another such debate concerns th e  'R ise of th e  G entiy’ i s s u e , the 
p o s tu la te  th a t  the English c i v i l  war and p o l i t i c a l  in s t a b i l i ty  must be seen 
ag a in st th e  background of a r is in g  gentry  ch a lla ig in g  t i e  o ld , and now d ec lin in g , 
a r is to c ra c y . C hallengers of the theo ry , and i t s  defenders, s e t  to  work on a 
h ig h ly  d e ta ile d  exam ination o f th e  economic changes amongst and w ith in  the 
c la s s e s , and te s t in g  the expected consequences of the th eo ry . Once ag a in , a severe 
‘m o d ifica tio n  has resu lted*  Evidence th a t  by the l630s th e  a r is to c ra c y  had 
succeeded in  m aintain ing  th e i r  p o s it io n  moans th a t  th e  suggestion  cannot be 
accepted in  i t s  simple form*
Both of these  examples i l l u s t r a t e  th a t  h is to r ia n s  do use the technique 
of com petitive te s t in g  (and show u s , to o , th a t a theo ry  can be u se fu l in  h is to ry  
i f  i t  genera tes t e s t s ,  even though i t  may i t s e l f  be d isca rd ed ). The- various 
su b -d isc ip lin e s  w ith in  h is to ry , such as d a tin g , docum entation, e t c , , a re  used in  a 
s c ie n t i f i c  way to  e s ta b lis h  t e s t s  on th e  proposals which concern them selves xd.th 
evidence or exp lanations. I t  would appear th a t  h is to ry  can be t r e a te d  as a 
.sc ience such as geology, concerned w ith  th e  form ulation  of general law s, and wd.th 
th e  a p p lic a tio n  of those laws to  provide exp lanations for sp e c if ic  and non- 
rep ea tab le  even ts. P rogress in  h is to ry ,  l ik e  p rogress in  sc ien ce , proceeds as 
a r e s u l t  of choices made a f te r  te s t in g  a t  a c r i s i s  p o in t to  r e je c t  some suggestions 
b u t to  r e ta in  o th e rs . The p ro g ress  i s  towards understanding and ex p lan a tio n , and 
i s  made because each choice a t  c r i s i s  p o in t in  te s t in g  i s  made on th e  a b i l i ty  of 
p roposals under co n s id e ra tio n  to  help  us to  acl lieve p re c ise ly  those  ends. I t  i s
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te s t in g  and re tro d ic t io n  which enable us to  proceed towards th e  estab lishm ent o f  
ever more adequate general law s and i n i t i a l  co n d itio n s , whose com bination se rv es 
the  fu n c tio n  o f exp lanation . P rogress in  th e  former, by means of the a p p lic a tio n  
o f our tw o-part equation , n e c e s s a r ily  invo lves p rogress in  the la t te r *
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5* Thus, while ROBERT BLAKE, "The-.Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill", (1970) can say,"History is not an exact science, and it never will be. It is a good story,"his own work belies so simple a view. He attempts himself at every stageto offer explanations of unique events in terms of generalisations appliedto particular cases. In the work cited, for example, he makes use more than once of a proposed generalisation that conservative parties perform better in elections when they do not propose radical policies. He advances the view that if electors want radicalism, they vote for a radical party, and he uses this generalisation to account for some Conservative defeats. Clearly, his own writing is far more than the telling of "a good story".
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5. H,A,L.FISHER, for example, says in his "History of Europe" (1935),"..These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave, only one great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalisations, only one safe rule for the historians that he should recognise in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforseen."
6. SIR KABI, POPPER, "The Open Society and its Enemies" (1945), Vol.II, ch.25.
7. ibid.
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10. Hayek*s example, from the work cited.
11. The social sciences face an even more serious drawback. As with History, they suffer from the moral impossibility of setting up societies in order to test theories. In making predictions concerning already existing societies, they encounter three problems:(1) The social scientist is also a citizen, and has responsibilities to his fellow men. He might not wish to keep quiet about unpleasant consequences which have been predicted and which can be averted.(2 ) His predictions mi^t therefore be self-negating. The malcing and announcement of the prediction mi^t serve to prevent it coming about.(3) His predictions mi^t be self-fulfilling. A prediction that a certain bank will soon collapse mi^t be sufficient to persuade people
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to withdraw funds, and hence precipitate the‘very collapse which was predicted.All of these are severe restrictions to the award of genuine scientific status to the social sciences.
12. The use of Imown information to * corroborate* a theory must, however, be viewed with caution. Footnote 15 of- Chapter 5 illustrates the dangers.
15* In "What is. History", B.H.CARR says,"And when we recognised certain explanations as rational, and other explanations as not rational, we were, I suggest, distinguishing between explanations which served some end and explanations which did not,"Carr is using the example of a road accident, pointing out that we only seize on causes about which we can hope to do something. The fact that the victim was crossing the road to buy cigarettes does not mean that cigarettes have to be regarded as a contributing factor. We can do something about drunken drivers, about faulty brakes, and about road siting; we cannot reduce road fatalities by acting against cigarette-smoking.
14. A Gaussian curve is a graph obtained by plotting particular values of the measured characteristic along the horizontal axis, against the numbers of cases with those particular values along the vertical axis; in the so-called ‘normal* distribution, this gràph takes the form of a bell-shaped curve, with most cases clustering under the bell about the mean value, and with very few examples of high or low values situated under the lip of the bell either at the right or at the left.
15o A.R.JENSEN et al, "Environment, Heredity and Intelligence" (1969), Harvard Reprint Series No.2,
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17. RoR.V/ALCOTT, "English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century" (1956),
18. A controversy started by R.H.TAWNEY in 1940. A good review of its progress is contained in the introduction to "Social Change and Revolution in England, 154O-I64O" by LAWRENCE STONE, (1965).
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Chapter 6
OBJECTIVES m  SOCIETY
"As for vicissitudes of fortune, and other disappointments connected 
with worldly circumstances, these are principally the effect either of gross 
imprudence, of ill-reflated desires, or of had or imperfect social institutions. 
All the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in great degree, many of 
them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort."
“ John Stuart Mill; ‘Utilitarianism*.
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¥11011 a t te n t io n  is  d ire c te d  towards the p o l i t i c a l^  s o c ia l  and moral 
a c t i v i t i e s  o f man in  h is  s o c ie t i e s ,  we encomiber a :Ciirther s tep  down from the 
conventional o b je c tiv t.ty  of s c i e n t i f i c  research* J u s t  as i n  'the co n s id e ra tio n  of 
s k i l l s  th e re  was encountered a "necessary  dependence on the in d iv id u a l"  brought 
about by the in c lu s io n  of in fo rm atio n  re le v an t to  the achievement of th e  nominated 
o b je c tiv e , bu t not su scep tib le  o f general a p p lic a tio n , so i n  man’s s o c ia l  a c t iv i ty  
do we meet w ith  a further subjectivity produced by the la c k  of co n v en tio n a lly  
agreed ta rg e ts*
The d iscu ss io n  of man’s s o c ia l  o b je c tiv e s  i s  fo r by f a r  the g r e a te s t  
p a r t  a d isc u ss io n  of ends which a re  thought worthy in  themselves of achievement* 
Unlike s c ie n t i f i c  and s k il le d  a c t iv i ty  in  viiich u n iv e rsa l agreement upon a convent­
io n a l nominated end se rv es  to  h arn ess  c lv e rse  m otives in to  a pur s i l t  o f  th a t  èiidJ 
we are  dealing  now with o b je c tiv e s  which are  sought fo r th e i r  own sake*. Convention 
ends supply e x te rn a l rewards for good per for mane e towards an o b je c tiv e  which lias 
low m otivating power; r e a l  ends have the advantage that th e  d ) ja c t iv e s  them selves 
b ring  d i r e c t  benefit* No-one gains directly from p u ttin g  a b a l l  in to  l8  h o le s  in  
fewer s tro k es  th an  o th e rs ; what he gains are satisfactions con tingen t upon his 
ex ce llen t G i n  an a r b i t r a r y  bu t conventionally recognised o b je c tiv e . He gains 
s e l f - s a t i s f a c t io n ,  r e f l e c t  and perhaps f in a n c ia l  reward from th a t  would, xvithout 
s o c ie ty ’s conventional d e c is io n , be a rather aim less and loxf m otivating activity* 
The man whose objective i s  a largex’ house, however, can actuaJ.ly enjoy th e  b e n e f i ts  
of th e - la rg e r  house i f  he achieves th a t  aim. The end i t s e l f  b rin g s  s a t i s f a c t io n  
s u f f ic ie n t  to  supply m otivation .
I t  might w e ll be the  case  th a t th e re  are o b je c tiv e s  which many people 
are  attem pting to achieve because they  consider than worthy of s a t i s f a c t io n ,  and 
i t  might be th a t  a man Wno achieves x h a t i s  generally regarded as a worthy aim can
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gain the adm iration  of h is  peers and a g re a te r  degree of s e l f - r e s p e c t  by h is  
achievement * But he s t i l l  gains th e  s a t i s f a c t io n  of the end i t s e l f ,  and i t  i s  
s t i l l  a r e a l  aim which people a c tu a l ly  m sh  to  ach ieve , ra th e r  than a conven tional 
aim th a t  i s  pur sued fo r  the  external gratifie ati o ns which so c ie ty  has supp lied  
to  i to  Thus i t  i s  q u ite  p o ss ib le  tlia t th e  man xiio f i l f i l s  h is  aim of acqu iring  a 
la rg e r  house might w all be lo o k ed 'u p  to  by o th e rs  as wo r  to y of emulation, aid 
m ight, in  consequence, walk t a l l e r  himse).f : but he still gains th e  tangible b e n e f i t  
he sought, th a t  of the  la rg e r  house. Since everyone (by d e f in i t io n )  wants to  
achieve th e ir  aims, th e re  is  esteem of a kind accorded to  everyons xtoo fulfils h is  
ob jectives*  He is  w orthy of adm ira tion  as a man who i s  good a t  achieving ai.ms, and 
can be resp ec ted  in  a fa sh io n , re g a rd le ss  of the general, op in ion  concerning th e  
desirability of the ends he p u rsu es. One encounters such remarks as " I  do not 
share h is  sca le  of values, but I  have to  admit'e the way in  which he s e ts  about 
g e ttin g  what he wants". But considerab ly  more adm iration  snd esteem is  reserved  
for those  who do sue cess to l ly  achieve a id s which are g en e ra lly  sought a f te r*
Indeed, adm iration  and esteem a re  themselves g en e ra lly  regarded as  d e s ira b le  aids* 
Their p u r s u i t  can o ften  involve a person in  th e  followâng of ends which he does 
not regard  a s  wortoy. in  thax iselves, but which, because they  are gen era lly  regarded 
as worthy, b ring  w ith  th e ir  achievement th e  ex te rn a ls  of p l 'a ise  and re sp e c t from 
other members of s o c ie ty . The ind iv ildual xtoo seeks fame and admiration can thus 
be placed i n  the p o s i t io n  of pursu ing  what fo r  him i s  a p u re ly  conventional end, 
bu t what i s ,  fo r  o th e rs , an end worthy of achievement in  i t s  am  right. There 
i s  COÏTS id  er ab le evidence fo r supposing th a t  many who engage in h ig h -le v e l economic 
a c t iv i ty  do so no t fo r th e  d i r e c t  f in a n c ia l g£fl.n, but fo r  th e  respect and 
adm iration  which they b e liev e  w i l l  accompany a su ccessfu l performance*
P ro g ress , as was mentioned in  the  in tro d u c to ry  s e c tio n , must always be
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aim -rela ted*  One does no t malce p ro g ress  i n  the a b s tra c t ;  one makes p ro g ress
to/Tards th e  to i  filam ent of a i  ob jective*  Noxf whereas fo r a c t i v i t i e s  which have
conven tiona lly  nominated ends, p ro g ress  i s  easy to measure o b je c tiv e ly  in  terms of
th e  end, i t  i s  as w e ll to  r e f l e c t  th a t  from the p o in t  of view of th e  p a r t ic ip a t in g
in d i'% d u a ls , p rogress i s  only made i f  achievement of toe conventional end does in
f a c t  b ring  them c lo se r to  achievement o f whatever aims le d  them to  undertake th e
a c tiv ity o  Thus, w hile everyone can vspealc m th  con fida ice  o f p ro g ress  in  s c ia ic e
or in  g o lf , th e re  i s  no t the same confidence in  f i e ld s  which lack  conven tionally
nominated and recognised  ends* Real m o tiv a tio n  i s  a personal th in g ; people have
d if fe re n t  id eas  about xtoich o b je c tiv e s  should be pursued, a id  about th e  com parative
ra tin g  o f o b je c tiv es  which c lash  w ith each other* There are reasons fo r  supposing
th a t  conscious m otives are  determined in  p a r t  by higher ends which a re  not
consciously  acknowledged, and th a t  people a re  perhaps more uniform in  the  p u rs u it
&of th ese  h igher ends than they are  in  accord over th e i r  recognised m otives; b u t a t 
the  le v e l  a t  T«toich people recognise o b je c tiv e s  th a t they  toinlc they w ish to  achieve? 
th e re  i s  c e r ta in ly  a m d e  v a r ie ty  o f d if f e r in g  aims*
P rogress is  the name given to  ’the c lo se r  approach to  an ob jective*  I t  
can on ly  be used in  circum stances in  xdiich the o b je c tiv e  i s  ad n it te d , and in  
which a s ta te  of attainm ent is  recognised  to  be nearer to th a t  o b je c tiv e  than was 
a previous s t a t e .  S ince real, o b je c tiv e s  are  p e rso n a l, ap p licab le  only to  s p e c if ie d  
in d iv id u a ls , i t  f o l la f s  ’to a t p rog ress tab a rd s  real, o b je c tiv e s  cm  only be regarded 
on a personal lev e l»  One man can make p ro g ress  i n  any p a r t ic u la r  f i e l d ,  bub 
one can on ly  speak of so c ie ty  as a ■xtoole maki% p ro g ress i n  a f i e l d  i f  i t  i s  
accepted th a t  E ith e r  we are  u sing  th e  term  ’p ro g re ss ’ according to ’tiie value-sca3.e 
o f the in d iv id u a l making ’toe pronouncenBnt, or we are ta lk in g  about circum stances 
in  xtoich so c ie ty  as a whole sh a res  a u n ify in g  o b jec tiv e  i n  th a t  f ie ld *  And s in c e
l i e
people d i f f e r  i n  m otives, i t  i s  only  a t  th e  conventional le v e l  th a t  we can t a lk
of p ro g ress ; only at the le v e l  where so c ie ty  agrees to  d ec la re  th a t  a p a r t ic u la r
aim is  to be achieved can th e re  be u n iv e rsa l estim ations o f progress* ¥e can spealc
of progress in  sc ience , th e re fo re , n o t, as Kuhn a lle g e s , because we give the
3a d je c tiv e  ‘s c i e n t i f i c ’ to  any f ie ld  i n  which we recogn ise  progress, but because 
we have accepted  a conventional end fd r  s c ie n t i f i c  activity* The f ie ld s  i n  which . 
we cannot agree th a t  th e re  has been p ro g ress are those fo r  which we do not have 
acceptance o f  a conventional end*
When we say such things as "There has been no p rog ress to speak of in  
moral th in k in g " , we are  no t denying th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  that in d iv id u a ls  might have 
made considerable pro g ress toxvards t i e i r  o b je c tiv e s  in  m oral thought* What we 
are saying i s  e i th e r  th a t  th e re  i s  no aim agreed by convention to  be the  ta rg e t  
of moral th in k in g , o r th a t  s o c ie ty ’s a tta in m en ts  in  moral th o ig h t do no t 
correspond with our own individual ideas*
P rogress is  made (and recognised  as such) by e lim in a tio n  of l e s s  
adequate attem pts to  achieve o b je c tiv e s  after com petitive te s tin g *  There is, as 
we saw, a kind of mental model in  the mind of tlie participant of what the  u n iv e rse  
should be lilce a f te r  the aim has been achieved* Tlie comparison of haf toe u n iv e rse  
a c tu a lly  looks a f te r  each attem pt w ith to a t m ental model a ffo rd s  a b a s is  fo r  
ap p rec ia tin g  how fa r  s lio rt of the aim the a t ta n p t has fa lle n *  I t  m ight suggest 
ways ill which b e t te r  a ttem pts can be made, and i t  certainly enables attem pts to  be
evaluated  com paratively* In  astronomy th e re  i s  a device o cc a s io n a lly  employed 
which i s  known as a blinlc microscope, and which oper a t es on similar p r in c ip le s .  In
order to  d e te c t  n o n - s te l la r  o b je c ts  moving aga inst a background of to  a t  appears 
by the e a r th ’s ro ta t io n  to  be co n s tan t s t e l l a r  m otion, t-wo p la te s  are exposed a t  
some time distance from each o th e r , bu t showî.ng tirie same p a r t  of th e  sky* Because
.  I l l
the e a r t h '8 motion i s  followed by th e  te le sc o p e , th e  s ta r s  appear as p o in ts  of 
l i g h t  i n  the same p o s it io n  with re sp e c t to  each o th e r on both p la te s .  Any minor 
p la n e ts ,  comets, etc*, which have an independent motion w il l  appear in  d if fe re n t  
p o s itio n s  on the two plates®  In  the blinlc m icroscope, the images are p resen ted  to 
the  eyes su ccess iv e ly , so th a t  w hile th e  s ta r s  appear to remain s ta t io n a ry , the 
o b je c ts  xfith independent motion appear to  jump bacâc and fo r  h i b efo re  th e  eyes, thus 
enabling  the observer to  Id e n tify  them in a la rg e  s ta r  f i e ld .  In  a way which i s  
s im ila r  in  many re sp e c ts , we compare the id e a l imagi.ned s ta te  w ith  hie a c tu a l s ta te  
a f te r  an a ttem p t; and the  d if fe re n c e  betwreen the two which i s  revealed  i s  a t t r ib u te d  
to  inadequacies in  our attem pt* Our competitive te s t in g  in v o lv es us i n  continually 
proposing new a l te r n a t iv e s ,  and d iscard in g  wliichever produces th e  g r e a te s t  
divergence between intended and adiievedo Progress comes about because every 
d ec is io n  xve make is to  adopt the b e t t e r  o f  two a l te rn a t iv e s ,  to  adopt th e  one 
which produces th e  c lo s e s t  correspondence xfith the ideal.*
Wien ve  engage in  activities which are de lin ea ted  by a co n v en tio n a lly  
nominated o b je c tiv e , we a l l  share the sane concept of th e  id e a l ;  we are  a l l  as i t  
were using one p la te  i n  common when we compare performance attempts» But fo r  
a c t iv i t i e s  to th o u t sn agreed o b je c tiv e , w jeuse d if fe re n t concepts of the id e a l ,  so 
the  approach by one person  to  h is ‘id e a l p l a t e ‘ need not be an approach to  the 
‘id e a l p l a t e ' of another person* I t  foUosfs from th is  th a t  any q u estio n  of 
" u n iv e rsa lly  recognised  p rogress" does n o t a r i s e  a t all* I t  i s  a ph rase  ap p licab le  
only to  activities whrlch have u n iv e rsa il.y recognised  ends*
Even though reco g n itio n  of p rog ress i n  the attainm ent of r e a l  o b jec tiv es  
might never be u n iv e rs a l ,  th e re  are, of course, f ie ld s  in  which wre may say th a t  
p rog ress can be g en e ra lly  recognised* ¥ben the m otives are  such that they  apply 
to  a la r  go proportion of so c ie ty , then  to a t  la rg e  p ro p o rtio n  id. 3.1 be able to  ta lk
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In  terms of general p ro g re ss  towards those ends* This i s  tantamount to  saying 
th a t  although people Viave d if fe re n t m otives, i t  might happen th a t  la rg e  nuiribers 
co incide on p a r t ic u la r  ones* S ince they are  using the sane n o tio n  of th e  id e a l ,  
they w i l l  be ab le  to  eva luate  the  performance o f o thers ta b a rd s  th a t  idea]., and 
ta lk  of p ro g re ss  being made tO'^ards i t s  a tta inm ent on something more than  an 
ind i\d .dual basis® Tnls is  not to  say t h a t  p rog ress c o n s is ts  i n  the nearer approadi 
to  what the m ajo rity  regard  as  a des ir able : i t  i s  to  ssy th a t  p ro g re ss , fo r  any 
gr oup, c o n s is ts  i n  the n ea re r  approach to  what th a t  group reg a rd s  as a d e s ira b le  
end*- Dtoere th a t  group c o n s is ts  of the bulk  of a s o c ie ty , one can  ta lk  of p ro g ress  
towards general ends, xdiile adm itting  th a t  th e se  might not be universcill.y sought 
end 8 0
The f ie ld  of economics a f fo rd s  an example * I t  wjould be g m e ra lly  
accepted , I  th in k , to a t people seek from economic a c t iv i ty  an i ix re a s in g  supply 
of goods and serv ices*  Thus an economic s ta te  i n  xhich th e re  were more goods and 
se rv ic e s , and in  which th e se  were g en e ra lly  a v a ila b le , would be spoken of 
g en e ra lly  as repr es an ting  p ro g ress  i n  toe economic field® But there might be 
members of so c ie ty  who regarded th e  prime aim of economic a c t iv i ty  as the 
equal to a t io n  of the a b i l i ty  to  command goods and s e rv ic e s , reg a rd le ss  of q u an tity  * 
I f  the s t a t e  of increased  goods and se rv ic e s , though toe se be g e n e ra lly  a v a ila b le , 
and to  ou gh every s in g le  manber of so c ie ty  were able to  command more than  b e fo re , 
nonetheless be d is t r ib u te d  i n  such a way th a t xtoder d is p a r i t i e s  e x is t  to  an did 
b e fo re , th e n  toe stops taken w i l l  be regarded by th a t  m in o rity  as a re tro g re ss io n *  
Our use of th e  term " g n e ra lly  recognised  p rogress" tous c a r r ie s  xd.th i t  the  
assumption th a t  th e re  w i l l  be some to  d isp u te  th is  ; an assum ption xvhich we do not 
make when we spealc of the reco g n itio n  as ‘u n iv e rsa l ’ *
When we say sudi to in g s  as to a t the re  has been general agreement th a t  our
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so c ie ty  has made moral p ro g ress during th e  p a s t  two hundred y ears , we do so in  
the knocvLedge th a t  th e  hulk of so c ie ty  would reg a rd  i t  as  c lo se r  to  th e i r  id e a l 
th a t we no longer survey  xvith equanimity th e  p rospect o f ch-ildren under ten  being 
led  to  a l i f e  o f  hard labou r in  mines and f a c to r ie s ,  or human beings being bought 
and sold  fo r  menial s er \d_tud e* But we do so i n  f u l l  a wax' eness ih a t  th e re  are 
those i n  our so c ie ty  who reg ard  such steps a s  outweighed by what they  regard  as 
re tro g ra d e  steps such as the preparedness to possess n u c lea r weapons, and who 
consequently  deny th a t  xhat has talven p la ce can be ca lled  progress*
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  a sc rib in g  p rog ress do no t r e s t  w ith th e  problem of 
unshared m otives, fo r  th e re  i s  the added com plicating fac to r th a t  m otives change 
over tim e . Even i f  an o b je c tiv e  i s  so x-fidely sought th a t xfo can c a l l  i t  a general 
motive a t  one s ta g e , x-re ap p rec ia te  th a t  i t  m y  no t always be so i n  the fu ture*  
Conventionally nominated o b je c tiv e s  r a r e ly  change; people might no lo n g er wish to  
pursue them i f  they ceased to  be accompanied by th e  ex ternal s a t i s  fa c tio n s  of 
re a l  m otive, b u t the only changes are  made to  the imposed l im i ta t io n s .  We can 
say th a t the o b jec tiv e  o f  golf has changed to  we in tro d u ce  a mw ru le  th a t  20 
clubs may be c a rr ie d ; bu t m o tlie r (and perhaps mere accu ra te ) xvay o f  looking a t  i t  
vK)u].d be to  say th a t  the new o b je c tiv e  does n o t d e lin e a te  ‘go'to’ , but some nexv 
a c tiv ity *  C e rta in ly , no-one- could ta lk  s m s ib ly  of "changing th e  o b jec tiv es  of 
sc ien ce" . VJhat they  xiould mean x-ras th a t  people x-rould be pursu ing  o ther o b je c tiv e s  
than ones which can r ig h t ly  be c a lle d  ’s d e n t i f l o ’*
Real m otives, being unfixed by convention as marking o ff a p a r t ic u la r  
a c t iv i ty ,  a re* su b jec t to  change* Whereas th e  o b je c tiv e  of sc ien ce  xvill alx^ajrs 
be th a t  of g re a te r  p re d ic tiv e  power over the observed u n iv e rse , we ca m o t say 
th a t  our economic m otives x%dll always be what they are a t  p res a it*  Oui' re a l 
m otives, th e  th in g s  we xvish to  achieve fo r  th e ir  own sake, are not se le c te d
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a r b i t r a r i l y  by o u rse lv es; toe y a re  th e  dev3.ces by xtoich we serve more general enclso 
Thus th e  man who s t r iv e s  to  gain  a la rg e r  house can, as xfe saw, a c tu a lly  enjoy the 
b e n e f i ts  of th e  la rg e r  house i f  he is  suecessfu l*  But m otives such as "d e s ire  
fo r  la rg e r  house" can them selves be general, i s  ed under m d er head ings such as 
"d e s ire  fo r personal com fort", and be s u b je c t  to change i f  they  f a i l  to  meet th e
xd.der ob jectives*  The man who sought the la rg e r  house x&th a view to  promot tog h is
own - com fort (and perhaps to a t  o f  h is  famtoy) might w ell f in d  on in h a b itin g  the nexf 
house th a t  i t  does n o t ,  in  f a c t ,  make him more comfortable® He might xfell move 
out of th e  la rg e r  house i n  order to  serve  th e  requirem ents o f  th a t  com fort, 
r e je c t in g ,  as i t  w ere, h is  o r ig in a l a t te n p t to malce hims e lf  more com tortable i n  • 
favour of a way xtolch h is  experience has nm  shoxm him achieves g rea te r  coiriforto 
I t  may be apprec ia ted  from toe  example to a t  our a im  may change i f  xve 
find  them le s s  ad actuate than o th e rs  a t  achieving toe general ends under xfhich they  
are grouped® Ju s t as we improve our perform ance tox^ards any end by c o n p e tit iv e  
te s t in g  and inadequacy e lim in a tio n , so can væ improve th e  aims themselves® We 
r e je c t  those xtoose f a l f i l lm e n t  leav es us s t i l l  d is s a t is f ie d  in  terms of th e
general end which the i n i t i a l  md was designed to achieve* We can thus see
motives a s  arranged i n  an h ie ra rc h ic a l  s tm c tu r e ,  m th  le s s e r  ones subo rd inate  to  
h ig h er ones* On each le v e l  o f  toe h ie ra rc h y  th e re  can be p ro g re ss  toxfards th e  
achievement of superio r aims by com petitive  te s t in g  and e lim in a tio n . There i s  no 
reason fo r any aim to  be d iscarded  except th a t  i t  f a i l s  to  s a t i s f y  us by i t s  
fu lfi]% m ent; and s in ce  vie must be d i s s a t i s f ie d  in  some respect*  we can deduce th e
tssls*5*3reM«ic»:i
o p e ra tio n  of a higher aim.
Some of our o b je c tiv e s  a re  undoubtedly unconscious ones* We f in d  th a t  
the  achievement of some of our o b je c tiv e s  leav es u s  u n s a t is f ie d , x^ithout us being 
able to t r a c e  the  source o f d is s a t to f a c t io n ,  and we a re  l e f t  xd.th toe expedien t o f
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experim enting xtolli d if fe re n t aims to  see xhiich of than leave le s s  d is s a t i s f a c t io n
by their fu lf i l lm e n t  * I t  i s  q u ite  p o s s ib le , th e re fo re , th a t  we can p rog ress to ,
or reg re ss  from, some of our aims to  to  out consciously  r e a l is in g  i t*  I t  has been
4proposed, fo r example, th a t  we have an inborn  urge to  compete, a genetic  d r iv e  to
f u l f i l  our p o te n tia l  and a s s e r t  our 'id e n ti ty *  « I f  t h i s ,  or something l ik e  i t ,  is
indeed an unconscious aim, then we can see  hoxf i t  might come about th a t  the
fu lf i l lm e n t of more conscious o b je c tiv e s  f o r  se cu rity  could le ad  to  a b locking of
o u tle ts  fo r  th is  unconscious d r iv e , and consequent fe e l in g s  of d isco n ten t d e sp ite
5the ev e r-in c reas in g  achievement of our recognised aims®
I t  ma;^ )' w ell be to a t there  are genetic a l l  y tra n sm itte d  unconsciou.s
m otives of th i s  v a r ie ty  a t  th e  apex of th e  h ie ra rch y  of motives® Since m otives
a t  each le v e l se rve  higher motivations, we have to  p o s tu la te  th e  e to s ten c e  o f
'h ig h e s t  m o tiv a tio n s ' in  o rder to  avoid th e  i n f in i t e  regress® The p o in t can be
made th a t  aims incom patible xtoth the su rv ival of th e  species would be se le c te d  out
by the a c tu a l  p rocess of evolutionary e lim in a tio n , so i t  would not be unreasonable
to  propose th a t  th e  h ig h e s t m otivations of a l l  xvould be  ones concerned with
ev o lu tio n  and su rv iv a l, or th a t  tîiese  would ta k e  th e  form of in h e r i te d  instincts*
I t  _ ma y be to a t our unconscious h i^ ie r  m otivations a re  in h e r i te d  behav ioural t r a i t s
se lec ted  in  us by the  evo lu tionary  p ro cess , and th a t a l l  of our h ie ra rch y  of
m otivations a re  b u t steps xtoich ascaad tab a rd s  toe evolutionary d riv e s  of our
species® I f  a l l  o f  our o b je c tiv e s  were bu t a t te n p ts  many stages removed to  ful.ü .1
(o thein b u i l t  d riv es  f o r  ' i d e n t i t y ' ,  's t im u la t io n ',  ' s e c n r i ty ' and l i lm ,  it would
leav e  th e  hwnan race many s ta g e s  removed from toe com pletely  autonomous agents
7which some to  in k e rs  like to  propose |  but i t  would s t i l l  le a v e  considerab le  scope 
for th e  ex e rc ise  o f  im agination  and c r i t i c a l  judgcsraent in  toe devising  of ways i n  
to ic h  higher ends might be served in  a way com patible xd.th l iv in g  in  modern societies
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Progress toxfards tlie  achievement of any aims can only be made by com petitive 
te s tin g  and in a  d equ acy-elim inat i  on * And com petitive te s t in g  re q u ire s  th a t  
competing proposals are  formulated* Thus even i f  man were not p laced  i n  the 
p o s i t io n  of being  ab le  to  determine th e  ends which, u lt im a te ly , would b ring  most 
s a t i s f a c t io n  by the  to fulfifJXment, he most c e r ta in ly  is  in  the  p o s i t io n  o f knowing 
th a t  th e  degree of s a t i s f a c t io n  and fu lf i l lm e n t he does ad iiev e  i s  dependent upon ' 
h is 'r e s o u rc e fu ln e s s  aid c re a tiv e  im aginât ion*
Even though man's m otives may u ltim a te ly  have t h e i r  ro o ts  in  evolutionary 
f a c to rs ,  h is  s a t i s f a c t io n  of higher aims i s  dependent upon his com parative 
ev a lu a tio n  o f proposed secondary aims* I t  is  th ese  aims virlch change from genera tic  
to g en era tio n  and thus confuse our use of th e  term  p ro g re ss . Me are  measuring 
by means of a s h if t in g  sca le  when a ttem p t to say th a t  one s t a t e  of so c ie ty  
i s  b e t te r  than another, Our very n o tio n  of xfhat c o n s t i tu te s  ' b e t te r  ' may have 
changed w ith the  t r a n s i t io n . Every so c ie ty  sees i t s e l f  as on a kind of moral 
p la te a u ; i t s  moral standards are used to  eval.uate th e  m orality  of p re \io u s  s ta te s  
of so c ie ty , and even conjectured fu tu re  states cf society® S im e  i t s  own values 
form i t s  d e f in i t io n  o f what i s  m oral, i t  i s  in e v ita b le  that a l l  behaviour d if fe re n t
from p re v a ilin g  standards must be regarded as 'l e s s  m o ra l’* The only people
vho t e l l  us t h a t  th e i r  am  ago i s  l e s s  moral than previous ages are those who 
d isse n t from th e ir  contanporary s o c ie ty 's  m o ra lity , and p re fe r  in s tead  to adopt th e  
values of th e  past* Those xfho do adopt the general morality o f th e ir  contemporary 
s o c ie ty  can on ly  regard previous ages as le s s  moral* Slm ilax 'ly in  the contem platior 
of futuree s ta te s  of s o c ie ty , any s tan d ard s d if fe re n t from their am  a re  n e c e s s a r ily  
seen as low er. I f  they were regarded as h ig h e r, taen s o c ie ty 's  p re v a ilin g  m orality  
would a lready  have a lte red *  I t  i s  much the same as xtoen we a t tm p t  to  p re d ic t
xtoat new knavledge w i l l  become av a ilab le  in  the  fu tu re*  I f  xve can p re d ic t  i t ,  th en
■IX
we have it a lread y , and i t  i s  p re sen t and not fu tu re  knasrledge* The only 
circum stances in  which we envisage f i tu r e  so c ie ty  to  be more moral a re  th o se  i n  
which we imagine th a t  more people xd.ll adlier e i n  f a c t  to th e  moral code xdiich we 
now p o ssess in  theory* Such circum stances do not re p re s e it  an improved fu tu re  
m o ra lity , but a more widespread obedience to  the c u rra r t moral code, and we a re  
ta lk in g  about changes in  perform ance, not in  ob jectives*
‘ E v iden tly  i t  i s  impossible to  t a l k  d )jec tlv e l.y  about p m g ress  towards
r e a l  (as opposed to  conven tional) ends fo r two reasons* In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e , th e  
ends a re  not u n iv e rs a lly  sh ared , and in  the second p la c e , the chj a c tiv e s  change 
over a p erio d  of tim e. ¥e can t a lk  about ind iv iduals, making p ro g re ss  towards 
to e ir  ends, and we can ta lk  about p rog ress toxfards general m ds when th e re  are 
o b je c tiv es  which are  w idely shared by members o f a society* Communities do have 
these  general ends, even tiaxgh  xfe a l l a f  fo r  th e  presence of d is s e n te rs , because 
there  a re  fa c to rs  which militate in favour o f the  general acceptance of commu.nal 
o b je c tiv e s , and a re  a t  times s u f f ic ie n t  to overcome the c e n tr ip e ta l  fo rc e s  of 
human variety® Emulation i s  one such force* Because people have vague and 
inde term ina te  aims a t  the general le v e l ,  such as d es ire  fo r  com fort, fo r  job 
s a t i s f a c t io n ,  fo r  g a in , e tc * , they are  able to  adopt the more s p e c if ic  aims xtoidi 
are  shoxm by o ther members of so c ie ty  to  be su ccessfu l a t achieving the more 
general aim s. J u s t  as th e re  is th e  te ch n ic a l knowledge In  the  a c q u is i t io n  of a 
s k i l l ,  xfhich can be communicated to  o th e rs  and xiiich ap p lied  to  o th e rs , so th e re  
are  sp e c if ic  alms whose pur s u i t  va. 11, fo r  most people, s a t i s f y  general aims* 
People, do not need to  make com petitive to ia ls  them selves a t  every p o in t; 'they 
can emulate the bd iav iour of th o se  who appear to  have achieved a d e s ira b le  degree 
of su ccess .
Any new id e a , be i t  an aim th a t  :ls proposed a s  a way of s a tis fy in g
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deeper o b je c tiv e s , or be i t  a px'oposal o f  a new attem pt to f u l f i l  an -ex is tin g  aim, 
always s t a r t s  as the p ro p e rty  of toe  in d iv id u a l too  forrau3ntes i t*  I f  he (and 
the sm all c i r c le  o f those  he can inÜ .uence d ire c t ly )  adopt to e  innovation  and is  
seen to  achieve itoa t o th e rs  c a l l  su ccess , then  o th e rs  xflD. im ita te  him in  i t s  
adoption* I f  th is  p rac tica l, t e s t  does indeed toow Increased  success for those 
who fo llow , then they  in  tu rn  become toe o b je c ts  o f  em ulation u n t i l  th e  innova tion  
has been w idely adopted. By fo llow ing the lead  o f th e  more advm turous members 
o f so c ie ty , th e  more cau tious members a re  le d  in to  achieving more o f th e i r  
ob jec tives*  I f  th e  innovation  does indeed provide -a la rg e  p ro p o rtio n  of s o c ie ty  
xfith increased  s a t i s f a c t io n ,  then xve can t a lk  of genera l p ro g re ss  having been 
made® Of co u rse , i t  may come about th a t  e i th e r  the  innovator h im self or some of 
h is  em ulators achieve r e s u l t s  no t thought d es irab le  by o ther members of soc ie ty*
In  xdiich case , s in ce  i t  does n o t serve a general, end, toe innova tion  w i l l  never 
become p a r t  of g e n e ra lly  accepted progress* By em ulating success and avoiding 
f a i lu r e ,  so c ie ty  can gain access  to  te s te d  a l te rn a t iv e s  and become more uniform  
in  i t s  aims and p ra c t ic e s ,  even tooxgh toe presence o f d iv e rse  aims w il l  alxvays 
mean to a t  some proposals a re  su sc e p tib le  o f  todespread  adoption , xtoile some a re  
not o
Another .factor to ic h  helps to  px'ovide more un ifo rm ity  i s  toe  d e s ire  
fo r  s e c u r ity  i n  society* There i s  p ressu re  i n  so c ie ty  towards th e  p o ssess io n  of 
shared values because of toe secu rity  to ic h  accompanies th is  ® The prevalence  of 
shared values re in fo rc e s  th o se  v a lu es ; in s te a d  of the constan t and u p se ttin g  
question ing  of v a lu es , th e re  is  the  knowledge th a t  th ey  are  accep ted  by so c ie ty  
and can be held unthinlcingly in  the forms of custom and t r a d i t io n .  People l i k e ,  
to o , to  be able to p re d ic t  what th e i r  f e l la h s  w il l 'd o  in  c e r ta in  s i tu a t io n s | th is  
enables them to p lan  xdLtli reasonab le ex p ec ta tio n  of success in  t h e i r  r e la t io n s
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w ith  them, and brin>gs the se c u r ity  of fe e i ii 'g  adequate to  cope xfith such 
clrcum stances as may arise*
•To some ex ten t toe se f a c to r s  are mut a l ly  con trad ic to ry*  D esire fo r 
shared values cannot always be reconc iled  x^ito toe d es ire  to  p ro g re ss  by adopting 
innovations which have been tooxm to  be su c cessfu l fo r others* D espite th e i r  
apparent in c o m p a tib ility , so c ie ty  somehow manages to  balance  these f a c to rs  ag a in s t 
each o th e r , fo r both m aybe seen a t work, and both  con tx lve to  produce ra th e r  
more ’general’ values tlian x\re might expect i n  to e ir  absence* Both enable us to  
ta lk  o ccas io n a lly  about p ro g re ss  on a general level ra th e r  than an in d iv id u a l 
one, even tha igh  we knew th a t  toe g e æ ra l le v e l i s  not a universal one®
The im p lic a tio n  of our d isc u ss io n  of true m otives has been th a t  p ro g re ss  
toxfards the a tta inm en t of th e se  i s ,  l ik e  p ro g ress  towards toe nominated end o f 
sc ience , founded upon c re a tiv e  acts® And a s , in  sc ien ce , xve are  x^rong to  think in* ^  — ■ II, n i^ iagTgy ^  ^  ^
terras of a 'c o r r e c t  ex p lan a tio n ' waiting to  be discovered  by u s , so i n  the
achievement of cur tru e  o b je c tiv e s  are we wrong to thinlc in  terms of a 'c o r r e c t '
way of doing th ings*  In  science we propose models c re a t iv e ly ,  and r e ta in  th o se  
xAiich serve our purpose b e t t e r  than i t  was served before*  So i n  the achievement of 
our non-conventiona]_ alms do x-je c r e a t iv e ly  dexdse nexv a t te n p ts  ( in  th e  form of 
ac tions or sub or ch. mate aims ) to  achieve our pruposes b e t te r  than d id  our previous 
creations* Progress in our non-conventional ends means toat we have devised 
proposals to ic h , a f te r  c r i t i c a l  testing, we have pr e f  e rr ed over our p rev io u s ly - 
adopted proposals as better serv ing  our purposes* I f  those purposes be d iverse  
amongst people, th en  so must the adopted proposes vAiich xvL31 re p re se n t progress* 
When we talk of "generally" accepted  p ro g re ss , -therefore, we are  doing no more 
to an u sin g  a terra of convenience m iich xve a re  e iab led  to use because the  m otives 
o f men happen to  coincide* P rogress xtoich i s  g en e ra lly  recognised  as  such
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i s  not 'g r e a te r ' or somehoxf 'b e t t e r '  p ro g ress  than th a t  which lacks th i s  
recogn ition^  I t  is  sim ply progress xtoich is  more evldenfc because i t  re p re se n ts  
th e  nearer achievement of a widely-held obj eotive*
We have no grounds from th e  foregoing argument to  suppose th a t  humanity
makes more progress by agreeing on xtoat a re  th e  tru e  m otivations of man* The
agreement to d ec la re  a conventionaa! o b je c tiv e  xd .ll produce a s i t u a t io n . in  xvhich
are'm ore l ik e ly  to pro g ress toxfards th a t o b je c tiv e ; bu t we cannot assume th a t  the
pathway to  p rog ress in  our moral and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  xd .ll b eg in  xdth the reco g n itio n
9of id e n tic a l  aims betxfeen men® I f ,  fo r any o b je c tiv e , there comes about th e  
d iscovery  and adm ission th a t  i t  X£ a univer sa l end of man, then so c ie ty  m i l  be 
able to  agree th a t  th e  p rogress made towards to a t  aid can be described  as p ro g ress  
for society* But th is  p u b lic  reco g n itio n  of p ro g ress  does not make i t  any more 
or le s s  real® P rogress r e f e r s  to  the nearer approadi to  o b je c tiv e s , xtoether or 
not to is  i s  recognised and >âdely admitted® The d iscovery  and reco g n itio n  of 
u n iv e rsa l ends simply means th a t everyone may now q ip ly  th e  terms p rog ress where 
only some used i t  before.
Because tru e  motivations are  in d iv id u a l,  so must be the idea  of progress 
toxfards to e ir  fulfillment® If i t  happens t h a t  everyone discovers th a t  they  colncid{ 
in  th e i r  viexfs on th e  desir ability of any p a r t ic u la r  objective, then i t  w ill  happen 
th a t  in  th is  re sp e c t a t least th e ir  opinion of xhat c o n s ti tu te s  p rog ress > a l l  
co in c id e 0 But i t  i s  to e ir  op in ion  we are  ta lk in g  about, the e s tim a tio n , ra th e r  
than the  fact. If th e  members of a society»* pursue aims on xtoich they  are  not 
agreed, i t  might come about th a t  a l l  of them could app m a to  nearer to  achieving thoE 
aims, and a l l  could be said  to make progress, even thou^i th e y  them selves xxiould 
not agree on that*  We cannot assume t h a t  i n  a s i tu a t io n  xiiere some members o f 
so c ie ty  regard  an aim as d e s ira b le , xtoile o th e rs  do n o t, th a t one group i s
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n e c e s s a r ily  ‘r i g h t ’ and the other ‘wrong ’  ^ I t  m ight be tlie case th a t  a l l  of them
were pursuing (perhaps unconsciously) a h igher aim^ and h ia t th e  secondary aim
were held .in  the  manner of a co n jec tu re  as to  what m ight achieve th e  higher aim«
In  such a case c r i t i c a l  te s t in g  wrould t e l l  whether th e  achievement of the secondary
aim did serve the  higher aim b e t te r  than nothing a t  al.l^ or b e t te r  than  any
proposed alternatives@  But th e re  might be p o ss ib le  a l te rn a t iv e s  no t y e t proposed
which would serve the hi«^aer aim b e t te r .  Thus^ even i f  i t  could b e  sho/m th a t
adoption o f the secondary aim g.d^ serve the higher aim^ i t  m i^ it be  shw n
subsequent to  th a t  dem onstration th a t non-adoption served the  higher aim b e t t e r .
I t  would seem ‘r ig h t ‘ a t one tim e, and ‘wrong’ a t another o
Our reco g n itio n  th a t  p ro g ress  s t a r t s  w ith  the  c re a tiv e  a c t  of a new
co n jec tu re  i s  an im portant one. J u s t  as i t  i s  in c o r r e c t  to  )think of sc ien ce  as
th e  gaining of in c reas in g  access to  a body of o b je c tiv e  t ru th  by a lim in a tin g
what is  no t t ru e , so i t  i s  e q u a l ly  in c o r re c t  to  jbhinlc of moral and p o l i t i c a l
p ro g ress  in  terms of the system atic e lim in a tio n  of ‘wrong’ a l te r n a t iv e s .  The
mental conception of p rog ress should be one of system atic  b u ild in g , ra th e r  th an
of w h ittl in g  away. I t  is  n o t the case  th a t  in  the p u rsu it o f  our tru e  aims we are
attem pting to  discover the b e s t  way of achieving them by t i e  gradual abandonment
of ways which a re  n o t the  b e s t .  I t  the case th a t  our achievement depends upon
our abU -ity  to  c re a te  ways which are  b e t te r  than the ones we c re a te d  b e fo re , as
w e ll as on our a b i l i ty  to e s ta b lish  which waj?* i s  b e t te r  by com petitive te s t in g .
Follow ers of John S tu a r t M ill would have i t  th a t  i n  such a c t i v i t i e s  as
the p u rs u it  of our aim s, no-one can ever be c e r ta in  th a t he i s  r i ^ i t .  They
advocate p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r t y  on the grounds t h a t  we can never know h ia t  a proposa].
ûOi s  wrong, and cannot di ere fore be j u s t i f i e d  in  forb idding  i t ,  Tiie p o in t i s  th a t  
we cannot even assuma th a t  th e re  i s  such a th ing  as ‘r i ^ i t ’ in  th is  sphere . I t  i s
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not so much th a t we can never recogn ise  i t  fo r c e r ta in ,  as th a t  i t  does no t e x is t  
a t  a lio  ¥e a re  dea3.ing w ith  c re a tio n s  of the  human mind # iic h  can be compared in  
p ra c t ic e  to  see  i f  they are ‘b e tte r*  or ‘w r se* than each o th er a t achievi.ng what 
they were devised to  ach ieve. We knew, too, that s in c e  hie m otives vary  w ith  
in d iv id u a ls , then  so m i l  the comparisons of th e  success of p ro p o sa ls , Miat i s  
‘be tte r*  fo r  one might not be so fo r an o th e r. There is  l i t t l e  to be gained by 
th e , suggestion  th a t  “u lt im a te ly , we a l l  seek the same thing**. As in d ic a te d , i t  
might w ell be th a t  a t  th e  le v e l  of “h ig h e s t m o tiv a tio n s” we a l l  do indeed share 
common evo lu tionary  ends. But i t  i s  undoubtedly tru e  th a t some, i f  not a l l ,  of 
these  "h ig h es t m otivations" are  ones which we pursue unconsciously , and which 
l i e  beyond th e  range of our introspection. We are d^endent for th e i r  fr.lfil.Zm ent 
on our more conscious, secondary aim s, And th e  d ec is io n  as to  which secondary 
aims w i l l  b e s t  serve th e se  higher ends can only be made on the b a s is  of com petitive 
te s t in g .  I t  cannot be deduced, only proposed aid  tested*
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6
9
1 « In the upper echelons of the world of business, the hi^ salaries are apparently regarded more as marks of status than direct measures of spending power. With high marginal rates of taxation, the difference between £45?000 and is very small in terms of what it will buy;to the status conscious director, however, it can be vital. When Dr.Beeching left I.G.I. to become the director of British Rail, he insisted on not accepting a salary lower than the £2 4 ,0 0 0 he was already being paid.He explained publicly that this was so that the move would not be regarded as a demotion,
2, This is the point dealt with in Chapter 2, and amplified in Footnote 16 of that cliapter,
3, THOMS S.KIIHN, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (1962),
4, Suggested by ROBERT ARDREY in "The Territorial Imperative" (19&7), oh,9,and amplified in his "Social Contract" (l970), oh,3*»
5 , One of Audrey’s points (in "The Social Contract") is that one explanation of juvenile violence in our societies is that life has been made "too safe". By denying opportunities to respond to challenge and danger, we have (claims Ardrey) produced a situation in which our youth feels the need to ’prove’itself on the streets in acts of vandalism and gang violence,
6 , These are the three "basic drives" which Ardrey proposes in the workscited,
7 , This is an allusion to the school of environmental sociology which has BoPoSkinner as one of its high priests, (B,F,SKINNER^ "Science and Human Behaviour" (1955) un^ "The Pbylogeny and Ontogeny of Behaviour" (1966),)
8, Popper uses this idea as an outline refutation of historicism in his "Poverty of Historicism" (first published 1944/45» in book form 1957)» Because the course of human history is influenced by the growth of knowledge, and because we cannot anticipate today what we shall know only tomorrow,we can therefore reject the possibility of a theoretical history, (preface of the 1957 edition op.cit,) My point on morality is that we cannot now admit the superiority of tomorrow’s values (even if we could know them), for to admit that would be to adopt those values in preference to our present ones,
9, The recognition of a common aim actually possessed Is not to be equated with general concurrence in a decision to make something a common aim by convention,
10, P.A.HAYEK, "The Constitution of Liberty" (1960) has been the principal exponent of this view.
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Chapter 7
PROGRESS IN ECONOMIC LIFE
"There was no ’one, two, three, and away,’ hut they began running when 
they liked, and left off when they liked, so that it was not easy to know when 
the race was over. However, when they had been running half an hour or so, and 
were quite dry again, the Dodo suddenly called out ’The race is overS’ and they 
all crowded round it, panting, and asking, ’But who lias won?*
This question the Dodo could not answer without a great deal of thought, 
and it sat for a long time with one finger pressed upon its forehead (the position 
in which you usuàlly see Shakespeare in the pictures of him), while the rest 
waited in silence*, At last the Dodo said ’Everybody has won, and all must have 
prizes.’
’But who is to give the prizes,’ quite a chorus of voices asked."
- Lewis Carroll| ’Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’.
'■ f ■
1  fÜÜT
In  a c t i v i t i e s  •which a re  not d e lin ea ted  by* th e  acceptance o f  a convention- 
ally-nom inated  end, th en , we are faced  by an h ie ra rch y  of r e a l  and imagined aims 
which v a r ie s  from in d iv id u a l to  in d iv id u a l, even though i t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t  people 
share common ev o lu tio n a ry  goals a t  th e  apex of the h ie ra rc h y . D espite numerous 
a ttem p ts , no re d u c tio n is t  school has ever managed to e s ta b lish  t h a t  human m otivatioi 
can be derived from one b a s ic ,  common aim. A ll have i t  in  common th a t ,  because 
a c tu a l behaviour does net lend i t s e l f  re a d i ly  to  such a u n iC ica tio n , th en  many o f 
our apparent a s p ira tio n s  must be s tre tc h e d  on the rack  or have head and f e e t  
lopped o f f  i n  o rder th a t  th ey  might f i t .  onto th e  sing le model bed .
The weaknesses of th e se  proposed reductions have been t'âd e ly  exposed, .
and £Û.thou gh some workers a c tiv e  i n  the so c ia l sciences s t i l l  attem pt to b rin g
human aims doim. to  basic  d r iv e s , the r e la t iv e  fo rce  o f th e se  d r iv e s , and hence
*their order of p r io r i ty  in  the h ie ra rc h y , i s  admit ted to  vary ivi.th the in d iv id u a l.
The on].y u n if ic a t io n  ever to  gain  wide acceptance i n  a s o c ie ty  was the h ed o n is tic
u t i l i ta r ia n is m  of Be n th  am in  N ineteenth  Century B r i ta in . Benthara’s con ten tions
th a t  whatever i t  i s  we thinl-c we seek , we seek i t  for the  favourable balance of
p leasu re  over p a in  which is  consequent upon i t ,  aid  th a t  th is  q u a n t if ic a t io n
can be summed from the in d iv id u a l to  *the s o c ie ty , were popu larised  in to  the
ca tch -p h rase  “The g r e a te s t  happ iness of th e  g re a te s t  nuniber", and sueCGSsfu]_ly
caught hie ear of those  in  power. Following from the d isc u ss io n  of p rog ress and
conventional ends, we may no te  th a t  i t  was during th e  period  in  B r itis h  h is to ry
vAeii th is  d o c trin e  was paramount 'th a t th e re  was most w idespread b e l i e f  i n  moral
p ro g re ss . Wibh the  in flu en c e  of men such as Bentham and Chachick, the u t i l i t a r i à i i r
th e s is  had considérab le  in f lu e m e  on l e g i s la t io n ,  and was so w idely accepted  th a t
i t  assumed tem porarily  something approaching the s ta tu s  of a conventional end of2the le a d e rs  of s o c ie ty . This was tlie  period which saw fa c to ry  a c ts  and mines 
a c ts ,  laws l im itin g  working hours for women and c h ild re n , th e  a b o l i t io n  o f slavery
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and th e  r i s e  of an in sp e c to ra te  and c i v i l  s e rv ic e . I t  was a period  during which
a la rg e  p ro p o rtio n  of those in  power were convinced ih a t  p ro g ress  was being made.
They though t, to o , t h a t  tlie y had a standard  independait of personal opin ion
ag a in s t V'Aiich th a t  p rogress could be measured. Although h e d o n is tic  u t i l i t a r ia n is m
cannot now be regarded as tlie b as is  of Æ1 value and m o tivation , few would d isp u te
th a t  the N ineteenth  Century l e g is la to r s  did irdeed  b r in g  g rea te r  happiness to
g re a te r  numbers, and did indeed approadi neare r to  vàiat th ey  regarded as the
Sfundam aital o b je c tiv e .
The question  which i t  i s  now proposed to  consider i s  whether or not the re  
can he any general assessm ent o r awareness o f p ro g re ss  in  the absence of any kind 
of o b je c tiv e  stan d ard . Can th e re  b e , in  o th e r w ords, any id ea  o f  p ro g re ss  when 
we deal w ith  a c t iv i t i e s  in  which th e  ends are  not conven tiona lly  nominated? In  
the f i . r s t  in s tan ce  th e  answer must be th a t  th e re  canno t. I f  th e re  is  no agreed 
end, th en  people cannot es tim a te  perform ance in  terms of an ideal,, and cannot 
th e re fo re  t a lk  of p ro g re ss  towards i t .  But th e re  i s  a sense  i n  which th e  members 
of a so c ie ty  can be agreed th a t  th e re  has been p ro g re ss , even where they a re  not 
in  agreement over the ends to be pursued. I t  is  p o ss ib le  th a t  i n  some a c t i v i t i e s  
people can pur sue d if f e r e n t  ainB , and yet al.l, make p ro g ress  sim ultaneously  t  awards 
the achievement of those in d iv id u a l a i i t s  . Although the term *p regress* i s  
nor mal. l y  used in  an a im -re la ted  way as ‘p ro g ress  towards something*, we can r e a d i ly  
conceive of s itu a tio n s  i n  wlrLch i t  could be used v ith o u t the aim being sp e c if ie d .
A teacher a t  a c ra f t- s c h o o l may say "A ll of the pup ils made good p ro g re ss" , w ithout 
n e c e s s a r ily  implying t l i a t  they were a l l  attempts.ng to  ach ieve the same th in g . Some 
might have s tu d ied  needlework, some b a sk e try , sonB cooking, and some weaving; but 
i f  each one approached n ea re r to  p ro f ic ie n c y  i n  whatever aim he or she had s e t  fo r  
themseQ,ves, i t  would be se n s ib le  to  spealc c o l le c t iv e ly  of hie whole c la s s  as 
malcing p ro g re ss .
3 " jurr
‘Progress* i s  here  being taken  to  mean "advancerænt towards th e  aim, 
whatever i t  might b e " . I f  asked in  what f i e ld  the  p rogress had been made, the 
te ac h e r  could only re p ly  by enumerating tlie in d iv id u a l aims of th e  members of th e  
c la s s ,  or by giving a general answer such as ‘h an d icrafts*  vihich served to  conceal 
the d isp a ra te  aims included under i t s  heading. The s i tu a t io n  described  by th e  
example is  a lim ite d  one. We a re  ta lk in g  here o f  p ro g re ss  i n  f ie ld s  which perm it 
a v a r ie ty  of indiv1.dual m otives to  f a l l  under th e i.r  term s of re fe re n c e , and we a re  
fal.king about m otives which r e f e r  to  th e  desi.r ed achievement of th e  in d iv id u a l who 
holds them, r a th e r  than a d e s ire  fo r o th e rs  to  behave in  a p a r t ic u la r  way. 
Obviously, i f  th e  m otives are  o f a type which r e q i i r e  su ita b le  behaviour on the 
p a r t  o f o th e rs  befo re  th e y  can be i h l f i l l e d ,  then we meet ^•dth a p o ssib le  c o n f l ic t  
of m otives. The person who is  req u ired  to  behave i n  a p a r t ic u la r  way to  fu lfill, 
a n o th e r’s motive might find  th a t  th is  re q u ire d  behaviour does not enable him to  
achieve h is  own aim s. Only i n  a s i tu a t io n  vhere the m otives re fe r  ex c lu s iv e ly  tx? 
'those m otivated can such c o n f l ic t  be e lim in a ted . In  tiie h a n d ic ra f t c la s s  o f  our 
example, i t  is  assumed th a t  each p e rso n 's  aim i s  p ro fic ien c y  fo r  h in s e lf  i n  h is  
chosen craft©  Because h is  aim cbes n o t invo lve o th e rs  i n  ‘the actiievemenb of ends 
which he nom inates, h is  p ro g ress  does no t in te r f e r e  with "their oi-rn. The other 
monter8 of the c la s s  pursue .tJieir in d iv id u a l aims i n  a s im ila r  fashion© Because 
the  p ro g ress  of some does no t involve the  r e ta rd a t io n  or re tro g re ss io n  of o th e rs , 
we can speak of th e  c la s s  as a Wiole making progress©
This i s  a very d if fe re n t c a se  from one we considered before, in  which we
ta lk ed  o f two people vn.th co n tra d ic to ry  m otivesj and em dsaged a s i tu a t io n  in
which a new s ta te  would mean progress towards h is aim for o îb , but (n ecessarily )
4"reg ress io n  for the other© The p o in t o f d if fe re n c e  i n  our new exm ple is  th a t  we 
a re  tallcing n e i th e r  about con f].ic ting  aim s, nor about s ta te s  of achievement common 
to  'the h o ld e rs  of d if fe re n t  aims© In  the  h a n d ic ra f t c la s s ,  any new ‘s ta te*  i s  a
hs ta te  of achievement in  ih ic h  only one in d iv id u a l f in d s  h im self ; we a re  ta lk in g  
about a s i tu a t io n  in  which a c tio n s  are  in d iv id u a l ra tlie r  than c o l le c t iv e .  We say 
th a t  th e  whole c la s s  made p ro g ress  i f  each of th e ir  in d iv id u a l s ta te s  of 
achievement re p re se n ts  an advance towards t h e i r  in d iv id u a l aims from the 
previous state©  We are e f f e c t iv e ly  summing d em en ts  which do not mix© Ju s t 
as th em  is  no composite sum of ‘my shoes p lus your s p e c ta c le s ‘ , so th e re  i s  
no sum of sev era l d if fe re n t s t a te s  o f  per for man ce in  d i f f e r e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  by 
d if fe re n t people© But we can c e r ta in ly  t a lk  about an in c re a se  in  the com posite I f  
every  s in g le  element i s  larger©  Thus i f  my shoes a re  rq )la c e d  by a la rg e r  p a i r ,  
and your sp e c ta c le s  are rep laced  by a la rg e r p a i r ,  then we know t h a t  the new ‘my 
shoes p lus your s p e c ta c le s ’ is  la rg e r  than before© What we cannot do is  to  g ive 
com parative w eighting to  the in d iv id u a l i t  ans | we cannot say  th a t  an in c re a se  i n  
s iz e  o f  sp e c ta c le s  malces up fo r a decrease in  s iz e  o f shoes©
The ana].ogy i s  a h e lp fu l one, because i t  may be seen th a t  i f  two people 
pursuing  n o n -co n flic t t in g  aims bo th  malce p ro g re ss , then we can t a l k  of th e  two 
c o l le c t iv e ly  malcing p ro g re ss ; w hereas i f  one advances and one re g re s s e s , we have 
no common sc a le  on which to  determ ine whether one’s advance ‘com pensates‘ fo r  tiie 
o th e r ’s regression© We ta lk  of p ro g ress  i n  g e ie ra l terms, to o , where a la rg e  
number of people a re  engaged in  a c t i v i t i e s  grouped under a general, heading, and 
where a g rea t m a jo rity  of them malce in d iv id u a l progress© While we cannot assume 
th a t  the p rog ress of one can compensate fo r  the, re g re ss io n  of an o th er, we do tend 
to  assuiïB w ith  very la rg e  numbers th a t  p ro g ress  for most of them enab les us to  ta lk  
about ‘the p rogress o f th e  group* or * c o l le c t iv e  p ro g re s s ’ © While we have no 
system of ca lcu lus which enables us to  weight th e  p ïo g ress o f  some ag a in s t th e  
reg re ss io n  of o th e rs , we assume that th e  re g re ss io n  of a very sm all sub-group is  
outweighed by the  advancement of a la rg e  majority© U t i l i t a r ia n  theor)^, although 
faced by a sim ila r problem in  being unable to  w eight p le a su re  o f some ag a in s t
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p a in  of o th e rs , did n onethe less advocate the të c ing of dec isio n s in  which a 
' sL ig ib ’ unhappiness of few was accompanied by g re a t ly  in c re a se d  happiness o f many,, 
Wliile i t  might be d i f f i c u l t  to  dec ide whether the unliappiness o f  one, however 
s l ig h t ,  could be coun ter-balanced  by the happiness o f  tivo, i t  was recognised  as 
being e a s ie r  to  rndce th e  d ec is io n  where tlie  hap p irn  ss of two thousand la y  on the 
o ther s id e . S im ila r ly , w hile a c la ss  o f th re e  menfoers m i ^ t  nob lead  us to  t s l k» X
in  terms of ‘c o lle c t iv e  p ro g re s s ’ i f  two had advanced and one re g re sse d , we would 
use the terms w ithout much h e s i ta t io n  i f  i t  were a case of txfo thousand nearing  
th e ir  aim s, and only one rec /ed ln g .
I t  comes abou t, th e re fo re , th a t  the term ’p ro g re s s ’ i s  used in  th e  case  
of la rg e  numbers of people pursuing d isp a ra te  aims under a general head ing , where 
a la rg e  m ajo rity  of them talce steps which b ring  them c lo se r to  tlie achievement of 
th e ir  in d iv id u a l aim s. But only  fo r  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  which the in d iv id u a l aims re.'U te 
only to the  performance of the m otivated person  can the c o n f l ic t  of* ends be 
avoided. In  cases Vnere tlB ih lfilam ent, o f  an aim xd.ll re q u ire  ap p ro p ria te  
behaviour by those  not sharing the  aim, i t  xvLXI, be Ipijiossible to  t a lk  of p rogress 
by a group g en e ra lly , onI.y of p rog ress from the p o in t of view of c e r ta in  members 
of the group.
Economic a c t iv i ty  i s  a f ie ld , i n  which d isp a ra te  aims may be followed 
by p a r t ic ip a t in g  in d iv id u a ls , and in  vdiich i t  may som etlm s happen th a t  the vast 
m a jo rity , by malcing advances tav ard s  th e i r  in d iid d u a lly  d i f fe re n t  ends, w i l l  
enable us to  ta].k of the  ’economic p ro g re s s ’ of a so c ie ty . ' I t  may be p o ss ib le  to  
ta lk  of tlie c o l le c t iv e  economic ahns of a so c ie ty  i f  i t  happens th a t  th e re  i s  a 
very la rg e  m ajo rity  of opinion anxious fo r  th e ir  s o c ie ty  to  achieve common ends 
in  the economic sphere . But Wiether or not a so c ie ty  has any c o l le c t iv e  economic 
ends, i t  is  c e r ta in ly  t)rue th a t  the  in d iv id u a ls  w ith in  i t  have personal economic 
aims. The economic o b je c tiv e  v a r ie s  from in d iv id u a l to  in d iv id u a l;  i t  might be
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more consumer goods, g re a te r  s e c u r i ty ,  more le is u r e  t in ^ ,  or any bombination of 
th ese  which allow s unequalw ^^^t to  one a sp e c t, depending upon the circum stances 
and the ch arac te r of the  person  concerned© These o b je c tiv es  are  a l l  o f  the  s e l f -  
r e fe r r in g  ty p e , which deal xvith th e  s ta te  o f ach ievenant of the in d iv id u a l h im self; 
b u t th e re  are  id e o lo g ic a l aims expressed in  1he economic sphere which r e f e r  to  die 
achievement of o th e rs . I f  one perso n  has fo r  h is  aim th a t  a l l  people w i l l  om  an 
equal q u a n tity  of goods, then th is  i s  ev id en tly  not a s e l f - r e f e r r in g  aim, and i t  
i s ,  m oreover, one x r^hich we can expect to  c o n f l ic t  w ith in d iid d u a l s e l f - r e f e r r in g  
aims© I t  x f il l  no t be p o ss ib le  fo r  th a t  person to  f u l f i l  h is  aim a t the same time 
as o th e rs  s a t i s f y  th e ir  d if f e re n t  d e s ire s  for q u a n t i t ie s  o f goods. ■
Because economic aims of ttie s e l f - r e f e r r in g  v a r ie ty  tend to be comparativi 
i t  i s  p o ss ib le  for people to  move sim ultaneously  tcpwards th e ir  achievement© The 
aim fo r a p.art1jcular house must in e v ita b ly  d!,ash xvith the i d m t ic a l  aim of someone 
eQ.se; b u t the aim for a la rg e r  house i s  one liiich  can be s a t i s f ie d  fo r  severa l 
people sim ultaneously . th e n  i t  x^as though t th a t the to tal, w ealth xfas fix ed , i t
(dused to  be thought th a t  com parative aims xmre conflic ting©  Thus, i f  one person is  
to  acq u ire  more from a f ix ed  supp ly , then  o th ers  must re c e iv e  less© The only x-xay 
in  which a xhole so c ie ty  could advance sim ultaneously  x^as thought to  be a t  d ie  
expense of o th er s o c ie t i e s .  In  modern in d u s t r ia l  economies, th o u ^ i, i t  is  e a s ie r  
to  a p p rec ia te  d ia t  x-jealth is  co n tin u a lly  c rea ted , th a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  fo r  
com parative advance to  be made xfithout i t  being to anyone’s disadvantage© There ar< 
modern econom ies-in xhich a l l  members o f so c ie ty  can ( in  iiieory) approach nearer to  
a v a r ie ty  of econonn.c aim s, w ithout n e c e s s a r ily  thxfarting o th e rs  from doing 
likexd .se0 Of cou rse , th is  only a p p lie s  to s e l f - r e f e r r i r ^  economic ends; i t  i s  n o t 
p o ssib le  fo r people to  advance si. multaneou si y tox^rards xhat they xfant to  do and 
tab ard s  vha t someone e lse  xfants them to  do, e x c ^ t  i n  the remarkable case of 
coincidence*
We can e a s i ly  conceive of s t a te s  of so c ie ty  in  which we can say  th a t  
th e re  i s  economic p ro g re ss  because a l l  of th e  in d iv id u a ls  x rith in  iiiem have 
advanced fu r th e r  toxfards th e i r  v a r ie ty  of aid s. We can a lso  conceive of s o c ie t ie s  
in  xiiich the ends a re  determ ined c e n t r a l ly  by  th o se  in  power, and in  which th e re  
can be p ro g ress  towards those  ends© Only in  t&b f i r s t  type o f  s o c ie ty , though, 
w i l l  th e re  be none to c o n tra d ic t th e  u se  o f  the terrrs.
’ Wlien x-7e look  a t the Xfay i n  xhich people attem pt to  achieve th e i r
economic o b je c tiv e s , we can see how th e  method x h id i has already  been inspected
coîifôs to  be ap p lied . Provided th a t  people keep a c lea r s ig h t  of th e ir  o b je c tiv e s ,
then they  a re  able to improve th e ir  performance by e lim in a tio n  of in f e r io r
a l te rn a t iv e s  a f te r  com parative testing©  Many of what x^ e r e fe r  to  as ‘market
mechanisms* are  r e a l ly  no more th a n  the summation o f many attem pts by many people
to ach ieve th e ir  economic aim s. C onsider, for exemple, the mai s e l l in g  goods.
For a f ix ed  supply, he loicws xdien the p r ic e  i s  too high because h is  goods
ren a in  unso ld ; vhen i t  i s  to o  law , tlien he is  unable to meet the .demand© Because
h is  aim is  to  s e l l  a l l  o f tlB  goods a t  the b e s t possib le  p r ic e , he vri3J. r e je c t
as in f e r io r  those  attem pts to  e s ta b lis h  the p r ic e  x^hich x d l l  le a v e  him xd.th unsold
goods, or those X'7hich leave  him w ithout goods to  seQ-l© His ‘ec jiilib riu m  p rrice’
is  the p r ic e  a t which he can ju s t  s a i l  a l l  of h is goods© The eq u ilib riu m  p r ic e
in  economics re p re se n ts  th a t  p rocess m agnified many times© Because s e l l e r s
g en e ra lly  x«dsh to  s e l l  a l l  of th e ir  goods a t  the b e s t  p o ss ib le  p r ic e ,  and because
buyers xwish to  pay as l i t t l e  as is  necessary  for secure th e  a r t i c l e ,  a p r ic e  is
a rr iv ed  a t  where the  supply co in c id es x-nth t i e  demaid© The conves* ging ad ju stm aits
made by in d iv id u a ls  in  response to  th e ir  f i r s t  attem pts (and the consequences which
7f o i l  aw) are  xwrit la rg e  onto th e  economic situation©  Because an assumed aim of the  
buyer is  to  make h is  resou rces s t r e tc h  to  the  maximum qu an tity  of goods, he x-jill 
buy xdiere i t  i s  cheapest to  do so© Tlie e f f e c t  of th is  aim m u ltip lied  by thousands
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i s  to  make p r ic e s  roughly equal; i f  one s e l l e r  u rd e rcu ts , he wx3,l corner the 
m arket, so th e  o th e rs  must f o l i a r  s u i t  or be l e f t  m th  unsold goods©
The aims o f buyer and s e l l e r  a re  contradictory©  The s e l l e r  wants to  s e l l  
d ea rly ; (die buyer to  buy che^ly©  Tlie m arket mechanism o f the equ ilib rium  p r ic e  
is  a kind of compromise. I t  re p re se n ts  the most which eadi of them can f u l f i l  of 
h is  own aims xfithout p re ju d ic e  to  the aims of the o th e r . Both aims are d e r iv a tiv e  
from h igher aims : the s e l le r  wants to  s e l l  dearly  in  order to  malce more money, or 
in  order to  s a t i s f y  h is  needs w ith  a minimum of x^ork; the buyer wants to  s t r e tc h  
h is  resources in  order to  maximise h is q u a n tity  of goods, œ  to  enjoy more l e i s u r e  
tim e. I t  i s  q u ite  p o ssib le  th a t  the s e l l e r  would accept a lower p r ic e  i f  he 
could s e l l  more (thus malcing more money), or the  buyer x^uld pay a h igher p r ic e  i f  
he could save time by doing so . A ll of th e se  motives are found a t  xTork i n  any 
ac tu a l economic s i tu a t io n .  Tlie corner shop, for example, rem ails i n  business 
d esp ite  i t s  higher p r ic e s  because convenience is  inc luded  among economic ends.
These m arket mechanisms are  not devices vjhich have been invented  in
order to  accomodate c o n f lic tin g  m otives; they  are a d i r e c t  r e f le c t io n  of the
o p era tio n  of in d iv id u a l m otives, in  a sense the  sum of them. Increased  supply in
tim es of s c a rc ity  is  an e f f e c t  produced by the economic alms of in d iv id u a ls .
When goods a re  scarce  the  s e l l e r  lias an advantage, and i s  ab le  to charge a h igher
p r ic e  because people xn.ll bid a g a in s t each other to  acq u ire  the scarce  goods
(or s e rv ic e s ) .  But the h igher p r ic e s  cause more r e s a irc e s  to  be committed as
o th e r people attem pt to maximise th e ir  gains by  td^ing  advantage of the nexvly-
increased  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ;  and hie ir c r e a s e  in  supply natui'âL ly la s e r s  the p r ic e
8as people no longer need to  outbid each o th e r to  the same e x te n t. S im ila r ly  in  
a g lu t s i tu a t io n ,  p r ic e s  tend to  f a l l  (as  s e l l e r s  s t r iv e  to  d ispose of tlie 
surplus goods and se rv ic e s  by u n d er-cu ttin g  each o th e r ) ,  and l e s s  resou rces a re  
committed because the f a l l  in  p r ic e  has me a i t  th a t  th e re  i s  mere p r o f i t  to  be
mad e e l s ewhe r e .
Economic man, lilce s c ie n t i f ic  man, is  coneerned w ith  im aginative  
proposing and w iih testing©  S c ie n t i f ic  man w a its  to  e x t aid h is  p re d ic tiv e  
power; he seelcs proposed mod els x-jith * sur plus corroborated  em pirica l c o n te n t’ , 
the ones which pass the t e s t  of prediction©  Economic man seek s  aich th in g s  as 
m axim isation of p r o f i t ,  purchase o f  goods aid s e rv ic e s  a t  1he cheapest p r ic e ,
g r e a te s t  retm ui on investm ent, etc© IVhen economic nan makes h is  p ro p o sa l, be i t
what to  produce, what p rocess to  employ, xiiere to  in v e s t ,  xAiat p r ic e  to  charge , 
then  he has some id ea  o f what he wants to achieve© Often hi^ aim xd.ll be a simple 
com parative (or a s u p e r la t iv e ) ;  i f  he seeks re tu rn  on c a p i ta l , he xd.ll a t ta u p t to 
o b ta in  the g re a te s t  re tiirn : i f  he i s  a f te r  p r o f i t ,  he w il l  seek more profit©1^  u T tT illT iM j ^  ir  ^
But i t  i s  not always so© He might simply sedi a com fortable liv i .n g , an involvement 
in tlie economic system xdiich leaves him sohb f re e  tim e to himself© There i s  reason
to  suppose th a t  many p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  economic a c t iv i ty  seek the lack  of xforry xdiich
accompanies a steady  and secure job conicimd x^ith the reasonable expectancy of a 
systematic and u n id ire c t io n a l  advance in purdiasing power. The po in t i s  t h a t  the 
p a r t ic ip a n t  has to  t e s t  proposed a l te r n a t iv e s ,  and judge tliem on the b a s is  of the 
r e s u l t s  achieved. I f  the re tu rn  on investm ent f a l l s  sh o r t of t i e  aim, he can t r y  
somexdiere e lse  xvith h is c a p i t a ,  aid r e je c t  the in f e r io r  attem pt © I f  he cannot 
s e l l  enough o f h is  goods, he can change the p r ic e  or change the p)roduct© Alxvays i t  
i s  th e  r e s u l t  a f te r  te s t in g  which he compares vzith h is  ains i n  order to  see hox-7 
fa r  ^ o r t  of su ccessfu l if as his proposal©
I t  i s ,  of co u rse , true  tiia t economic s i tu a t io n s  be com e}:ceedingly comple; 
and th a t such decisions may invo lve c o n s id e ra tio n  of many factors©  But the 
p r in c ip le s  rem ain the sane; th e  proposal is  fo lla re d  by th e  p r a c t ic a l  t e s t ,  which 
i s  folloxfed in  tu rn  by modifcaition o f  perfoxmiance in  a 'd e r  to approach more n ea rly  
to the d es ired  end© Faced by th e  f a c t  t h a t  he is  unable to  supply a demand, the
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s e l le r  has to  consider such fa c to rs  a s  whether a p r ic e  r i s e  on h is  p a r t  Xfould bring  
more com petition  in to  the  f ie ld  to  take advantage c£ th e  increased  p r o f i t s ;  fo r a 
wrong guess on h is  p a r t  x r^ould do j u s t  that© Even f in e r  ju d g em n ts  a re  req u ired  
from the producer x4ien he has to decide whether to  produce more goods i n  response 
to  an excess o f demand, and i f  so , how much mere©
As w ith  s c ie n t i f ic  d iscovery , i t  i s  no t o n ly  the proposer h im self who 
learns© In  economic a c t iv i ty  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  h is  t e s t s  a re  av a ila b le  fo r in sp e c tio n  
by o th e rs  ( in  most a s p e c ts ) ,  who may tdce th e  lessons about what to do or what to  
avoid© This f a c e t  i s  im portant fo r  a market economy because, s in ce  a market 
economy deals w ith  economic s itu a tio n s  in  xh ich  no â n g le  produce r , su p p lie r  or 
consumer can n o tic eab ly  a f f e c t  th e  equ ilib rium  by his in d iv id u a l a c t i v i t i e s ,  i t  . 
i s  em ulation which h ^ p s  to ensure th a t  su ccessfu l proposals do have th e ir  e f f e c ts  
on a p re v a ilin g  situation©
In  sc ience there  i s  a conventional ta r g e t  of increased  p re d ic tiv e  power, 
a ta rg e t  by whose achievement the fu lf i l lm e n t of re a l aims can be brought about©
The s c ie n t i s t  may be m otivated by  d e s ire  f o r  x^eslth or fo r  ^ c r y ,  but i t  i s  
increased  p re d ic tiv e  pa^er whidi he must aim a t in  order to  secure them© M ille th e  
ta rg e ts  a re  not conventional in  the economic sphere, t t e  type of economic 
o rg an isa tio n  of a so c ie ty  determ ines what must be achieved i f  r e a l  aims are  to 
be sa tisfied©  In  a market economy the u ltim a te  t e s t  is  whether th e  proposals 
involve th e  p roduction  or p ro v is io n  of goods and se rv ic e s  xhich people w il l  be 
prepared  'to buy, and a t  a p r ic e  x r^hich they  are  prepared to pay. This i s  no t somethi; 
xdiich has a t  any stage been agreed upon a s  a xvorthy ta rg e t ;  i t  is  not conventional 
in  th a t  sense© But in  an economy ch a ra c te rise d  by th e  v o lu n ta ry  exchange of money 
for goods and se rv ic e s  resou rces a re  accumulated by supplying a p roduct or se rv ic e  
xfhich people xTOu3.d p re fe r  to  p o ssess ra th e r  than  the reso u rces x*hich they a lread y  
possess© Tlie t e s t  of t i e  proposal i s  whether or not the product o r s e rv ic e  s e l ls  ©
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I t  i s  the consumer a t the  end of the chain  \Aio e i th e r  makes the d ec is io n  to  buy, or 
wiio commits h is  lim ite d  reso u rces  elsexhere© In  a com petitive  s i tu a t io n  (of the 
market economy) r e t a i l e r s  are  competing with each other to s e l l  to consumers, 
w ho lesa le rs competing xvlth each o ther to  s e l l  to  r e t a i l e r s ,  and producers a re  
competing w ith  each o th er to  s ^ l  to  wholesalers© I f  th e  consumer w i l l  n o t buy 
the p ro d u c t, then  the r e t a i l e r  w i l l  not buy i t  from t i e  w h o le s ^ e r , nor the 
x/holesaler from th e  m anufacturer; and t i e  m anufacturer w i l l  have to  stop  producing 
it© In  such a s i tu a t io n ,  i t  i s  only  by havi,ng consumers s u f f ic ie n t ly  s a t i t f i e ^ d  
to  buy th a t  th e  r e t a i l e r ,  xdiolesaler and producesr can hope to ach ieve t i e i r  
objectives©
There is  tiu s  in  a market economy an o b je c tiv e  whose achievement i s  
req u ired  i f  r e a l aims of the p a r t ic ip a n ts  are  to  be fu lfilled ©  I t  i s  an o b je c tiv e  
independent of the p r iv a te  m otives of in d iv id u a ls , whose relatd .on  to them is  only 
th a t  th e i r  s a t i s f a c t io n  i s  dependent upon the degree to which 'they serve i t  
successfully©  There may be th o se  engaged in  economic a c t iv i ty  who hold the r e d  
aim of b ring ing  s a t i s f a c t io n  to  o th e rs , ju s t  as th e re  m aybe s c ie n t i f i c  workers 
genuinely anxious to  extend p re d ic tiv e  poiver; b u t in  each case tlxe ap p ro p ria te  
o b je c tiv e  must be pursued xfhether or not i t  i s  a rea l aim, in  order th a t  people 
might gain  success i n  xhatever they  are a tten p tin g  to ach ieve.
The f a c t  ‘th a t i t  i s  the consumer*s read in ess  to buy xhich re p re se n ts  the  
v i ta l  t e s t  means th a t  i n  a com petitive market s i tu a t io n ,  produc’tio n  and d is t r ib u t io n  
w i l l  tend to  converge toxfard consumer s a t i s f a c t io n .  In  sc ience  the process 
converges on ev e r-in c reas in g  a b i l i ty  to  p re d ic t  the observed u n iv e rse , because i t  
i s  th i s  ta rg e t  ih ic h  c o n s t i tu te s  the  v i ta l  t e s t ,  and because a ttem p ts a re  re je c te d  
i f  they are  sham  to  be in fe r io r  to  o th e rs  a t  achieving tlia t target©  S im ila r ly  
in  the economic sphere , tecause th e  preparedness of the consumer to p a r t  m th  h is  
resou rces c o n s ti tu te s  the  v i ta l  key to  success, proposals a re  re je c te d  xfbich are
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found to  be in f e r io r  in  th a t  respect© Thus we can ssy  th a t th e  system produces a 
convergence toxfard in c re as in g  consumer sa tisfac tio n ©  The p o in t may be i l l u s t r a t e d  
by co n s id e ra tio n  of the entxy in to  a p re v a ilin g  market s i tu a t io n  of a com petitor 
# 1 0  can produce more cheaply than  ex is tin g  p roducers, either, by reason  of more 
e f f ic ie n t  o rg a n isa tio n , or by  v ir tu e  o f  a techno log ica l advance. The newcomer w i l l  
be ab le  to  s e l l  more cheaply than  h is  competitors© Because people w ish to  buy as 
cheaply as p o ss ib le  (xvith q u ^ i t y  co m id ered  as c o n s ta n t) , he xd.ll cap tu re  a la rg e  
share of th e  market© He w i l l  make more p r o f i t , and xd.ll thus have more resources 
to  commit to  p roduction , and w i l l  be able to expand© Wo on ly  t h i s ,  bu t because 
he i s  more p r o f i t a b le ,  he xd .ll find i t  e a s ie r  to a t t r a c t  investm ent from o u ts id e , 
s in ce  inves'bors seek high re tu rn s  on capital©  Other producers, on the rev e rse  
s id e  of the co in , xvill find the jr a re  s e l l in g  less© The e f f e c t  of th e  nexfconar *s 
p roduction  coming onto t i e  m arket xd .ll be to  I w e r  p r ic e s  to the le v e l  a t xdiich i t  
i s  not worth th e ir  xdiile (b u t s t i l l  xvorth h is  xdiile) continuing to produce© They 
(or o th e rs) may copy t i e  su c cessfu l innovation  of th e  newcoriBr and become 
able to  produce more cheaply themselx?‘e s © The e f f e c t  i s  a tendency towards the 
cheapest method of p roduction , and t h i s  e f f e c t  i s  brought about because th e  
consumers xfish to  buy as cheaply as possible©
Again, xfe miglrb consider the a c tix d ty  of the entrepreneur©  He has thought 
of a refinem ent or an im provanent, or a new product or serxdce which he th in k s  
the public xvill xvish to  buy© IVhm (he c r it ic a l . t e s t  comes, i f  the conaxmers do 
buy h is  product i n  p re fe ren ce  to  o th e rs , then  h is  com petitors x d l l  b e  forced to  
fo llo if h is  le a d , to  accent a se rious dec0.im i n  th e ir  b u s in e ss , or to a tta iip t 
innovations of th e i r  oxni© I f  he f a i l s  the t e s t ,  on the o ther hand, and consumers 
do not xvLsh to  buy h is  p roduct, then  he him self xsdll go cut of b u s in e s s , perhaps 
lo s in g  a l l  of the money xAich he in v ested  in  tlie  exp o r im n t© The a c t i v i t i e s  of 
the en trepreneur provide a p a r t ic u la r ly  dram atic form of el im in a tio n  by com petitive
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te s t in g ,  s in ce  h is  fa te  is  u su a lly  t i e d  to  th a t of h is  proposal.. I f  th e  proposal 
i s  su p e rio r  to  i t s  a l te r n a t iv e s ,  th e n  he per sonal.ly w i l l  mdce money| i f  i t  i s  
in f e r io r ,  then he w il l  f a i l  w ith  it© The marl<et allovfs him to t^ce  tremendous 
r i s k s ,  bu t i t  alLa^rs him tremendous rewards fo r  success© And ‘su c ce ss ’ c o n s is ts  
in  the production  of goods and se rv ic e s  xAich the pub lic  p re fe r  to  buy© The e f f e c t  
of the ac cumul at, ed te s t in g  and e lim in a tio n  a c t i v i t i e s  of en trep ren eu rs  is  Ihus to 
produce more and b e t te r  goods which the public xvants, and in  ways which a re  
in c re a s in g ly  e ffic ien t©  The more en trep ren eu rs  th e re  a re , the mere dynamie w i l l  be 
the economy, and th e  more dramatic w i l l  b e  i t s  perform ance a t  producing more and 
b e t te r  and cheaper goods.
The heady x \h irl of b u siness e n te rp r is e  might seem to  be f a r  removed from 
the a c t iv i ty  of the s c i e n t i s t  xfno s i t s  d isp a ss io n a te ly  making cbser v a tio n s to  
check a g a in s t h is  th e o r ie s , b u t bo th  businessman and s c i e n t i s t  are  engaged in  a 
s im ila r p ro c e ss . The s c i e n t i s t  i s  a id in g  the  p ro g ress o f  p re d ic tiv e  poxver by 
enabling nexv and b e t te r  models to  supplant tlie old ; xA ile t i e  businessman i s  
aid ing  the p ro g ress  of consumer s a t i s f a c t io n  by enablxrg new and b e t te r  p roducts 
and p rocesses to  supp lan t t i e  old© Each makes h is p ro p o sa l, and each performs h is  
experiment© Each may find  th a t  th e  r e s u l t s  of th a t  experim m t make him r e j e c t  h is  
p ro p o sa l, and each may modify the o r ig in a l attem pt i n  the l i # i t  of those re su lts*
Or each may d1.scover th a t th e  t e s t  r e s u l t s  e iab le  him to p re fe r  t i e  nexv proposal, 
over i t s  predecessors* The s c i e n t i s t  may find th a t some day a nexf experim ent 
means th a t h is  modal must be su p p lan ted , j u s t  a s  the su ccess ih l businessman may 
one day be fo rced  out of b u sin ess  by an innovation  b e t te r  th an  h is  was. They are 
both engaged in  the pm^suit of an end whose f u l f i l j m n t  is  in c re a s in g ly  req u ired  
i f  th e i r  own aims are to  be achieved© Both a re  involved i n  the q u es t fo r p ro g re ss .
A system xAich converges tow ards consumer s a t is f a c t i .c n  i s  one xfhich has 
space x*n.thin i t  fo r th e  s a t i s f a c t io n  of many economic ends* Not on ly  can th e
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pub lic  o b ta in  th e  q u an tity  and v a r ie ty  of the goods i t  seelcs, but th e re  i s  scope 
for the p u rsu it of ends not d i r e c t ly  re la te d  to  m a te r ia l goods© I f  th e  e f f e c t  o f 
te s t in g  and e lim in a tio n  i s  to  produce more, b e t te r  and cheaper goods, then  a 
person w il l  be able to  command a su ff ic ie n c y  on sm aller resa irces*  This g iv es him 
the op tion  o f purchasing  more goods or of p re fe rr in g  to  take more le is u r e  time* 
M iile  many regard  increased  m a te ria l a ff lu en c e  as  ‘progress* because i t  advances 
them towards th e i r  aims, th e re  a re  undoubtedly o th ers who r a te  n on -m ate ria l 
s a t is f a c t io n s  more h i^ i ly ,  and whose aims can be s a t i s f ie d  the more by inc reased  
time spent w ith  th e ir  fan i l  y or th e ir  f r ie n d s , or on the p u r s u i t  of p r iv a te  hobbies 
or in t e r e s t s .  I t  i s  t iu s  p o ss ib le  hi a t  a market economy, by converging toward 
in c reasin g  consumer s a t i s f a c t io n ,  could lead  to  increased  fu lf i l lm e n t of a v a r ie ty  
of p r iv a te  o b je c tiv e s . I t  could (and does) produce s i tu a t io n s  in  which a so c ie ty  
can be said to  make economic p rogress because in d iv id u a ls  w ith in  th a t  so c ie ty  are 
able to  approach n ea re r  to  the  achievement of d isp a ra te  aims. I t  îjs q u ite  p o ss ib le  
th a t  X'je could d e s c r ib e 'a  general, in c rease  in  p ro sp e rity  as ’progress* for a 
so c ie ty  because i t  m a b led  the  members of hi a t  s o c ie ty  to  p u rsu e  th e i r  own ends 
more effectively©  P ro sp e rity  b rin g s  pcfv*7er i n  i t s  wake; men have to  commit l e s s  
time to  a t ta in in g  s e l f - s u f f ic ie n c y ,  and le s s  reso u rces to  achieving  s e c u r i ty .  
M iether the su.rp lu s  time i s  used to  achieve g re a te r  x^ealth or g re a te r  independence 
from the p roductive  process is  a m atter xvhich depends upon the p r iv a te  m otivations 
o f  the indixridual concerned©
The co n s id era tio n  of economics on xAich hie se arguments have been ra is e d  
has been devoted to  only a leif of the theoreticaQ. elem ents of a market economic 
s i tu a t io n .  I t  might w e ll be  argued th a t  when a t te n t io n  i s  tu rned  to  p r a c t ic a l  
a sp e c ts , to  the co n s id e ra tio n  of a c tu a l economies, the presence o f  such th in g s  
as f re e  com petition  and h ie  absence of monopoly parer a re  nowhere to be r e a l is e d .  
Real economies a re  c h a ra c te r ise d  by such fa c to rs  a s  l a i s s e z - f a i r e ,  xiiich a l l a r s  the
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tob u ild -u p  o f coerc ive  parer by b ig  supp3.iers o f c c p i t ^ ,  goods or la b o u r, and by 
c e n tra l  d ir e c t io n , which s u b s t i tu te s  p o l i t i c a l  co n tro l fo r consumer p re fe ren ce  as ........ fcl HAiwlfa
th e  d riv ing  fo rce  of the system. Such f a c to r s ,  where t t e y  are  perm itted  or 
implemented, do indeed l im it  the capacity  possessed by the th e o re t ic a l  max’ket 
modal to  allox^ scope fo r the fu lf i l lm e n t of p r iv a te  ends© They rq > resen t the 
im position  of ends upon th e  economic system© Monopoly and coerc ive power of 
c a p ita l  or labour re p re se n ts  an a t ta n p t  to achieve independence from the in s ta b i l i ty  
o f a changing m arket; while c e n tr a l  d ir e c t io n  rep re se n ts  to e  a tto iip t to malce the 
economy achieve e i th e r  the o b je c tiv e s  o f  the ru le r s ,  or what they th in k  are  toe 
c o l le c t iv e  ends of society©
The th e o re t ic a l  m rk e t modal considered  was one i n  which consumer 
p re fe ren ce  x-ras the u ltim a te  t e s t  by xtoich proposals were r e ta in e d , r e je c te d  or 
modified* I t  i s  easy to  see  xfhy people in  th e i r  cap ac ity  a s  consurrers should p ref; 
a ^ s te rn  which converges toxfards sa tisfy i.n g  th e i r  p re fe re n c e s , toxfards the 
production  of more and b e t te r  and cheqier gpods, and xvhich a lla v s  space xvLthin i t  
fo r  th e  in c reas in g  attainm ent of n o n -m ate ria l, as X‘?ell a s  m a te r ia l , objectives©
This i s  no reason xtoy people ac ting  i n  other economic c a p a c it ie s  should p re fe r su.ch 
a system . I t  might be e f f i c i e n t ,  b u t i t  i s  a lso  r is k y , and a t tim es c o s t ly ,  to  
those xvho malce unsuccessfu l proposals* People tend to  p r e f e r  a s ta te  of a f f a i r s  in  
xfhich they have more s t a b i l i ty  to  th e ir  in d iv id u a l s i tu a t io n ;  they p r e f e r ,  in  
o ther w ords, to  remove the element of foirtune© VJhy should a producer be exposed 
to  the vag>€sries of the p r ic e  mechanism i f  he can cap ture a s u f f ic ie n t  share of th e  
market to  be indépendant of i t ?  Why should he r i s k  being driven out of b u sin ess  
by more e f f ic ie n t  com petitors i f  he can buy them out? Why should he take the 
chance of the  pub lic  not wanting h is  p r e d ic t  i f  he can make them buy i t  by ‘coercivi
Xiad v e rtis in g ?  Why sh o ild  a man. l e t  the p r ic e  of h is. labour be dependent upon the 
preparedness of an u n p red ic tab le  p u b lic  to buy th e  p roduct he malces, xtoen he can,
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12by combining, use c o l le c tiv e  power to  a s s e r t  a p r ic e  for i t ?  A ll o f th ese
questions show hoxr a d riv e  fo r se c u r ity  of p o s it io n  can e a s i ly  subvert the
p r in c ip le s ’ of the market economy© Tîiey i l l u s t r a t e  a basic  t r u th  about human
n a tu re , th a t  no-one l ik e s  a p r ic e - r in g  when he i s  buying, bu t everyone l ik e s  one
ISxAen he i s  se llin g *  They rep resen t th e  attem pt to gain  the b aie f i t  o f p ro g ress  
brought about by the te s t in g  and inadequaey-e lim ination  of o th e rs , xfhile rendering  
o neself in v u ln e rab le  to  the  in e v ita b le  changes xduch are consequent upon i t*
P rogress n e c e s s a r ily  invo lves change; change from a prevj.ous s ta te  of 
performance to  a new s t a t e  xAiich is  c lo s e r  to  the conception of the id e a l being 
soumit* Change might ’be valuable in  b rin g in g  people nearer to  o b je c tiv e s , bu t i t  
is ' a source o f x-jorry and u p se t to  those a ffe c te d  d i r e c t ly  by i t*  Any so c ie ty  
xAich was committed to  economic ’p ro g re s s ’ , to  t i e  p ro v is io n  of more and b e t te r  and 
cheaper goods, xfoxjû,d have to  accept the consequences of change xjiich xfere necessary  
fo r i t s  accomplishment* A mobile labour fo rc e , ever ready to  le a rn  new s k i l l s  
and to  change jo b s , i s  an in e v ita b le  consequence of the e lim in a tio n  of le s s  
adequate economic proposals and p ra c tic e s*  A changing flow of su ccessfu l businesses 
i s  another such consequence* No so c ie ty  x-jhich refused  to  accept such consequences 
could hope to  engage in  the rap id  turnover of p roposals and t e s t s  xfhich are p a r t
o f the method of making progress*
The c e n tra l ly  d irec ted  economy is  no t n e c e ssa r ily  immune from the clim ate
of change xAich c h a ra c te r is e s  the m arket model, fo r  i t  is  i t s e l f  a system designed 
to  achieve ob jec tives*  Although th e  o b je c tiv e s  are predeterm ined by the co n tro lle rz  
in s tead  of being the p r iv a te  aims of iiiose p a r t ic ip a t in g ,  th e  economy i s  s t i l l  
su b je c t to  t r i a l  and inadequacy-elim in a tio n  as the  attem pt i s  made to b rin g  i t s  
performance in to  l in e  xvith the idea* O bviously, a c e n tr a l ly  d ire c te d  economy can 
be geared to  the achievement of a r b i t r a r y  ends, such a s , for exatiple, a 200/o inc rea j 
in  s te e l  p ro d u ctio n , by making those  ends the  id e a l  ag a in st xjhich a c tu a l p er for mane «
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i s  measured when p roposals are  being compared© Those d ire c t iv e s  xAich do no t 
b ring  about the req u ired  in c re a se  in  s te e l  p roduction  can be re je c te d  in  favour 
o f those xAich do* I f  p roposals a re  judged ag a in s t the stan d ard  of what i s  req u ire  
then  each d ec is io n  w il l  be one to  p re fe r  an attem pt which succeeds more than i t s  
r iv a ls  a t  achieving  xvhat i s  required* IVhen sim ple, lim ite d  aims are  being 
considered , the  c o n tro lled  system can undoubtedly b ring  about p ro g ress  toxvards 
them© It xd.ll be a ‘p ro g re s s ’ only thought of as such by hi ose xfho hold those aims 
since  th e  average c i t iz e n  o f such an economy xd.ll hard ly  describe  an in c re a se  in  
s te e l  p roduction  as ‘p ro g re ss ’ i f  i t s  achievement invo lves the neg a tio n  of h is  
p r iv a te  ob jectives»  The p ro g ress of d irec ted  economies i s  l im ite d  to  a 
convergence on the  aims a c tu a lly  nominated; th e re  may be a l l  k in d s of s id e  
consequences xjhich follox-7 from the achievement of nominated ends, and xAich are 
unacceptab le  by th e  standard  o f undeclared  aims.
I t  i s  claimed of c e n tr a l ly  d ire c te d  economies th a t  they enable h ie  re a l 
aims of members o f so c ie ty  to  be f u l f i l l e d  more adequately  th a n  do market economies 
The con ten tion  i s  th a t  not only are  they more e f fe c tiv e  i n  the p u rs u it  o f  arbitrary 
ends nominated by the con troU .ers , but ih a t they a re  b e t t e r ,  to o , a t achieving the 
p roduction  of more and b e t te r  and cheaper goods, Xràth the consequent in c re a se  in  
th e  a b i l i ty  o f  the  c i t iz e n  to f u l f i l  h is  p r iv a te  o b je c tiv e s . The m arket economy, 
i t  is  pointed o u t, i s  xrastefU lo Many of i t s  p a r t ic ip a n ts  are engaged in  th e  
in e f f ic ie n t  p roduction  of th e  ‘wrong’ s o r t  o f  goods, x^siting fo r consumer 
p referen ce  to  d e liv e r a v e rd ic t  on th e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  xAich xd.ll u lt im a te ly  count, 
them out of the economic process© In  arguim nts xdiich have c e r ta in ly  found the 
ear of government, i t  has been pointed out th a t a market s i tu a t io n  takes time to 
s o r t  out the e f f ic ie n t  from the i n e f f i c i e n t ,  the wanted product from the xuiwanted® 
I f ,  in stead  of re ly in g  on the haphazard operations of te s t in g  and 
inadequacy-e lim in a tio n , an overall p lan  x^ere made for a fixed  period o f  economic
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prog ress ( f iv e  y ea rs  seems to  be a f a v o u r i te ) ,  th en  i t  i s  claim ed th a t  the 
p r i o r i t i e s  could- be so rted  ou t i n  advance, the most e f f i c ie n t  p ro d u c tio n  methods 
used by a l l ,  and the reso u rces  a llo c a te d  over the  #io%e economy in  an in te rloc ld .ng  
way* The advantages x-jou3.d be t h a t  no p roduction  would th en  be xfasted in  the 
b lin d  a l le y s  o f methods which a market s i tu a t io n  would have taken ‘biine to  weed 
o u t, th a t  raw m ate ria ls  ifhich take time to  p repare  could be g o t ready in  advance, 
and th a t  th e  requ ired  q u an tity  of p roduction  could be knoxm a c cu ra te ly  and 
achieved accordingly*
This planned economy is  also capable of improvenent by te s t in g  and 
elim ination» The ‘f iv e  year p la n ’ is  the p ro p o sa l, and the r e s u l t s  o f  i t  in  
p ra c t ic e  can be compared w ith  the d e s ire d  o b je c tiv e s  to see hasr good wras the 
p roposa l, and how the  next one might be improved* But the ‘p r i o r i t i e s ’ to  be 
"so rted  ou t in  advance" a re  the o b je c tiv e s  nominated by the c o n tro l le r s  as 
the  im portant ones; th ey  a re  not n e c e s s a r i ly  the p r i o r i t i e s  of toe partic ipan ts©  
Even i f  the p lanners attem pt to a sse ss  the re a l m otives of the members o f s o c ie ty , 
th e re  i s  no assurance th a t  they x i i l l  be c o r re c t  in  iiie ir  assessm ent, or even 
th a t  th e re  w i l l  be s u f f ic ie n t  m ianim ity for general assessm ents to  be made a t  
a l io  The proposed use of "tlB  most e f f i c ie n t  p roduction  m thods" inç>lies th a t 
toe se are  e i th e r  k n am , or can be computed in  some way * Our pre\dous argument 
c a rr ie d  th e  im p lic a tio n  th a t  th e se  were discovered by te s t in g  competing proposals « 
I f  one is  se lec ted  fo r  overal.l a p p lic a tio n , th e re  i s  not on ly  the  p o s s ib i l i ty  
th a t  i t  -vriLll not be the most e f f i c i e n t ,  but th e re  x f i l l  be no means o f a sc e r ta in in g  
th i s  f a c t  in  the absence of com petitors* The a l lo c a t io n  of re so u rce s  i n  such a 
xfay to a t no p roduction  would be  ‘w asted’ means, in  e f f e c t ,  th a t  on ly  one p ro p o sa l 
i s  being te s te d  in  each field©  The ‘w astage’ of th e  market economy i s  l i k e  toe 
‘w astage’ of l e s s  adequate s c i e n t i f i c  models* I t  would be much more e f f i c i e n t ,  
i t  seems, i f  s c ie n t i s t s  did no t w aste time on th e o rie s  which were l a te r  r e je c te d .
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b u t spen t th e ir  e f f o r ts  in s tea d  on ones which could be preferred©  Hie p o in t i s ,  
of co u rse , th a t i t  i s  on ly  com parative te s t in g  which t e l l s  us which ones are 
to  be p re fe rre d ; i t  i s  absurd to  suggest th a t  we should confine our a t te n tio n s  
to  good models xAen the standard  of ‘good’ r e la te s  to  th e ir  s u p e r io r i ty  over the 
‘bad’ ones, a s u p e r io r i ty  only revealed by spending tin n  on both* The ‘w astage’ 
of a market economy re p re se n ts  the d iscovery  of su p e rio r ways; re je c te d  wa>’s  are  
only wastage because b e t te r  ways a re  found by com parative te s t in g *  Without 
t e s t in g ,  we have no reason  to  p re fe r  one proposal to  another * The ^ im in a tio n  
of ‘w astage’ is  th e  e lim in a tio n  of th a t comparison'xvhich is  so e s s e n t ia l  fo r  
progress©
F in a lly  i t  may be said of th e  ’p lanned ' economic model th a t  i t  i s  by 
no means obvious t h a t  the ’re q u ire d ’ q u a n tity  of p roduction  can be "knoxm 
accuratà l^r", even i f  th e  nominated f ig u re  could indeed b e  ’’achieved accordingly" ©
I f  a ta r g e t  i s  to  be s e t  fo r  planned achievem snt, th a t t a r g e t  must be as  accu ra te  
a p re d ic tio n  as p o ss ib le  of xAat w i l l  be needed© I s  i t  to  be the p la n n e rs ' view 
of what people w i l l  need, or an attem pted es tim a te  of what people them.setves thinic 
they  xvill need? In  th e  f i r s t  case th e re  is  no reason  to  suppose th a t  the 
v a lu a tio n  of the p lan n ers  i s  superior to  th a t of the  people, and in  th e  second 
case th e re  i s  no reason to  suppose th a t such ca lc u la tio n s  w i l l  be c o r re c t .  To 
estim ate  y ea rs  in  advance what goods people X'jill need, in  xAat q u a n t i t ie s ,  v a r ie t ie  
s ty le s  and c o lo u rs , is  a d i f f i c u l t  mough ta sk  even xdihout t i n g  account of 
changing c ircu m stam es and fa sh io n s , l e t  el one s c ie n t i f ic  and te ch n o lo g ica l advance
I t  is  a se rious x^ealcness o f  th e  c e n trÆ ly  d ire c te d  economy tlia t th e re  
can be l i t t l e  b a s is  fo r assessm ent of performance© The p lanners can compare t i e  
achievement w ith tlie id e a l ,  and modify accordi.ngly; but they have no com parative 
s e le c tio n  of p roposals to  make, s in ce  on ly  one was t r i e d .  I f  a p re d ic tio n  is  made 
concerning xdiich p ro d u c ts , in  #i.ich v a r ie t ie s  and in  xAtoh q u a n t i t ie s  people w i l l
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wish to  buy, and i f  th e se  a re  then produced sa cce ss fu lly  according to the  p lan , 
then people xtoll have to  accept them in  toe  absence cf a lternatives©  A f iv e  year 
p lan  can p re d ic t  what numbers, s ty le s  and co lo u rs  of shoes people w i l l  want; 
and people > jill have no o p tio n , i f  toey  need shoes, bu t to buy what i s  a c tu a l ly  
produced© Since a l l  of the shoes a re  bought, the p lan n ers can co n g ra tu la te  
them selves on a ’su c c e s s fu l ' p re d ic tio n , w ithou t having any opportun ity  to  le a r n  
from t h e i r  mistalces© In  a market s i tu a t io n  toe  producers xtoo p red ic ted  
in a c c u ra te ly  xfould be su ffe ring  economic consequences, while su c ce ss fu l guessers 
would be enjoying the  rexfards aid findiiig resources a llo c a te d  th e ir  xfay fo r 
fu rh te r  p roduction  of xAat xvas required* In  th e  absnsce of a l te r n a t iv e s ,  any 
s1.tuation can be sh am  to  be ’adequate’ , and the re  i s  no stim ulus towards 
progress*
Thus, even xAere the o b je c tiv e s  of the planned economy a re  confined to  
those nominated by the  p lanners them selves, p rog ress can only  be made towards th e se  
aims i n  d is c re te  s ta g e s ; the performance of the proposal a t  one tim e can only be 
ra te d  a g a in s t the performance of another proposal a t another time * In  a market 
s i tu a t io n ,  on the o ther hand, toe m u l t ip l ic i ty  of propo8a].s under t e s t  means th a t  
the re  i s  con tinuel p rogress ta-rards the  aims of the  p a r tic ip a t in g  ind iv iduals*
Miere the  aim of to e  planned economy i s  to ad iieve  toe vjider o b je c tiv e s  o f the 
members o f so c ie ty  by aiming a t  such ta rg e ts  as tlie p roduction  of mcr e and b e t te r  
and cheaper goods, th en  the absence of com petitive te s t in g  makes the d is p a r i ty  even 
more apparent* The economic p lan  is  a co n junction  of many p roposals  xvhich range 
over various a sp ec ts  of the economy* An inadequate r e s u l t  (even xAere th e re  i s  
the b a s is  fo r ap p rec ia tin g  xvhich r e s u l t s  a re  inadequate) x f ill not n e c e s s a r ily  
revea]. the source of the inadequacy* Because so many asp ec ts  are  being te s te d  
to g e th e r , i t  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  to  knav where to  apply m o d ifica tio n  proposals* In 
a market economy, le s s  adequate proposals are  c o n tin u a lly  being rep laced  a t  source
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by more adequate p roposals; because the te s t in g  is  performed in d lv id u a lly  in  
d is c re te  sec tio n s  of toe  economy, each se c tio n  can b e n e f it  from e lim in a tio n  of 
in f e r io r  a l te rn a tiv e s*  The r e s u l t  of the in f e r io r  a l te rn a t iv e  can be in spected  
>Aen and xAere i t  happens, and can serve a s  a b a s is  fo r  immediate decision® When 
one conjoined proposal i s  made over an extended p erio d , d e f ic ie n t a sp ec ts  are  no t 
so r e a d i ly  id e n tif ie d *
One fac to r  xAich serves to  a s s i s t  progress is  the  awareness of xtoat i s  
possib le*  We saw i n  th e  se c tio n  on skiD .s how atta inm en t le  vels come to  be s e t ,  
dependent to  some e x tm t on toe conception of possib le  levels® I t  xvas noted th a t  
an axfareness o f new p o s s i b i l i t i e s  c a i  r a i s e  both  ta rg e t  and achieved lev e l*  I t  i s  
an obvious xfealcness o f the  d ire c te d  economy th a t toe axvareness of new p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
is  in h ib ite d  by th e  achievement of preconceived per for mam e levels® I f ,  from our 
previous examples, a l l  of the shoes produced X'fere a c tu a l ly  bought, then n e ith e r 
p lanners nor public might have any idea o f xAat could have been ach ieved , except 
perhaps by ex te rn a l comparison w ith the a tta in m en ts of market economies elsexfhere* 
Tlie market s i tu a t io n ,  by alloxjing those  vjxth su c c e ss fu l proposals to  achieve more 
than o th e rs  in c u lc a te s  n o t only em ulation of the p ro p o sa ls , bu t em ulation of the  
objectives®  I t  se rves to  b rin g  about awareness of to  a t  o th e rs  can do, and so 
r a is e s  the economic s ig h ts  of everyone® The di.rected system not only p recludes 
em ulation of independently  te s te d  p ro p o sa ls , bu t i t  a lso  p reven ts  toe example of 
,v i.sib le  higher ta r g e ts .
In  e i th e r  system a proposal might involve unexpected aid unacceptable 
side  consequences, consequences d isco v erab le  only by te s t in g  * In  a market 
s i tu a t io n  lA ere d if f e r e n t  competing proposals are  being te s te d ,  one su.ch un fo rtu n a t; 
in s tan ce  does not drag doxm to e  xvhole economy, i t  ne r e ly  ta k e s  out those who 
implemented it© A few people go out o f b i s iœ s s  o r , i f  toey are  lu ck y , can escape 
by merely abandoning the proposal® A bad guessof th is  nature i n  a planned economy
' ‘ ■   14fe
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might mean th a t  resources were committed on la rg e  sc a le  to  p roduction  methods 
which involved unacceptable consequences* In  the m onolithic economies the eggs 
are  en tru s te d  to  one basket^ and e ill may brealc i f  the basket f a l l s . The 
p lu r a l l s  t i c  economy achieves a kind of sa fe ty  in  i t s  v a r ie ty ; th e  unacceptable 
can be removed as p a r t  of a continuous p rocess of te s t in g  b e fo re  i t s  m istakes 
a re  repea ted  on the la rg e  s c a le .
There i s  not only s a fe ty  in  varie ty^  but increased  probabid .ity  of
su c cessfu l proposals being made* As we saw i n  sc im ce^  the more c re a tiv e  minds
th e re  are a t  lo rk  on the ta sk  of form ulating and te s t in g  new p ro p o sa ls , then  the
g re a te r  i s  th e  chance th a t  some v j i l l  be fouixl to  be superio r to  ex is tir jg  ones.
VJhen the U nited S ta te s  Governmenb committed I t s e l f  i n  t te  Second World War to  the
m anufacture of a nuclear boni), i t  s e t  about th e  ta s k  by proceeding w ith  severa l
a l te rn a t iv e  so lu tio n s sim ultaneously , e s tim a tin g  ( c a ’re c tly )  th a t th e  d iscovery  of
a workable one would be thereby  a c c e le ra te d . The process of gaseous d if fu s io n  only
emerged as the p re fe ra b le  s o lu tio n  during th e  ac tu a l development of th e  Manhatt&n
P ro jec t*  In  economic a c t iv i ty ,  to o , i t  seems e n t i r e ly  reasonable to  expect th a t
th e  commitment of a la rg e  number of c re a t iv e  minds to  1iie fo rm ulation  and te s t in g
o f new proposals should b r in g  the b e n e f i t  o f more rapid p ro g re ss . The market
economy has la rg e  numbers engaged in  the making of p ro p o sa ls ; and the p roposals/
a re  confined to  sm sll s e c to rs  a t a tiire  of tlie whole economy* In  such circum stances 
• i t  i s  u n su rp ris in g  th a t  we should expect a higher chance o f  superior p roposals 
being made.
M otivation , to o , i s  h igher where people ax’e i n  d ir e c t  p u rsu it o f th e ir  
p r iv a te  o b je c tiv e s . Hie man idio makes h is  p roposal in  the market economy does sori n  the knm ledge th a t h is  m n  f a te  i s  bound up to  some degree with h is  proposal *
The a s so c ia tio n  of su b je c t and p roposal i s  no t a s  c lo se  as th a t  between su b je c t and 
m utation in  ev o lu tio n ary  development, fo r the  u rsu c c e ss fu l businessm an wil3. not
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p e rish  w ith  h is  p ro p o sa l. But the a s so c ia tio n  i s  there because success wil]. bring 
inc reased  fu lf i l lm e n t of economic aims* What i s  being said here  is  th a t  people are
committed to  th e i r  economic proposals because they  stand to gd.n or lo s e  according
to  the success or f a i lu r e  idiich they achieve* In  a d ire c ted  economy i t  i s  o ften  
the case th a t  th e re  i s  no such c lo se  a s so c ia tio n ; people sr e car trying out 
d ire c tiv e s  from the c e n tra l  c o n tro llin g  a u th o r ity , and have l i t t l e  in c e n tiv e  to 
maice su ccessfu l p ro p o sa ls , even in  the lim ite d  cases in  which they a re  perm itted  to , 
In  order to  e s ta b lis h  m o tiv a tio n , the au th o rity  has to s e t  up nominal ta rg e ts  fo r  
p a r t ic ip a t in g  in d iv i.d u a ls , ta rg e ts  whose attainm ent, w i l l  b ring  lEb.lfillment of 
p r iv /a te  o b je c tiv e s . Hius do we hear of the device of hie p roduction  bonus, paid 
to  se c to rs  of the economy which f u l f i l  p roduction  quotas* The attem pt is  to  t i e  
what the  a u th o rity  wishes to  be achieved (a c e r ta in  le v e l  of production) to  what 
the in d iv id u a l wishes to  achieve (g re a te r  pur chasing power, or more le is u r e  time ) .  
The fa c to ry  owner i n  a market economy has in c e n tiv e  to supply what consumers 
req u ire  because he wi21 gaîjn h is  ends d ir  ectl„y by doing so: in  a d i r e c t  economy
some a r t i f i c i a l  l in k  must be supplied*
Successive c o l le c t iv is a t io n s  in  S oviet a g r ic u ltu re  have w h ittle d  the
s iz e  of th e  perm itted  p r iv a te  p lo t doim to  an average h a lf -a c re  i n  s iz e .  On the
r e s t  of the land  the a g r ic u ltu ra l  economy i s  c e n tr a l ly  d ire c te d , and th e .fa rm -
m')rker produces fo r fixed  wages what he is  to ld  to produce. On tlie pxxvate p lo t
he produces what he wants to produce, and i s  perm itted  to  keep vhat i s  produced.
P riv a te  p lo ts  occupy 3 per cent of a l l  Russian c u ltiv a te d  la n d , yet they  produce
alm ost h a lf  of a l l  m ilk and m eat, th re e -q u a r te rs  of a l l  eggs, and tw o -th ird s  of
IS"po ta toes produced in  the So\.dlet Union, M otivation  is  n o t a fac to r which can be 
l i g h t ly  ignored*
In  the market s i tu a t io n  we saw th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l com petitive p roposals 
ançd Inadequacy-elim ina tion  tr a n s la te d  them selves in to  a convergence by the system
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i t s e l f  towards consumer s a tis fa c tio n *  That i s ,  the e f f e c t  of an inadequate 
p roposal i s  to  produce a s i tu a t io n  in  wliich a more adequate replacem ent w i l l  be 
su b s titu ted *  More b lu n tly  s t i l l ,  we might say t l i a t  those who malce good/ proposals 
tend to  ge t the business a t the  expense of those who do no t (and ’ good  ^ i s  measured 
by th e  p ro p en sity  to  s a t i s f y  consum ers). The market thus c o n tin u a lly  channels 
resou rces away from people who have made unsuccessfu l p roposals and towards th o se  
\di0 ‘have shomi, by c o n tra s t ,  the a b i l i ty  to s a t i s f y  consumer preference* The 
c e n tr a l ly  d irec ted  system does not do th is  * Even fX, d esp ite  a l l  of the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  a ttend ing  the lack  of adequate comparison, in f e r io r  p roposals a re  
d e tec ted , tliere  i s  no mechanian whereby resou rces are  d irec ted  away from t i ie ir  - 
p e rp e tra to rs  and in to  the  hands of ‘bhose who propose more aiccessfu 'Jly*  The 
planned system does have a rough equ ivalen t idiereby the r e s u l t s  of t r i a l s  are  fed 
back in to  subsequent p ro p o sa ls , and th is  is  by the period ic  purging o f economists 
who make in c o rre c t  p red ic tio n s*  U nfo rtuna te ly  for the e f f ic ie n c y  of the system , 
th i s  replacem ent of personnel o f te n  talc es p lace  a t le v e ls  o ther - than those  where
the m istakes were made, and c a r r ie s  no guarantee th a t th e  successo rs ic i l l  be any
hatter*  'Ihe market rep la ces  a bad guesser by a b e t te r  one; the  planned system 
might e a s i ly  rep lace  th e  bad guesser by  om  eq u a lly  bad, even i f  i t  does manage to  
rep lace  him*
In  V3.ew of the f a c t  th a t  fewer co n jec tu re s  and marketing t e s t s  a re  made 
under the planned system , i t  would appear probable th a t  s in ce  l e s s  in fo rm ation  i s  
gained from m istakes, so a lso  w i l l  th e re  be le s s  opportun ity  to g a in  in fo rm ation  
concerning p o ss ib le  new products* In  t i e  same way that, we described a con jec tu re  
as ( f e r t i l e '  i f  i t  in sp ire d  t e s t s  which could le a d  on "bo p ro p o sa ls  in  o ther f i e ld s ,  
so t i e r e  i s  a p a r a l le l  i n  economic a c tiv i ty *  Economists ta lk  of the "sp in -o ff"  
caused when work on the c r e a t io n  or improvem nt of one product le a d s  to u n a n tic ip a te
id e as  concerning new products*  ^ Hie devetopnant of a new type of p la s t ic  fo r one
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product, for example, has o ften  le d  to  suggestions invo lv ing  i t s  use to Improve 
ano ther, t o t a l l y  d if fe re n t  product* The a l lo y  demised for an aeroplane might find 
i t s  vray in to  th e  engine of a motor car ; the  m a te ria l dev ised  to so lve problems 
asso c ia ted  vrith space t r a v e l  might f in is h  up as the coating on a n o n -s tick  f ry in g  
pan, 'When the e f f o r t  of improvement attem pts is  spread w idely  so th a t th e re  are  
thousands of fi.rmsaid in d iv id u a ls ' a ttem p ting  to improve p roducts , then we a re  
morç l ik e ly  to rece iv e  the unexpected ' f a l l a i t '  b e n e f i ts  of p rogress in  o th e r 
sec tio n s  than when p roduction  is  c o n tro lle d  by an o v e ra ll plan*
I t  appears from the foregoing co n s id era tio n s th a t  the market economy is  
more conducive to  p rogress than  is  i t s  planned coun terpart*  In. every a sp ec t of 
com petitive proposa], and te s t in g  for e l im im tio n  i t  produces cond itions more 
su scep tib le  to  rap id  and convergent p ro g ress  towards the aims of those p a r t ic ip a i  in  
Only in  the case of the o b je c tiv e s  of the ru lin g  a u tio x ity  of a planned economy 
does the d irec ted  system achieve what, they wou 1x3 c a l l  p ro g re ss . And even in  tiiese 
cases th e re  i s  the  se rious drawback of an absence o f e f fe c t iv e  com parison. There 
are  good reasons fo r  supposing th a t  even th e se  o b jec tiv es  could be achieved more 
ra p id ly  and more e f f e c t iv e ly  by the m arket-type of economy i f  the au th o rity  were 
prepared to  en ter i t ,  as p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  bidding s u f f ic ie n t ly  high for ttie ir  
o b je c tiv e s . In  such a s i tu a t io n  th e re  would be a l l  of th e  ad v æ tag es  of 
m otivation , m u l'b ip lic ity  of competing p ro p o sa is , e f f e c t iv e  te s t in g  of a l te r n a t iv e s ,  
and e lim in a tio n  of l e s s  adequate prooedui'es* N eil Am strong remarked on h is  way to  
the moon th a t  i t  afforded l i t t l e  com fort to r e f le c t  th a t  h is  s a fe ty  was dépendait 
upon the opera tion  of m illio n s  of p a r ts ,  aL.l b u i l t  by th e  lav  e s t  t a id e r .  He did 
not remark th a t the  m obilised reso u rces of a so p h is tic a te d  planned economy had 
fa ile d  to  achieve what p r iv a te  m o tiv a tio n  and i ix l ir id u a l proposal and e lim in a tio n  
had ach ieved . The United S ta te s  Government achieved i t s  o b je c tiv e s  in  the f ie ld  
of space re sea rch  by en te rin g  th e  market as  a b id d e r, and by l e t t i n g  th e  market
ï s ô '
econoray p ro g ress  towards ‘the o b je c tiv e  by com petitive attem pts*
% i l e  the m arket economy is  an e f f i c ie n t  device fo r  the ach icvenant of 
the in d iv id u a l s e l f - r e f e r r in g  eids o f i t s  p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  and fo r  a t ta in in g  what 
may, because of g m e ra l acquiescence, be regarded as the c o l le c t iv e  ends o f  
so c ie ty , i t  i s  not tiie veh ic le  b e s t  equipped to  advance towards ‘those aims which 
people hold concerning the behaviour of others* Ad an Smith used the metaphor o f 
the * In \as ib le  Hand’ which sbmehaf c o n tr iv e s  to  d i r e c t  seDX-seeking a c t i v i t i e s  in to  
the se rv ic e  of the common good. Our .analysis enables us to  pu t the same thought 
in  more r a t io n a l  term s, and say th a t in  a market s i tu a t io n  the f u lf i l lm e n t  of 
p r iv a te  ends re q u ire s  th a t  goods and se rv ic e s  be supplied which consumers would 
ra th e r  possess than  the  resou rces n ecessary  for the f u l& lln a n t  of those ends. 
People w i l l  p a r t  w ith  th e ir  resources i f  th ey  would p re fe r  th e  goods or se rv ic e s  to  
the conttjiued possession  of those re so u rc e s ; thus ttie man who supp lies  those  goods 
and se rv ic e s  i s  enabled to accumulate the resources requ ired  for h is  own o b je c tiv es  
He has to  s a t i s f y  ' the  common good* in  order to achieve h]js cwn a id s , hence 'the 
' In  vis ib le  Hand *.
I t  i s  e n t i r e ly  conceivab le , however, th a t  th e re  may be moral ends sought 
by in d iv id u a l members o f so c ie ty  which a re  no t served by th e  s e l f  - re fe r r in g  
o b je c tiv e s  o f others* Someone, for example^ whose aim is  a so c ie ty  i n  which men 
are  equal in  th e ir  m a te r ia l p o sse ss io n s , w il l  not fincî t h a t  the m arket economy i s  
.conducive to  advancement toward th a t  end* Because he has ob jec‘bives which are  
a t a superio r le v e l  in  the h ie ra rch y  o f  m otivations th an  economic aims, he w i l l  
not be able to d escrib e  the convergence on p r iv a te  f h l f l l l im n t  a s  ’p ro g re s s ’ . An 
e s s e n t ia l  fa c e t of the  market economy is  d is p a r i ty  of achievement* I t  i s  th i s  
very d is p a r i ty  which serves as the guide for the r e je c t io n  of in f e r io r  a l te r n a t iv e s  
i f  every attem pt b r o u ^ t  the same r e s u l t ,  th e re  would be no b a s is  fo r the 
e lim in a tio n  of some a lte rn a tiv e s*  Nor w u ld  t i e  re be m otivation  fo r  experim ents!
A .
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pro p o sa l and te s tin g *  Nor would th e re  be reason  for em ulation of e i th e r  
performance or achievement* The d is p a r i ty  of achievement is  fundamental to  th e  
o p e ra tio n  of th e  sjTstemj i t  is  the b as is  o f  me a sur m ent th a t  some ways are  b e t t e r  
than  others* Without i t  th e r e  could be no p ro g re ss  towards the I f i lim ent of 
p r iv a te  economic ends.
The vi.sib le d isp a rity  is  undoubtedly a focus fo r d isco n ten t and a source 
of envy; th is  i s  p a r t  o f i t s  value to  progress*  Contented people do not make 
p ro g re ss , fo r  they  have no need to  * Advancement towards aims n e c e s s a r i ly  im plies 
the presence o f u n f u lf i l le d  objectives*  The contented man, being s a t i s f ie d ,  has 
no concept of a superior id e a l ,  no h3p)othetioaL le v e l  of a tta inm en t w ith  which to  
compare h is  a c tu a l level*  Envy and d isco n ten t a re  th e  d riv ing  fo rces wliich lead  
men to  seek p ro g re ss . Advancement re q u ire s  m o tiv a tio n , as well as method, aid i t  
i s  the ap p rec ia tio n  th a t a b e t te r  s t a t e  is  p o ss ib le  ih ic h  su p p lie s  th a t  m otivationo 
The superio r le v e l  of p o ss ib le  attainm ent may e ith e r  be im agined, or i t  may be seen 
as an ac tu a l achievement by o th e rs ; i n  e ith e r  case i t  is  the d is s a t i s f a c t io n  m th  
the p resen t s ta te  which th is  co n te ïip la tio n  arouses Wiich pushes men intx) doing 
something about i t .  The Ki.ysian dream of the Lotos E a te rs  rem ains only a (dream. 
Though men yearn for r e s t  and contentm ent, th e se  are  not t i e  a t t r ib u te s  of humanity, 
b u t of the  sheep-pen and the q u ie t  p a s tu re . Those who attem pt to  remove from 
human so c ie ty  the envy and d isco n ten t which are so much a source of unhappiness, 
are  attem ptiuig to remove th e  w al.l-sp rings o f p ro g ress .
I t  i s  claimed o f th e  market system of economic o rg an isa tio n  th a t i t  
em phasises the  se'JX-seeking, ra th e r than the cooperative s id e  of m an's n a tu re , t h a t  
i t  i s  only  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  w rit la r g e .  While th i s  exam ination i s  more concerned w ith 
the r e l a t iv e  ef;£leiency of the r iv a l  systems as v eh ic le s  fo r  th e  achievem ent of 
p ro g re ss , i t  i s  as w ell to  r e i t e r a t e  tlie p o in t th a t the  market system  harnesses 
what are  adm itted ly  se lf-se e k in g  ends in to  the se rv ice  of consumer s a t i s f a c t io n ,  as
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a necessary* means of approaching th o se  ends* The market economy* is  only  a type 
of o rg a n isa tio n ; the ends i t  r e f l e c t s  are  on]_y ’those of the  p a r t ic ip a t in g  
indi*vlduals o I t  may w ^ l  be th a t  some people would l ik e  to  prevent o th e rs  from 
achieving p r iv a te  ends because they  d isapprove o f *tiiose ends, and would l ik e  *to 
c u r ta i l  the o p era tio n  of *bhe mai'ke t economy b eca ise  i t  allow s *iiiose ends to  be 
pursued* But th is  i s  very d if fe re n t from ca teg o ris in g  th e  tern i t s e l f  
as one which gen era tes ends th ic h  some th in k  undesi.r able * The system in  f a c t  
alloi'is the p u rsu it of a v a r ie ty  of ends, both  so c ia l and in d iv id u a l .  The d e s ire  to  
make o th e rs  happy i s  a p o ss ib le  o b je c tiv e  w ith in  the market o rg a n is a tio n , ju s t  as 
i s  the d e s ire  fo r p r iv a te  gain*
In  p ra c t ic e  those s o c ie t ie s  with strong market elem ents in  th e ir  economic 
arrangem ents have found i t  p o s s ib le  *fco re d re ss  what a re  considered  m oral f a i l in g s  
in  a superio r economic system by tak in g  p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n  cut with 'the sphere of 
the economic in s t i tu t io n s *  Thus, because i t  i s  considered m cra lly  u n d es ira b le  th a t  
some members of so c ie ty  who perform  po o rly  in  the m arket system should be unable 
to l iv e  decent l i v e s ,  some of th e  g a in s  of the su ccessflil a re  d irec ted  towards 
the l e s s  su ccessfu l by p o l i t i c a l  actijon. Again, because g ro ss d i s p a r i t i e s  of 
m a te ria l possessions a re  regarded as p o te n tia l  sources of more unliappiness than 
so c ie ty  w i l l  accep t, p ro g ressiv e  ta x a tio n  i s  in troduced to  r e d is t r ib u te  iixiome to  
some degree a f te r  d is p a r i ty  of a tta inm en t has been recorded . As long as th e re  
remains s u f f ic ie n t  d is p a r i ty  *bo supply  m o tiv a tio n , so c ie ty  i s  able to enjoy a l l  o f  
hie advantages of economic p ro g re ss , and yet re d re s s  so ms of the unhappiness which 
i s  brought about by the d isco n ten t requ ir ed fo r  hi a t  p ro g ress . The a t ta n p t has 
been bo r e ta in  hie system which biii^gs advancemait towards 'the achievement of more 
and b e t te r  and cheaper goods, and yet bo tslce such actions o u ts id e  th a t  system as 
w i l l  a l le v ia te  what a re  f e l t  to be m oral shortcom ings. The more reso u rce s  which 
are a v a ila b le  to a so c ie ty , the more w il l  i t  be able to cope wi*bh poverty  in
29 153
ab so lu te  te rm s, and th e  more w i l l  i t  be able to extend th e  range of choice open to  
i t s  c i t i z e n s .
The market economy i t s e l f  i s  m orally  neutral.* I t s  fu n c tio n  i s  to  p rov ide
a framework m th  in  xdiich people can  pursue t h e i r  in d iv id u a l economic o b je c tiv e s ,
xdiatever th ey  are* I t s  rewards a re  not a l lo c a te d  on the b a s is  of any moral w orth ,
b u t only  in -te rm s of the value to  so c ie ty  of th e  goods and se rv ic e s  o ffe red  by th e
p a r t ic ip a n t8. These m aybe in  the form of manual- la b o u r, idiich i s  r e l a t iv e ly  easy
to o b ta in , or in  tbie form of c r e a t iv e  im ag ination , i-hich i s  somewhat more r a r e .  Tlie
V aluation  tak es  more account of achieveiiBnt th an  of e f f o r t ;  i t  i s  made of th e
a c tu a l worth to  so c ie ty  of the goods or se rv ic e s  p resen ted , no m atter hO'f th e se
are ach ieved . I t  fo llow s from th is  th a t t i e  market has no sense  of human f a irn e s s
17imposed on i t ,  as f a irn e s s  can be imposed on a d ire c te d  economy. In  market 
conditions an u t t e r l y  'unworthy* per son ' might be able t o  produce goods and se rv ice ; 
of more value to  th e  r e s t  of the cummunity than those of a more deserving ca se . 
Whatever our standard  of ’ f a i r n e s s ’ , t i e  market does n o t r e g is te r  i t ,  u n le ss  i t  
be i t s e l f  t ie d  to  th e  no tion  of economic worth to so c ie ty .
I t  i s  in  p a r t  a d e s ire  to  malie l i f e  f a i r e r  which lead s  to  th e  im position  
of moral val-ues on an economic system . I t  seems wong to  many people th a t  a 
d is s o lu te  popular e n te r ta in e r  should be a b le , by record ing  four songs a y e a r , to  
command reso u rces many tim es th o se  o f the  devoted nurse who works hard for more 
th an  s ix ty  hours every week, m in is te rin g  to  those in  sickness and d i s t r e s s .  Tlie 
s in g e r rece iv es  more reward from the market because he su p p lie s  a product and 
se rv ice  ih ic h  p e rh ap s 'm illio n s  m sh to  buy. They p a r t  w ith  money i n  order to 
rece iv e  the  added p leasu re  brought by h is s in g in g . The n u rse , on the o ther hand, 
thou^i she might be w r t h i e r  by any moral s ta n d a rd , can m in ister to  a few hundred 
people a t most. The market a l lo c a te s  i t s  rewards by economic v a lu a tio n ; and th is  
i s  what seems u n fa ir .
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A man can gain  enormous rewards from t ie  market by v ir tu e  of simple 
luck * I f  he i s  fo rtu n a te  to  h i t  upon a product or se rv ic e  i n  id.de demand, h ien  he 
w il l  h a rv e s t v a s tly  g rea te r re so u rces  th an  some very worthwhile person  who has pu t 
in  a g rea t deal of e f f o r t  over a long p e rio d , bu t has n o t had the  good luck to  
achieve a breakthrough. T his, to o , seems u n fa ir  to  many people. The d e s ire  is  
very r e a l  to  e s ta b lis h  an economic o rgan isaü .on  which w i l l  r e f l e c t  v a lu a tio n s  on 
people o ther than those of economic w orth . One advaitage o f iiie d ire c te d  economy 
is  th a t  d ec is io n s may be made concerning r â .a t iv e  ivorti viiich a re  t o t a l l y  a rb i tr a ry  
i n  economic terms because they are made by some other s tan d ard . In  the planned 
economy the nurse can be paid more than  th e  popular s in g e r . U nfo rtuna te ly , th e  
abandonment of economic measures m ans th a t economic ends id  11 not be fu ] .f i l le d . 
tVhereas the market economy converges on consumer s a t i s f a c t io n ,  the r e je c t io n  of 
market mechanisms involves a d en ia l o f consumer s a t i s f a c t io n .  I t  might seem f a i r  
th a t  plum bers, for example, should be paid le s s  ih.an farm ers; but any tran sfe ren c e  
of th a t  opinion of fa irn e s s  in to  economic terms w ill  im m ediately d is lo c a te  the 
r e la t iv e  supply of plumbers and farm ers. In  a market s i tu a t io n ,  plumbers w il l  
command high rewards when t i e  re i s  a sho rtage  of them; and the high rew ards m i l  
encourage more people to  take up plumbing (thus red ressin g  tlie  sh o r ta g e ). In  a i 
economy in  which plumbers are  paid  by a non-economic standard  of woidth, die re  w i l l  
be no in c en tiv e  fo r  shortages (or su rp lu se s)  to be c o rre c te d . The a l.te rn a tiv e  
to  in c en tiv e  is  coerc ion , but th a t  in v o lv es th e  co n s id e ra tio n  of s t i l l  more moral 
is s u e s .
Tlie market economic system ho lds more knowledge in  i t s  mechanisms th an
18can ever be held sim ultaneously  by any ir r l iv id u a l or g ra ip . I t  i s  a form of
13'epistem ology w ithout a knovdîig su b je c t* . A Eh or tag  e id  11 cause p r ic e s  to  r i s e ,  
and w i l l  encourage both t i e  commitment of resources to  produce more of what i s  in  
sh o rt supply , and the use of s u b s t i tu te s  to  rep lace  i t .  A ll of t h i s  can talce
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p la ce  w ithout anyone being req u ired  to  kno-r hw  the sh o rtag e  came about, or bar
long i t  i s  l i k e ly  to la s t*  Perhaps only a h a irlfu l of people know th a t  one t i n
mine is  now exhausted: many, many more w i l l  see th e  conséquent r i s e  in  t i n  prj.ces,
and many w i l l  search fo r s u b s t i tu te s  (noif ch eap er), or s t a r t  to  tfp  l i ia t  were
;20form erly uneconomic mines* The markeb i t s e l f  produces circum stances in  i4rich 
people m i l  behave i n  such a way as to minimise th e  e f f e c t  of th e  event* No-one 
h a s ‘to  order people to  produce more t i n  or make do m t i  something e ls e ;  th e  p r ic e  
mechanism achieves i t  instead*
The system  converges upon the adiievemenb of the aims of t i e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  
because i t  o p e ra te s  by those  aims* They provide the  m otivation and the b as is  for 
te s t*  I f  we in sp e c t once more the tw o -p art equation  of p ro g ress  i te c h  was a rr iv ed  
a t  i n  se c tio n  I ,  we can see  haf n e a tly  th is  is  described  in  economic terms by the  
market economy* The equation  req u ired :
(1) Agreement on an o b je c tiv e , and
(2 ) A procectire o f  te s t in g  for competing proposals w ith  e lim in a tio n  of 
the l e s s  adequate* Al or A2 — ^  T —^ CP —^ IE — ^ A2
In the case of a p r iv a te  aim pursued in d iv id u a lly , we can s u b s t i tu te  * d e a r  
ap p rec ia tio n  of th e  aim* for ’agreement* on i t*  We can see  from the foregoing 
d e sc r ip tio n  of the  market economy th a t i t s  s tru c tu re  a3.1ows the e f f ic ie n t  o p era tio n  
of both p a r ts  of t i e  equation . I t s  b e t te r  accommodation to  those  requ ired  
cond itions serves to  exp la in  why i t  i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  the  more e f f i c ie n t  veh icle  of 
economic p ro g rè ss *
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTEE' 7
1. The point d iscussed  in  Chapter 2 , Footnote 16.
2. There i s  debate between h is to r ia n s  on t h i s .  Against the view se t out here 
may be opposed the ’McDona^ th e s ia * , th a t  the reform s, a l th o u ^  owing 
something to  u t i l i t a r i a n  thought, were b a s ic a lly  fu e lle d  in s t i tu t io n a l ly ,  
and th a t the s e t t in g  up of in sp e c to ra te s  to  manage the f i r s t  few acted  as a  spur to  fu r th e r  reforms*
This statem ent does n o t, of course, exclude the p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  events 
beyond the  range of N ineteenth  Century le g is la t io n  m i^ t  have brought 
g re a te r  m isery to  g re a te r  numbers* B ooth 's rep o rt on cond itions in  London 
a t  the  tu rn  of the  cen tury  was one fa c to r  co n trib u tin g  to  the  disappearance 
of what some have described  as N ineteenth  Century complacency*
4. This was the case considered b r ie f ly  in  the  Introduction*
5* But even U t i l i t a r ia n  th e o r is ts  recognised th a t  "pain  counts fo r  more than
p leasu re" , and one school developed the poin t to  the .ex ten t of s u b s t i tu t in g  
"minimise pain" fo r  e i th e r  "maximise happiness" o r "achieve the g re a te s t 
balance of p leasure  over pain" *
6. The ' exemplify th i s  view* Because they thought w ealth was
fix e d , they thought th a t  one country could only become r ic h e r  i f  o thers  
became poorer* Their p o lic ie s  (hold ing  sway in  F i f t e e n t h  Century France 
in  p a r t ic u la r )  were thus designed to  maximise t o t a l  w ealth inflow ing, and 
to  minimise t o t a l  w ealth  outflow ing ~ even i f  th is  unknowingly stun ted  
economic growth. T heir concern was w ith  an increased  share of what they 
th o u ^ t  was a constan t tra d e , r a th e r  than  w ith a constan t share of an 
in c reas in g  tra d e . Events of the  past decade in  B r ita in  have made i t  
. c le a r  th a t  ' ' has by no means disappeared from modem economic
thought,
7o In  the example given, i t  i s  assumed th a t  no buyer o r s e l l e r  commands a
share of the market la rg e  enough to  in fluence  p ersona lly  a f f e c t  the outcome,
8, A lte rn a tiv e ly , the im position  by law of a p rice  c e i l in g  in  tim es of
s c a rc i ty  w ill  mean th a t  e x tra  resources w ill  not be committed to  supply,
and a llo c a tio n  of the  scarce commodity must be by some form of ra tio n in g  
o th e r than p r ic in g  ( i t s e l f  a  form of ra t io n in g ) ,
9, I t  should be understood th a t  the term "com petitive market economy" i s  not
used to  denote any economy which has , in  f a c t ,  e x is te d . I t  i s  a th e o re tic a l
model. I t  does not rep re sen t a s i tu a t io n  which can be expected to  a r is e  
w ithout p o l i t i c a l  in te rv e n tio n , because th e re  are  economic fo rces  which,
i f  l e f t  a lone , m il i ta te  ag a in s t com petition . I f  ever a fre e  market 
economy has occurred, the p ro b a b il i t ie s  are  tlia t i t  d id . so by chance, and 
th a t  i t  was sh o r t- l iv e d . To e s ta b lis h  and m aintain  a com petitive market 
economy would req u ire  considerab le and constan t a p p lic a tio n  of governmental 
power; power which our s o c ie tie s  have n o t seen a p p lie d .to  th a t  end,
10, I t  i s  im portant th a t  monopolies of labour are  not omitted from the d e fec ts  
of la is s e z - f a i r e  s i tu a t io n s .  While monopolies of c a p ita l  o r of commodities 
might arouse most opposition , the a c t iv i t i e s  of powerful trad e s  unions can achieve a monopoly of labour f a r  more complete in  i t s  e ffe c tiv e n e ss , and
a t  le a s t  as damaging in  i t s  consequences.
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Chapter .8
TESTING AND SOCIAL PROGRESS
"A th in g  may look speciouë in  th eo ry , and y e t he ru inous in  
p rac tic e  I a th in g  may look e v i l  in  theo ry , and y e t be in  p ra c tic e  e x c e lle n t,"
« Edmund Burkes ’Speech in  Parliam ent during  the
Impeachment of Warren Hastings*
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11» The efficiency of attempted 'coercive* advertising is controversial.Against the arguments of J.K.GALBRAITH ("American Capitalism" (l952)) and VANCE PACKARD ("The Hidden Persuaders" (1957))> may be set the fate of the Ford Edsell car, whose failure despite the most modem and sophisticated marketing campaign has been documented many times; and also on the other side is the fact that analysis of advertising shows that it is used primarily for interlopers to break into established markets, rather than for established products to hold their markets,
12. Some lead ers of tra d e s  unions have argued th a t the  purpose of production i s  
not and should not be to  provide products fo r  consumers, but r a th e r  to  
provide employment fo r  working men. Obviously, i f  such aims are  attem pted, 
then  convergence w il l  be upon some fa c to r  o ther than  consumer s a t is f a c t io n .
13. And trad e s  unions rep resen t men as s e l le r s  of labou r, not as buyers of 
consumer products (even thou# i they are  u su a lly  b o th ).
14» The invention of the ball-point pen, for example, made useless in a very
sh o rt time a l l  of the long-term  plans involved in  raining the  m etal which i s  
used fo r  the n ib s of fo u n ta in  pens.
15. From A.N.SAKOFF's "The P riv a te  S ecto r in  Soviet A gricu ltu re" (Monthly 
B u lle t in  of A g ricu ltu ra l Economics, FAO, Rome. 11,9,1962). R eferred to  in  
Ardrey’s " T e r r i to r ia l  Im perative".
16. In  "The Wealth of N ations", ADAM SMITH (1776).
17» F.A.HAÏEK, in his "Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics" (196?) distinguishes between ’distributive justice’ and ’commutative justice’. Distributive justice, he says, "is the justice of a command-society or command economy and irreconcilable with the freedom of each to decide what he wants to do." Commutative justice, on the other hand, rewards by results and not by intentions. It involves not estimating the worth of a person, but simply "allowing him to keep what his fellows are willing to pay him for his services".
18. A poin t explored by F.A.HATBK in  h is  essay "The Use of Knowledge in  Society" (American Economic Re view, 55,1945 )
19» The phrase forms the title to one of Popper’s essays in "Objective Knowledge" (1972).
20. Hayek's example.
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"Wlien a t te n t io n  is  extended from the n a rra r  f ie ld  of economics to the
w ider p rogress of man i n  so c le ty , a d .m ilar d iv is io n  i s  encountered between
in d iv id u a l and c o lle c tlv B  ends* In d iv id u a ls  may p rog ress in  so c ie ty  by le a rn in g
how to  l i v e  i n  ways which bring  in c reased  fnlfilX iiB nt of ends; w hile s o c ie t ie s
tliem selves may be sa id  to advance i f  th e ir  customs aid in s t i tu t io n s  change i n
such a way th a t  l i f e  w ith in  them i s  g e n e ra lly  agreed to  be b e t te r  than b e fo re .
T he,standard  by which 'b e t te r  than liefere ' i s  adjudged must be th e  aims s o u ^ t  by-
in d iv id u a l members; Wiere th e re  i s  geiersO. agreement, i t  i s  because the  aim was
w idely shared* We are  co n s id erin g , then , the increased  fu lf i l lm e n t  of the
o b je c tiv e s  of merfoers of s o c ie ty , whether th is  be achieved by clianges i n  die
behaviour p a tte rn s  of the in d iv id u a l, or by changes made on a la rg e  en o u ^  sca le
fo r them to  become the new norms of the society*
For most people, i t  would probably  be tru e  to  say th a t  l i t t l e  or no
conscious thought goes in to  the choice o f a l i f e - s t y l e  * They adopt unquestion ing ly
the values of the so c ie ty  i n  which they were ra is e d , ani i f  they  are aware a t  a l,l
of a l te r n a t iv e s ,  i t  i s  u su a lly  in  the form of kno'^ing I'iiat i s  done i n  o ther
co u n trie s  (or in  other c la s s e s ) ,  and regard ing  i t  a l l  as remote from , and ir re le v a n t
to ,  th e i r  own way of liv in g *  What we c a l l  'custom ' i s  a major determ ining fa c to r
1i n  the adoption of s o c ia l ' values* "We are a f r a id " ,  said Edmund Burke, " to  p u t men
to  l i v e  and tra d e  each on h is  own p r iv a te  stock  of reason; because we suspect th a t
th is  stock in  each man is  small., and th a t  th e  in d iv id u a ls  would do b e t te r  to  a v a il
them selves of th e  general bank and c a p i ta l  of nations and o f ag es . Many of our men
of sp e c u la tio n , in s tead  of exploding general, p re ju d ic e s , employ th e ir  sa g ac ity  to
discover Wie l a te n t  msdom which p re v a ils  in  *them"c
The customs and t r a d i t io n s  o f  a s o c ie ty  are  i t s  te s te d  ways of doing
Z‘tilings* Something "hallaved  by p re s c r ip t iv e  p ra c t ic e  since tinB  immemorial" is  
something which has been shown by exhaustive  te s t in g  to  achieve a s o c ia l  aim* There
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may be b e t te r  ways of a tta in in g  the same o b je c tiv e , or of a tta in in g  more o b je c tiv e s
b u t th e re  is  in  man i-Aiat Lord Hugh C ec il d esc iib es  as "a d is p o s i t io n  averse  from
change", a d isp o s itio n  which be claims "sp rings p a r t ly  flora a d i s t r u s t  of th e
unlcnown and a cor re se n d in g  re l ia n c e  on experience ra th e r  than on t ie o r e t ic
reason ing ; p a r t ly  from a fa c u lty  in  men to  adapt them selves to  Hieir surroundings
so th a t  what i s  fa m ilia r  m erely because of i t s  fa m il ia r i ty  becomes more a c c i t a b l e
or more to le ra b le  than  v h a t i s  un fam iliar"*  Hie re are th re e  d i s t in c t  no tions h ere ,
all. of id iich  re in fo rc e  acceptance of custom: they  are su sp ic io n  of the unlaiavn,
re lia n c e  on eicperience, and love of th e  fam iliar*  I t  i s  im p u ta i t  to  r e a l i s e  th a t
4th ese  a re  d i s t i n c t ,  and t î i a t  the  fam ilia r  is  loved because i t  Is f a m il ia r ,  ivithout
any necessary  regard  for i t s  in t r in s ic  m erits*
While tlie se no tions appear a t  f i r s t  g lance to m i l i ta te  a g a in s t so c ia l
p ro g re ss , a c lo se r in sp e c tio n  sh w s  th a t they have an im portant fu n c tio n  to  pley
in  th e  se rv ic e  of i t*  The simple a f f e c t io n  generated by fam iliai’i ty  i s  one which
can induce us to  p re fe r  p re se n t im p erfec t to fu tu re  p e r fe c t  b ec a ise  i t  f u l f i l s  an
im portant ob jec tive*  And althcugh th is  a f fe c t io n  i s  described as 's im p le ',  i t  Is
by no means a sim ple ta sk  to  account for i t*  We can see why men sh a ild  esteem or
value tlie customary fo r i t s  apprec ia ted  m erit and u t i l i t y ,  but we carmot re a d ily
see why they should jj.ke i t*  The w a te r-ë i r ews ih ic h  Konrad Lorenz d e sc rib e s  in
S"King Solomon's Ring" ].earn th e i r  l i t t l e  'approved pathw ays' so t h a t  they can move 
along them a t  speed , always p re fe r r in g  to keep with the p a th  >hich Wiey know, evai 
in  cases wîiere they subsequently  d iscover a s h o r te r  route* The confusion  caused 
when some sm all d e ta i l  of a customary p a th  is  d istu rbed  can e a s i ly  be a t t r ib u te d  
to  the lo s s  of the u t i l i t y  affo rded  by a knavn safe  re n te ;  but w ith  human beings we 
are  faced wiHi a confusion  even in  cases where th e re  was no apparent u t i l i t y  to  be 
destroyed* An animsl taicen away from i t s  t e r r i to r y  and p laced in  a new environment 
i s  o f te n  a ib je c t  to  a fe a r  of the unlcnown* However, even when i t  has estab3,ished
th a t  the new surroundings are  sa fe  and possess abundant su p p lie s  o f  food, the 
animal wil]. u su a lly  s t i l l  tales a considerab le time before i t  s e t t l e s  down and can 
be seen to  be 'a t  home ' in  i t s  new lo ca tio n *  I t  could be 'fcliat we are watching the  
r e s u l t s  of a re la tio n s h ip  m th  i t s  surroundings sim ilar to  th a t  which appears to be 
enjoyed by humans*
In  some way men seem to  id a i t i f y  w ith  ilie ir  enviromBiit* I t  i s  as i f  th e  
a b s tra c t  mind anchors i t s e l f  in  r e a l i t y  by fam ilia r  i s  i rg  i t s e l f  with the  th in g s  
which surround i t  * Without regard  to  any apprecia ted  vsQ.ue which they may have, 
they  serve somehoif to  bu ild  up id e n ti ty , in  the in d iv id u a l, to  enabto him to  f e e l  the 
confidence of a se c u re ly -e s ta b lish e d  ex istence*  The s e c u r ity  i s  not the p h y sica l 
s e c u r ity  of having access to "the means of l iv e lih o o d  and s u rv iv a l ,  but th e  s e c u r ity  
of Imowing o n e 's  p lace  in  the universe*  Men decorate  th e ir  minds w ith  ideas 
derived from tlie world about them, and liie th e r  th is  fu rn itu re  be composed of th e  
id eas  of physica l o b jec ts  or of th e  notions of ways of doing th in g s , i t  se rv es to 
f i l l  tlie mind w ith  th e  ab s tra c tio n s  of observed e x is ten c e , and gives to th e  mind a 
'c h a ra c te r ' i n  much the same way th a t  fu rn ish in g s  w i l l  g iv e  ch a rac te r to  an enpty 
room* This is  the way in  lÆiich the environment becomes p a r t  o f  a man's id e n tity *
The lo s s  of a faveur i t  e tre e  or a fam ilia r shop genera tes uneasiness because i t  
leaves the mind b e r e f t  of a p a r t  of i t s  fa m ilia r  f u r n i tu r e , and th r e a te n s . in  a 
sm all way the  id e n t i ty  which an in d iv id u a l has b u i l t  up for himself*
This is  no semi-mystic a], c o n c q it, bu t one secur el.y based in  our knavledge 
of what c o n s t i tu te s  character*  We id e n tify  other people no t on ly  b y  th e ir  
p h y sica l c h a r a c te r i s t ic s ,  b u t by th e i r  'ways of doing th in g s ',  and, indeed, i f  we 
know üiem a t  a l l  w e ll ,  by th e i r  'ways of th in k in g  th in g s '*  As o u ts id e rs  we come to  
recognise  th e  r e s u l t s  of a customary mode o f mental a c ti .v i ty , and we use th i s  
rec o g n itio n  to f ix  a person in  our mind and to  sep a ra te  him and d is t in g u is h  him fron 
others* Similai-'ly our awc-areness of our a/n  id e n t i ty  and d is t in c t iv e n e s s  i s  not
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merely derived  from the contaTiplation of our physical bod ies, but fmm a partiad. 
ap p rec ia tio n  of our oim th a ig lit p a tte rn s*  E x ternal change which n e c e s s a r ily  le ad s  
to  lo s s  of th e  fa m ilia r  le av es  u s  so much the  le s s  anchored to r e a l i t y ,  so much the 
le s s  'id e n tif ie d *  in  our own eyes.
E th o lo g is ts  have shavn us hof in  1he animal kingdom i t  comes about th a t
an in d iv id u a l o f a t e r r i t o r i a l  species i s  a b le , m th in  the confines o f i t s  own
’ 6  t e r r i t o r y ,  to  d e fea t an aggressor of many tim es i t s  oim s iz e  and s treng th*  There
7is  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  men, to o , derive  co n fid a ice  from being 'on  th e i r  home g ro u n d ', 
th a t  they  are  more a t  ease ih en  surrounded by th e  f a m il ia r .  This is  th e  ' s e c u r ity  
of id e n ti ty !  r e fe r re d  to above vh ich  enab les a man those  in d iv id u a li ty  is  not 
th rea ten ed  by the absence of the fam ilia r  fu rn itu re  of h is  mind to  achieve more 
hi an one those mind is  d is tu rb ed  by  the  problem of having to re -e s ta b lis h  h im se lf . 
I t  i s ,  I  suggest, a tran sfe ren c e  of th e  s e lf - lo v e  so im porta it for su rv ival which 
b rin g s  about the  a f fe c t io n  m th  which a mm endavs those f a n i l ia r  th in g s  th a t 
form p a r t  o f h is  m n  id e n t i ty .  A man b es tav s  fondness on th in g s  f a n i l i a r  because 
he recogn ises unconsciously  th a t  i n  making up a p a r t  of his ifental id e n t i ty ,  they 
become p a r t  o f h im se lf . The o b je c ts  which h a b itu a l ly  surround us in  the p h y sica l 
i-jorld, our ways of doing th in g s , and our \Tsys- of th ink ing  th in g s^ a ll form p a r t  o f 
our unique id e n t i ty .  We f e e l  a f fe c t io n  fo r thou because toey are p a r t  of ourse3.ves; 
tiius any d ep re iv a tio n  o f an h ab itu a l s ig h t or sound, or of a t r a d i t io n a l  mode of 
behaidour, m i l  induce th e  pang of r e g r e t  a t lo sin g  somelhing we love; i t  i s  a p a r t  
o f our am  s e l f ,
Oakeshott t e l l s  of the Masai t r ib e  i n  Kenyaf who, when moved from th e ir  
old surroundings to  a mw re se rv e , pi’omptly ch ris ten ed  a l l  of the h i l l s ,  p la in s  
and r iv e r s  in  th e ir  new environment a f te r  th e  old ones they had l e f t .  By th is  
device were th ey  able to p reserve  something of the custom ary, some p a r t  of th e i r  
th rea tened  id e n t i t i e s ,  u n t i l  they could w ly  secu re  them selves by con tanp la ting
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and accustoming them selves to  ihe new* H isto ry  abounds w ith sim ila r examples, A 
glance a t  any a t la s  w i l l  shav i n  hew many p a r ts  of the w r Id  a tra n sp lan ted  people 
has sought to  secure id e n t i ty  by ca rry ing  over in to  the new whatever they  could 
r e ta in  of the old* Not only New York, New Zealand, New Je rse y , bu t Cambridge, 
Birmingham and Boston a H  t e s t i f y  to  the s tru g g le  fo r  r e te n t io n  of id e n t i ty  in  a 
changing world *
Much i s  ta lk e d  of a l ie n a tio n , as i f  i t  were so ne tiling unique to  the 
tw en tie th  cen tu ry . In  f a c t ,  men have been 'a l ie n a te d ' wherever they  have been 
uprooted from p lace  or h a b i t ,  Tlie p a r t ia l  l o s s  of id e n ti ty  ih ic h  comes about w ith 
the lo s s  of the m ind's fam ilia r  f u rn i tu re ,  and the uneasiness and la ck  of confidence 
idiich accompany th is  lo s s  have b e se t men i n  every age . Our a<jn cen tu ry , vdth i t s  
ac c e le ra te d  r a te  of p rog ress, perhaps th ra v s  th is  problem in to  sh arp er r e l i e f ,  b u t 
our obsession  x-jith i t  sp rin g s p a r t ly  from our inane b e l i e f  tlia t to  have su p p lied  a 
new name means to have described  a new problem* Men have always been a lie n a ted  
when th e i r  id e n t i ty  was th re a te n e d , aid have d e a lt  w ith i t  by re ta in in g  what th ey  
could o f th e  customary, proceeding sic%7ly so th a t  they could begin  to anchor 
them selves in  th e  nexv before they  l o s t  s i  g lit of the o ld , By accepting  necessary  
change slow ly and a l i t t l e  a t a tim e , men ca i be assured  o f having a t  any time an 
overxAelming preponderence of customary and f a n i l ia r  m n ta l th rn i tu re  in to  xvhich 
they  can in co rp o ra te  the  sm all element of th e  new. Only th e  advait of too many 
would-be so c ia l reform ers im patien t fo r  the millenium xvithin th e i r  omi l i f e t im e  
has brought about th e  r e je c t io n  of too  much of the com fortable f o r  people to  hold  
f a s t  to  th e i r  sense of id  a i t i t  y and secu rity *
Love of the fam ilia r  for i t s  a-m sake may thus be seen a s  a species o f 
s e l f  lo v e , a d riv ing  fo rce  in  toe p u rsu it  of such unconscious o b je c tiv es  as 
the d e s ire  fo r id e n t i ty  and for th e  s e c u r ity  xtoich th is  b r in g s . The love o f the 
f a m il ia r ,  on toe other hand, fo r i t s  m erit and u t i l i t y  is  as pow erful a sentim ent
beckoning us i n  th e  same d ir e c t io n . Both re in fo rc e  th e  commitment to  t e s t in g ,  as 
opposed to  a b s tra c t  reason ing . The advantage of a te s te d  way i s  to a t  i t s  worth is  
ta n g ib le ; xve know th a t  i t  w orks. While deductive or in d u c tiv e  c a lc u la tio n  might 
p u rp o rt to  shotj us the \<fay to  su p e rio r attainm ent of our o b je c tiv e s , tlie te s te d  
a l te rn a t iv e  has already sh am  us i t s  a b i l i t y .  F a ith  i n  tlie t r i e d  and tru s te d  
f a m il ia r ,  ra th e r  than in  the planned and ca lcu la ted  unlaiam , is  a sentim ent as old 
as man. A ll o f  our fo lk  proverbs on the  su b je c t a re  amongst the most f a m il ia r  *
"•A b ird  i n  the hand is  worth tx-jo in  the bush" bespeaks of a cau tio n  founded on long 
experience and sings a sad cynicism  of promised tomorravso The lie re-and-nw  has 
an overxAielming advantage over th a t X\hich is  m erely p ro ffe red  or p re d ic te d : we knar 
i t  i s  ours. The b ird  i n  tlie hand is  secure ; and havever much b e t te r  i t  may be to  
have two b ird s ,  hox-rever much r ic h e r  i t  may make our l iv e s ,  hafever much our 
p le a su re  and happiness may be in c re ase d , they  are  in  the bush * And any opening of
our hand to ensnare them may on3,y re le a s e  th e  b ird  x^ have* Thus the f i r s t  th in g
-edxdiich can be said about the  value of a t e s t  a l te rn a t iv e  is  th a t  we knav we are in  
possessio n  of th a t va lu e , x4i at ever i t  is*
C losely a l l ie d  m th  the f a c t  th a t  x-je d e riv e  ac tu a l enjoyment o f the  
here-and-no-j is  the f a c t  th a t  f e e l  much more com petait to q u an tify  the value of 
something i f  xve have had long  experience of i t  * Not only do we knox^ r th a t we enjoy 
i t ,  x\T0 are xn a p o s it io n  to  es tim ate  had much we enjoy i t*  I t  has been our 
experience of th e  vjorld th a t  has le d  us to  propose tlia t th is  cal.cuI.ation can be 
performed more accuratal.y  fo r the p r a c t ic a l  th an  fo r the th e o r e t ic a l .  We have 
observed hav i t  corns about th a t  th e re  a re  always more r e s u l t s  and consequences 
of our ac tions than those xve in te n d . The m erit of something which has been xrith us 
fo r a long time may perhaps be estim ated  from cur con tinual experience of i t*
The m erit of an u n te s ted  proposal may be computed th e o re t ic a l ly ,  but we knew in  
making the  com putation th a t  th e re  a re  hundreds, perhaps to  ou sand s , of fa c to rs
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which could make our es tim a te  xvildly wrong* I t  comes a b a i t ,  th en  th a t  i f  seek t
rep lace  something of value by  a nexv thj.ng of g re a te r  value, our susp ic ions a r is e
t l ia t  the hew th in g  may n o t be of g re a te r  value at a ll*  We may, i n  f a c t ,  be d e p r iv i
ourse lves of a knawn value in  order to rep lace  i t  w ith none* " I  re tu rned  and saxv uru
the sun th a t  the  race  is  n o t to the s w if t ,  ncr the b a t t le  to  tlie s tro n g , n e ith e r  ye'
bread to  t ie  m s e ,  nor y e t r ic h e s  t o  men of understanding , noc* yet favour to  men
loof s lc ill j  bu t time aid chance happeneth to  tiem  a l l"  *
This su sp ic io n  concerning ttie  paver of man’s O clcu la tio n , th is  knav- 
ledge  th a t  th in g s  r a r e ly  tu rn  out as we intend them, shculd n o t lead  us to  conclude 
th a t  th e re  is  i r r a t io n a l is m  in  tlie approach to  progress* There may b e , b u t i t  i s  
n o t c o n s ti tu te d  by th is*  On the c o n tra ry , th:ls cau tio n  xve r e f e r  to  has o f te n  been 
d ig n if ie d  by the nanB of ’r a t io n a l  p rudence’ . Human n a tu re  i s  p ess im is tic  
concerning the ways o f men because th e re  is  good reason to be so* Man has noted frc 
h is  experience t h a t  Hi ere a re  more f a c to r s  involved in  human beha\dour than  can eve] 
be taken  account of in  c a lc u la tio n . He knavs tb.at even the most p la u s ib le  
sounding p roposals  can come to  g r ie f  on the ro ck s of an unintended consequence; and 
h is  ra tio n a lism  is  cau tious because he knavs i t s  l im i ta t io n s ,
I t  i s  not d i f f i c u l t  to  t r a c e  the source of th is  accu sa tio n  of i r r a t io n a l i ;  
which i s  sometimes lev e lled *  There are circum stances in  wliich man xvill p re fe r  to  
keep w ith  t r a d i t io n a l  ways of doing tilings even Wien a l l  reaso n  seems t o  p o in t 
towards th e i r  m o d ifica tio n  or abandonment. The crux of th e  m atter i s ,  however, 
th a t  human nature is  susp icious n o t oiiD.y of man’s a b i i i ty  tb  produce workable 
p lans derived from a b s tr a c t  r e a s o n ii^ ,  b u t su sp e c ts , to o , man’s a b i l i t y  to  analyse 
com petently h is  ex is tin g  in s t i tu t io n s  and tra d it io n s*  The xvorld seems to be 
inhab ited  by people xA o sometimes a c t  s tu p id ly , and xAio sometimes to ink  stup id ly*  
Our experience has taught us th a t men are more prone to  s tu p id ity  in  th ink ing  than 
in  a c tin g . We recognise th a t the man xvho th in k s  has l i t t l e  to lo s e ,  whereas the
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11mæ who a c ts  i s  committing h is  f a t e  to  h is ideas* In  any c o n f l ic t  betxveen th e  ways 
of men and the though ts o f men, xve u su a lly  p re fe r  to be guided by  xvhat men have 
a c tu a lly  done, even xhere th e  reasoning behind th e  a c tio n  eludes u s . I f  men have 
done th in g s  in  a p a r t ic u la r  way fo r  a long 'Ilme, then we are  in c lin e d  to  suppose 
th a t  th e re  i s  probably m erit i n  i t*  The a n a ly s t m i^ t  t iy  i n  vain to  d iscover 
what i t  i s  about the  t r a d i t io n a l  way th a t  ^ v e s  i t  i t s  su p e rio rity *  To many 
people i t  i s  enough Hi at i t  xvorks * I f  i t  has been done for a long  tim e , th ey  
take i t  on t i i i s t  th a t  th e re  are good reasons for i t ,  p re fe r r in g  to  count the 
experience of o th e rs  a s  a su re r  guide tia n  th e ir  "avn p r iv a te  stock  of reason"*
Even xiien men of sp e cu la tio n  f a i l  to  discover l a te n t  xwisdom in  general 
p re ju d ic e s , i t  seems more reasonable to suppose th a t  th e  power of an a ly tic  
reasoning i s  a t  f a u l t ,  than  Hiat a la rg e  p a r t  o f mankind should have been m istaken 
fo r so long a period* The bank and c a p ita l  o f  nations and of ages is  the 
c o l le c t iv e  experience o f manlcind; i t  i s  to e  r e s u l t s  of many t e s t s  by many persons 
in  many periods*  I t  does not seem i r r a t io n a l  th a t men should be l e s s  ready to 
consign the populations o f previ.ous ages t o  th e  category  of fools than  they  a re  to  
consign some over-vaunting a b s tra c t  reasoner to  the ca tegory  of men lacldng  in  
wisdom*
I t  i s  no t necessary  and in e v ita b le  to propose th a t  toe men of old always 
Imew b e s t ,  th a t th e y  were so ms how a ip e ric r  to modern man* I t  is  simply th a t  
th e re  were more of them, and th a t  operated (c o lle c tiv e ly )  over a long period*
Man assumes th a t  i f  an i n s t i tu t i o n  or a manner of behaviour has long been 
t r a d i t io n a l ,  toen  i t  i s  because of i t s  l a t e n t  value , even itoere such va3.ua is  no t 
to  be d iscerned . He to inks i t  probable th a t th e re  is  such m e rit , and in  cases  
of doubt p re fe r s  to  a c t  on th is  assum ption u n t i l  evi-dence le a d s  him to  change i t .  
Aware o f th e  r isk s  o f ac ting  (as opposed to  mere th in k i r ^ ) ,  man p u ts  the onus of 
p roo f on the  shou lders of those xho propose in n o v a tio n s . He does n o t have to  ju s  t i l
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h is  adherence to  t r a d i t io n ,  because he knows his reasoning may be inadequate 
fo r  the task  * He knows i t  xcorks, and th a t  it  has passed down to  him as a t r a d i t io n  
because of i t s  proven a b i l i ty  in  p rac tice*  I t  has been  te s te d  and y e t 3noi 
re je c te d  i n  favour of an a l te rn a t iv e  shewn to  be superior a t  achieving h is  so c ia l 
ob jec tives*  He asks of the innovations t h a t  toey , to o , be te s te d ,  so he w i l l  
have a b as is  for decision*
'Che obvi.ous o b je c tio n  to  t h i s  q^proach, namely t h a t  i t  i s  one xvhich 
appears to  make p ro g ress  d i f f i c u l t ,  i s  no d e t e r r a i t . The xvcrds of another popular 
proverb come to  mind, th a t  i t  i s  b e t te r  to  be sa fe  Hian to  be sorry* Men in
general seem to  p re fe r  the co n tin u a tio n  of t r a d i t io n s  which might be v a lu e le ss
ra th e r than the r isk  of lo sin g  any hidden vaTuie which they might possess* In some 
s o c ie t ie s ,  fo r exanple, the re has been a custom th a t  people should not e a t  meat fro; 
the  pig* Although long derided a s  u s e le s s , the tr a d i t io n  was shown to  have value 
vjhen i t  was d iscovered  th a t  v a r ia is  p a ra s i te s  xdiich prey on the pig can a lso  use 
humans as th e ir  host* Thus the t r a d i t io n  of n e t eaü n g  p ig s  served to  keep people 
f re e  from the in fe c tio n  of th e se  p a r a s i te s ,  even though manyxvho subscribed  to  the  
custom were undoubtedly unaxvare of i t s  m lue* Now th a t modern standards of 
hygiene and medical research  have done much to  ranove th i s  danger, the t r a d i t io n  
i s  nonetheless kept in  some s o c ie t ie s  because i t  i s  r e la t iv e ly  harm less, and becausi 
people see no reason to  submit them selves to 'the u p se t xvhich i t s  abandonmeu't 
would cause* No only  may th e re  s t i l l  be hidden value i n  i t s  s t r i c t  observance, 
b u t th e re  i s  also  th e  simple a f f e c t io n  for the t r a d i t io n  xvhich was considered 
above* As was suggested then  th a t  th e  co n tanp la tion  of *the cus'tximary and f a n i l ia r  
serves to  e s ta b lis h  and to  s u s ta in  the in d iv id u a l 's  id e n t i ty ,  so i t  might be argued 
t l ia t  i t  i s  in  the keeping of th e i r  c o l le c t iv e  customs and t r a d i t io n s  tha'b a people
b u ild s  up and su s ta in s  i t s  cu ltu ra l, identi't^.r*
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I t  i s  no t only  a f fe c t io n  fo r the fa m ilia r  and esteem for th e  l a t e n t  value
of the t r a d i t io n a l  which co nsp ire  to le ad  u s  i n  toe d ir e c t io n  of a p re fe ren ce  for
te s te d  ways, there  i s  a lso  the fa c to r  of simple indolence* People not on]_y l i k e
the e s ta b lish ed  ways, they not only  toinlc them s a fe r , b u t they  also  f in d  them
easier*  The e a s ie s t  way is  no t found by c a lc u la tio n , for c a lc u la tio n  i t s e l f  does
not come easily*  I t  i s  the X'fa^ r xihich can be followed xd.thout t h o u t o e  customary
way* I f  the old way is  adequate, and h as been  shown to be so from continued
usage, then  people w i l l  continue x\ith i t  because they cannot be bo toered  to  attem pt
a new one* He draws on the "bank and c a p ita l"  not* only  because i t  con tains more
resources th an  h is  oxvn, but a lso  because i t  i s  l e s s  burdensome to  do so* The
in d iv id u a l does not wish to  submit h im self to  a l i f e  of worry and p e rp le x ity  when
he could be a t  ease* The d i f f i c u l t i e s  and the dangers of co n s tsn t decision-m aking
can be avoided by follow ing p ra c t ic e s  wliich have been su b jec ted  to improvement
and refinem ent over a long period* By drax\ing on toe e f f o r t  o f  previous generation
a man i s  ab le  to  put h is  e f f o r t  in to  the enjoyment and ap p rec ia tio n  of what is
12a], ready a v a ila b le , and from xtoat te  knows he can d erive  s a t i s  faction*
There are  thus to re e  s tro n g  c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  xtoich m i l i t a te  ag a in s t th e  
r e je c t io n  of te s te d  -a lte rn a tiv es*  The d e s ire  fo r  secure id e n t i ty ,  for the la te n t  
m erit o f  t r a d i t io n s ,  and for an e a s ie r  l i f e  are  a l l  f a c to r s  xvhich im l in e  us to  
re sp e c t the  custom ary, proven ways* I t  might be expected ftom the  foregoing  
exam ination th a t  man would alxvays oppose so c ia l change* But i t  does n o t happen 
l ik e  th is*  Man recogn ises th a t change is  necessary  i n  a changing world * New 
in s t i t u t i o n s ,  id eas  and re lig io n s  are c re a te d ; a l te r a t io n s  in  c lim ate  and 
geography, as w ell as in  a g r ic u ltu re  and technology, mean th a t co n d itio n s change; 
and men irrast conform th e ir  behaviour to  the new conditions* What was adequate 
a t  one tiros need n o t be so a t  another * Tlie la te n t  value o f a t r a d i t io n  might 
deoart w ith  the changed e x te rn a l circum stances which we encounter* khiat
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the th re e  f a c to rs  do i s  to in f lu en c e  th e  way in  xAiich the behavigour o f man in  
so c ie ty  does change. They p lace  a prenium upon te s t in g ,  and upon the  demand for 
rigo rous comparison b e fo re  one way is  re je c te d  fo r another* They m i l i ta te  in  
favour o f  gradualism  in  so c ia l change. By charing  g radually  as p a r t  o f a co n tin u a i 
p ro cess , we are ab le  to  s a t i s f y  a l l  th ree  d e s ire s  to some extent* We give 
ou rse lves time to  anchor ourselves i n  th e  new befo re  th e  old has been f in a l ly  
d iscarded ; we enable our se lves to  rev e rse  course ivithcut too  inuch damage having 
been done i f  the  im plem entation of ne if propceals does rev ea l unsuspected and 
unacceptable consequences; we can s i  a i l  y f ^ . l  in  w ith nexf ways of doing th in g s w ith  
Hie vrorry th a t  our decisions are  i r r e v e r s ib le .
The fo rce  xHiich genera tes new s o c ia l  proposals i s  an awareness of 
inadequacies ; and s in ee  the n o tio n  o f ’adequacy' i s  dependent upon an o b je c tiv e , 
we can say th a t  innovatory  proposals w i l l  be sought xhenever people r e a l i s e  th a t  
x h a t is  achieved f a l l s  sh o r te r  tlian i t  reed  of what is  possible* Tlius the stim ulus 
might come from a new conception  of what i s  possib le  ( such as might be induced by 
a contem plation of other s o c ie t ie s ,  or by an e x tra p o la tio n  of tren d s  writhin an 
e x is tin g  so c ie ty ) oU'- by the impact of new circum stances which malce the  
customary ways achieve le s s  than  they did b efo re  of our o b jec tives*  A r i s e  in  
ta rg e t  or a drop in  performance le v e l  both serve to in c u lc a te  a sense of the 
inadequacy of p re sen t p rac tice s*  Ttoen one manner of l iv in g  in to  which a s o c ie ty  
has f a l le n  p re sen ts  no awareness of inad eq u ac ies , we do not expect to  encounter 
much co n s id e ra tio n  o f a lte rn a tiv e s*  I t  might be la c k  of ex te rn a l examples, or 
la ck  of any b as ic  changes in  circum stances: e ith e r  way i t  means th a t the impetus wh 
moves men to propose innovations is  ab sen t. T rad itio n s tend to be m odified or 
abandoned by s o c ie t ie s  only \4aen i t  is  r e a l is e d  t h a t  the folloifiiig  of a custom 
does n o t b rin g  s a t is f a c to ry  consequences; and th i s  r e a l i s a t io n  is  u su a lly  one 
which tak es  place over an extended period of tim e , We might r e c a l l  from our
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d iscu ss io n  o f such a c t iv i t i e s  as s k i l l s  and economic systems th a t  th e  innovator 
i s  n o t only the man who proposes new ways of doing tilin g s , Imt th e  man who 
proposes new ta r g e t  le v e ls .  He i s  in  some sense a d iscon ten ted  man, for th e re  
are  some asp ec ts  of the r e s u l t s  of t r a d i t io n a l  behaviour which leav e  him 
d is s a t is f ie d ^
S o c ia l in n o v a tio n s, to o , s t a r t  o f f  as m inority p rac tice s*  They s t a r t  by 
being the  p ra c t ic e s  of the  d iscon ten ted  man and the immediate c i r c le  of fam ily and 
fr ie n d s  which he i s  able to  in flu en c e  dlrecuLy* Their aim is  to  achieve r e s u l t s  
which d i f f e r  from those produced by Hie p re v a ilin g  mode of behav iour, and r e s u l t s  
which are  ( in  th e i r  eyes, a t  l e a s t )  in  some way b e t te r  and more worthy of being 
p re fe r re d . I f  th ey  proceed to  follow  th e ir  own chosen course  of behav iour, then  
they  and o th e rs  w i l l  be able to  observe the r e s u l t s  vjhich a c tu a l ly  do follow ',
I f  the requ ired  consequences are no t ach ieved , then the behaviour may be 
m od ified -in  the l i g h t  o f  the  observed d iffe re n c e  between achieved and in tended .
That i s ,  new proposals t o l l  be sought to  c lo se  the gap. I t  sometimes happens th a t ,  
w hile the r e s u l t  i s  not what was in ten d ed , i t  i s  s t i l l  found to be more sa tis fac to ry  
than  the r e s u l t s  of t r a d i t io n a l  behav iour, so the  new way of l iv in g  may be 
p re fe rre d  over the  o ld , even though i t  f a i le d  to achieve the ob jec tive*
I t  i s  t r u e ,  o f co u rse , th a t  people diow a t  tim es a renuirkable r e s is ta n c e  
to  le a rn  from th e i r  m istakes in  l i f e - s t y l e ,  and i t  may e a s i ly  come about tha'b 'the 
experim ental group 'wi.H p e r s i s t  in  th e ir  in f e r io r  ways even 'ihon Hie r e s u l t s  are 
seen* Vhether from p rid e  or ideo logic to commitment, H ieir p e r s is te n c e  w i l l  n o t 
a f f e c t  the way in  which o u ts id e rs  can le a rn  from tlie m ist toe s . I f  the way i s  no 
good they  v jil l  no t follow  i t ,  aid i t  w i l l  be re ta in e d  on ly  by Hie o r ig in a l  group 
and th e  ever-decreasing  group of such of H ieir descendants as do nob abandon i'b.
On the oHier hand, i f  the  new method i s  seen to  bri.ng b e n e f ic ia l  r e s u l t s  
to bhe experim ental group, toen  i t  wi].l be copied by o th e rs  liio wish bo tto e
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advantage of these  b e n e f i ts ,  îhe em ulation >0 .11  be gradual^ fo r  people m i l  wish 
to  be as su re as p o s s ib le , to  see i t  thoroughly  te s te d ,  and to  phase out th e i r  
re lia n c e  on p rev io u sly  adopted ways a t  a r a te  th a t  w i l l  allow  them to  accustom 
them selves to  the iiewo Xve o f te n  see t r a d i t io n s  change by re ta in in g  th e ir  outward 
form. People g rad u a lly  sxfitch to  i¥3wways, while co n tin u irg  to pay llp « s e rv ic e  to  
the o ld . In  th is  way they  r e ta in  tlie ’f a u i l i a r i t y  > aspect o f the old u n t i l  tlie 
new ,is a lso  fa m il ia r ,  IVhen th e  t r a d i t io n  being rep laced  i s  no more th an  an empty 
s h e ll  of pub lic  show, and when most people have a lre ad y  committed them selves 'bo the 
r e a l i t y  o f  the new, h e n  th e  old one f a l l s  q u ie t ly  in to  desuetude.
I t  might be said h a t  people seeic th e  ‘best* way of achieving so c ia l 
o b je c tiv e s , ju s t  as they  do fo r s c ie n t i f i c  or economic o b je c tiv e s ; where ‘best* is  
u n a tta in a b le  in  abso lu te  te r n s , only to be achieved as a ’best* of c u r re n tly  
a v a ila b le  a l te r n a t iv e s .  As m th  the other f i e ld s ,  i t  i s  a case of co n tin u a l 
p rogress towards an u n a tta in a b le  idea].. As each improvenient i s  adopted a s  a 
behaviour p a t te rn ,  so i t  becomes the base for a subsequent f a r th e r  improvement. 
Since th e re  are no a r b i t r a r y  conventional goals in  so c ia l l i f e ,  we f in d  the 
h ie ra rch y  of ends, w ith le s s e r  o b je c tiv e s  ser ving more b as ic  ones. In  so c ia l 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  th e re fo re , we f in d  agad.n the  problem of a changing measuring^rodj 
we t e s t  and modify our aim s, as w ell as our attem pts to  achieve them* Changes in  
aims talce p lace in  so c ie ty  in  imch th e  sanB way as  do changes i n  behav iour,
A m inority  group which has chosen to  l i v e  by new values can shew o th e rs , by i t s  
success or f a i l u r e ,  whether or not hie an. ms are worhi adopting *
There a re  t w  sources of com plexity. In  th e  f i r s t  c a se , i t  is by no 
means c le a r  in  a l l  cases  whether what outside rs  regard  as su p erio r r e s u l t s  of a 
l i f e - s t y l e  are hie consequences o f improved b eh av ia ir  towards e x is ‘C3..ng ends, or 
the replacem ent of th o se  ends by  ones which b e t te r  serve higher o b je c tiv e s . S ince 
the measuring-rod a g a in s t which performance i s  ra te d  i s  i t s e l f  a is c e p tib le  to
lb durz
a l t e r a t io n ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  d is t in g u is h  a change in  perform ance from a change o f 
measure* The second com pileatir^  fac to r i s  h ia t  s in c e  people do no t n e c e s s a r ily  
share o b je c tiv e s , '(he adoption of an aim by one person  to s a t i s f y  a higher 
o b je c tiv e  might not n e c e s s a r i ly  mean th a t  another person would f in d  th a t  aim 
equa lly  sa tisf^dngo  In  both of th e se  cases th e  r e s o lu t io n  of -Ihese d i f f i c u l t i e s  
i s  only b rought about by te s  "ting. I t  i s  on ly  by try in g  i t  fo r h im self th a t  a 
person can judge .whether or no t he w i l l  b aie f i t  from the new p l’ope s a l , The 
p o s s ib i l i ty  '(iiat some innovations w i l l  not be su scep tib le  of w idespread em ulation 
w ith  the  same degree of success a ffo rd s  y e t ano'ther reason fo r esteem ing the  
cau tion  w ith  ih ic h  men proceed towards so c ia l change*
Of co u rse , "there ai'e many p r a c t ic a l  o b jec tio n s  to  'bhe workinr^ of so 
simple a modal, of s o c ia l  p ro g re ss , Meiibers of soc ie ty  do no t in liab it in d iv id u a l 
moral is la n d s . To some ex ten t almost any d e c is io n  on s o c ia l  l i f e  made by soti’a  
w il l  have i t s  e f f e c t  on o th e rs  * S o c ie tie s  show considerab le  reluctance to  allow 
in d iv id u a ls  and groups w ith in  th e ir  m idst to  pursue al'Jnn l i f  e - s ty l e s , I t  i s  p a r t  c 
'the value o f a t r a d i t io n ,  fo r example, h ia t  i t  be accepted by everyone. I t  was 
only e lev a ted  in to  a t r a d i t io n  because people ibund "(hat i t s  keeping produced 
d es irab le  consequences* I f  th e re  are now i n  so c ie ty  people behavi%  i n  a 
d if f e re n t  way (and perhaps seek ing  d i f f e r e n t  en d s), 'then "the assurance i s  gone 
T'hich used "bo accompany the t r a d i t io n .  No longer can i t  be accepted w ith  confidm ce 
people now have to re f] .e c t t h a t ’' i t  miiÿit be in ad eq u ate . F u rther to  t h i s ,  i t  i s  
e s ta b lish e d  behaviour p a tte rn s  which enable people to  p re d ic t  how o th e rs  w i l l  
respond; the  t r a d i t io n s  give people a reasonable b as is  fo r  dqy-to-day planning 
in  th e ir  r e la tio n s  w ith  others. I f  some members of so c ie ty  now s t a r t  to l iv e  
in  d if fe re n t  ways, then  the reasonable expecta tions of the o 'thers w i l l  be denied, 
and l i f e  w U l become for them soTrewhat more confusii'ig and com plicated , as  th e  
t r a d i t io n a l  behaviour no longer produces the  expected re su lt*  I t  i s  o f te n
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u p se ttin g  fo r people to  see th e i r  v a lues over run* The id e n t i f ic a t io n  w ith tlie 
t r a d i t io n s  and p ra c t ic e s  o f th e  community cai be ^ a k e n  by th e  sp ec tac le  of 
non-adherence to  what were th a ig h t o f  as basic  values* Ttie toTiptation i s  g re a t 
in  any so c ie ty  to  remove hi i s  cause of unhappiness and in s e c u r i ty  by o u tr ig h t 
p ro h ib itio n  of a l te rn a t iv e s  which appear to  f lo u t th e  beloved fa m il ia r .  F in a lly , 
i t  i s  q u ite  p o ss ib le  th a t most people would p r e f e r  to l iv e  b y  unquestioned 
t r a d i t io n s ,  opting to  avoid h ie  in te l l e c tu a l  ferm ent in  l i i ic h  the values by 
which tiiey liv e d  were co n s tan tly  under ch a llen g e , and dëLiberatêLy warding o f f  
the unp leasan t s ta te  of having to  th ink  ih iiigs ou t fo r them selves.
These re p re se n t considerab le  fo rces  of in e rtd u  in  a so c ie ty , f œ ces
which could e a s i ly  be app lied  to  the suppression  of new proposals and t r i a l s ,
even in  a so c ie ty  which thought o f  i t s e l f  as f r e e .  These a re  p re ssu re s  which
co ild  be brought to  b ear w ith o u t le g a l  s a n c tio n . WithdrawaTl o f goodw ill, expressior
o f contempt, and removal o f  rewards a re  a l l  iinasures vh ich  prov ide d is in c e n tiv e
for s o c ia l experiment* S o c ie ty  i s  enabled , b y  ihe u se  of such m easures, to  add
weight to  th e  balance-pan  sivinging tav ard s p re v a i l irg  norms. Anyone who experim ents
W 3.th proposed innovations must s t a r t  by accep ting  a l l  of th e se  fa c to rs  In  ilie
l i s t  of undesirab le  conséquences* Even in  a so c ie ty  i f i th  no le g a l  b a r  to  s o c ia l
experiment r the  p re ssu re s  to conform s o c ia l ly  can be overwhelming. D esire fo r  the
re sp e c t of o n e 's  peer group appears to be a very common (and probab ly  in s t in c t iv e )
1 3m otive; thus the d e l ib e ra te  use of th a t  r e s p e c t ,  or i t s  w ithdraw al, forms a very  
powerful weapon in  the f ig h t to  p rese rv e  so c ia l norms*
IVhere le g a l  sanctions a re  used in  order to in t e r d i c t  experiment m th  
a l te rn a t iv e  p roposals , so c ie ty  i s  denied the p a s s ib le  b e n e f i t  gained by comparison 
o f  r e s u l t s ,  Wien consequences cannot be in spected  by t e s t in g ,  members o f so c ie ty  
have no r a t io n a l  ground fo r p re fe rr in g  some a l te rn a t iv e s  to  o th e rs  on the b a s is  o f 
superio r perform ance. S ocia l p rogress in  such c ircu m sta ices can on].y be made by
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chance th ro n ^ i the a r b i t r a r y  im position  of behaviour p a t te r n s .  Moreover, since  
th e re  are  no a l te rn a t iv e  experim ents taking p la c e  w ith in  so c ie ty , the community 
w i l l  be dependent upon ex te rn a l example to  supply them w ith  new conceptions of 
achievement. I t  is  no accident t h a t  an id e o lo g ic a l commitmnt to a p a r t ic u la r  
l i f e - s t y l e  as ‘n e c e s s a r ily  s u p e r io r ' u s u a lly  involves the to ta l  p ro h ib itio n  of 
a l te r n a t iv e s .  I f  in d iv id u a ls  and groups a re  a3,laved to  d i f f e r ,  they  might 
se r io u s ly  embarrass the ideo logy  by l iv in g  l i v e s  which o th e rs  regarded as more 
s a t is f a c to ry  than th e ir  awn. Only by p reventing  people from fo l ia t in g  any o ther 
paü'i can an ideo log ic  a l ly  committed so c ie ty  tak e  s te p s  to ensure the p re se rv a tio n  
of th e i r  chosen manner of l iv in g .  I t  is  n o to rio u s , to o , th a t  s o c ie t ie s  which 
are id e o lo g ic a lly  committed to  p a r t ic u la r  l i f e - s t y l e s  tëce  very good ca re  to  
ensure th a t  co n tac t w ith  o ther s o c ie t ie s  i s  kept to  a minimum. Only by fx ilte ring  
in fo rm ation  concerning d i f f e r e n t  s o c ie t ie s  can those imposing the id e o lo g ic a l 
p a t te rn  prevent al. t e r  n a tiv e  achievement le v e ls  from bd-ng conceived and sought,
Tiius we expect th a t  an id e o lo g ic a lly  committed so c ie ty  m i l  be ch a ra c te rised  by 
the severe l im i ta t io n  on fo re ig n  t r a v e l  fo r  i t s  c iti% ens, the c a r e f i l  co n tro l of 
any v i s i to r s  from abroad, the jamming of fo re ig n  b ro ad casts , and the p ro h ib itio n  
o f fo re ig n  p u b lic a tio n s . Only by s tep s  such as 'these can p o ss ib ly  em barrassing 
comparison be avoided,
in  a f re e  market of s o c ia l  p ro p o sa ls , u n s a tis fa c to ry  co n jec tu re s  p i le  
up l i k e  unwanted goods in  the windows, m th  few, i f  any, cus'tomers. People talce 
only 'the s o c ia l  proposals which w i l l  enable them to advance fu r th e r  towards the 
f i i lf i l /m e n t of th e i r  aims; much as th ey  s e l e c t  goods on the basis  o f th e i r  
r e la t iv e  a b i] .i ty  'to s a t i s f y  economic aims* Vhien on].y sta te-p roduced  goods can 
be b o u ^ t  and so ld , people m i l  buy and s e l l  s ta te-p roduced  goods. When only 
s ta te -p e rm itte d  id eo lo g ie s  a re  allow ed, people w i l l  l iv e  by them* As w ith  the  
sta'be monopoly goods, they  iv il l  have few ways of évalua "ting the performance of th e
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s ta te  monopoly ideology* In  tlie absence of a l te r n a t iv e s ,  they  have no to  
assess*. I f  experim ent i s  p ro h ib ite d , and fo re ign  exanple i s  c a re fu l ly  screened 
away, the only  b as is  of comparison m i l  be m th  p re iio u s  perform ance; p e r io d ic a l ly  
the c i t iz e n s  of such a so c ie ty  might be aware th a t  they a re  f u l f i l l i n g  aims 
b e t te r  or vmse th a n  they  used to  do *
The main drawback of s o c ie t ie s  which do impose le g a l  sanctions on 
a l te rn a t iv e  experiment i s  th a t  the b a s is  fo r  p rogress is den ied . Only one proposal 
i s  te s te d  a t a time i n  each s e c tio n  of so c ia l l i f e ,  and when th e  consequences are  
found u n s a tis fa c to ry  by comparison m th  l i ia t  has been achieved b e fo re , o r , more 
l ik e ly ,  m t h  what people were le d  to  expect by the proponents of the ideo logy , 
th e re  i s  no way except the p o l i t i c a l  in  which d is s a t is f a c t io n  can be reg is te red *  
I'lJhereas in  a so c ie ty  which allowed exiperiment people would be ab le  to  r e j e c t  the 
behaviour p a tte rn s  which brought u n s a tis fa c to ry  r e s u l t s ,  aid adopt in s te a d  one 
which seemed to  liave achieved b e t t e r  r e s u l t s  for th e se  vjho t r ie d  i t ,  i n  the 
r e s t r ic te d  so c ie ty  they  have to change the mind of the a u th o r i t i e s ,  or change th e  
a u th o ritie s*  S o c ia l p rogress i n  s o c ie t ie s  which p ro h ib it a l te rn a t iv e s  tends to 
be made ( i f  a t a3.l) in  a s e r ie s  of spasmodic jerks as th e  p re ssu re s  of d isco n ten t 
bu ild  up to  a p o in t where a l t e r a t i o n  i s  forced* Testing td c e s  p lace  on only one 
proposal a t  a tim e , and the only b a s is  for compari.son tc w ith  previous performance 
or w ith  promised performance* Tliere i s  no smooth pr ccess of so c ia l t r a n s i t io n ,  no 
re te n tio n  o f  the fa m il ia r  u n t i l  men have accustomed them selves to  the new, no 
cau tious te s tin g  and adoption by emulation* On the co n tra ry , such s o c ie t ie s  
n e c e s s a r ily  commit them selves w holehearted ly  to  a p ro p o sa l, deriv ing none of the 
b e n e f its  of gradualism* IJhen the proposal i s  found w anting, i t  must be rep laced  
ab ru p tly  by a new w holehearted commit ment to a new proposal*
The Russian neb le  man who described the T s a r is t  system  as “absolutism  
tempered by a s sa ss in a tio n "  perhaps spoke more w ise ly  than he knew. In  th e  absence
of any o ther means of changing the s o c ia l  s ta te ,  the l a s t  r e s o r t s  of a people 
are  rev o lu tio n  and assa ss in a tio n *  I f  p rogress i s  made as a r e s u l t  of com parative 
te s t in g  and inadequacy~aLim in a tio n , and the mechanisms of s t a t e  do not a].lav fo r 
the te s t in g  of a l te rn a tiv e  p ro p o sa ls , th en  for p rogress to  talce p la c e  th e re  must 
be period ic  u p se t to  the mechanisms of s ta te*  These period ic u p se ts  se rv e  to 
in troduce  new s ty le s  o f l iv in g ,  which -tiiemselves soon face the same problems* The 
process reminds one of nothing so much a s  tlie p e rio d ic  l i f t i n g  of a k e t t le  l id  as  
steam p ressu re  b u ild s  up in s id e  the k e t t le *  VJhen the steam has escaped, the  l i d  
descends u n t i l  the p ressure b u ild s  up again  to  th e  c r i t i c a l  lim it*  We might n o te ,- 
in  p ass in g , th a t  the T s a r is t  system  which tiie nobleman re fe r re d  to was much more 
p lu r a l i s t i c  th an  many of the present day ideo lcg ically -co rm aitted  so c ie tie s*  
P lu r a l i s t i c  s o c ie t i e s ,  t h a t  is  th o se  >iiich perm it ex p e rim n t m th  
a l te rn a tiv e  s o c ia l  behaviour and v a lu e s , not o n ly  preserve the reby  Ihe cond itions 
requ ired  for p ro g re ss , they m aintain  in  a d d itio n  a dynamic s ta b i l i ty *  Because 
the process o f change can be f i t t e d  in to  th e  in te rn a l s tru c tu re  of the  s o c ie ty , i t
can talce p la ce  smoolhly and g rad u a lly , w ithout dram atic u p se t to the whole
society* The so c ia l values of p lu r a l i s t i c  s o c ie t ie s  are su b je c t to continuous 
change because people can move to the adoption cf te s te d  a l te rn a t iv e s  whenever they 
are  convinced th a t  th e ir  o b je c tiv e s  wnuld be more fu l ly  r e a l is e d  by such a move» 
V/hile very  many of the  s o c ia l  experim ents are not taken up g m e ra lly , the p o te n tia l  
for change i s  always th e re  should a su p erio r pro pee at be revea led  by  te s tin g *
S o c ie tie s  which p ro h ib it  a l te rn a t iv e s  td.tb.in them a re  more s tab le  i n  one sense, th a t
they go fo r longer p erio d s w ithou t change* But th is  is  the s t a b i l i t y  o f b u ild in g  
up p ressu re  as i n  our k e t t le  analogy* ' When change does corns, i t  comes v io le n tly  
and a t  c o s t to  s o c ie ty 's  f a b r ic .
Change must come, to o , because o f d iangir^  circum stances* A so c ie ty  
vjould find  i t  very di.f f i c u l t  to  immunise I t s e l f  ag a in s t a l l  of th e  f a c to r s  which
consp ire  to  malce i t s  p rev a len t l i f e - s t y l e  no longer adequate* Obviously, 
tec lino log ica l and economic advance a re  bo th  f a c to rs  lA ich can  in flu en ce  the 
e f fe c tiv e n e ss  of e s ta b lish e d  behaviour p a tte rn s*  Beth can b rin g  about a change 
in  the values by which th a t  behaviour is  r a te d .  Economic advance can change 
a t t i tu d e s  to  both p ro p erty  and p o v e rty . S tea lin g  a sheep, fo r example, might be 
a se rio u s crime in  a s o c ie ty  where the sheep i s  th e  major source cf a fa m ily 's  
liv e lih o o d s  i t  in e v ita b ly  becoiæs le s s  s e r io u s  when economic changes mean th a t  
th e  sheep i s  one of a herd of! thousands rea red  fo r  p r o f i t .  S lavery can be regarded 
as necessary  by a so c ie ty  u n t i l  both techno log ica l and economic p rogress enable 
so c ie ty  to  a ffo rd  the lu x u ry  of regarding  i t  as abho rren t. While an  id e o lo g ic a lly  
committed so c ie ty  might conceivably be prepared to forego economic and technologic:rl 
advance in  order to  p rese rv e  i t s  custom s, there are  som  fa c to rs  over which i t  h a s  
no contro l*  A change i n  th e  cond itions of l i f e ,  i n  the environment i t s e l f ,  can 
le ad  to  tile adoption of new w a^  as the old ones prove no longer v ia b le . A ll of 
the d if fe re n t communities vhich sought to  p re se rv e  th e i r  v a lu es  and e th ic s  by  
em igrating to  America were forced one by one to face th e  r e a l i t i e s  o f  the new 
environm ait, and to  adopt new standards and ways of behaving* But change comes 
in  a d d itio n  from the growth of knofledge w ith in  a so c ie ty , from a c c id e n ta l 
d isc o v e r ie s , from the m ergence of new re lig io n s*  A ll of th e se  would have to  be 
co n tro lled  by a so c ie ty  determined t o  p rese rv e  i t s  norms* The ta sk  i s  im possib le , 
fo r th e re  a re  too many fa c to rs  o u tih th  human co n tio l*
We might regard  th e se  changes as serving the equ ivalen t ro le  to  th a t  of 
the new in form ation  i n  sc ience  vdiich makes us doubt hie e f fe c tiv e n e s s  o f  our 
models* The new 'e x te rn a l ' fa c to rs  which impinge upon our s o c ia l  l i f e  a re  the  
analogous spur to  progress* I t  i s  the a r r iv a l  of th e se  new f a c to r s  which renders 
obso le te  in  some way th e  old scheme of values* We r e a l i s e  th a t  our e x is t in g  
standards a re  l e s s  e f f e c t iv e  a t  ach iev ing  s o c ia l  aims; and th is  is  where the
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innovator steps i n  m th  h is proposals*  J u s t  as we f lrd  a t  the  comparable s tag e  in
s c ie n t i f i c  d iscovery  th a t  th e re  are  o ften  many people working on the attem pt to
produce a v iab le  p ro p o sa l, so in  our s o c ia l l i f e  do we f in d  th a t when i t  becomes
obvious th a t  t r a d i t io n a l  ways must be changed, there  are many d if fe re n t  so lu tio n s
o ffe red  to  so c ie ty  by d if fe re n t people* And the d ec is io n  between th e s e  c o n f lic tin g
a l te rn a t iv e s  i s  made on the b a s is  of te s tin g *  We see hav people fa re  who l i v e  in
th e se  proposed manners, and adopt th e  ones which produce r e s u l t s  corresponding
clo ser t o  our idea o f success. Only ra r e ly  in  our s o c ia l  l i f e ,  however, does i t
become 'obvious* th a t  t r a d it io n s  must be changed; th is  is  an awareness vjhich
d iffu se s  sLa<rly outward through so c ie ty  from the experitiB ntal group in  the normal
course of s o c ia l  p ro g re ss . Very in f re q u e n tly  do we fin d  any sudden and dramatic
re je c tio n s  of p re v a ilin g  l i f  e -s ty le  s *
I t  is  th is  p ro fu sio n  of p o ssib le  a l te rn a t iv e s  which fJohn S tu a r t  Mi3.1
regards as th e  key to  the success of Eur ope an c u l tu re .  “What", he ask s , “has made
the European fam ily of nations an im proving,instead o f a s ta tion& ry  p o r tio n  o f 
ITmankind?" I t  i s  n o t ,  he t e l l s  us “any su p e rio r excellence in  them ", but “th e ir  
remarkable d iv e r s i ty  of ch a rac te r  and c u ltu re "  * In  h is judgement, "Europe is ,» *  
c.w holly indebted to  th i s  p lu r a l i ty  of p a th s  for i t s  p ro g ressiv e  and many-sided 
development". He thinlcs th a t  i t  i s  the p resence of a la rg e  number of ready 
a l te rn a t iv e s  which has enabled Europe to  advaice. l\hen one p a r t ic u la r  path  has 
been rendered inadequate by a change in  circum stances, th e re  have been o th er ways, 
a lready  te s te d  in  p ra c t ic e ,  fo r people to tu rn  t o .  M il l 's  view, re in fo rc e s  >ihat 
we expect from our ap p re c ia tio n  o f the  el.em aits of s c ie n t i f ic  a c tiv i .ty t th a t  a 
so lu tio n  i s  more l i k e ly  to  be found i f  many people are  working on the problem in  
d i f f e r e n t  ways * I f  a la rg e  number of reseai’ch workers a re  attem pting a v a r ie ty  
of a l te r n a t iv e s ,  th en  we ra te  h ig h ly  tlie p ro b a b ili ty  of proposals more 
su ccessfu l than  ex is tin g  ones making th e ir  appearance. What a p p lie s  to  sc ience
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ap p lie s  to  so c ia l l i f e ;  the q u a n ti ty  and d iv e r s i ty  of the  s3.mu3.taneous experim ents 
g ives us more chance of meeting w ith  superior p ro p o sa ls .
‘I t  i s  remarkable th a t  the achievements of European c u l tu re  diould  have 
become the" standard  by lA ich , a l l  over th e  w orld , p rog ress i s  measured. Every 
o ther c u ltu re  has looked a t  the f r u i t s  of European developmmt and reso lv ed  to 
acqu ire  them fo r i t s e l f .  We have only  one model of 'm o d ern ity '; i t  i s  th a t  o f th e  
in d u s t r ia l is e d  growth economy which has c h a ra c te r ise d  the  European achievem ent.
As ra p id ly  as th ey  denounce Europe, hie o ther p a r ts  o f  th e  worId s t r iv e  to  em ulate 
h er. Out’ s o c io lo g is ts  bew ail the w holesale submergence o f a ].te rn a tiv e  c u ltu re s  as 
everyone rushes to  board the European express; we g lib ly  ta lk  about the need to  
p reserve th e  ' i n t e g r i t y ' of other c u ltu re s ;  they rush to adopt ii-B te  ad what they 
regard as a su p erio r manner of l iv in g .  The European example has s e t  a le v e l  of 
a tta in m en t which has become id e n t i f ie d  m th  p ro g ress . lA/hile oilier cu ltu i'e s  m i^ it 
p reserve th e i r  h e r ita g e  as a t o u r i s t  a t t r a c t io n ,  the a ttem pt i s  always to  s t r iv e  
fo r the  'modern' world o f tlie  in d u s tr ia l ,is e d , mass-produc i io n  and consumption 
economy* The a t t i tu d e  of Europeans i s  n o tab ly  am bivalent. They talJc a t once of 
E urope's m ission to  help  the r e s t  of the world to  advance, and o f th e  need to  
regard a l ie n  c u ltu re s  as ' equal, but d i f f e r e n t ' .  I f  hie o th e r c u l tu re s  r e a l ly  were 
'e q u a l ',  th e re  would not be th e  rush  to  r e j e c t  them* Our development experts  dash 
around the world savdng dragons' spawn, and then complain th a t  a l l  they  produce 
"Tre more dragons. The f a c ts  are  (whether sad or no) th a t  European behavioural 
p roposals have su c c e ss fu lly  produced sonath ing  th a t everyone w ants. The r e s t  of 
the vjorld i s  making p rogress by em ulation ju s t  a s  nr egress i s  made ;h .th in  a so c ie ty  
by th e  general spread of the most su c ce ss fu l p ra c t ic e s .
The p lu ralism  makes not only for M il l 's  "p rog ressive  and many-sided 
development", b u t for s a fe ty .  A s o c ie ty  which has a l te rn a t iv e s  being te s te d  w ith in  
i t  i s  more r é s i l i a n t  to  changed circum stances, more ready  to  su rv ive by ad ap ta tio n .
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A so c ie ty  which has long follow ed a t r a d i t io n a l  p a tte rn  and which does not have 
av a ila b le  a l te rn a t iv e  examples may d is in te g ra te  nndar the impact o f d ram a tica lly  
changed circum stances, much as some p rim itiv e  s o c ie t ie s  have co llap sed  under the 
im pact of Eui’opean cu ltiu 'e . In  tim es of d ire  s t r e s s  and anergency, the  p lu r a l i s t i c  
so c ie ty  has a range of a l te rn a t iv e s  ready  under t e s t .  The new co n d itio n s  them selve 
might bring  about the dominance of one of th e s e , supplying th e  e x te rn a l cond itions 
under whi ch i t  becomes 's u p e r io r ' ( i . e .  pr e f  a? able ) * lîius, as wal.l as supplying a 
co n tin u a l th r e a t  to  e s ta b lish e d  values, the  exper in sn ta l. g raips provide a kind of 
s a fe ty  in  d iv e rs ity *
17As H.L.Ac H art has po in ted  o u t, th e re  is  a kind of arrogance in  those 
who i n s i s t  th a t  a l l  o th ers  a re  to  fo lla -i one chosen p a th . The assum ption on thed.r 
p a r t  i s  t h a t  th ey  are  in  a p o s it io n  to  knav tie  b e s t wa)^, and th a t a l l  o ther paths 
rmist n e c e s s a r ily  be in f e r io r .  Such knowledge is  im possib le . We a re  dealing w ith 
th e  products of th e  human c re a tiv e  im agination  a s  com paratives. There a re  'b e t t e r '  
ways which emerge by te s t in g ,  but no th e o re tic a l  'b e s t ' way. Only te s tin g  rev ea ls  
which ways are  found p re fe rab le  i n  p ra c t ic e ,  and th e re  regains the every -p resen t 
p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t a new c re a tiv e  ac t w i l l  produce a proposal fount more p re fe rab le  
s t i l l .  I t  i s  p re c ise ly  the im p o ss ib ility  o f  th is  s o r t  of knovledge which pro vibes 
F.A. Hayek w ith  the b as is  of h is  argument for l i b e r t y .  Since we cai never knaw 
for c e r ta in  th a t  any way is  c o r re c t  (we would say "more adequate than  i t s  r iv a l s " ) ,  
Hayek concludes th a t  we should l e t  people pursue th e i r  own roads; they  may be r ig h t ,  
and we w ror^.
The im p lica tio n  of th is  d iscu ss io n  is t i i a t  we should perm it experiment 
I'jith a l te rn a tiv e s  for p ra c t ic a l  rea so n s , t o  enable so c ie ty  to be in  a b e t te r  
p o s it io n  to  cope with any change i n  c ir c u itb  tances. M ill po in t out t l ia t  "Although 
a t  every period those who tr a v e l le d  in  d if fe re n t p a th s  have been in to le ra n t  of one 
ano ther, and each wou3.d have thoufJ.it i t  an ex c e llen t th in g  i f  a l l  the  r e s t  could
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have been compelled to  tr a v e l  h is  road, th e ir  attem pts to  thw art each o th e r 's  
development have r a r e ly  had any permanent a ic c e ss , and each h a s  i n  time endured to  
rece iv e  the good which the o th e rs  have o ffe re d " . Although we need not accep t H i l l ' s 
apparent claim  th a t  every so c ie ty  has something to  o f f e r ,  we can see th a t h is  kind 
of to le ran ce  does give so c ie ty  the a b i l i t y  to  pick the b e s t  fe a tu re s  from a 
v a r ie ty  of l i f e - s t y l e s  w ith in  range of i t s  in spection*
' I f  i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  a b s tra c t  from a parti.cu la r manner of l iv in g  those
elem ents of behaviour which consp ire  to  produce the p a r t  o f th e  r e s u l t  which i s  
ag reeab le , then  a so c ie ty  which has wo.thin i t  a p ro fusion  of l i f e - s t y l e s  vn.ll be 
able to adopt the b e s t  p ra c t ic e s  from each, in  order to malo up i t s  'most p re fe rre d  
w ay '. Examples spring re a d i ly  to  mind in  which p a r tic u la r  element-s o f  beliavj.our 
have been adppted by  a s o c ie ty  from one of i t s  sub-groups, w ithou t th e  whole 
package being si-fallowed. The c o n tr ib u tio n  of Methodism to  B ritish  so c ie ty  i s  a 
good example of th is  e f f e c t ,  but th e re  are many examples of wtiat i s  - a con tinual 
e f f e c t  in  p lu r a l i s t i c  s o c ie t i e s .  The e f f e c t  has i t s  c lo se  p a r a l le l  in  the f ie ld  
of s c ie n t i f i c  d iscovery , where i t  sometimes com s about tlia t even thou^i a proposal, 
be r e je c te d , there  are elements i n  i t  found wor toy  of irco rp o r a tio n  in to  subsequent 
p roposals because of th e ir  a b i l i ty  to  extend our p re d ic tiv e  pcvjer. P lan c k 's  
quantum theory  con tains elem ents of both  Huyghens' wave th eo ry  and Newton's 
corpuscular th e o ry , n e ith e r  of vhich was, by i t s e l f ,  able to serve as a 
s a t is fa c to ry  model.
P rogress in  so c ia l l i f e  c o n s is ts  in  the adoption  of p roposals  which 
enable us to  approach neare r to s o c ia l  o b je c tiv e s . The p l u r a l i s t i c  so c ie ty  a l la v s  
fo r  independent proposal, and independent te s t in g  of innovations. I t  enab les the 
r e s t  of so c ie ty  (o ther than  the experim ental groups) to have access 'to te s t in g  
r e s u l t s  w ithou t p u ttin g  them selves a t  r id e . By accepting  th e  occasional d is t r e s s  
which i s  caused by m in o rity  groups re je c tin g  e s ta b li to e d  values, t ie  r e s t  of
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so c ie ty  can observe experim ents in  which th e ir  otm f a te  is  not t ie d  to th e  success
or f a i lu r e  of the proposals under te s t*  I f  the re  are unacceptable consequences,
then o n ly .th e  innovators m i l  s u f fe r  them* I f  the consequences a re  found d e s ira b le
by o ther members of s o c ie ty , then th ey  w i l l  be able to  em ulate the innovato rs at
a sa fe  d is ta n c e  behind them* The freedom to  propose both  new behaviour p a tte rn s
and new o b je c tiv es  i s  im portan t to the e f f ic ie n t  o p era tio n  of th e  p rogress
equation . There must be a l te r n a t iv e s ,  and there must be a d isp a rity  of achievement
between d if fe re n t  proposals so th a t  th e re  can be grounds for d ec is io n  between them *
The card in a l v ir tu e  of a democratic system of government is  no t th a t  i t
produces t t e  b e s t  le a d e rs , or even (as is  commonly supposed) th a t i t  enables the
w il l  o f the m ajority  to be put in to  e f fe c t*  I t  i s  th a t  i t  i s  the p o l i t i c a l  system
most amenable to  te s t in g  and inadequacy-é lim in â tion* Few ^ o p ie  th ese  days
cherish  i l lu s io n s  about the q u a li ty  of le a d e rs  produced by dem ocratic s ta te s*  Some
indeed, argue th a t  b e t te r  le a d e rs  were produced by  a r is tc o r a t io  s o c ie t i e s ,  when
men tended to eriBrge who had time to  th in lc, and who did not m ed the f in a n c ia l
g r a t i f ic a t io n  from o f f ic e  * Since P la to 's  Republic men have bem  concerned to  find
ways of se le c tin g  the b e s t  le a d e rs ;  p o l i t i c ^  ph ilceophers have thought th a t  the
problem was one of d e v is ii^  ways in  ^ h id i the most nob le , educated, a l t r u i s t i c ,
19e tc* , e t c , ,  people could be.p laced  a t  the head of tlie body p o li t ic *  The d i f f i c u l t i  
d iscussed  were those of d iscovering or in v an tin g  such a system, th o se  conceræ d 
w ith  implementing i t ,  and those  of persuading the common people to accqpt to is  
iVLse and noble le a d e rsh ip , even where i t  d isagreed  w ith  Ü ieir oivn views* The 
f a i lu r e  o f any of ü ie se  a t ta u p ts  le d  people to  suggest th a t perhaps no-one could 
ever know wiiich were toe b e s t  ways, or recogn ise  them i f  he saw toem* One of the 
arguments commonly adduced fo r democracy is  th a t  i t  invo lves a kind of 'c o l le c t iv e  
g u i l t '*  S ince no-one knavs what i s  r ig h t ,  i t  i s  argued, o n ly  by in vo lv ing  
everyone in  decisions can we produce a s i tu a t io n  in  itoich they have no-one to
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blame but •themselves*
Rather m or e p ess im is tic  p o l i t i c a l  p h ilo so p h ers  have po in ted  out th a t
even i f  th e re  were a system of s e le c tin g  tiie b e s t lu le s , we would have no guaran tee
th a t  th e y  would continue to  r e ta in  t t e  qual i t i e s  which in sp ire d  th e ir  s e le c t io n  *
I t  i s  p o ss ib le  th a t  t t e  very ex e rc ise  of 1 ife -an d -d ea th  pm er over m illions might
induce moral degenera tion , might breed arrogance and le a d  to  the im position  of th e
personal ends of th e  r u l e r s * Even Marcus A urelius appointed h is  a^n (unworthy) son
2 0as h is  successor* lAien Malcolm Muggeridge re a l toed a f t e r  h is  "Winter i n  Moscow" 
th a t  perhaps rev o lu tio n s  a re  'doomed' to be b e tra y ed , th a t  perhaps the very  
co n cen tra tio n  of power induces i t s  abuse, he was expressing the dictum made 
famous by Lord Acton, bu t observable in  every age aid c iv i l i s a t io n .  The rea l 
p o li t ic a l , q u es tio n  i s  no t hav we can s e l e c t  our r u le r s ,  but hw  we can tame them. 
The p o in t about the  democratic system to ih a t  we can chan g e our ru le rs*  We le a rn  
from our m istakes by removing (p eace fu lly )  the men who were in  charge when the 
mis talc es were made, and by re p la c in g  them w ith  a group of men committed to  try in g  
another way. Ih e ir  way may a lso  be m'ong, b u t then they , to o , can be dism issed 
in  tu rn . Not only  do dem ocratic s o c ie t ie s  le a rn  from th e ir  mis talce s ,  b u t the leads: 
have an in c en tiv e  to 'b e  r i g h t ,  o r , more ac c u ra te ly , a d is in c e n tiv e  to  be wrong* 
Because no le a d e r  i s  in s ta l le d  beyond r e c a l l ,  each one knafs th a t  he w i l l  be c a lle d  
to  account a f te r  a sp ec ified  p e rio d . His ta s k , th e re fo re ,  i f  he w ishes to  r e t a in  
o f f ic e ,  is  to behave in  such a way th a t  v o te rs  vTill p re fe r  him to  the a l t e r n a t 'Ives 
o ffe re d . Only by th is  p e rio d ic  c a l l  to  account can socie'by to ie ld  i t s e l f  from the 
p o ss ib ly  corruping e f f e c ts  of power. I f  a lead er i s  corrup ted  by pa-jer, then  he 
can be d ism issed . Democratic s o c ie t ie s  do not always see the w i l l  of the m a jo rity  
being implemented, htoat they  do see to tlie v e rd ic t of the m ajo rity  given on th e  
rela/bive competence o f a d m in is tra tio n s . I f  th e  e f f e c t s  r e s u l t in g  from p o lic ie s  
o f  one a d m in is tra tio n  are f e l t  by the m a jo rity  to be le s s  adequate than  the
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a l te rn a t iv e s  might be, the m ajority  can r e j e c t  th a t  ad m in is tra tio n  in  favour 
of one o f the  a lte rn a tiv e s*
The key fa c e t about dem ocracies i s  not the 'popular m andate ', b u t th e  
p erio d ic  c a l l  to  account. I t  i s  not th a t  we can  put in to  power who we w ant, but 
ra th e r  th a t  we can tu rn  from power th o se  who we do not w ant. C r i t ic s  of modern 
W estern democracies who claim  th a t  the  people have no 'r e a l '  choice a re  missing the 
p o in t. Even i f  the  two (or more) teams o f men stand  for the same tj^pe of so c ie ty , 
i t  is  s t i l l  b e n e f ic ia l  fo r the adiievem ent o f  p e o p le 's  o b je c tiv e s  ti ia t  they  should 
be alloi'ied to throw out one s e t  in  favour of ano ther. Because th e  various teams 
are  a c tiv e ly  seeking power, they  have the  in c a i t iv e  to .behave in  such a way th a t  
people w i l l  vote them in ,  and not vote them o u t. Democracy achieves t to  s h if t in g  
of the p r iv a te  o b jec tiv es  of ihe ru le r s  in to  the se rv ic e  o f the c o l le c t iv e  aims 
of the so c ie ty . To f u l f i l  h is  o b je c tiv e , th e  r u le r  must s a t i s f y  the aims of the  
m ajori.ty b e t te r  th an  anyone e ls e  can . J u s t  as i n  economics the e f f e c t  of the 
market system is  to  make the  fu lf illm e n t o f p r iv a te  ends dependent upon a b i l i ty  to 
achieve consumer s a t i s f a c t io n ,  so in  the  democratic so c ie ty  the e f f e c t  i s  to malce 
the fu lf i l lm e n t of a d e s ire  to  a t t a i n  and keep pover dépendait upon a b i l i ty  to  
achieve vo ter s a t is f a c t io n .  Itoereas p o l i t i c a l  p h ilo so p h ers  have looked fo r ways of 
ensuring th a t  our le a d e rs  have worthy m otives, the democratic system is  ab le  to 
channel th e ir  o rd in a ry  m otives in to  the servi.ce o f the achievement of c o l le c t iv e  
d e s ire s . Like th e  market economy, the democratic system of government is  considéra  
more so p h is tic a te d  in  i t s  o p e ra tio n a l elem ents th a t  i t  appears to be.
Noii“democratic governments have managed to in co rp o ra te  soiæ of the 
seemingly a t t r a c t iv e  elements of democracy in to  th e i r  own system s. A u th o rita rian  
regimes have enjoyed notable success id .th  t ie  stage-managed p le b is c i te ,  and even 
w ith  'e l e c t i o n s ',  a lb e i t  o ften  withou.t a l te r n a t iv e  choices. But a l l  of th is  i s  
windaw-dressing w ithou t the basic  elem ent of the democratic systern; the  a b i l i t y  to
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remove th e  ru le r s  peaceful].y , and thus to  e f f e c t  change to  the p o lic ie s  being 
21pursued* In  the-absence of p eacefu l medianlsms for change, we s a id , th e  l a s t  
r e s o r ts  o f a people are to  rev o lu tio n  and assass in a tio n *  I t  i s  because re v o lu tio n  
is  d i f f i c u l t  to  achieve and a source of considerab le  so c ia l d is t r e s s  th a t  i t  i s  
no t a frequen t remedy. People to . l l  p re fe r  to accept le s s  than adequate ways 
because the a l te r n a t iv e  of re v o lu tio n  is  even more im dequate* In  a democratic 
so c ie ty  they  do not have to a t  t e r r ib l e  to oice. Change can be  implemented as  and 
>hen i t  i s  f e l t  to  be needed, and i t  can  be done to to  in  the in s t i tu t i o n s ,  and 
unaccompanied by the to t a l  upheavto of socie 'ty . Thus dem ocratic s o c ie t ie s  can 
respond b e t te r  to  clianging c ircum stances, and d isp la y  a t a l l  tim es more e f f ic ie n t  
con d itio n s for the achievement by c i t iz e n s  of th o se  aims shared s u f f i c ie n t ly  
tod  e l y to become in f lu e n t ia l  in  e le c tio n s .
Democratic s o c ie t ie s  need not be p l u r a l i s t i c .  The phrase 'The tyranny of 
the m a jo r ity ' i s  one vjhich has assuiæd a t  tim es an ug].y meaning. But the  re i s  a 
strong tendency far democracies to  encourage p lu ra lism , one which d e riv e s  from th e  
in s t i tu t i o n a l  framework of the system . Becaus e a democracy t r a n s la te s  th e  p r iv a te  
aims of the ru le r s  in to  toe  se rv ice  of the o b jec tiv es  o f  members of so c ie ty , the 
ru le r  i s  encouraged e ith e r  to s a t i s f y  w idely shared  o b je c tiv e s , or to  c re a te  
co n d itio n s in  to ic h  they can be s a t i s f i e d .  Ttie r u le r s  are mor e l ik e ly  to  r e t a in  
power by a favourable v e rd ic t  from the aLectors i f  they have s a t i s f i e d  as many 
p r iv a te  o b je c tiv e s  as p o ss ib le , in c lu d in g  toose of m inority  groups where toe se do 
not c o n f l ic t  t o th  the others® This is  the  p ro cess  c a lle d  'b u ild in g  a m a jo r i ty ',  
in  w iich the  ru le r s  (or would-be r u le r s )  attem pt to  harness to to e ir  p o l i t i c a l  
band-wagon the aims of a s  many m in o r it ie s  as toey can. In  a h ig h ly -p lu r a l is t ic  
so c ie ty  such as th e  United S ta te s , the a r t  of p o l i t i c s  c o n s is ts ,  in  la rg e  ire a su re , 
of combining m in o rity  in te r e s t s  in to  a p o l i t i c a l  p la tfo rm . TIb poor, toe b lades, 
the young, the housewives, the  jew s, the v e te ran s , a l l  are  co u rted  by p o l i t ic ia n s
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amcious to  build  up a to ta l  vote of support s u f f ic ie n t ly  la rg e  for the attainm ent
and p re se rv a tio n  of p a re r . The democratic so c ie ty  tends to be p lu r a l i s t i c  because
the le a d e rs  are  constra in ed  by th e  system in to  the  s a t is f a c t io n  of as many
p r iv a te  aims as can be reconc iled  w ith  each o th e r . Thus the dem ocratic type of
so c ie ty  i s  conducive to p rog ress in  m inority  aims, as i t  i s  to  p ro g ress in  the
23achievement of m a jo rity  aims®
One advantage noted in  t i e  comparison of economic systems a s  being 
possessed by the market model was th a t  i t  i s  mo: e l ik e ly  than  inadequacies can be 
tracked  down on th e  sm all s c a le . Where tlie  experim ental proposals a re  te s te d  
in d iv id u a lly , we can a t t r ib u te  consequences to  proposal much more r e a d i ly  than 
we can when a huge conjunction  of proposals i s  tested® S im ila r ly  in  our s o c ia l  
p ro p o sa ls , we are  f a r  more l i k e ly  to  tra c k  inadequacies back to  source when t ie  
innovations are proposed in d iv id u a lly  in  response to  need, ra th e r than  as some 
block id e o lo g ic a l package presen ted  as a panacea. In  human beliavioir we have noted 
th a t  the com plex ities are such as to  produce always some e f f e c ts  a d d itio n a l to  
those in tended . By making oui’ changes 'p iecem eal' (as Popper describ es i t  ) ,  we 
are le s s  l ik e ly  to  f in d  our in tended  refornB lead in g  to  an immense s e r ie s  of 
un d esirab le  changes, s in ce  we can check th e  r e s u l t s  as ws go along, and can r to a te  
consequences to in d iv id u a l proposals* Progress iby the method of com petitive 
te s t in g  and inadequacy e lim in a tio n  i s  n e c e ssa r ily  system atic and g rad u a l. I t  i s  
system atic because we proceed in  stag es, always accep ting  wtiichever of th e  
a l te rn a t iv e s  i s  sbœni in  p ra c tic e  to  be b e t t e r .  I t  i s  gradual because we advance 
here and th e re , now improtong one a sp ec t, hot another® A ll of th e  proposed 
m odifications are te s te d  a g a in s t each other and a g a in s t our cu rren t p ra c t ic e s .
L i t t l e  by l i t t l e  we accept some aid  d:lscard oiliers, and l i t t l e  by l i t t l e  we advance 
by the e lim in a tio n  of in fe r io r  choices. I f  we mg age i n  many changes sim ultaneously 
we s h a l l  find ourselves unable to  in s p e c t which changes produced which e f f e c t s .
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and th e  e f f ic ie n c y  of our te s t in g  w il l  be im paired.
I f  a g o lfe r  in troduced  a l l  at once a new s ta n c e , a new swing, and a new 
s e t  of c lu b s, he would have no way of knowing which of them was c r i t i c a l  to  the 
change in  h is  performance* Only by læeping everything e ls e  as co n s tan t as p o ss ib le  
and te s t in g  the innovations one by one would he be able to  t e l l  us which ones were 
of b e n e f i t  to  h is  game, and to ic h  ones were not* Mien th e  s c i e n t i s t  devises t e s t s  
for ' h is  th eo ry , he so ends a g rea t deal of e f f o r t  on i s o la t i ig  the fa c to r  under 
t e s t .  He t r i e s  to  keep the behaviour o f the  r e s t  of tlie u n iverse  as constan t as 
p o ss ib le  in  order th a t  he might t e s t  the new fac to r in  i s o la t io n ,  and n o t m erely 
t e s t  the  conjunction  of an unlaia-rn number of unknam circum stance s . To a s s i s t  him 
in  th is  d i f f i c u l t  ta s k  he sometimes makes use of th e  'c o n tro l g ro u p ', s e t t in g  up 
two experim ents which are  id e n tic a l  i n  a l l  re sp e c ts  save o æ , th a t  one of them is  
in fluenced  by the fa c to r  under t e s t .  Only in  th is  way can he t e s t  th e  in flu en ce  
o f th a t  fac to r alone.
So is  i t  in  ou.r s o c ia l innovations. I f . they are te s te d  l i t t l e  by l i t t l e ,  
w ith  the  r e s t  of s o c ie ty 's  p ra c t ic e s  held c o n s tan t, tlien we m i l  be able to 
a t t r i b u te  change in  r e s u l t s  to the opera tion  of the innova tion . I t  i s  more 
e f f i c ie n t  for judging the e ff icacy  of new p ra c tic e s  i f  the groups which in tro d u ce  
them do so in  sm all doses. I f  a group in troduces a com pletely new l i f e - s t y l e , Oïb 
which d if f e r s  markedly from p re v a ilin g  norms, i t  g ives us l i t t l e  in form ation  to  
observe the r e s u l t s  of th e ir  new ways. I f  unacceptable r e s u l t s  a re  produced 
(unaccep tab le , th a t  i s ,  to  the r e s t  of s o c ie ty ) , th e re  i s  now ay of knoid.ng which 
p a r t ic u la r  innovations are  the ones tx> be avoided® We cannot p ro g ress  by te s t in g  
and inadequacy e lim in a tio n  u n le ss  we knaf whi.ch proposals are  in tro d u c in g  to ic h  
inadequacies®
I t  i s  im portant th a t  th e re  should be no p r iv ile g e d  p ro p o sa ls  in  s o c ia l  
innova tion . No m atter how d e ta ile d  tlie an a ly sis  o f human n a tu re  and so c io lo g ica l
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fo rces which are claimed to  have gone in  to toe fo rm ulation  of a p ro p o sa l, i t  stand; 
no b e t te r  and no worse than any o ther u n te s ted  proposal® The s tre n g th  of ideology ; 
a t o t a l l y  i r r e le v a n t  fac to r ; i t  m atte rs no t hav much some people mi^Jit want 
p a r t ic u la r  proposals to  be superior a t achieving objectives® Once form ulated , a l l  
co n jec tu re s  jo in  the ranks of proposals w aiting  to be te s te d ,  and th e  trea tm en t of 
them must be c a rr ie d  out to th o u t regard  to  the  degree of f a i t h  behind to  am® I t  is  
a sim ple, undeniable f a c t  th a t many of toe th in g s  in  which men have believed  most 
s tro n g ly  have turned out subsequently  to be to t a l ly  inadequate* Thinking men once 
held the conv ic tion  th a t  the  e a r th  was fL at; they liaLd th e  b e l i e f  even more 
s tro n g ly  than to d a y 's  so c ia l s c ie n t i s t s  b e liev e  th a t  the environment is  every th ing  
in  the make-up o f ch a ra c te r  and personality®  The \dlew of th e  f l a t  e a r th  was not 
saved by th e  belief® I
We have, in  any case , no reason to  suppose th a t  those so c ia l innovations 
whidi claim  to derive  from c a lc u la tio n  are any b e t t e r  tlian thcs e itoich admit to  
being the in sp ire d  product of a c re a tiv e  mind. Experience has given us no b a s is  
for p re fe r r in g  one type ra th e r  th a n  the other * R e jec tio n , m odifiea t io n  or re ten tio ]  
takes p lace  only on the b as is  of te s t in g  r e m i t s ,  and we c e r ta in ly  have no b a s is  
for a ban do lining the te s te d  proposals which rep resen t s o c ie ty 's  cu rren t p ra c tic e s  
and v a lu es in  favour of any p la u s ib le  b u t u n te s te d  scheme of a l te rn a t iv e s .  
Apprehension a t  th e  fanciful, proposals we are sometânîBs a deed to  a c t  upon ca in o t be 
d isp e lle d  by argument. I t  i s  an apprehension found ed on su sp ic io n  em bittered  by 
p rac tica l, experience* We have a s  y e t  encountered no t e s t  whidi might lead  us to  
abandon the proposal t h a t  d is a s te r  fo llow s i f  society  commits i t s e l f  w holesale 
to  the im plem entation of u n te s ted  proposals®
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po in t in  "The Idea of Progress" when he says,
"More in te re s t in g , however, i s  the assumption of the in e v i ta b i l i ty
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of ’economic development* in  the Western sense, among the  large  
m ajority  of the yrorld 's population  l iv in g  in  ’underdeveloped*
 ^ economies." ("The Idea of P rogress" , tl968),* ch .5 ) .
1*7« H.L.A.HA.RT, "Law, L ib erty  and M orality" ( 1963 )®
18. J.S.MILL, op .c i t .
1 9 . Popper i s ,  once more, a  no tab le excep tion . In  h is  "Open Society" ( v o l . I l ) ,  he argues th a t  th i s  i s  the wrong problem. He says,
" I t  fo rces  us to  rep lace  the q u e s tio n ;*Who should rule?* by the new 
question; ’How can we so organise p o l i t ic a l  in s t i tu t io n s  th a t bad o r 
incompetent ru le r s  can be prevented from doing too much damage?* "
20. The essay which he wrote a f t e r  h is  experiences of v i s i t in g  the  Soviet
Union in  h i ^  hopes, only to  ap p rec ia te  a t  f i r s t  hand the n a tu re  of i t s  r e a l i ty
21® I t  i s  noteworthy th a t  the dec line  in  the  use of impeachment as a p o l i t i c a l
weapon in  B r ita in  was accompanied by the  in c reas in g  dependence of admin­
i s t r a t io n s  upon a parliam entary  m a jo rity . When th e re  i s  an in s t i tu t io n a l  
method of opposing p o licy , or of removing o ffic e -h o ld e rs , then  there  i s  no 
more need fo r  the f i c t io n  th a t  they  are  'c r im in a ls ’ to  be removed by 
impeachment. Only in  co u n trie s  where o ffic e -h o ld e rs  cannot be so removed 
are  such devices as impeachment s t i l l  c u rren t,
22. The phrase i s  from ALEXIS 2)E TOCOUEVILLE’s "Democracy in  America" ( I 8 4 0 ) .
2 3 . Indeed, th e re  can be cases where the one i s  p re ju d ic ia l  to  the o ther in
a  way inconceivable in  a u th o r ita r ia n  s o c ie t ie s .  I t  has been se rio u s ly  
argued, fo r  example, th a t  United S ta te s  p o li t ic ia n s  have been forced to  
pay too much a t te n t io n  to  m inority  demands. Because of the U.S. balance 
between the  two p a r t ie s ,  e le c tio n  tended to  be decided in  the so -ca lled
* swing sta tes*  of the E ast and Mid-West. These s ta te s  were ch a rac te rised  by 
la rg e  urban m in o ritie s  of 'poor* , ’b la c k s ’ , e t c . ,  and so, i t  has been 
argued, p o l i t ic ia n s  gave them a d isp ro p o rtio n a te  amount of a t te n t io n . Only 
w ith  the change of th e  v o tin g  h a b its  of Southern S ta te s  in  the la te  1960s 
was the balance s h if te d  away from these  * swing s ta te s  *.
2 4 ® In  h is  "Open Society" ( v b l . I l ) .
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Chapter 9
OPTIMUM CONDITIONS
"The o ff ic e  o f government i s  not to  confer happiness, hu t to  give 
men opportun ity to  work out happinesd f o r  them selves."
- W illiam Ellery Ghanning.
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For p rogress to ta k e  p lace in  any a c t iv i ty  conditions must p re v a il  
which s a t i s f y  the in te rn a l  requirem ents o f th e  systern® That i s ,  the tw o-part 
equation  of p ro g ress  must be sa tisfied®  There must be c le a r  s i ^ t  of hie aims, 
a mental concept of what i t  would be lil<e to  succeed . There must be te s t in g  o f 
a l te r n a t iv e  p ro p o sa ls  i n  such a way t h a t  we are ab le  to see 'which one r e s u l t s  in  
a s t a t e  corresponding m œ t c lo se ly  to  th a t  mental concept® There must be dec isio n  
a t  th i s  c r i t i c a l  p o in t in  te s t in g  to  p re fe r  the a l te rn a t iv e  which does achieve 
th e  c lo s e s t  such correspondence® These cond itions are  a l l  ' in te rn to  ' in  th a t  
they r e la te  d i r e c t ly  to  the terms in  the eq u a tio n . But tlB re  are o ther cond itions 
which, although not n e c e s s a r ily  v i t a l , are c e r ta in ly  conducivë to the e f f i c ie n t  
o p era tio n  of th e  method, and a p p ro p ria te , th e re fo re , to hie prom otion of progress* 
In  order fo r men to  make p ro g re ss , they must  d e s ir  e the  nominated aims® 
This sounds ta u to lo g ic a l and fo r m ost cases i t  i s ,  s ince  the aims a re  what is  
d e s ire d , and supply th e ir  own m otivation* There a r e  those  cases , however, where 
the end i s  an a r b i t r a r y  conventional one, or a g aie r a t  end not n e c e s s a r i ly  shared  
by a l l  in d iv id u a ls ; aid in  th ese  cases  a d d itio n a l m otivation w il l  be requ ired  to  
a tta c h  the p r iv a te  aids of people to  t i e  se rv ic e  of the req u ired  major objective*
In  science we saw th a t  even i f  people do not share  the general d e to re  to  p re d ic t  
th e  observed un iverse  (fo r the pa^er i t  b r in g s ) ,  th ey  cai be m otivated to  s c i e n t i f i  
research  by conventional p r iz e s  in  tlie form of f in a n c ia l  ga in  or ihe re sp e c t of 
th e i r  fellow  men or even se lf - re sp e c t*  In  economics the  market system  t i e s  
the d e s ire  fo r p r iv a te  gain  to  the  s a t i s f a c t io n  of oonaimer p re fe ren ce . In  
democratic systems of government the d es ire  fo r achievement and r e t s i t i o n  of 
pcR'Zer can be fu lfü .le d  by the s a t i s f a c t io n  o f voter preference* In  every case i t  
i s  a q u estio n  of supplying ex tern a l m o tivati%  f a c to r s  to  an o b je c tiv e  whose 
s a t i s f a c t io n  i s  th o u ^ it to  bring general good i n  the form of an inc reased  a b i l i ty  
to  f u l f i l  p r iv a te  aims* From the p o in t of viax of p ro g re ss , th e re  i s  l i t t l e  to  be
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achieved by s t ip u la t in g  th a t  men should pursue th e se  worthwhile m otives fo r  th e ir  
own sake; th i s  i s  akin  to  expressing  the wish to a t  people were other than  th e y  
a re . Maybe th is  might indeed be p le a s a n t,  bub th e  only way s h œ t  of coerc ion  
to  malce men l i v e  by m otivations o ther than the ones they f e e l  is  to  a t ta c h  th e i r  
to lfü lm e n t  to  iiiose m otivations which men ^  f e e l .
I f  th e re  i s  to  be p ro g re ss , then th e re  must be p ro p o sa ls . Conditions 
must p re v a il  under which men can fee l d iscon ten ted  w ith  ex is tin g  le v e ls  of 
achievement* There must be an awareness tl ia t  more i s  p o s s ib le , an awareness 
deriv ing  from ex te rn a l example, or from- e x tra p o la tio n  based on In te rn a l c r i t ic is m . 
The p o in t has already been made th a t  the c re a tiv e  im agination  seems more prone 
to  in s p ire  new p roposals  when e x is tin g  ones a re  being su b je c t to c r i t i c a l  ap p ra isa l 
There must a lso  be the o p p o rtu n itie s  for te s t in g  of p ro p o sa ls , fo r comparing the 
r e s u l t s  achieved by the various a l te r n a t iv e s ,  and for making toe d ec is io n  to  
e lim in a te  from co n s id e ra tio n  those  proposals (new or o ld) to ic h  pm duce r e s u l t s  
le s s  adequate than o th e rs  a t  achieving toe so u g h t-a fte r  ob jec tive*
This s e c tio n  of the th e s is  is  concerned w ith th e  o p tim isa tio n  of the 
e x te rn a l p re v a ilin g  cond itions i n  such a way th a t p rogress t o l l  proceed most 
e f f i c ie n t ly ,  most ra p id ly , and y e t most s a fe ly .  I t  i s  concerned, th en , w ith toe 
measures which man can talce in  order to  maximise h is  p ro g re ss , 'P ro g re ss ' i s  
taken  as befo re  to  mean advancement towards whatever i t  i s  lie wants to  ach ieve , 
Man's behaviour changes, and man's d e s ire s  change, lil th  th o se  changes he is  
p resen ted  by new problems a t  every  tu rn . For h is  com parative aims he i s  p resen ted  
by an unending sequence of problem s, the so lu tio n  of each one being to  achieve a 
h igher le v e l  o f performance and a tta inm en t than he enjoyed b e fo re . But although to 
problems change, the  p r in c ip le s  which govern the so lu tio n  to  toose problems do 
not change; and our concern i s  to th  the cond itions which u n d erlie  toose  p r in c ip le s .
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The f i r s t  requirem ents a re  freedoms. People must a c tu a lly  be allowed to
c r i t i c i s e  e x is tin g  achievement le v e ls ,  and to  propose a l te rn a t iv e  aims and
behaviour patterns®  They must be perm itted  to t e s t ,  to  observe the r e s u l t s  of
those t e s t s ,  and to  make dec isio n s on the b as is  of them. Tolerance, th e re fo re ,
i s  a t  a premium in  the co n d itio n s fo r p ro g ress . A so c ie ty  which not only perm its
in  law the r ig h t  o f p r iv a te  d is s e n t ,  b u t which manages to  minimise the  s o c ia l
p ressu re s  working towards t o t a l  conform ity , i s  one which s tan d s to  gain  from the
ob serva tion  o f r e s u l t s  achieved by a l te rn a t iv e  so c ia l proposals® toe arguments of
l ib e r t a r i a n  ph ilo sophers have cen tred  around th e  mor a], i t  y of freedom, th e  f a c t
th a t  only through the making of perso n a l dec isions and the acceptance o f  consequenc
can people acqu ire  moral worth and resp o n sib ility ®  They have taken as th e  b a s is  o f
a p o l i t i c a l  system the  dictum of M ilton, " I f  every ac tio n  which i s  gpod or e v il  i n
a man of r ip e  years were under p i t ta n c e  and p re s c r ip t io n  and compulsion, what were
Zv irtu e  bu t a name, what p ra is e  would be due to  w e l l - d o i n g a n d  have declared
3l i b e r t y  to  be th e  source of a].l values. The concern h e re in  is  w ith the lo g ic  
of freedom, not i t s  morality® Vvhether or not l ib e r ty  has moral, arguments 
in  support of i t  as an end i n  i t s e l f ,  i t  c e r ta in ly  i s  a necessary  p reco n d itio n  i f  
men are to p ro g ress e f f ic ie n t ly  towards th e  fu lf i lZ m n t of th e i r  d ije c tiv e s*  On 
l ib e r ta r ia n  p rece p ts , to le ra n c e  is  advocated because no-one can be sure th a t  
d is s e n te rs  are not ' r ig h t ' ,  and because even I f  they a re  ' wr ong ' t ie y  can only  gain  
mor a], worth by accepting re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  to e ir  decisions® From co n s id e ra tio n  
of the  co n d itio n s for p rogress we can say th a t  to le ra n c e  w i l l  enable a so c ie ty  
to  gain  in fo rm ation  sa fe ly  about which so c ia l p ropœ als do or do not enable 
o b je c tiv e s  to  be more adequately  sa tis fied ®
The ro le  of an experim ental group in  s o c ia l  innovation  is  th e  methodolog- 
ica). eq u iv a len t of a 'l im ite d  m arketing sample ' in  b u s im ss  a c tiv ity *  Rather toan 
commit the to  ole of h is  resources to  a new co n jec tu re , the prudent businessman
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w il l  market i t  under t e s t  cond itions in  a lim ite d  area® I f  tlie r e a i l t s  a re  
s a t is f a c to ry ,  he w i l l  be ab le to rep ea t the innovation  on a la rg e  sca le  to th  
some assurance of success* I f  the l im ite d  experiment does nob sæ c e e d , then he m l  
be warned w ithout to o  much lo s s  ag a in s t a i expensive re p e titio n *  Tolerance i s  
what enables so c ie ty  to  observe lim ite d  marketing; samples on so c ia l innovations®
Otoy i f  th e  new id e as  succeed fo r those  who to l l in g ly  p u t iiiem to  t e s t  need the  
r e s t  of so c ie ty  th iilc  s e r io u s ly  about t h e i r  adoption: i f  tlie experim ental groups 
achieve adverse r e a i l t s ,  then the r e s t  of so c ie ty  knm s one mere range of so c ia l 
co n jec tu re s  to  avoid® There a r e ,  of c o a rse , problaiis a sso c ia ted  to. 1h the expansion 
of a sm a ll-sca le  adoption to  so c ie ty  g en e ra lly . I t  might be th a t  what works fo r  a 
few w il l  not work fo r  many, or th a t  success is  dependent upon fa c to r s  which vary  
from person to  person* As an example from our am  tim es , we might in q o ec t the 
so -c a lle d  "counter-culture"®  The so c ia l innovation  th a t i t  makes fo r  g rea te r  
fu lf i l lm e n t of aims i f  one 'd rops o u t ' ,  dratonig w elfare  payments in s te a d  of working 
fo r a l iv in g ,  i s  obviously  not su scep tib le  cxf widespread adoption® I t s  v ia b i l i ty  
as an a l te rn a t iv e  re q u ire s  t h a t  th e re  be la rg e  numbers who do not adopt i t ,  bu t 
continue in s tead  to  provide the  economic reso u rces whereby th e  w elfa re  payments ' 
can be made. The "co u n te r-cu ltu re"  also  seems to propose th a t  .the  conventional 
c u ltu re  should be drawn on fo r such th in g s  as m edical se rto c es  and tra n s p o r t , and 
again c a rr ie s ' the im p lica tio n  th a t  i t  i s  only an a v a ila b le  a l te rn a t iv e  i f  i t  i s  
no t w idely adopted. I t  would be more ap p ro p ria te  to  re fe r  to i t  as a ‘p a r a s i t ic  
su b -cu ltu re* , r a th e r  than a genuine ' counter -cu ltu re  ‘ ,
H erbert Marcuse, in  h is  "C ritiq u e  of Pure T olerance", has po in ted  out 
some of the harm which might be caused by l ib e r ty  and tolerance® He says t lra t  
very o ften  l i b e r t y  can mean simply the freedom to  propagate e r r o r ,  and iiia t l ib e r ty  
must be checked in  order th a t  e rro r  might be c o n tro lle d . "T olerance", he sa y s , " is  
re p re s s iv e " . I t  i s  undoubtedly tru e  th a t  l ib e r ty  can be a means fo r  the  propagation
± %
.1
of e rro r I i t  i s  a lso  true^  however, th a t  i t  p rovides the b a s is  fo r  tlie d e tec tio n
of e r r o r .  I t  i s  not (as M ilton im plied) th a t  tru tii w i l l  always trium ph over e rro r
S’i f  i t  competes on equal term s, bu t ra th e r  th a t  liberty* wi31 aH.ow coun ter-c laim s to  
be te s te d ,  in  order th a t  a com parative assessm ent may be made. I f  people are f r e e ,  
they  may indeed embrace e r ro r ,  b u t they-vmay also  r e je c t  i t .  I f  they are  n o t f r e e ,  
then  th ey  have no choice a t  a l l  to  embrace or to  r e je c t  xdiat i s  en fo rced , nor any 
means o f a sc e r ta in in g  whether or no t i t  e r ro r ,  Marcuse i-fould have us r e s t r i c t  
to le ra n ce  to  the ex ten t requ ired  for the  e lim in a tio n  of e r ro r .  The q u estio n  "But 
who i s  to  determine what i s  e rro r  and what should be r e s tr ic te d ? "  i s  a p u re ly  
rh e to r ic a l  one, s in ce  the answer i s  obvious, Marcuse h im self, and th o se  of l ik e  
mind, w i l l  perform  for us the onerous ta sk  o f so r tin g  out ‘tru th  from falsehood .
In  order fo r so c ie ty  to  reap th e  f u l l  b e n e f i t  o f te s t in g  by experim ental
groups, freedom of in form ation  i s  req u ired , in  ad d itio n  *bo the r ig h t  of d is s e n t,
On].y through fre e  expression  can p roposals and t e s t  r e s u l t s  be communicated, A
so c ie ty  which imposes censorship  on d iscu ss io n  of a l te rn a t iv e s  i s  denying *to
people the a s s is ta n c e  of o ther minds on th e i r  problems. People o ften  (as we noted)
show g re a t foundness fo r th e ir  own th e o r ie s ;  i t  may take the work of o th ers  to
b rin g  ou t inadequacies and suggest m od ifica tions to  overcome d e fe c ts . The
tra n s fe r  of in form ation  from one experim enter to  o thers  not only saves time which
might o therw ise be wasted in  need less r e p e t i t io n  of work, i t  a lso  allow s f u l l  p lay
to  *bhe f e r t i l i t y  o f con jec tu res by p re sen tin g  work to  as many minds as p o ss ib le .
Rare, indeed , i s  the  problem which cannot be solved more ra p id ly  and more e f fe c t iv e
by th e  a p p lic a tio n  of many minds ra th e r t ia n  o f one, Edmund Bur le sa id  he had
"never y e t seen any p lan  t-hich has no t been mended by *bhe observations of those
who were much in fe r io r  in  understanding to  *the person who took the le a d  in  the 
6b u s in e ss" .
In  ta lk in g  of ease of communication as a necessary  constituenb  of
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e f f ic ie n t  p ro g re ss , we a re  ta lk in g  of txo f a c to r s .  There i s  ihe f a c i l i t y  of 
in form ation  tr a n s fe r  birjugbt abcut by technical, means and accom plidim ents. Radio 
and ta],ephones p lay  th e i r  p a r t  in  t h i s ,  a s  do Royal S o c ie tie s  and the pu b lish in g  
in d u s try . That p a r t  we have a lread y  considered , namely th e  ease o f communication 
which comes by  the p revalence  o f f r e e  speech and d isc u ss io n , i s  th e  o th e r  aspect 
of the e f f ic ie n t  d issem ination  of inform ation«
But even i n  a so c ie ty  %Aich p ro te c ts  th e  fre e  t r a n s fe r  o f in fo rm atio n , 
there  a re  concealed impediments to fu l.l communication of td e as . There are  l im i ts  
imposed by those who c o n tro l the so u rces of d is sem im tion . The in fo rm ation  
tran sm itted  by magazines, newspapers and ra d io  or te le v is io n  s ta tio n s  depends to  
some ex ten t upon what the c o n tro l le r s  re gar d as w orthy of di ss em im .tion. There 
might be commercial fa c to rs  a t  work, to o , m th  re lu c tan ce  by in fo rm ation  media to  
c i rc u la te  stones which might offend advertisers*  C lea rly , a d if fu s io n  of ownership 
and co n tro l of the agencies i-^iich d issem inate in form ation  m i l  m i l i ta te  in  favour 
o f  fre e  exchange of news and ideas* Ju st a s  com petition  between producers and 
between s e l l e r s  guarantees the consumer ag a in s t the e v ils  of economic monopoly, so 
the d iv e r s i ty  of co n tro l of communications media serves to p ro te c t  so c ie ty  ag a in st 
the e v ils  of in fo rm ation  monopoly *
Freedom of c r i t ic is m  and o f research  are  obvious n e c e s s itie s*  Tnere i s  
l i t t l e  p o in t in  alloiving fre e  access of in fo rm atio n  :if people are no t then  f re e  to  
sp ecu la te  upon i t  and to  t e s t  th e i r  speculations.. I f  some p o l i t i c a l  au th o rity  is  
to lic e n c e  resea rch , deciding %Aat i s ,  or is  nob, a f i t  su b je c t of enqu iry , hien 
p rogress wiLl be r e s t r i c te d  to  narrow and ar-bi.fic ia l channels* Progress i s  made by 
te s tin g  and re je c tin g  a l te rn a t iv e  p roposals * I f  th is  is  a r b i t r e r il,y  r e s t r i c t e d ,  
then not only to. 11 men be unable to  e lim in a te  inadequacies i n  cei'bain f ie ld s ,  but 
they w il l  be denied , to o , -the unim aginable * f a l lo u t ' from each p ro h ib ite d  l in e  of 
enquiry*
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I f  p rog ress i s  to  be made, th e re  must  be  no ‘i n f a l l i b l e ’ a u th o r i t ie s  i n  
society* I f  i t  i s  held t h a t  son® person , book or c reed  is  v jithou t the p o s s to i l i ty
o f erro r (or can never be improved upon), tVien cap ac ity  to  le a rn  from m istakes
w il l  be se v e re ly  r e s tr ic te d *  Wot only  w il l  i t  be d i f f i c u l t  to  mdce co n jec tu res  
which run counter to  the ' i n f a l l i b l e  w ord ', b u t ihe l a t t e r  m i^ it also  be used as a
standard  to check th e o rie s  a g a in s t, rep lac in g  the  world o f  cbservation* Thus
p o ss ib ly  inadequate th e o r ie s  m aybe re ta in ed , and u se fu l ones might be  d iscard ed . 
And i f  the world of observation  i s  used to  ev a lu a te  proposais not d e a lt  m th  by the 
' i n f a l l i b l e  w ord ', there  w i l l  be the a tten d an t d i f f i c u l t ie s :  of attem pting  to  
reco n c ile  t\'K> s e ts  of in fo m a tio n , derived from fundam entally  d i f f  e re n t prem ises, 
in to  a coherent body of knowledge. The men who mdce p ro g ress  are th o se  vho do 
not thinlv they know a l l  the answers. I f  people hold the b e l i e f  Ihat they a re  in  
possession  of a form ula whereby fu r th e r  k navi edge may be deduced fx’om e x is tin g  
knoivledge, then  the range of p roposals  and th e  l i lo l ih o o d  cf te s t in g  are bo th  
dim inished, then men th o u ^ it th a t  A r is to t le  had said a l l  th e r e ‘was to  be said abcu* 
sc ience , th e re  was l i t t l e  stim ulus to  re se a rc h , When they thought th a t  an In s p e c t i  
of h is  te x ts  was the s u re s t  wa^ r to s c ie n t i f ic  knowledge, they  were not in c lin e d  
to  make th e ir  own c o n je c tu re s , th e n  people thou^rb th a t  i f  observa tion  appeared to 
run counter to  A r i s to t l e 's  teach ings, then hie observa tion  must be a t  f a u l t ,  th e re  
was l i t t l e  scope fo r improving on A r i s to t l e 's  proposals. One need o n ly  r e c a l l  
th a t  human bodies not i n  p o ssessio n  of what A ris to tle  said was th e  c o r re c t  number 
of te e th  were w ritte n  o ff  as 'd e fe c tiv e  specim ens' to  ap p rec ia te  how d i f f i c u l t  
progress becomes in  the presence o f in f a l l ib l e  a u th o r i t ie s .
There are human s o c ie t ie s  ih ic h  claim  to be i n  possession  o f  i n f a l l i b l e  . 
so c ia l d o c tr in e s , and which r e s t r i c t  experiment w ith  a l te rn a t iv e s  on the groind 
th a t  they are le s s  s a t is f a c to ry .  This n o tio n  of ' l e s s  s a t i s f a c to r y ' i s  obtained 
not from observa tion  of performance in  p ra c t ic e , but from c a lc u la tio n s  which derive
8from the in f a H ib le  a u th o r ity . These s o c ie t ie s  are th u s  deprived of a range of 
p roposals and t e s t s  which might reveeiL a l te rn a t iv e s  found su p e rio r  in  p ra c t ic e  
( i* 0 , a c tu a l ly  su p e rio r)  to  the i n f a l l i b l e  guide. But even in  s o c to t ies which
« e c a t j — t irr» .h y r r  a>
enforce no obedience to  a lle g e d ly  i n f a l l i b l e  s a irc e s ,  th e re  are many who make
p erso n a l obeisance to such sou rces, and who d e l ib e ra te ly  sedc to confuse or b lur
the co n H ic tin g  evidence o f p ra c t ic a l  t e s t  which might run  counter to  them, Tlie
f i r s t  attem pt is  to prevent evidence from a r is in g  a t  a l l ;  the second i s  to  prevent
i t  from being apprec ia ted  fo r i h a t  i t  is  vhen i t  cannot be avoided*
I t  is  a common syndrome amongst those  who work from ' i n f a l l i b l e '  sources
7to  i n s i s t  th a t  everyone must be made to  fo lla v  iiie proposed p la n , They are no t
content to  have the proposed in n o v a tio n  p ra c tise d  by a few ma-nbers of so c ie ty  so 
th a t  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  r e s u l t s  might be in spected  before o iliers conimit them selves to  
i t .  On the co n tra ry , there  i s  u su a lly  a c lause to  be found somewhere near tlie 
cen tre  o f  the grand design to  the e f f e c t  th a t  t>B plan w i l l  not work u n le ss  
everyone adopts i t  sim ultaneously . I t  does not talce an ex cep tio n a lly  susp ic ious 
mind to r e f l e c t  th a t  i f  no o ther p ra c t ic e  i s  perm itted , then  i t  w i l l  be v ery  
d i f f i c u l t  to  compare th e  e f f e c ts  o f the innovation  m th  idiat might have been 
achieved by a lte rn a tiv e s*
By destroy ing  al3- counter-exarp3.es, one i s  guaranteed a t l e a s t  th a t  th e  
p lan  wi31 not come out unfa voir ab ly  from a comparison i-jith a3.ter n a tiv e s . I f  no-one 
i s  allcwed access to  an o b jec tiv e  assessm ent of i t s  m erits , then no-one w i l l  be 
ab le  to  shake f a i t h  in  the in f a l l ib le  p r in c ip le s  Wiich gave r i s e  to i t .  Those who 
vzish genuine p ro g ress to  be made and recogn ised  as  such w i l l  always a c t l ik e  
s c ie n t i s t s  in  p reserv ing  th e  c o n tro l group. Sm all-scale t r i a l s ,  l ik e  sm a ll-sca le  
m arketing, allow r e s u l t s  of a l te r n a t iv e  systems to  be compared. Much more to  the  
p o in t, they allow unsuccessfu l experim ents to be w r i t te n  o ff wiiii no g re a te r  lo s s  
to  so c ie ty  th a n  t i e  damage done to th e  sm all group under t e s t .  With the un iversa l.-
sca le  p la n n e rs , ' i n f a l l i b l e '  or no , i t  m aybe so c ie ty  which has to be w r i t te n  off*
As im portant as th e  p re se rv a tio n  of a l te rn a tiv e s  f o r  a basis  of
comparison is  the acceptance of evidence from them. I t  was observed how i t  comes
about in  th e  world of s c ie n t i f ic  a c t iv i ty  th a t  the o r ig in a to rs  of th e o r ie s
sometimes c lin g  to  them long a f te r  evj_dence from te s t i r g  has led  most s c i e n t i s t s
to  r e je c t  them as inadequate* This e f f e c t  seems evm more marked in  the  f ie ld
of so c ia l and p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv i ty ,  where simple b e l i e f  is  re in fo rced  by id eo lo g ica l
commitment* The studen t who remarked " In  sc ie n c e , i f  the  evidence c o n f l ic ts  w ith
the th eo ry , one r e je c t s  the tb eo ry ; in  the s o c ia l  sc iences one r e je c t s  the  
8evidence!" was c e r ta in ly  exaggerating* Yet the te n a c i ty  w ith  which th e o r ie s  are
re ta in ed  i n  sp ite  of c o n f lic tin g  evidence does seem much more marked in  th a t
a c t iv i ty  than  i t  does in  the more a u s te re  discip3.ino of science* P rofessor Peter
Bauer pointed to  the  h e a r t  of the problem by explaining th a t  "VJlien a p ro p o s itio n
9is  held as an artic3.e o f fat-th , the evidence bcomes i r r e le v a n t"*
l o
P rofessor B auer's th e s is  a ffo rd s  a good exanple of trea tm en t of the 
evidence. His claims concerning the e f f ic ie n c y  of overseas development aid a re  
both  con ten tious and co n tro v e rs ia l « bheiher he is  c o rre c t or in c o rre c t  in  h is 
a s s e r t io n  th a t  overseas deveJ-opment aid  is  u se le ss  as a pro motor of growth, and 
a c tu a lly  does the r e c ip ie n t  country more harm th a ï good , can h a rd ly  be considered 
in  any d e t a i l  h e re in ; bu t h is  comments on the way in  vhich ev id a ice  i s  rece ived  
are h ig h ly  re levan t*  His claim  i s  th a t  because the proponents of overseas 
develooment aid are  committed to  a b e l i e f  in  i t s  e f f ic ie n c y , then evidence of 
economic growth by the r e c ip ie n t i s  talc en as proof th a t  i t  works, vhereas evidence 
of la ck  o f  gra-xth i s  taken  as proof th a t  more aid i s  needed* The " aid brigade" 
win every tim e, whether the co in  f a l l s  heads or t a i l s .  I f ,  in stead  of being 
held  as an a r t i c l e  of f a i th ,  the view concerning th e  e f f ic ie n c y  of a id  were 
advanced as a s c ie n t i f ic - ty p e  of p ro p o s itio n , with i t s  re te n tio n  œ  r e je c t io n
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depending upon toe r e s u l t s  o f t r ia l ,  s ,  B auer's  d a im  is  th a t  the a d d  enc e would
have led  us to  d iscard  i t*  Whether or no t he i s  c o r re c t  in  th is  a s s e r t io n , he
is  c e r ta in ly  r ig h t to  p o in t out th a t m th  c u r re n t trea tm ent of toe evidence, th e  
claim  concerning th e  e f f ic ie n c y  of aid in  s tim u la tin g  growth i.s not put a t  r isk  in  
any t r i a l  w hatsoevor; th a t  th e re  i s  no event to ic h  could occur th a t  might lead  us 
to  i t s  m od ifica tion  or re jec tio n *
I f  a p ro p o s itio n  is  held as an a r t i c l e  of fa ith  i n  aich a way th a t  no
evidence could conceivably  lead  to  i t s  change or abandonm nt, then  in so fa r  as
i t  o p era tes  w ith in  our tw o-part equation  o f p ro g re ss , i t  d i f f e r s  i n  no viise from
an imte s tab le  p ro p o s it i  on* I f  the ev idaice  i s  indeed i r r e le v a n t ,  then  toe
p ro p o s itio n  cannot be te s te d  com paratively  aga iiB t r i v a l  or co u n te r-p ro p o s itio n s ,
and i t  cannot, th e re fo re , be of any a s s is ta n c e  towards progress* Wtien the  evi.dence
is  ignored or re je c te d  out of a d e s ire  to re ta i.n  the  th e o ry , then we a re  no longei’
11engaged in  the  a c t iv i ty  of s o c ia l  p ro g ress .
Not only is  i t  im portant to a t  th e  evidence of th e  r e  ax I t s  of p roposals
be av a ilab le  fo r  in sp e c tio n  u n re s tr ic te d  and unco ni. used, but i t  i s  \dLtal to a t
th e re  should be p r e s a i t  toe c a p a b il i ty  of evaluating  a], t e r  n a tiv e  adiievemsnt le v e ls
and of c r i t i c i s in g  p rev a ilin g  p rac tices*  toe formal freedom to  c r i t i c i s e  w i l l  be
of no value to  p ro g ress iud.ess i t  i s  accompanied by con d itio n s c a lc u la te d  to
in c u lc a te  the  p ro p en sity  to ex e rc ise  c r i t i c a l  f a c u l t ie s .  A so c ie ty  which has no
concept of a l te r n a t iv e s ,  e i th e r  of achievenent or o f p ra c tic e s , w i l l  not engage
in  c r i t ic is m  of i t s  own ways, I t  i s  toe sp ec tac le  of d if fé re n t ways of doing
th in g s which lead s on to c r i t ic is m  and in n o v a tio n . The dictum of hie E ighteenth
Century r a t io n a l i s t s  t h a t  "Knowledge i s  freedom" expresses the simple tru ism  t h a t
choice cannot talce p la ce  i n  toe absence o f a l t e r m t lv e s .  to ile  freedom to s e le c t
between toe choices av a ila b le  to th o u t the a rb i t r a ry  im position  of a n o th e r 's  w i l l
12.should not be confused w ith ex to rs io n s  to  the range of ch oic es a v a ila b le , i t  i s
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c o r re c t  to  recogn ise  th a t freedom can only be exercised  through cho ice , and i s  
V alueless w ithout i t*  The more d io ices  toe re are av a ilab le , the more valuable 
does freedom become. The E ighteenth Century r a t io n a l i s t s  recognised  th a t  knoiiLedge 
b rin g s  vzith i t  an awareness o f av a ila b le  a l to rn a t iv e s ,  and can thus put substance 
in to  th e  empty s h e l l  of a form al freedom*
VJhen a so c ie ty  i s  uniform , and in su la te d  from ex tern a l c o n ta c t, i t s  ways 
of doing th in g s  are  seen as th e  ways o f doing tliin g s , nob as one group of p ra c t ic e s  
aiiiong many a lte rn a tiv e s*  The t r a d i t io n s  of an in su la te d  soc to t  y a re  n o t seen as 
chosen a l te r n a t iv e s ,  but as necessary  p rac tices*  I t  takes c o n tra s t  w ith  o ther ways 
fo r  ex is tin g  ways to be recognised  as ways. The in h a b ita n ts  o f an is lan d  do not 
recognise  i t  as an is la n d  u n t i l  they have seen other is la n d s ; i t  ta k e s  two of an 
o b jec t before one of them re q u ire s  a name * In  a u n iverse  co n sis ti.rg  of naught b u t 
b lue spheres, th e re  would be no no tio n  of b lueness or s p h e r ic ity ; only m th  the  
in tro d u c tio n  of something l ik e  a red cube would the re  corns the  rec o g n itio n  th a t  
every th ing  e lse  was b lue  and sp h e r ic a l , as  w ell as m erely ' t h e r e ' .
The lack  of p rogress i n  sh e lte re d  s o c ie t ie s  happens p a r tly  because of the 
la c k  of ex te rn a l examples of a tta in m en t, p a r t ly  th raigh  la ck  of ap p rec ia tio n  th a t 
th e re  could be a l te rn a tiv e s .  The ty p ic a l in su la te d  socie'ty is no t marked by 
p ro g ress , b u t by the  ru le  of. the  t r ib a l  law, the r i t u a l  aid th e  taboo* Only when 
the members of such a so c ie ty  come in to  con tact with members of a l te r n a t iv e  c u ltu re  
do they begin to  ap p rec ia te  th a t what toey thcugh t of as in e v ita b le  ways were only 
v iable a l te rn a t iv e s .  Quite p o ss ib ly  t ie  i n i t i a l  r e a c t io n  to  such an encounter 
might be marked by d isg u s t and horro r at th e  apparen tly  'unnatu ra l,' p ra c t ic e s  
engaged in  by other s o c ie t i e s ,  bu t th e re  fo3-lajs the r e a l i s a t io n  th a t o ther 
s o c ie tie s  seem to  achieve what they regard  as adequate r e s u l t s  vi.a a l te rn a tiv e  
p rac tice s*  In ev ita b ly  there comes com parison. Even i f  th e  man exposed to  
c u l tu ra l  co n tac t fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e opts for h is am  ways, th e  decisi.on is  now a
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conscious one, not an unth inking  acceptance* iJhat has been accepted as n a tu ra l 
and in e v ita b le  now begins to  be evaluated  in  terms of the a ids achieved* People 
begin to  th in k  in  term s of incorpŒ ’atin g  p r a c t ic e s  from other s o c ie t ie s  i n  order 
to improve th e i r  own, and c r i t ic is m  is  bom*
The s tag es  by which an is o la te d  so c ie ty  i s  transform ed by c u ltu ra l 
co n tac t in to  a c r i t i c a l  and improving one can be described  by the psychological 
steps which are  tslcen* Contact le ad s  to  a p p re c ia tio n  of ^ t e r n a t iv e s ;  co n s id e ra tlc  
of aHrbernatives lead s  to  comparison; comparison lead s to ev a lu a tio n ; ev a lu a tio n  to  
c r i t ic is m ; c r i t ic is m  to  improvement. .It is  but a sh o r t step  from the c o n s id e ra tio r  
of actual, a l te rn a t iv e s  to  the p o s tu la t io n  of h y p o th e tica l ones; from proposing 
the adoption of p ra c t ic e s  to ic h  p re v a i l  e lse ih e re , to  th e  suggestion  of p ra c t ic e s  
which e x is t  only in  the im agination . The s tep  from em ulation to innovation  i s  a ’ 
sh o rt one fo r  those minds equipped to  take  i t ;  and i t  i s  from the c r o s s - f e r t i l l s a t i  
of c u l tu re s  in  co n tac t hi a t  we can expect th e  development o f such mind s* The 
awareness of a l te rn a t iv e s  i s  a to ta l  in g red ien t for ihe developrrent of th e  c r i t i c a l  
amd c re a tiv e  mental.ity* I t  i s  a p re re q u is i te  of p ro g re ss .
Any co n s id e ra tio n  of th e  optimum conditions which can be app lied  to  
a s s i s t  th e  development of p ro g ress must th e re fo re  ta k e  account of the value of 
c u l tu ra l  co n tac t w ith otlier .soc ie ties*  V.liere th e re  i s  th e  a b i l i t y ,  both te c h n ic a l 
and le  g a l, to  v i s i t  a lien  c u ltu re s , to receive v i s i to r s  from them , to  read about 
o ther s o c ie t ie s  and to  in v e s tig a te  a sp ec ts  concerning them, Ihen th e re  vzill be 
circum stances p re v a ilin g  of th e  type witoch must be p resen t i f  c r i t ic is m  and 
in v en tiv e  proposal a re  to be promoted.
An in sp e c tio n  of human h is to ry  itoth to is  i n  mind shows th a t  those societ-' 
which have made fu r th e r  and fa s te r  p ro g ress  towards th e  fu lfllX m ent of th e  
aims of th e i r  c i t iz e n s  have been th o se  toiich were p laced  in  circum stances of 
expanded co n tac t w ith other cu ltu re s*  Every sp u rt of human achievement which has
13 204-
been found dram atic eiKxigh to be given the name of a 'R enaissance ' or an
' E nllflitenm ent' can be traced  back to the  p o in t a t  wliich a com paratively  in su la te d
so c ie ty  suddenly found i t s e l f  i n  su s ta j,æ d  aid f a r  -reaching c o n ta c t m th  o th e r
cu ltu res*  I t  i s  th e  Athenians vrith  h ie ir  ship-borne c u l tu ra l  f r o n t i e r  who wa
remember for th e i r  p ro g re ss , not the Spartans w ith th e ir  i s o la te d  and t r ib a l  i s  t i c
so c ie ty . I t  i s  the I ta l i a n s  m th  to e ir  merchant p rin ces  who we remember for the
beginnings of th e  Renaissance in  Europe* I t  is  the Eiij^ish m th  th e i r  to ip s  \ho
produced the c u l tu ra l  advances of th e  f i r s t  E lizabethan  age* I t  i s  the S co ts ,
suddenly dragged from com parative i s o la t io n  by the union with England, who made
such leap s w ith in  a s in g le  g en era tio n  th a t t ie  term "Scobttoh Eitolghtenment" has
been coined to  describe the  p r o l i f e r a t io n  o f  genius*
I t  would appear th a t  we are w itiB ssing  here one of th e  genera l (and
te s ta b le )  s o c io -h is to r ic a l  laws re fe rre d  to  in  Chapter I t  seems reasonable to
propose th a t  p rogress is  made d ram a tica lly  by th o se  s o c ie t ie s  which change from a
r e la t iv e ly  is o la te d  p o s it io n  to  one in  which they have great).y in c reased  access to
14other cu ltu res*  Oust as th e  American h is to r ia n  F rederick  Jackson Turner proposed 
th a t  i t  was co n tac t m th  the f ro n t ie r  which l e d European s e t t l e r s  "to adopt the  
s a l ie n t  c h a ra c te r i s t ic s  of an American c u ltu re , so i t  is  proposed here th a t  th e re  
i s  a psychological equ ivalen t of the American f ro n tie r  i n  c irc u n s ta n c es of sudden 
c u ltu ra l  contact* This ‘c u ltu ra l  f r o n t i e r '  b rin g s  m th  i t  th e  a p p re c ia tio n  of 
a l te r n a t iv e s ,  the comparison, the ev a lu a tio n , t ie  c r i t i c is m  and th e  c re a t iv e  
im agination  which are the halDjnarks o f a p r  ogres s i iTg society* the re  as th e  American 
f ro n tie r  bred s e 3 f- re lia n c e , so c ia l e g a lita r ia n is m , re sp e c t fo r  dem ocratic v a lu es , 
and an easy c la s s  m o b ility , so the c u ltu ra l f ro n tie r  breeds c r i t i c a l ,  innovating  
and decision-m aking man * These a re  th e  very c h a ra c te r i s t ic s  requ ired  f o r  th e  
su ccessfu l and e f f ic ie n t  o p e ra tio n  of toe equation  of progress*
Hi zos
I t  i s  ev id en t, th en , th a t  so c ie ty  can e x e r t conscious c o n tro l over even 
such an in ta n g ib le  phenomenon as the c re a tiv e  im agination* Without f u l ly  under s ta r  
ing i t s  source, th e re  can be a p p re c ia tio n  of th e  conditions under which i t  a r i s e s ,  
and d e l ib e ra te  a c tio n  to  in s td .tu te  and to m aintain  those cond itions * These 
cond itions inc lude a wide access to the p ra c tic e s  and ideas of o ther s o c ie t ie s ,  and 
a f re e  exchange of in fo rm ation  w ith them* I t  i s  a kind of plural.ism o f  th e  
in te rn a tio n a l community* U n til now, we have been concerned w bh s o c ie t i e s ,  and 
w ith  groups and in d iv id u a ls  in  so c ie tie s*  But the  th o le  human race  may be 
considered as a kind of s o c ie ty , t-âth in d iv id u a l na tions and c u ltu re s  making up the
groups w ith in  i t*  (hat we found to  be tru e  fo r  an in d iv id u a l so c ie ty  wi'th i t s
in te rn a l  experim enting groups need be no le s s  tru e  fo r  toe in te rn a tio n a l community 
of man* We can say of th a t  community, as  we said  of an in d iv id u a l so c ie ty , th a t  
p rogress tv il l  be made i f  th e re  i s  v a r ie ty  i n  i t s  p ra c t ic e s  and f re e  passage of 
in fo rm ation  between toe d if fe re n t  groups * The req u ired  cond itions fo r  p ro g re ss  
on the sm all scale apply no l e s s  on the world scale* N ations and c u ltu re s  may 
emulate su ccessfu l examples elsew here, ju s t  a s  in d iv id u a ls  and groups may copy 
su ccessfu l innovato rs w ith in  a so c ie ty ; and the same freedoms a re  requ ired  i f  the 
process is  to  operate  e f f ic ie n tly *  The m or e tha t t ie  se conditions p re v a i l  over toe
in te rn a tio n a l  community of n a tio n s , the more does each in d iv id u a l cu ltu re  stand to
gain from i t s  co n tac t with the o th e rs . I t  has been argued th a t  world peace w i l l  be 
.u n lik e ly  u n t i l  more uniform  in s t i tu t io n s  aiü  p ra c t ic e s  a re  e s ta b lish e d  under a 
world government. This m y be t r u e ,  but we shm ld raiiember t h e ‘o th e r side  of th e  
co in , and ap p rec ia te  th a t  i t  i s  the  very d iv e r s i ty  of a l te rn a t iv e  and competing 
c u l tu ra l  p ra c t ic e s  which provi.des such an im portant in g re d ie n t of p ro g ress  towards 
the achievement of human ends*
This in sp e c tio n  of tlie cond itions ap p ro p ria te  to th e  most e f f ic ie n t  
o p era tio n  of toe  equation  of p ro g ress  le a d s  us f in a l ly  to p o s tu la te  what s o r t  o f
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so c ie ty  i t  w i l l  be t h a t  w i l l  c o n s t i tu te  the optimum soc ie ty  for p ro g re ss . I t  t o l l  
be, f i r s t  and forem ost, what can be c a lle d  a 'f r e e '  s o c ie ty . I t s  le g a l  framework 
and in s t i tu t io n s  must be such th a t  th e re  i s  freedom to e v a lu a te , to  c r i t i c i s e ,  to  
comment upon the value o f e s ta b lish e d  p r a c t ic e s .  There must be freedom, to o , to  
propose a l te r n a t iv e s ,  to  sp ecu la te  concerning possib le improvements. There must 
n e c e ss a r ily  be a la rg e  measure of l i b e r t y  granted to to ose too  would to sh  to 
innovate in  so c ia l behaviour, to  experiment to th  proposed l i f e - s t y l e s .  I t  must 
be a to le ra n t  so c ie ty , as w ell as a fo rm ally  f re e  one, s in ce  so c ia l p ressu res  can 
be as e f fe c t iv e  as le  gal in te r d ic t s  in  p ra h ib it i i '^  th e  te s tin g  of a l te r n a t iv e s .  I t  
probably foU-ars from th is  th a t  i t  must be a s tab le  so c ie ty , even i f  toe s t a b i l i t y  
derives from a commitment to gradual improvement. From our observa tions concerning 
toe ro le  of custom and t r a d i t io n ,  i t  may be seen th a t to le ra n ce  comes more re a d ily  
from a so c ie ty  which does not f e e l  th re a te n e d . Almost c e r ta in ly  i t  must be a 
dem ocratic so c ie ty  -  meaning th a t  the re m ust a t  l e a s t  be p ro v is io n  for the peaceluD. 
replacement of the ru lin g  group from time to tim e, even :lf i t  is  n o t one in-w hich 
the "w ill of th e  people" p rev a ils  in  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e *
Above a l l ,  such a so c ie ty  would be ch a ra c te rised  by i t s  p lu ra lism  and 
by i t s  d if fu s io n  of power. I t  would be marked by th e  presence of a v a r ie ty  of 
so c ia l a t t i tu d e s  and p ra c t ic e s  being te s te d  sim ultaneously  by d if f e r e n t  groups, and 
by th e  absence of any kind of monopoly c o n tro l  over the d issem ination  of inform ation 
P u ttin g  th is  in  p o l i t i c a l  language, we might t a lk  in  term s of a f re e  p ress  and 
p u b lish in g  in d u s try , w ith  widespread and d iv erse  co n tro l over communications 
media. Contact w ith  other c u ltu re s  would be r e la t iv e ly  u n r e s t r ic te d ,  w ith i t s  
c i t iz e n s  f re e  to  tr a v e l  abroad, to rece iv e  v is i to r s  from abroad, and to read 
fo re ign  m a te ria l and l i s t e n  to  fo re ign  rad io  s ta tio n s . We are ta lk in g  alxjut a 
so c ie ty  which has a t  l e a s t  some of the c h a ra c te r i s t ic s  o f the "Democracy" so 
c a s tig a te d  by P la to  i n  h is  ranking order of s ta te s  i n  th e ir  various phases of
16 ■ 2 o r
degeneration . But from the p o in t of view of progress towards the fu lf i l lm e n t of 
man's aims, the so c ie ty  i s  considerab ly  more a t t r a c t iv e  than P la to 's  a l te rn a t iv e s .  
The s ta te  of th is  "optimum so c ie ty  for progress" can be summarised 
e f fe c t iv e ly  by saying th a t  i t  must be one which recognises th e  value of te s te d  
p ro p o sa ls , and which makes i t s  dec isio n s on the b a s is  of t e s t  r e s u l t s .  Then there  
w il l  always be preserved the grounds fo r comparison of a l te rn a t iv e  p ro p o sa ls , and 
the 'g rounds for making dec isions on the b a s is  of th a t comparison.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 9
1, This is an idea developed from J.S.Mill by P.AoHayek, though its roots are older, as the quotation from Milton shows. Hayek quotes F.SCHILLER,"On the Aesthetic Education of îvîan", as saying, "kîan must have his freedom to be ready for morality,"
2, JOHN MILTON, "Areopagitica".
3* F.A*Hayek, "The Constitution of Liberty" (1960).
4* HERBERT klARCUSE, "A Critique of Pure Tolerance" (with R.P.VfOLFP andBARRINGTON MOORE),( 196?).
This is a reference to the lines in Milton's "Areopagitica","Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?"Popper attacks Milton's idea of 'manifest* truth in his essay "On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance" (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963)
6, Edmund Burke, 1729“1797*
7, Popper attacks what he calls "holistic social experiments" in section 24of his "Poverty of Historicism" (l957)<*
8, I am indebted to Mr, Athol 1 D. Robert son for this remark.
9* A comment made in the BBC "Controversy" television programme which featured Professor Bauer in September,1972.
10. PETER BARER, "Dissent and Development", "Two Views on Overseas Aid", "Development Economicss The Spurious Consensus" and other works.
11. Nor are we en^ged in the acquisition of loiowledge.
12. Hayek discusses the various types of freedoms in his "Constitution of Liberty", and the point is explored further by FRITZ MAGHLUP in his essay "Liberalism and the Choice of Freedoms" ("Roads to Freedom", edited by Erich Streissler, 1969)0
13* The point (and the example) are from BERNARD MAYO's "The Logic of Personality" (1952).
14. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, "The Frontier in American History" (1920, but based on essays of the 1890sj
15* Described by DANIEL J.BOORSTIM in "The Americans? 1, The Colonial Experience (1958)
16. In Plato's "Republic", bk.VIII.
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